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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an exploration of the relationship between the understanding of the 
past and the practice of theology. It is built around three major case studies: the history of 
interpretation of the commandment to blot out the memory of Amalek (Deuteronomy 
25:17-19), the commemoration of the First World War in Canada, and the development of 
post-Holocaust theology. Linking these cases are issues of theological response to (or 
justification for) violence, and tensions between individual and collective identity. 
Part I focuses on Deuteronomy 25:17-19, and the internal contradiction between 
the commandments to remember and blot out the memory of Amalek. The passage is 
analysed both in terms of language and reception history, with special attention paid to 
Rabbinic interpretations from the 19th and 20th centuries (sermons and commentaries 
generated during or immediately after the German Reform movement, the American Civil 
War, and the Nazi occupation of Poland). This reading prompts two further strands of 
analysis, which are pursued separately: the distinction between the remembering 
commanded in the passage and concepts of memory active in the Western philosophical 
tradition prior to the 20th century, and the place this passage has in a larger tradition of 
religious and secular discourse on acceptable justifications for violence, again in both 
Jewish and more broadly Western thought.  
Part II takes up these themes, beginning with an historically contextualised reading 
of two versions of Antigone—one written by Sophocles in the early days of the Athenian 
Empire, and the other by Jean Anouilh during the Second World War. Both of these focus 
on a dead body as the site of ideological contestation between divergent identity 
narratives—a conflict that is also apparent in negotiations over the memorialisation of the 
First World War, which is the main focus of this part. A close reading of novels from L. M. 
Montgomery‘s Anne of Green Gables series, published before, during, and just after the war 
reveals that the First World War partly destabilised the individual-focused structures of 
memorialisation that were in place prior to its beginning, in favour of structures which 
enforced the collective identity of the soldiers who died in the war; while much of this 
instability could be (and was) addressed in existing theological language, the war 
nevertheless left a mark on Canadian society and religious practice. This part concludes 
with an examination of the Canadian National Monument at Vimy, conducted via archival 
documentation of the monument‘s design and construction and then through a reading of 
The Stone Carvers, a recent novel which re-imagines the circumstances documented in the 
archives through the eyes of one war veteran and his family. This dual reading also 
demonstrates the instability of memorials, the tendency of their meaning to shift over time. 
Part III commences with a discussion of the shift in memorial forms precipitated 
by the Holocaust. I contend that the tendency to memorialise the Holocaust with complex 
museum narratives betrays an anxiety about the intended audience of these memorials, 
which points in turn to the degree to which the Holocaust upset previous cultural and 
religious worldviews. This section focuses on theological and literary attempts to record 
and respond to the ruptures caused by the Holocaust, with specific reference to two recent 
novels by Jewish Candian women which, taken together, provide a constructive 
interruption to overly tidy narratives of national and religious identity.
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NOTES ON THE TEXT 
 
References to texts typically cited by line or paragraph (such as Sophocles‘ Antigone 
or the Mishnah Torah) include, for ease of referencing, both the standard citation and the 
specific page of the edition I have used. 
The abbreviation A&P is used for volumes of The Acts & Proceedings of the General 
Assembly of The Presbyterian Church in Canada. 
  
PRELUDE
  
his thesis is about memorialisation—not about memory itself, but about the 
process of constructing cultural memory, about the negotiation, implicit or 
explicit, between what is remembered, transmuted into narrative, handed on 
from generation to generation, and what is forgotten, unspoken, overlooked. My 
underlying assumption is that the understanding of the past generated by such a process 
plays an essential role in shaping attitudes and actions of individuals and societies in the 
present. This understanding (‗memory‘) is at times difficult to distinguish from the process 
of its formation (‗memorialisation‘); the former is often the only evidence that may be 
found of the latter. That the two concepts blur together in discourse heightens the need for 
clarity on this point. The process of memorialisation is never complete; memory is not set 
in stone—it is constantly open to re-negotiation, and ‗reading backwards‘—an insertion of 
more recent understanding and experience into discourse about the past. This is discussed 
more fully in my first chapter.1 
This thesis is about ‗Jewish Theology‘, itself a contested term.2 Jewish theology is not, 
in spite of the insistence of the multitude of first-year papers which have graced my desk 
over the past two years, ‗words about God‘ or ‗language about God‘, nor, in Phyllis Tickle‘s 
more elegant formulation, ‗God-talk‘, nor even, in the classic definition put forth by 
Anselm, ‗faith seeking understanding‘, carried out from a Jewish perspective.3 Or, rather, it 
is not simply this. ‗Theology‘ is a word that falls far more naturally from a Christian tongue; 
the notion of Jewish theology is, by itself, a form of syncretism, Judaism being, in general, 
far more inclined towards praxis (or halachah) than logos (there is no Hebrew word that quite 
approximates the range of meanings that adhere to logos).4 Robert G. Goldy has observed 
that, ‗[h]istorically, Jewish theology has arisen at times when the Jewish people lived in, and 
were able to freely interact with, a highly developed non-Jewish culture‘; he goes on to 
argue that such an enterprise did not emerge in America until after the Second World 
                                                                                                                                               
1   An example of reading backwards is brought forward by Nicola King, in the introduction to her book 
Memory, Narrative, Identity: Remembering the Self (Edinburgh University Press, 2000), when she describes a 
Holocaust survivor recounting his experience, constantly punctuated by the insertion of the claim ‗he 
didn‘t know that then‘—understanding he acquired after the fact was so intimately bound up in his 
memory of what he did experience that he could not separate the two in his recounting. King writes that 
‗[h]is memory of that moment seems to have been deeply affected by what he didn‘t know at the time of 
the event: what he also has to remember is the painful fact of his own ignorance‘ (p. 1). 
2  Although not so contested that Louis Jacobs was compelled to include any introductory or explanatory 
note in his volume Judaism and Theology: Essays on the Jewish Religion (Valentine Mitchell, 2005).  
3  Phyllis Tickle, God-Talk in America (The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1998); Daniel L. Migliore, Faith 
Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991) 
2. 
4  See, for example, Robert G. Goldy, The Emergence of Jewish Theology in America (Indiana University Press, 
1990) 9-12. 
T 
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War—although he admits its existence in ‗ancient Alexandria, medieval Spain, and modern 
Germany‘.5 
Nevertheless, Jewish theology has emerged, in the United States and elsewhere in the 
English-speaking world, and it has, indeed, done so in conversation with Christianity; a 
brief survey of the books on my shelf which identify themselves as ‗Jewish Theology‘ show 
them to be produced almost entirely by authors who have some academic background in 
Christian academic theology.6 Amost all the self-identified Jewish theologians whose works 
currently inhabit my office shelf either have received an education from, or hold an 
academic post at, a department historically associated with some branch of Protestant 
Christianity: Judith Plaskow, Melissa Raphael, Ellen Umansky, David Blumenthal, Eugene 
Borowitz.7 My own experience as a student in a department with a predominantly Christian 
history and intellectual culture suggests that, in such circumstances, theology is a privileged 
discourse, and the ability to speak its language carries rewards in the degree of seriousness 
with which one‘s work is considered, which may encourage this sort of linguistic 
syncretism, the quest to apply words like ‗theology‘ and ‗liturgy‘ to a religious system in 
which they are applicable metaphorically, rather than historically.8 I maintain, however, that 
such metaphorical connections are potentially productive; they function, as Paul Ricoeur 
suggests, to underline both similarity and difference, holding them in tension against one 
another, creating a space in which understanding of both concepts being connected can be 
‗shattered‘ and rebuilt.9 
Jewish theology is, as I understand it via Goldy, contextual theology: it arises out of 
and responds to a specific intercultural milieu; its questions and answers arise from the 
encounter between Judaism and something other than Judaism.10 It may contribute 
questions and insights back to Judaism-in-other-contexts, or even religion-in-other-
                                                                                                                                               
5  Goldy 7. 
6  In fact, the only two possible exceptions to this are Louis Jacobs and Rachel Adler, neither of whose 
biography is sufficiently known to me for a definitive statement to be made either way. 
7  This is not meant to be an exhaustive list. 
8  Liturgy and Theology are the two ‗borrowed‘ words which I use most often in this thesis. Both have the 
virtue of referring to an enterprise engaged in by the same people who study it: ‗theology‘ from an 
outsider perspective, insofar as such a proposition is coherent at all, is ‗religious studies‘, and ‗liturgy‘ done 
in a context one does not oneself recognise as liturgical becomes ‗ritual‘.  
9  Paul Ricoeur, ‗Word, Polysemy, Metaphor: Creativity in Language‘ in A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection & 
Imagination, ed. Mario. J. Valdés, 65-85 (University of Toronto Press, 1991) 80-81, 85. 
10  ‗Contextual theology‘ originated in the 1970s as an African, Asian, and South American Christian 
response against the universalist claims of European theology; for an overview of its historical 
development, see Sigurd Bergmann, God in context: a survey of contextual theology (Ashgate, 2003). I am 
familiar with the term from the work of the Canadian Protestant theologian Douglas John Hall, who 
acknowledges that ‗[t]he term ―contextual theology‖ is [...] a tautology‘, since all theology arises from a 
cultural context; he argues that an acknowledgement of context is as important for those who write from a 
privileged (economically stable, European-descended) background as for those who write from an 
historically disadvantaged position—see Douglas John Hall, Thinking the Faith: Christian Theology in a North 
American Context (Fortress Press, 1991) 69. 
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contexts—indeed, it may even begin with, or acquire, the aim of influencing global 
Judaism, but historical hindsight informs later generations that its causes began with the 
local and particular. By drawing attention to the contextual nature of theology, I am also 
endeavouring to write with consciousness of my own situatedness in a specific historical 
and cultural context, and the influence that context has on my own work. 
 I write, then, having been trained under the supervision of an Anglican priest, in a 
department of Theology and Religious Studies with historic ties to the Church of Scotland, 
and with a previous educational background in Catholic theology, acquired under the 
supervision of a feminist theologian with Mennonite roots (and panentheist leanings)—as 
well as an undergraduate degree in studio art; my previous training in both art and feminist 
theology has played a role in my selection of source material for this study. This thesis is 
not precisely about gender, but gender—especially gendered divisions between public and 
domestic spaces—is a distinct theme in much of the material with which I engage, and this 
is reflected in my close readings. I write as a Canadian, though, like many Canadians, one 
who has spent considerable time living abroad, in both the United States and Europe. All 
of these circumstances mark my academic work; I have occasionally described this thesis as 
an intersection between Jewish and Canadian studies, and a significant portion of its 
subtext is an essay in drawing lines between Christian and Jewish modes of discourse—
although these are more often than not lines in the sand, attempts to pin down and 
separate two enormous, ever-shifting, deeply entwined cultural systems and make a definite 
statement about both of them at once. My major concern is to discover whether, and how, 
the context in which I write might offer a productive intervention into the field of Jewish 
Studies, how theological education carried out in primarily Christian terms can be brought 
to enrich a religious understanding of Judaism, and how national and religious cultural 
understanding might interact.  
This thesis is about identity. Memory and individual identity are closely linked; we are 
what we remember as much as we are anything else. This is apparent when philosophers of 
identity theorize scenarios such as the transplant of one person‘s memory into another‘s 
body—the term for such a scenario in science fiction is the ‗body swap‘, which is to say 
that we speak of Rachel inhabiting Leah‘s body, rather than Leah acquiring Rachel‘s brain 
or personality; the locus of identity in such a scenario is with the consciousness, rather than 
the body.11 At the same time, an amnesiac is a person who has ‗lost their memory‘, not an 
entirely new person; memory is not the sole criterion which determines identity. Nor is 
identity shaped just by personal experience, but also by the complex of stories—history, 
                                                                                                                                               
11  See, for example, Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Cornell University Press, 1996) 16-17.  
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folk tales, other people‘s memories—which surround individuals and help them to locate 
themselves within their socio-cultural milieu. Ricoeur argues that ‗we never cease to 
reinterpret the narrative identity that constitutes us, in light of the narratives proposed to us 
by our culture‘.12 In other words, such stories (which I will define in my first chapter as 
components of ‗cultural memory‘) do not simply inform people about past events, they 
provide models from which one might learn how to perform the ‗-ness‘ of group identity—
Canadianness, Jewishness.13 
This thesis is about imagination, which refers to both ‗the power or capacity to 
form internal images of objects or ideas not actually present to the senses, including 
remembered objects‘ and the activity of the mind exercising this capacity.14 Sidra Ezrahi has 
written that  
what is ―remembered‖ is of course also imagined, as mimesis takes on the 
authority and license of memory and memory becomes an article of faith. 
In its most radical form, memory and imagination describe a circularity that 
promotes an aesthetics of the whole.15 
Memorials, the vehicles constructed to convey cultural memory from one generation to the 
next, depend upon imagination: they stem from the imagination of their creators, and act 
on the imagination of those who encounter them. This is true of each of the sub-types of 
memorial with which I am concerned here. Monuments invite the visitor into a physical 
                                                                                                                                               
12  Paul Ricoeur, ‗Life in Quest of Narrative‘, trans. David Wood, On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, 
ed. David Wood, 20-33 (Routledge, 1991) 32.   
13  See also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities , revised edition (Verso, 1991). 
  I realise that, in this thesis, I tend to treat Canadianness and Jewishness as identities which oppose 
one another, rather than overlap or inform each other; there is very little said in these pages about the 
condition of being at once both Jewish and Canadian. In part, this is a function of the texts from which I 
am working—Montgomery‘s sole reference to Judaism in the Anne books is the immigrant Jewish peddler 
who sells Anne Shirley the dye which turns her hair green, in Anne of Green Gables (1908; repr., Puffin 
Classics, 1994) 260-261; Urquhart has nothing to say about Jews at all, and both Michaels and Ravel, while 
distinctively Canadian authors, portray Jewishness and immigrant status as interlocking conditions—
although Ravel is concerned with children of the second generation; more than any of the other authors 
in this study, she begins to portray Jewish-Candianness. In part, this is simply a feature of the exilic 
character of Jewish identity, as André Aciman has suggested: ‗we are always from elsewhere, and from 
elsewhere before that‘ Aciman, ‗In a Double Exile‘, False Papers: Essays on Exile and Memory, 107-110 
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000) 109; see also Arnold M. Eisen, Galut: Modern Jewish Reflection on 
Homelsessness and Homecoming (Indiana University Press, 1986); Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, Booking Passage: Exile 
and Homecoming in the Modern Jewish Imagination (University of California Press, 2000) esp. 3-23; and the 
essays in Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ed., The Writer Uprooted: Contemporary Jewish Exile Literature (Indiana 
University Press, 2008). In part, this is the result of a still-lingering ambivalence about exactly what 
constitutes Canadianness—as Margaret Atwood has observed, the Canadian immigrant novel does not 
follow the pattern typical of the American immigrant novel: ‗First, Canada does not demand a leap into 
the melting pot […] Secondly, if [the immigrant] does wipe away his [sic] ethnic origin, there is no new 
―Canadian‖ identity for him to step into: he is confronted only by a nebulosity, a blank‘; see Atwood, 
Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature (Anansi Press, 1972) 150. However, the reader should not 
take from this the impression that Canadianness and Jewishness are entirely irreconcilable; the novels of 
Mordecai Richler provide an excellent starting point for correcting any such misapprehension—but 
Richler belongs to a very different study than the one I am engaged in here and now. 
14  Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. ‗imagination‘. 
15  Ezrahi 9. 
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space, but within that space one encounters images (and sometimes text) which prompt the 
construction of a mental picture of the events and lives represented therein.16 Narrative 
invites the reader into a space that is not physical, but nonetheless real, as Ricoeur insists:  
To speak of a world of the text is to stress the feature belonging to every 
literary work of opening before it a horizon of possible experience, a world 
in which it would be possible to live […] To appropriate a work through 
reading is to unfold the world horizon implicit in it17 
This unfolding, like the reconstruction of events represented by a monument, takes place 
primarily in the reader‘s mind; it is a work of the imagination. The barrier between fiction 
and memory is more permeable than one might expect; both are constructions. This also 
holds true for the third category of memorial I consider, liturgy. 
 Liturgy, and especially Jewish liturgy, as I discuss more fully in my concluding 
chapter, has historically been considered to be a type of text which describes a public 
performance of worship.18 Neither the text nor its performance is imaginary—and, indeed, 
some might take offence at such a characterization19—however, the space which they 
construct for participants is imaginative. The many variations on the Passover Seder, for 
example, are carefully constructed to guide participants through an imaginative 
reconstruction of the Exodus, so that each participant might ‗regard him or herself as if he 
or she had come out of Egypt‘.20 Likewise, the Ne‟ilah service on Yom Kippur is dominated 
by the image of the worshippers standing at the gates of heaven, pleading for admittance; 
the worshippers, in fact, pray as though they are at those gates, they imagine themselves in 
that space just as the participants at Passover imagine themselves as slaves in Egypt.21 The 
imaginative space of liturgy differs from that of narrative in that it is a shared space; liturgy 
is primarily a communal endeavour.22 However, liturgical space functions in a similar 
                                                                                                                                               
16  See especially my discussion in the chapter entitled ‗Making Memory Solid‘. 
17  Ricoeur, ‗Life in Quest of Narrative‘ 26. 
18  See Lawrence A. Hoffman, Beyond the Text: A Holistic Approach to Liturgy (Indiana University Press, 1987) 
1-3. 
19  For example, Stanley Hauerwas insists that ‗Attending liturgy is a Christian‘s duty because it‘s true. It‘s 
what makes life make any sense at all‘ (emphasis added) ‗Christianity: It‘s Not a Religion: It‘s an 
Adventure (1991)‘ The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright, 522-535 (Duke 
University Press, 2001) 530. 
20  Mishnah Pesahim 10:5 (adjusted for gender neutrality). For a more robust discussion of the imaginative 
function of several variants on the Passover seder, see my article ‗Seder and Imagined Landscape‘ in 
Memory, Mourning, and Landscape, ed. Elizabeth Anderson, Avril Maddrell, Kate McLoughlin, and Alana 
Vincent (Rodopi, forthcoming 2010). 
21  See Reuven Hammer, Entering the High Holy Days: A Complete Guide to the History, Prayers, and Themes (Jewish 
Publication Society, 2005) 167-174. 
22  The difficulty with considering liturgy to be entirely communal is that this results in having to consider 
the recitation of the Amidah, for example, as liturgical when it takes place in the presence of a minyan, but 
not when it is recited privately. While context is certainly important, such a finely drawn distinction strikes 
me as nonsensical—a Catholic priest who says the Daily Office by himself is still engaged in a liturgical 
performance, and for a very similar reason to the one I would use to argue that some solitary acts of 
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fashion to narrative space, insofar as it provides the community with an identity-generating 
narrative which may be interpreted and re-interpreted as circumstances and the needs of 
the community change.  
 The issues surrounding memorialisation in the past century are, as even this brief 
preface indicates, complex and diverse, and the form of this thesis is dictated by the 
complexity of its material. The first part of this thesis will be an examination of one such 
liturgical space, the reading of Parshat Zakhor, one of four short passages appended to the 
normal order of Torah readings in the month prior to Passover. This examination both 
illuminates the backwards-reading tendency of memorials, as the responses of various 
communities over different points in history demonstrate the way that each found in the 
text a model for their own situation,23 but also provides a framework for a more widely-
ranging discussion of what memory is and how it functions, on both an individual and 
communal level.  
 Because it relies heavily upon terminology which I develop in my first chapter, the 
roadmap for the remainder of this thesis may be found at the end of that chapter.
                                                                                                                                               
Jewish worship ought to be considered liturgical: it connects him to the history and life of the community, 
even if the community itself is not physically present. This is yet another example of the imaginative 
dimension of liturgy. 
23  Cf Michael Walzer, Exodus and Revolution (Basic Books, 1985) 7.  In many ways, my reading of the Amalek 
texts reveals the dark side of the liberative narrative that Walzer finds in the Exodus text. 
  
  
Remembering Amalek 
 
 
 
 
Remember what Amalek did on the road when you were brought forth 
from Egypt. Finding you on your journey, he struck at the stragglers, the 
feeblest of all that were faint and weary; he did not fear God. When the 
Lord your God grants you rest from the enemies that surround you, in the 
land that the Lord your God will give you to hold as your inheritance, you 
shall blot out the remembering of Amalek from under heaven. Do not 
forget.  
Parshat Zakhor: Deuteronomy 25:17-191
  
 
t1 the end of every winter, in the month of Adar, the normal order of Torah 
readings is supplemented with four special readings which, taken together, 
lay the foundation for the observance of Pesach-Shavuot2, which begins in 
the following month of Nissan. The readings are, in order, Shekalim (Ex. 30 11-16), 
Zakhor (cited above), Parah (Num. 19:1), and HaChodesh (Ex. 12:1-20).3 One may argue 
that these readings lay out four essential pillars of Judaism: charitable giving, remembrance, 
ritual purity, and observance of sanctified time.4 These four areas are firmly intertwined, 
and a discussion of any one will necessarily involve the other three. My primary concern, 
however, and the focus of my discussion is the second area: remembrance. 
 Parshat Zakhor, read on the Sabbath before Purim, is recorded as part of the law 
that God commands Moses to convey to the Israelites.5 It contains two positive 
commandments: to always remember the treachery of Amalek, and to blot out the memory 
of Amalek entirely.6 Instantly, then, we are confronted with a paradox: how is it possible to 
both remember and forget at the same time?  
                                                                                                                                               
1 All translations preceded by the original Hebrew are my own. All other translations are taken from the 
JPS Tanach, unless otherwise specified. Throughout this thesis, quotations from the Torah are cited first 
by parsha and then by their standard chapter and verse. Because the Jewish lectionary is fixed to a one 
year reading cycle, a parsha citation not only identifies a certain point in the text, but also a certain fixed 
point in time—thus, citing this as Parshat Zakhor, rather than Ki Seitzei, indicates that I am reading it in 
the context of the Sabbath immediately preceding Purim—and therefore in conversation with the Book 
of Esther—and only a few weeks after the parallel passage (Ex. 17.14), part of Parshat Beshalach, would 
have been read out loud in the Synagogue, rather than near the end of the lectionary year, when passages 
from Deuteronomy are normally read. 
2 I am here choosing to treat Pesach and Shavuot, linked by the counting of the omer, as the beginning and 
end points of a continuous festival commemorating the journey from Egypt to Sinai, rather than as two 
distinct festivals.  
3 Mishna Megillah 3:4 
4 Ronald Hendel identifies three marks of distinction between the Israelites and the surrounding tribes in 
the Hebrew Bible: ‗circumcision, food laws, and the observation of the Sabbath. The domains of these 
practices—the body, food, and time—are exemplary for showing the effective symbolism of rituals as 
markers of cultural boundaries‘; see Hendel, Remembering Abraham: Culture, Memory and History in the Hebrew 
Bible (Oxford University Press, 2005) 19. Hendel and I are in agreement with regards to the importance of 
time and ritual purity (which extends to both bodily and food practices, though Parshat Parah is 
specifically concerned with bodily purification), and the remainder of Hendel‘s work is concerned with 
documenting the distinctiveness and importance of remembrance within the Hebrew Bible. My scheme 
differs from his, then, in the inclusion of charitable giving, but more importantly in that it is drawn from 
and reflective of post-Biblical—indeed, post-Temple—liturgical practice. 
5 The relatively minor festival of Purim celebrates the events of the book of Esther, in which Esther and 
her uncle Mordecai save the Jewish people from a pogrom engineered by the villainous Haman. Haman is 
named ‗the Agagite‘ (Esther 3:1), which marks him as a descendent of Agag, and, by extension, of 
Amalek. There are two Agags identified in the Tanach: the first is the king of the Amalekites who 
employed Balaam to prophesy against the Israelites (Parshat Balak: Numbers 24:7); the second is killed by 
Saul in 1 Samuel 15. A lengthy treatment of this connection can be found in Elliott Horowitz, Reckless 
Rites: Purim and the Legacy of Jewish Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) 107-146. 
6 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 5:5 (Hershman 217). In the following discussion, I assume Amalek refers to the 
nation of Amalek, rather than the person Amalek; thus, the pronouns used are ‗it‘ and ‗their‘, rather than 
‗he‘ and ‗his‘. 
A 
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 Rabbinic commentary mostly sidesteps this issue, as does contemporary Christian 
commentary, both seeming to read ‗blot out the memory of‘ as a poetic hyperbole meant to 
indicate total obliteration.7 The Harper Collins Study Bible (NRSV) suggests the following 
cognate passages: Deut 9.14, 25.6, 29.20; 1 Sam 24.21 (sic); Ps 9.5-6, 109.13. I can only 
assume that the reference in 1 Samuel is actually meant to be to 24.22, ‗So swear to me by 
the Lord that you will not destroy my descendants or wipe out my name from my father‘s 
house‘; all the other passages noted similarly make reference to the blotting out of a name 
( ) rather than memory ( ), as in Deut 25.19. We could also add Ex.17.14, 32.33, Deut 
                                                                                                                                               
7 Rabbinic treatments of the passage are addressed later in this chapter and in the next. A brief survey of 
Christian commentary yields the following results: John W. Rogerson‘s commentary on Deut. 25.19 in 
Eerdmans Commentary on the Bible, ed. James D. G. Dunn and John W. Rogerson (Eerdmans, 2003) ignores 
the difficulties of verse 19 entirely, focusing on Deut. 25.17-19 as a whole and its place in the ‗narrative 
framework for the laws of ch. 12-25‘ (168), and S. R. Driver‘s Critical and Exegetical Commentary on 
Deuteronomy (T&T Clark, 1973) considers verse 19 ‗a striking and emphatic‘ passage entirely consistent 
with ‗the style and manner of Dt‘. (286); William D. Johnstone‘s commentary on the parallel passage, Ex. 
17.14, also in Eerdmans Commentary, is likewise more concerned with the passage‘s place in a larger 
narrative structure, noting the mirroring of pre- and post- Sinaitic events in Exodus and Numbers (89-90). 
Everett Fox‘s commentary in The Five Books of Moses: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy: a 
new translation with introductions, commentary and notes, The Schocken Bible, Volume I (Schocken Books, 1995) 
notes the broad connection of these passages to the theme of holy war (352; 966), as does G. Ernest 
Wright‘s commentary on Deut. 25.19 in The Interpreter‟s Bible, Volume II, ed. George Arthur Buttrick 
(Abingdon, 1953) 482; Henry H. Shires and Pierson Parker, in the same volume of The Interpreter‟s Bible, 
note that the passage is decidedly un-Christian, and recommend that the dictates of Rom. 12:20 be 
followed instead (482-3). J. Coert Rylaarsdam‘s commentary on Ex. 17.14 in Volume I of The Interpreter‟s 
Bible does focus on the command to ‗blot out the name of Amalek‘, but is content with tracing the 
progression of the feud up through I and II Samuel and I Chronicles (961); J. Edgar Park‘s commentary 
on the same passage, also in Volume I of The Interpreter‟s Bible, focuses on the command to write down ‗a 
memorial in a book‘ (961-2), as does Rev. David Stalker‘s commentary on the same passage in Peake‟s 
Commentary on the Bible, ed. Matthew Black and H. H. Rowley (Routledge, 1962), 225, and Carol Meyers‘s 
commentary in Exodus, The New Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 135, 
although Meyers also notes the holy war connections. Again in Peake‟s, Rev. G. Henton Davies simply 
glosses Deut. 15.17-19 as a simple command to remember (280). Peter C. Craigie‘s commentary on 
Deuteronomy offers an interesting interpretation of v. 19, ‗You shall not forget‘, proposing that it be read 
as a factual statement, rather than a positive commandment, because ‗in Israel‘s future history, the 
continuing aggressiveness of the Amalekites gave the Israelites little chance to forget, until at last the 
Amalekites seem to have ceased to be a nation, about the time of Hezekiah (1 Chr. 4:43)‘; See Craigie, The 
Book of Deuteronomy, (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976) 318.  
  Richard D. Nelson does note that ‗[t]he rhetoric of v. 19 is striking: wipe out all memory of them, 
but always remember!‘ However, Nelson does not go any further in addressing this as a difficult passage, 
focusing the remainder of his commentary, again, on the concept of holy war, justified by Amalek‘s 
‗violation of universally accepted principles of war‘; see Nelson, Deuteronomy: A Commentary (Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2002) 302. 
  Brevard Childs‘s commentary on Exodus also concentrates on the theme of holy war, focusing 
primarily on the notion of perpetual enmity between Amalek and Israel; he finds this puzzling in light of 
the victory described in Exodus, but reads Deut. 25.27 as recounting ‗a humiliating defeat of Israel by the 
hands of Amalek‘, in which Amalek committed ‗an act of barbarism and provided a motivation for Israel‘s 
continued hatred‘. See Childs, Exodus: A Commentary (SCM Press, 1974) 313.  
  William H. Propp‘s commentary on Exodus follows Childs‘s assertion that and are 
interchangeable (see below), but makes an important point about the textual and oral modes of 
remembrance commanded in Ex. 17.14: ‗That which is written is permanent in a sense; but, precisely 
because it is set down, it may easily be forgotten. In contrast, that which is taught orally, ―put into the 
ears,‖ remains in the forefront of consciousness (Calvin). Our passage thus adumbrates the Jewish 
tradition of Oral Torah (m. „Abot 1:1)‘. See Propp, Exodus 1-18: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary, The Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1999) 619. 
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32.26, and 2 Kings 12.27 to the list of cognate passages; here, again, the direct object is 
always name, save for Ex.17.14, which is a very close parallel to Deut 25.19, and where the 
object is memory—but, again, the memory of Amalek. It seems clear that the standard 
interpretative key here is generally considered to be the verb ( ), rather than its object, 
and, thus, Parshat Zakhor is read through comparison with passages dealing explicitly with 
family lineage and implicitly—since the family lineage under consideration is, in all of the 
cognate passages, that of an Israelite—covenant.8 I would argue, however, that the change 
in direct object is too important to ignore; if memory is meant to connote family lineage, 
why not use the exact same word—name—as in all those other passages?  
 Brevard Childs argues that the noun form of the root is properly translated as 
‗name‘, rather than ‗memory‘, noting that it is frequently used in parallel to , and that the 
clearest distinction between the two words is that the former can be construed as a speech 
act, while the latter represents that which has been spoken. ‗Clearly there is a close 
relationship between cultic proclamation and memory. [...] Yet again, it is important to see 
that zēkher is only secondarily related to memory. The emphasis lies with the act of 
proclaiming‘.9 By this argument, then, the two positive commandments are to always 
remember what Amalek did, but to blot out the utterance of Amalek‘s name—which may 
appear to unravel the paradox, as, although Childs argues that the hiphil form of the verb is 
also an act of speech, the form that we see in Deut 25.17 is the qal, which even Childs 
agrees translates best as remember, an act of cognition.10 However, Childs relies here on 
assertion, more than argument, to make his case; while he cites a number of passages in 
which the noun may be translated quite sensibly as name, he does not produce a single 
passage in which that translation can be definitively shown to be superior, and several of 
his chosen passages become rather strained under his word choice.11 Even if Childs is 
                                                                                                                                               
8 See Lyle Eslinger, ‗More Drafting Techniques in Deuteronomic Laws‘. Vetus Testamentum 34, no. 2 (1984): 
221-26; 226. Rashi‘s commentary on this phrase also supports such an interpretation.  
9 Brevard S. Childs, Memory and Tradition in Israel (SCM Press, 1962) 72. 
 An interesting parallel with the Homeric tradition is the word κλέος, typically translated as ‗glory‘, which 
according to Gregory Nagy ‗should have meant simply ―that which is heard‖‗, but which came to indicate 
the transmission of great deeds through the recital of epic poetry. See Gregory Nagy, The Best of the 
Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979) 16-17. 
  An important distinction between κλέος and is that, while both may take their roots from, and 
refer implicitly to, acts of recitation, the former is always positive, a property of heroes, while the latter is 
neutral, as can be discerned from the passage currently under discussion; a commandment to verbally 
convey the great deeds of Amalek would be jarring and nonsensical. 
10 Childs¸Memory and Tradition 10-11. While Hebrew grammar is sufficiently different from that of Latin and 
German-derived languages (such as English) that applying terms from one system to the other is more 
often misleading than not, hiphil verbs are very often rendered in English as causative, and qal verbs are 
usually rendered in English as perfect. 
11 This is especially true of Ps 6.6 and 145.7, in which Childs must translate as ‗praise‘ in order to arrive 
at a coherent reading. See Childs, Memory and Tradition 71. 
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correct in his theory that memory was, to an ancient Israelite, an essentially active and 
vocalised, rather than purely cognitive, process, the majority of English translations 
contradict him,12 which is to say that very few contemporary, English-speaking readers of 
the passage are likely to understand ‗memory‘ in the way that Childs suggests. Moreover, 
we are still left with another layer of paradox: this particular passage is read out loud in the 
synagogue twice in the year, once during the normal course of readings, as the end of 
Parshat Ki Seitzei, and once, the Shabbat before Purim, as Parshat Zakhor. The name of 
Amalek is uttered at the very moment of its prohibition; Amalek is commemorated in the 
very command that its memory be blotted out.13  
And even if Childs is correct that and are essentially interchangeable, it is 
still worthwhile to note that is only used in reference to Amalek; Amalek is singled out 
for special treatment, even if only in the barest lexographical fashion. This is evident in 
commentaries upon Deut 25.19 and Ex.17.14 that focus on what Amalek did to deserve 
such a penalty. The Ramban maintains that Amalek‘s main sin was idolatry; their attack 
against the Israelites was actually a challenge to Hashem‘s divine authority.14 This reading is 
echoed in the nineteenth century, by the German Orthodox Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, 
writing in the generation immediately following the Reform movement. Hirsch asserts that 
Amalek (and the command to remember Amalek) serves as an example to the people about 
to enter the Promised Land of the contrast between the faith in God demanded of Israel 
and the faith in military might—a thinly-veiled reference to the secularism promoted by the 
Reformers—represented by Amalek:15 
This most marked contrast was accordingly again pointed out to the people 
who were about to enter the Land of the Torah, there to faithfully carry out 
                                                                                                                                               
12 A brief comparison of translations currently in circulation should suffice to demonstrate this point. Of 
twenty-two translations sampled, eleven translate the word as ‗memory‘ (New Revised Standard Version, 
English Standard Version, New International Version, New American Standard Bible, New Living 
Translation, New Century Version, Holman Christian Standard Bible, New International Reader‘s 
Version, New International Version UK , New Jewish Publication Society Translation); a further eight 
translate it as ‗remembrance‘ (Amplified Bible, King James Version, New King James Version, 21st 
Century King James Version, American Standard Version, Young‘s Literal Translation, Darby, 
Interpreter‘s Bible); one transforms the noun into a verb (Contemporary English Version: ‗you must wipe 
out Amalek so completely that no one will remember they ever lived‘), and only three render it as ‗name‘ 
(The Message, Today‘s New International Version, The Anchor Bible).  
13 Lena Roos has pointed out that this tension between utterance and blotting out is enacted every year 
during Purim festivities, when the book of Esther is read out loud and noisemakers are employed to 
drown out the reader every time Haman‘s name is mentioned. However, no such measures are employed 
during the reading of passages concerning Amalek. 
14 Nahmanides, Commentary on the Torah, trans. Charles B. Chavel (Shilo, 1973) s.v. Ex. 17:16.  
15 It should be noted at the outset that I use ‗Israel‘ as it is used in Jewish liturgy, to denote the entirety of 
the religious community which traces its origins back to Jacob, who received the name in Parshat 
Vayishlach  (Genesis   32:29),   because  he  ‗strove  with  God  and  with  men   and   has   overcome‘  
( --- ), rather than to denote citizens of the modern-day state. When 
geography is at issue, I refer to ‗the land of Israel‘. It should be clear that the implications of my chosen 
usage are theological, and the latter political. 
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its dictates. The event itself—that first unprovoked attack by Amalek—
with all the details of its contrast to what their mission in life was to be, was 
again brought to their minds, to be kept in perpetual recollection. [...] 
[H]ere Israel is exhorted to consider itself, and prove itself a co-working 
tool for this War of God against Amalek‘s leading mankind astray with the 
blinding glitter of military fame and glory in the palm awarded to victories 
of physical might.16 
The retelling of the Amalek narrative in Ginzberg‘s Legends of the Jews places the 
emphasis on Amalek‘s deceitfulness: they lie in wait for the Israelites to cross the Red Sea, 
incite other nations to join in their attack, lure individual Israelites away from the camp to 
kill them.17 The final proof of Amalek‘s treachery, by this account, comes well after their 
initial defeat by Joshua:18 
Concealing their weapons in their garments, the Amalekites appeared in 
Israel's camp as if they meant to condole with them for Aaron's death, and 
then unexpectedly attacked them. Not content with this, the Amalekites 
disguised themselves in Canaanite costume and spoke the speech of the 
latter, so that the Israelites might not be able to tell if they had before them 
Amalekites, as their personal appearance seemed to show, or Canaanites, as 
their dress and speech indicated.19 
Not only do the Amalekites initiate a surprise attack, in this account, they infiltrate the 
Israelite camp through deceit, both under the guise of offering condolences, and disguised 
as members of another tribe. Ginzberg‘s text emphasizes that the actions of Amalek are 
not due to a lack of fear in God; the reason given for assuming the speech and garments of 
Canaanites is that the Amalekites believed that God would, indeed, answer the prayers of 
the Israelites, and do so effectively, and thus, ‗[i]f we now appear as Canaanites, they will 
implore God to send them aid against the Canaanites, and we shall slay them‘.20 The 
offense here is an attempt to subvert the bond between God and Israel, by deceiving Israel 
and directing their focus, and therefore their prayers, and therefore God‘s attention, away 
from their true needs. That the Amalekites believed such a trick would prove effective may 
arguably be construed as a lack of respect for the intelligence of the Israelites and their 
God, but this is a move beyond the boundaries of the text itself. 
  Other commentators point to some aspect of the attack as particularly violating 
universal standards of decency in warfare: either they attacked without cause, or without 
warning, or (as suggested in Deut 25.18) unfairly targeted those unable to defend 
                                                                                                                                               
16 Samson Raphael Hirsch, The Pentateuch (translated and explained), trans. Isaac Levy, vol, 5, Deuteronomy, 2nd 
ed., (Judaica Press, 1989) 524. 
17 Louis Ginzberg, Legends of the Jews: Volumes III and IV (Forgotten Books, 2008) 37. 
18 This is consistent with Peter Craigie‘s hypothesis that Deut. Verses 17-18 ‗probably have in mind a 
number of encounters with the Amalekites, of which that referred to in Ex. 17 is the first. See Craigie 317. 
19 Ginzberg 214. 
20 Ginzberg 215. 
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themselves; a rather exhaustive summary of such commentaries appears in Avi Sagi‘s article 
on the subject and need not be rehearsed in further detail here.21 Still others view the issue 
as not so much what Amalek may have done, but what Amalek represents; this is the mode 
of interpretation that has dominated 20th and, thus far, 21st century Judaism, although its 
roots go back at least to Isaac Luria (d. 1572).22  
 Rabbi Kalonymos Kalmish Shapira, the Piacezna Rebbe, preached two sermons on 
Parshat Zachor during his imprisonment in the Warsaw Ghetto. In his sermon on 23 
March, 1940, Shapira bases his reading of Amalek on an alternative reading from Rashi, 
which translates as ‗who chilled you‘ rather than ‗who encountered you‘, arguing 
that the encounter with Amalek cooled the Israelites‘ ardour for Torah.23 He thus equates 
Amalek with worldly wisdom, which tempted and continues to tempt the Jewish people 
away from Torah, and suggests that ‗the text is saying: ―Now that you have seen and 
experienced all this, go and ‗obliterate the memory of Amalek from beneath the 
heavens.‖‘24 His sermon on 28 February, 1942, is considerably longer and more complex, 
delving into the Kabbalistic underpinnings of his interpretation of the passage, but the 
message is essentially the same:  
The implication is that we have to obliterate the seeds Amalek has planted, 
because otherwise, after Amalek himself is destroyed, the seeds that he has 
planted will remain. Who knows how long the Sabbath that today so many 
Jews, constrained by Amalek‘s torments, are forced to desecrate, God have 
mercy, will remain so desecrated? After this war is over, people will not be 
as afraid of doing work on the Sabbath as they once were. [...] Those young 
people who are forced to abandon the Torah now, who are enduring so 
much pain and suffering they do not even know if they are alive: Will they 
                                                                                                                                               
21 A number of these interpretations, including those put forth by Yitzhak Abrabanel, Yaakov Tzevi 
Mecklenburg, Yaakov Sofer, Yitzhak Aramah, Rabbi Judah, and Rabbi Nathan, are detailed in Avi Sagi, 
‗The Punishment of Amalek in Jewish Tradition: Coping with the Moral Problem‘, The Harvard Theological 
Review 87, no. 3 (1994) 325 . See also the discussion of just war in Ch. 2.  
22 Sagi further subdivides this mode of interpretation into three sub-modes: metaphysical, conceptual, and 
psychological; he traces the metaphysical mode back to Luria, the conceptual only back as far as Hirsch, 
and attributes the psychological mode to ‗the Hasidic tradition‘; see Sagi 330-6. This distinction is 
interesting, but not particularly relevant to the point at hand. 
23 Rabbi Kalonymos Kalmish Shapira, Sacred Fire: Torah from the Years of Fury 1939-1942, trans. J. Hershy 
Worch (Jason Aronson, 2002) 55-57. Rashi offers three separate explanations of : first, because 
(encounter) is linguistically connected to (a sudden thing) that Amalek attacked by surprise; second, 
that because is linguistically connected to (pollution), Amalek polluted the Israelites through 
pederasty (see Horowitz 114); third, because is linguistically related to (cold), Amalek ‗chilled‘ the 
Israelites. Shapira‘s reading is somewhat different from the parable provided in the Rashi commentary, 
which compares Amalek‘s attack on the Israelites to a man who jumps into a pot of boiling water and is 
scalded, but nonetheless persuades others around him that the water is cool enough to bathe in (i.e., 
Amalek showed other nations that Israel was susceptible to attack).  
  It is also notable that Rashi connects Deut.25.17, ‗Remember what Amalek did to you‘, directly to 
the previous verses concerning fair weights and measures, warning that unjust measures constitute a 
provocation to enemies—and thus placing some blame for Amalek‘s attack upon the Israelites 
themselves. 
24 Shapira 57. 
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put their whole heads and bodies back into the study of Torah, after the 
destruction of Amalek?25 
For Shapira, Amalek is not a specific people, but a specific type of people (or, perhaps, 
people who engage in a specific type of behaviour); the command to blot out the memory 
of Amalek remains unfulfilled so long as that sort of person and that sort of behaviour 
continue to exist. Thus, it is no contradiction for the Israelites to be commanded at once to 
remember and to blot out the memory of Amalek; the blotting out is a struggle that 
continues to this very day.26  
 Having dispensed with one apparent contradiction, however, we find ourselves 
immediately confronted with another: to whom is the command to remember actually 
given, and how can it possibly be fulfilled? To a Jewish reader, this question is hardly worth 
asking; the idea of memory stretching continuously from generation to generation is part of 
‗the taken-for-granted, tacit background of beliefs, concepts, values, attitudes, and so 
forth‘27 that constitutes Jewish culture.28 But it flies in the face of the concept of memory 
which has, at least until recently, been the basis for philosophical treatments of the subject 
in what, for the sake of simplicity, I refer to as the ‗Western‘ philosophical tradition, 
although I do so in full consciousness that this is, at best, an oversimplification and at 
worst a complete misnomer. Jewish thought, insofar as it constitutes a unified system of 
thought at all, is a ‗Western‘ system (in contrast to Chinese philosophy), simply not the 
dominant one, and there is, as evidenced by instances of Rashi borrowing from Plato‘s 
Symposium in his gloss on Parshat Bere‘shit (Gen. 1:27), and as shall be discussed at greater 
length in Chapter Two, a reasonable amount of overlap and borrowing between the two 
systems. The distinction I am drawing here (along with the collapsing of two vastly 
                                                                                                                                               
25 Shapira 300. 
26 For further examples of this reading of Amalek, see Horowitz 2-4. 
27 Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Fortress Press, 1997) 30-1. 
28 See, for example, Parshat Nitsavim, Deut. 29:13-14: ‗I make this covenant, with its sanctions, not with 
you alone, but both with those who are standing here with us this day before the Lord our God and with 
those who are not with us here this day‘; also the injunction in Mishnah Pesahim 10:5: ‗In every generation 
one must see oneself as if one had personally experienced the exodus from Egypt‘. See also Judith 
Plaskow, Standing Again at Sinai: Judaism from a Feminist Perspective (HarperCollins, 1991) 25-28; Plaskow 
notes that Parshat Yitro (Ex. 19:15) seems to specifically exclude women from the revelation at Sinai, and 
that its annual reading perpetually re-enacts that exclusion. See also Yosef Hayim Yerusalmi, Zakhor: Jewish 
History and Jewish Memory (University of Washington Press, 1982). 
  Again, there is an interesting parallel with the Homeric tradition, with the verb μιμνήσκω, which 
Nagy suggests ‗means not so much that the Muses ―remind‖ the poet of what to tell, but, rather, that they 
have the power to put his mind or consciousness in touch with places and times other than his own in 
order to witness the deeds of heroes (and the doings of gods)‘ (Nagy 17). However, Nagy makes clear that 
this ‗witness‘ is not a direct transportation of the poet to the scene, but rather mediated through the 
witness of the Muses; they convey the κλέος which he is to recite to the poet, who then repeats it to the 
audience. See also Virgil‘s invocation to the Muse at the beginning of the Aeneid: ‗Musa, mihi causas 
memora‘—‗Muse, cause me to recall‘ (Aeneid I, ln 8, emphasis added). 
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complex and diverse networks of thought into two unified systems) is, in other words, a 
useful fiction—but still a fiction, a narrative constructed in hindsight.  
 
 
Michael Rossington and Anne Whitehead open their recently published volume, Theories of 
Memory: A Reader, with an historical overview of the evolution of concepts of memory.29 
They begin with Plato, working their way through Aristotle, Cicero, Yates, Locke, Hume, 
and Hegel, before finally arriving at the Late Modern era. It is notable that, while they do 
have a section devoted to ‗Jewish Memory Discourse‘, it is entirely separate from this initial 
overview; it does not fit into the narrative of intellectual history that the editors are 
attempting to present.30 A brief examination of the theorists who do fit into that narrative 
reveals the reason for the separation between the Western philosophical tradition and the 
Jewish concept of memory: all the theorists represented in Rossington and Whitehead‘s 
overview, up until late modernity, treat memory as an individual faculty. This distinction is 
made most clearly in Locke, when he writes: 
Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah‘s flood, as that I 
saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I 
could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames 
overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was 
the same self,- place that self in what substance you please—than that I 
who write this am the same myself now whilst I write (whether I consist of 
all the same substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday.31 
This is not the passage that Rossington and Whitehead have chosen to excerpt for their 
anthology. Rather, they select an earlier chapter of the same book, ‗On Retention‘, which 
describes, rather mechanistically, the functional relationship between mind and memory. 
This decision on the part of the editors—and the absence of any excerpt from Descartes—
                                                                                                                                               
29 Michael Rossington and Anne Whitehead, eds., Theories of Memory: A Reader (Edinburgh University Press, 
2007). This is the first major historical anthology dealing with memory studies to be published; I am 
reading it here as representative of the generally accepted approach to the intellectual history of the topic. 
See also the review of the volume by Rebecca Bramall in Memory Studies vol. 1 (2008): 341-343. 
30 This section, containing extracts from Yerushalmi, Jack Kugelmass and Jonathan Boyarin, and James E. 
Young, is located in Part II: Positionings, sandwiched between ‗Collective Memory‘ and ‗Trauma‘—and, 
tellingly, not in Part III: Identities, which is taken up by ‗Gender‘, ‗Race/Nation‘, and ‗Diaspora‘. 
31 John Locke, A Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. John W. Yolton (Everyman, 1993) XVII:16 (185-
186). Although Locke here uses the word consciousness instead of memory, later passages in this chapter of 
his Essay Concerning Human Understanding demonstrate that he uses the terms equivalently, if not 
interchangeably; memory is, to Locke, consciousness of the past. For example: ‗Suppose I wholly lose the 
memory of some parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be 
conscious of them again; yet am I not the same person that did those actions, had those thoughts that I 
once was conscious of, though I have now forgot them?‘ XVII:20 (187); ‗and the mind many times 
recovers the memory of a past consciousness[...]‘ XVII:23 (189). 
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obscures the linkage between memory and individual identity that I will place at the centre 
of Part II of this study.32 However, it cannot obscure, and may even serve to emphasize, 
that memory, from Ancient Greece to the Enlightenment, has been conceived of as a 
function restricted to an individual mind. Every excerpt in the first two sections of the 
Reader operates with the implicit assumption that memory functions as a link to knowledge 
or experience acquired in an individual‘s own past, and is concerned primarily with either 
describing (primarily in the case of the Enlightenment and Romantic philosophers) or 
improving (primarily in the case of the ancient and medieval thinkers) this function.33 
Within such a framework, either commandment in Parshat Zakhor is logically incoherent; 
no person currently alive could be commanded to remember something which they did not 
                                                                                                                                               
32  Locke is here engaged with what Marya Schechtman has labelled ‗the reidentification problem‘--the 
philosophical problem of whether a body moving through time and acquiring different experiences can be 
said to be the same entity at point A as at point Z. This is the normative approach to the philosophy of 
identity. See also Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Clarendon Press, 1984), still a highly influential 
treatment of the reidentification problem; and also Paul Ricoeur‘s critique of Parfit in ‗Narrative Identity‘, 
discussed in the prelude. 
  Schechtman‘s analysis of earlier treatments of this problem concludes that re-identification puzzles 
are asking the wrong question, and she goes on to theorize identity in terms of character and narrative—a 
much more intuitive approach for scholars, such as myself, already steeped in narrative. However, even 
Schechtman does not carry the narrative approach to identity forward past the boundaries of an 
individual‘s self-awareness; to the best of my knowledge, no philosopher of identity has made the leap 
between the internally oriented statement ‗My selfhood is defined by the continuity of my memory‘ and 
the externally oriented statement ‗My selfhood is defined by another‘s memory of me‘. While under most 
circumstances, the latter statement could very quickly be shown to be logically untenable (I do not cease 
the exercise of my selfhood because my mother happens to forget who I am), it becomes reasonable in 
situations where the ‗self‘ under consideration is deprived of agency—as, for example, a dead body would 
be (I am not interested in pursuing questions concerning the immortality of the soul). Thus, it is the latter 
statement which becomes most relevant to the issues of commemoration that will be taken up in Part II. 
33 Section 1, ‗Classical and Early Modern Ideas of Memory‘, edited by Jennifer Richards (20-67), contains 
excerpts from Plato‘s Theaetetus and Phaedrus, Aristotle‘s De Memoria et Reminiscentia, Cicero‘s De Oratore and 
Ad Herennium, Mary J. Carruthers‘s The Book of Memory: A Study in Medieval Culture and Francis A. Yates‘s 
The Art of Memory. The brief excerpt from Theaetetus (found on page 25) describes memory as a wax tablet 
upon which impressions are made and from which impressions may be erased; the somewhat longer pair 
of excerpts from Phaedrus (pages 25-27) discuss the ability of the soul to recollect the true nature of 
existence, and suggest that training in philosophy is the best way to nurture such an ability. The excerpt 
from De Memoria et Reminiscentia (28-38) is concerned first with identifying the connection between 
memory and the soul (or in what part of the soul memory resides), and then with precisely how 
recollection occurs. The excerpt from De Oratore (39-42) describes the advantages of a well-trained 
memory, and Ad Herennium‘s (43-49) excerpt details a system of image-associations useful for aiding 
rhetorical recollection. The extracts from Carruthers‘s The Book of Memory (50-58) and Yates‘s The Art of 
Memory (pp. 59-67) also detail various associative systems meant to improve recollection; Carruthers‘s 
extract is somewhat remarkable in that it, alone of all the excerpts in this section, is a modern work which 
talks about concepts and systems of memory in the medieval period, rather than a medieval work on 
memory. 
  Section 2, ‗Enlightenment and Romantic Memory‘, edited by Michael Rossington (pages 70-89) , 
contains excerpts from Locke‘s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Hume‘s A Treatise of Human 
Nature, and Hegel‘s Philosophy of Mind, Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. The 
excerpt from Locke (75-79) is discussed above. The Hume extract (80-84) addresses the relationship 
between memory and imagination, portraying them as two separate faculties, while the Hegel excerpt (85-
89) hearkens back somewhat to Cicero and Yates, discussing the mechanistic function of memory in 
terms of the construction and retrieval of mental images. 
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themselves experience, nor could they be commanded to blot out a memory which cannot 
be reasonably said to exist. 
 This is not the case in the third, and final, portion of the historical section, which 
covers representative texts from late modernity: Marx, Nietzsche, Bergson, Freud, and 
Benjamin. While the excerpts from the last three theorists continue the pattern of 
reflection on memory as a marker of individual existence and experience, the excerpts from 
Marx and Nietzsche appear to approach the relationship between memory and history. 
Nietzsche uses the term history to signify events in the past, including an individual‘s own 
experienced past: 
A leaf flutters from the scroll of time, floats away—and suddenly floats 
back again and falls into the man‘s lap. Then the man says ‗I remember‘ 
and envies the animal, who at once forgets and for whom every moment 
really dies, sinks back into night and fog and is extinguished forever. Thus 
the animal lives unhistorically: for it is contained in the present, like a number 
without any awkward fraction left over; it does not know how to 
dissimulate, it conceals nothing and at every instant appears wholly as what 
it is; it can therefore never be anything but honest.34 
In other words, Nietzsche here uses history and memory in a somewhat interchangeable 
fashion, being more concerned with the role the past plays in distinguishing human from 
animal consciousness (the latter existing only in an eternal now) than with distinctions 
between memory and history as potentially different types of past. 
 The excerpt from Marx‘s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte involves a similar 
conflation of history and memory, although that conflation appears in this case to be at least 
as much on the part of Rossington and Whitehead as on the part of Marx himself. 
Granted, only fifty-two years elapsed between Napoleon Bonaparte‘s original coup d‟état and 
what Marx characterised as an echo event orchestrated by Louis Bonaparte; there were 
certainly people alive at the time Marx wrote who had a clear living memory of the time of 
Napoleon, even if Marx himself (born in 1818, some nineteen years after Napoleon‘s coup) 
was not among them. Nonetheless, Marx‘s critique is almost entirely historical; the word 
memory occurs only twice in the entire book, and the second time (in a later chapter than 
that excerpted by Rossington and Whitehead) it refers in an uncomplicated fashion to the 
function of an individual mind.35 The first instance, from the passage excerpted for the 
                                                                                                                                               
34 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‗On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life‘ [1874], trans. R.J.Hollingdale, in 
Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazale, 60-77 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 102-103; 
reprinted in Rossington and Whitehead 102-108. While Rossington and Whitehead have selected a 
relatively short portion of the essay to excerpt, Nietzsche‘s conflation of history and memory—or, perhaps, 
cultural and personal history—is consistent throughout the larger essay. 
35 See Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852; repr., International Publishers: 1963). 
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Reader, is more interesting: ‗As long as the French were engaged in revolution they could 
not free themselves of the memory of Napoleon‘.36 Neither Marx nor the editors of the 
Reader note anything unusual in this usage, nor make any attempt to explain it; absent that 
sentence, the excerpt reads as a straightforward critique of a political misuse of history. 
This is, however, the first time in the Reader that memory does not clearly refer to an 
individual experience and, in fact, appears to describe a link to the experience of a 
collective past, the sort of memory that would be necessary to the fulfilment of the 
commandments in Parshat Zakhor.37  
 
 
The conflation of memory and history in the above passages from Marx and Nietzsche 
may appear to have been mostly unselfconscious, the result of an innocence with regards to 
the past that seems to have been mostly lost by the dawn of the 21st century—though, in 
truth, it was already well eroded by the time either of them wrote. Bill Schwartz‘s entry on 
memory in New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society suggests that conscious 
division between ‗subjective‘ and ‗social memory‘ dates to the development of the 
                                                                                                                                               
The second time ‗memory‘ is used in the complete work is in Chapter 5: ‗[...] which holds those 
infected by it fast in an imaginary world and robs them of all sense, all memory, all understanding of the 
rude external world [...]‘ (91). 
 Cognate terms (remember, remind, reminisce, recollect, recall) also occur in the text, though again not 
with great frequency. Most of these also refer unambiguously to the activity of a single mind, with only 
two notable exceptions:  
 ‗If after Duprat‘s interpellation it proceeded to the order of the day, this did not happen 
merely because Girardin‘s motion that it should declare itself ―satisfied‖ reminded the 
party of Order of its own systematic corruption‘ (85).  
In this passage Marx has been speaking of the party as a single entity, just as he treated ‗Bourgeois society‘ 
in the first quote, and thus in both cases ‗remembering‘ or being ‗reminded‘ could be read an extension of 
the anthropomorphic metaphor, or as an instance of collective remembering.  
‗The former revolutions required recollections of past world history in order to smother their own 
content. The revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead in order to arrive at 
its own content‘ (18). Who or what is actually doing the recollecting in this instance is entirely unclear. 
36 Rossington and Whitehead 99. 
37 The Oxford English Dictionary‘s entry on memory complicates this picture somewhat. The first instance 
of the word in English is recorded in 1225 CE, and refers specifically to a commemorative activity, rather 
than a mental faculty: ‗þe Memoires of þe halhen‘ (a margin note in Ancrene Riwle). This usage died out 
after the 16th century, re-emerging briefly in the middle and late 19th century (although use of terms such 
as ‗in memory of‘ or ‗to the memory of‘ remained in usage from the 14th century to the present day). The 
earliest recorded usage of memory as ‗the action of remembering‘ is c. 1250 CE, which is not terribly long 
after the Ancrene Riwle note, but the idea of memory as a mental faculty does not appear until 1380 CE, in 
Chaucer.  
  Prior to the importation of the word memory from French to English, via the Normans, the Anglo-
Saxon term for contemplation of the past (particularly the traces of the past that precedes living memory 
which are evident in the landscape) was dūstscēawung, which literally translates as ‗contemplation of the 
dust‘. See Bruce Mitchell and Fred C. Robinson, A Guide to Old English, 5th Edition (Blackwell, 1992) 253. 
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discipline of historiography in the 19th century. 38 Schwartz supports this in part by citing a 
passage written by the historian Thomas Macaulay in 1849, prior to the passages from 
Marx or Nietzsche discussed above; even if neither of them were deeply familiar with the 
discourse of the emerging discipline, it left a mark on their language. However, even 
Schwartz places the movement of memory to ‗the center [sic] of modern consciousness‘ in 
the late 19th century, primarily crediting Freud with bringing it to prominence.39  
While Freud‘s memory discourse was, for the most part, strongly centred on the 
individual mind, later works, such as Moses and Monotheism, expand the scope of his theories 
from the individual to a social collective.40 In Freud, this shift is accomplished in the 
simplest way possible, by treating the collective metaphorically, as one very large individual, 
possessed of a single mind and will—a model which renders the commandments in Parshat 
Zakhor perfectly comprehensible, but is too high a level of abstraction to pass a test of 
realism; no collective operates in as neat or as unified a fashion as Freud imagines.41 Other 
theorists, such as Maurice Halbwachs and Paul Connerton, have attempted to correct this, 
offering increasingly complex models meant to account for the collective as a collection of 
individuals, each with their own mind and motivations. 
 Halbwachs was a contemporary of Freud, and a follower of Durkheim.42 A 
sociologist, rather than a psychologist, he had little interest in the function of individual 
minds, instead insisting that the consciousness of a social collective possesses ‗a self-
sufficient reality. In spite of the fact that they are engendered by society, they are assumed 
to originate and develop independently of the forms of social life‘.43 At the same time, 
Lewis Coser, who edited and translated a number of Halbwachs‘s works into English, 
                                                                                                                                               
38 Bill Schwartz, ‗Memory‘, in New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society 214-217, ed. Tony 
Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg, and Meghan Morris (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). See also Susan A. Crane, 
‗Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory‘, The American Historical Review vol. 102, no. 5 (1997): 
1372-1385. 
39 Schwartz 215. 
40 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (Hogarth Press 1939; reprinted Random 
House, 1996).  
41 This is perhaps an oversimplification of Freud, though not by much. Patrick H. Hutton protests that 
Freud did not envision ‗a free-floating collective memory‘, but rather saw it as an issue of historical 
repetition (quite similar to that discussed by Marx) in which ‗the re-creation of similar conditions 
historically calls the same psychical predispositions to come into play [...] The legend of Moses could be 
made to evoke a deeper content because it was only a place marker for the hidden ―deep memory‖ of the 
original experience‘, although this ‗deep memory‘ and ‗original experience‘ still belong to a collective, 
rather than a collection of individuals. See Patrick H. Hutton, ‗Sigmund Freud and Maurice Halbwachs: 
The Problem of Memory in Historical Psychology‘, The History Teacher 27.2 (1994): 145-58; 152. 
  C.G. Jung, of course, also developed a theory of the collective unconscious, although we shall not 
pause to consider that in greater depth here. 
42 For a brief description of Durkheim‘s work, especially in relation to Halbwachs, see Lewis A. Coser, ‗The 
Revival of the Sociology of Culture: The Case of Collective Memory‘, Sociological Forum 7.2 (1992): 365-73. 
43 Maurice Halbwachs, ‗Individual Psychology and Collective Psychology‘, American Sociological Review 3. 5 
(1938): 615-23; 615. Note that this article was published only a year before Freud‘s Moses and Monotheism. 
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insists that Halbwachs‘s collective memory is not ‗some mystical group mind‘, but rather a 
specific group context which provides a basis for the memories of individuals.44 Coser is 
here citing a passage from Halbwachs‘s 1951 work, Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire.45 This, 
therefore, represents over a decade‘s worth of development and refinement in Halbwachs‘s 
thought from the publication of ‗Individual Psychology and Collective Psychology‘, and if a 
younger Halbwachs was a bit more focused on the importance of viewing the collective 
mind and collective memory as phenomena in their own right, the mature Halbwachs was 
careful to identify collective memory as a contextual system in which—and even because of 
which—individual memories function:46 
it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in 
society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories. If we 
enumerate the number of recollections during one day that we have evoked 
upon the occasion of our direct and indirect relations with other people, we 
will see that, most frequently, we appeal to our memory only in order to 
answer questions which others have asked us, or that we suppose they 
could have asked us. [...] Most of the time, when I remember, it is others 
who spur me on; their memory comes to the aid of mine and mine relies 
on theirs. There is nothing mysterious about recall of memories in these 
cases at least. There is no point in seeking where they are preserved in my 
brain or in some nook of my mind to which I alone have access: for they 
are recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am a part at any 
time give me the means to reconstruct them [...]47 
Halbwachs‘s theory of collective memory remains one of the most, if not the single 
most, influential explanations of group memory.48 However, it still does not provide a 
particularly satisfactory explanation of social memory enduring beyond a single generation, 
or two at the most—the sort of memory commanded in Parshat Zakhor. With the aid of 
Halbwachs, we can see that the command given to all of Israel is really meant to be fulfilled 
                                                                                                                                               
44 Coser 367.  
45 Partially available in English as Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser 
(University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
46 Halbwachs‘s earlier reification of collective memory is even more apparent in his 1939 article, ‗Individual 
Consciousness and Collective Mind‘, The American Journal of Sociology 44.6, 812-22. 
47 Halbwachs On Collective Memory 38. 
48 See Elizabeth A. Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory: Early Christian Culture Making (Columbia University Press, 
2004) 11-24; Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge University Press, 1989) 36-40; Danièle 
Hervieu-Léger, Religion as a Chain of Memory, trans. Simon Lee (Polity Press, 2000) 125-30; Barbara A. 
Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering (Open University Press, 2003) 4, 7, 50-56; Jeffrey K. Olick, The Politics 
of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility (Routledge, 2007) 5-7; Miroslav Volf, The End of 
Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006) 99. 
Castelli‘s summary of Halbwachs‘s critics (pp. 19-24) is especially useful; the main criticism she cites is the 
philosophical difficulty involved in applying the language of individual actions and attributes to a 
collective. 
  This is not to say that there have been no competing theories of collective memory. For example, 
Jan Assman cites Aby Warburg as an important thinker who worked in parallel to Halbwachs; see 
Assman, ‗Collective Memory and Cultural Identity‘, trans. John Czaplicka, New German Critique 65 (1995) 
125-133. However, in my review of the literature no other theorist is currently cited as widely as 
Halbwachs. 
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by all of Israel, acting in concert, rather than by each individual Israelite guarding the nooks 
of his or her mind,49 but we cannot quite extrapolate the continuity of that memory from 
the time the command was given down to the present day. 
 This gap in Halbwachs‘s explication was noted and largely corrected by Paul 
Connerton, in his 1989 book How Societies Remember.50 Connerton argues that collective 
memory is performative; it is transmitted primarily through ritual and bodily practices. By 
this Connerton means primarily unconscious, non-deliberate habits and postures, but more 
deliberate rituals are also vehicles for memory transmission—particularly commemorative 
rituals tied to a fixed and recurring point in the yearly calendar, as in the annual recitation 
of Parshat Zakhor.51 Connerton also places a particular emphasis on ritual speech, 
maintaining that  
The performativeness of ritual is partly a matter of utterance [...] Curses, 
blessings and oaths, together with other verbs frequently found in ritual 
language, as for instance ‗to ask‘ or ‗to pray‘ or ‗to give thanks‘, presuppose 
certain attitudes—of trust and veneration, of submission, contrition and 
gratitude—which come into effect at the moment when, by virtue of the 
enunciation of that sentence, the corresponding act takes place. Or better: 
that act takes place in and through the enunciation. Such verbs do not 
describe or indicate the existence of attitudes: they effectively bring those 
attitudes into existence by virtue of the illocutionary act.52 
We have already noted that, paradoxically, Amalek is commemorated in the command to 
blot out its memory, though we neglected to point out that, more obviously, Parshat 
Zakhor also contains the self-fulfilling commandment to remember; the very first word of 
the passage, ‗Remember‘, is a performative verb of the sort that Connerton describes.53 
This may appear to be arriving back at the conclusion reached through Childs‘s conflation 
of memory with utterance, albeit by a different route, but Connerton does not quite suggest 
                                                                                                                                               
49 Traditionally, of course, each Israelite would only guard the nooks of ‗his‘ mind. 
50 It is also entirely possible that Halbwachs‘s theory remains preeminent not due to its innate perfection, 
but rather due to several decades during which there was little academic interest in social or collective 
memory (with the exception of the early critics mentioned by Castelli; see above, note 37); Halbwachs was 
not even translated into English until 1980, and a complete translation of La topographie légendaire des 
évangiles en terre sainte: Etude de mémoire collective has yet to appear. See Coser 365; Crane 1375-8; Patrick 
Hutton, ‗Recent Scholarship on Memory and History‘, The History Teacher 33, no. 4 (2000): 533-48, 537; 
Kurt Lang, ‗Review: How the Past Lives On‘, Contemporary Sociology 22, no. 4 (1993) 596-600. See also 
William Hirst and David Manier, ‗Towards a psychology of collective memory‘, Memory 16, no. 3 (2008): 
183-200, the introduction of which seems to imply that academic interest in collective memory has been 
constant and continually progressing—however, Hirst and Manier are psychologists, and as ill at ease with 
the literature of the humanities and social sciences as I am with the literature of psychology; they may be 
mistaking the large number of articles now in existence for evidence of a uniformly high level of interest 
in the subject since the time Halbwachs. 
51 Connerton 45. 
52 Connerton 58. Emphasis in original. 
53 Connerton himself holds that ‗In both the Old Testament and the prayer-book ―remembrance‖ becomes 
a technical term through which expression is given to the process by which practising Jews recall and 
recuperate in their present life the major formative events in the history of their community‘ (46). 
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that it constitutes memory on its own.54 Rather, ritual utterance (such as a public reading of 
a set text at a fixed point in the liturgical calendar) forms part of the structure which 
supports the transmission of collective memory, which also includes family relations, oral 
tradition, clothing, unconscious gestures, movements, and postures—in short, Connerton 
argues that collective memory is encoded and transmitted in culture itself. 55  
 
 
The concept of culture has a long and varied history; the word is used above to indicate 
what Tomoko Masuzawa calls ‗the empirical totality of a given society‘.56 This use derives 
from the German Kultur, and is one of the latest senses of the word to enter the English 
language (the Oxford English Dictionary places its first use in 1891).57 However, the earlier 
meanings and evolution of the word also contribute to our understanding of the sort of 
memory that Connerton is describing. 
 Culture comes into English from the Latin cultura, which, as with so many Latin 
roots, was originally agrarian in context, denoting ‗the tending of something, basically crops 
or animals‘.58 Cicero extended its use beyond the agrarian with cultura animi, the cultivation 
of the spirit (or mind), although Raymond Williams asserts that such a usage did not 
actually become common until early in the 16th century CE.59 The important feature of this 
usage is the unspoken assumption that it enables: discussing the cultivation of the spirit or 
mind is implicitly admitting the existence of something above the spirit or mind, capable of 
tending it. Once this crucial step from the concrete to the metaphorical has been taken, 
subsequent shifts in meaning all rest on changes in who, or what, is actually doing the 
tending. 
 Kathryn Tanner suggests that the understanding of culture as ‗spiritual, artistic, and 
intellectual refinement‘ arose during the Reformation, partially in response to the 
                                                                                                                                               
54 The distinction between ‗remember‘ as a performative verb and memory-as-utterance is subtle, but the 
performative verb is still referring to a process which takes place through the utterance, whereas in 
Childs‘s memory-as-utterance, the utterance is the process. 
55 Connerton 38-39; Connerton‘s admission of oral tradition, passed from grandparent to grandchild (rather 
than from parent to child) is based on his reading of Marc Bloch, who was a colleague of Halbwachs (see 
Castelli 19). 
56 Tomoko Masuzawa, ‗Culture‘, Critical Terms for Religious Studies 70-93, ed. Mark C. Taylor (University of 
Chicago Press, 1998) 77. 
57 For a more complete discussion of the German notion of culture, see Tanner 9-12. 
58 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Oxford University Press, 1983) 87. 
59 Tanner 4; Williams 87. The OED identifies the earliest use of the word in English as Palladius‘s De Re 
Rustica, c. 1450. 
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weakening of restraints previously enforced by means of the medieval religious hierarchy.60 
With this development, the ability of a single, centralised, Church to ‗afford a means for the 
transmission of much of the culture with little loss of content—thus protecting cultural 
continuity and stabilizing the society‘ was drastically diminished.61  
 In its early incarnation as ‗a noun of process‘, culture carried certain overtones of 
Puritanical perfectionism, which certain inflections of the term retain even to this day.62 But 
by the 19th century, the understanding of culture as a process waned, and the word began to 
refer to the end result, or ultimate goal, of the cultivation process.63 The ideal of the 
cultured mind served as the same sort of model for individual development that medieval 
hagiography once provided; in some instances (especially in Germany) it took on an almost 
spiritual significance.64 This significance led eventually to culture being equated with virtue 
(or a lack thereof, depending on one‘s social class).65 At the same time, culture began to 
shift from an abstract ideal to a commodity, which an individual might possess or lack.66 
The term began to return to a more concrete inflection, referring to the intellectual 
artefacts associated with the possession of culture—specific works of philosophy, art, 
literature, etc., which one might appreciate (or pretend to appreciate) in order to 
demonstrate the cultivation of one‘s mind.67 
While this idea of culture (henceforth referred to as ‗constructed culture‘) seems to 
imply a near-universal system of values, or at least aesthetics, the particular intellectual 
commodities associated with such culture did vary between societies, as did the exact virtue 
ascribed to their possessors. Tanner identifies three main approaches to the idea of 
constructed culture. In France, culture represented a deliberate contrast to the stratified 
order of feudal society. Seen as a commodity that could be possessed by anyone it quickly 
became a democratizing force, possessed by everyone, and presumed to consist of the 
same set of accomplishments throughout the world (bearing in mind, of course, that ‗the 
                                                                                                                                               
60 Tanner 4-5; see also Williams 87. 
61 Clyde Kluckhohn, ‗Myth and Rituals: A General Theory‘, Harvard Theological Review 35 (1942; repr. Bobbs-
Merril Co., 1962) 65. Kluckhohn is here speaking of religion, and using culture in the later, 
anthropological, sense. 
  The rise of culture to replace the diminished stabilising authority of religion may be the source of 
the opposition occasionally found between religion and culture found. See Masuzawa 70-70; H. Richard 
Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, (1951; expanded edition, HarperSanFrancisco, 2001), 31; Tanner 4. 
62 Williams 87. See also T. S. Eliot, ‗Notes towards the Definition of Culture‘ Christianity & Culture (San 
Diego: Harcourt, 1948) 95; Masuzawa 74; Tanner 5-7. 
63 Williams 88; the OED places the earliest such use of the word in 1678 (Isaac Barrow‘s Sermons), and notes 
other occurrences in 1703 and 1790, but by far the greatest frequency of such references is concentrated 
in the 1800‘s. 
64 Masuzawa 75. See also Castelli 33. 
65 Williams 92. 
66 Eliot 96; Tanner 12-13. 
67 Eliot 95; Niebuhr 33; Tanner 12; Williams 90. 
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world‘ was mostly limited to Europe and, to a lesser extent, its colonies). In Britain, by 
contrast, culture became a reaction to the democratic ideal common to France and 
America; the possession of constructed culture, which was there referred to as ‗high 
culture‘, separated the enlightened aristocracy from the lower forms of life. In Germany, 
culture was construed as a blatantly nationalist undertaking, and German culture was 
acknowledged as a phenomenon distinct and apart from the culture of any other society. 
The acknowledgement of the unique, self-contained nature of German culture led logically 
to the idea of other societies possessing their own unique, self-contained culture, and the 
word came to represent the mark of a particular society‘s dominance over the individual 
psyche.68 This is the source of the current anthropological understanding of culture, a 
nearly perfect reversal of the term‘s original meaning. From being something deliberately 
and painstakingly acquired, or imposed on an individual, culture has mutated into 
Masuzawa‘s ‗empirical totality of a given society‘, something that no individual can exist 
outside of; it is no longer a commodity that any person is capable of possessing. 
This recent meaning is not without its own nuances, many of which are indirect 
results of the word‘s long and confusing heritage. There exists, for example no true 
consensus on where, or even whether, to draw the line between what Tanner calls ‗the 
taken-for-granted, tacit background of beliefs, concepts, values, attitudes, and so forth that 
are the constant accompaniment of everyday activities‘ and the everyday activities 
themselves.69 H. Richard Niebuhr, writing in 1951, construed culture as almost entirely 
result-oriented, defining it as ‗social‘ and ‗the work of men‘s [sic] minds and hands‘, 
including ‗speech, education, tradition, myth, science, art, philosophy, government, law, 
rite, beliefs, inventions, technologies‘, though retaining certain aspects of the high culture 
ideal, claiming that ‗the world of culture is a world of values‘ and that ‗the values with 
which these human achievements are concerned are dominantly those of the good for man 
[sic]‘.70 Tanner, by contrast embraces the more mainstream anthropological view of culture 
                                                                                                                                               
68 For a much more thorough discussion of the various nations‘ approaches to the idea of culture, see 
Tanner 6-16. 
69 Tanner 30-31; see also Williams 91. Katherine Verdery believes that ‗nearly all nonanthropologists 
understand ―culture‖ as cognition, ideas‘, rather than activities or material artefacts, a belief which I 
neither share nor see much evidence for in the (nonanthropological) sources I have consulted, though 
Religious Studies may be still sufficiently close to anthropology that researchers in that field absorb a 
more technically correct use of anthropological language than is evident in other disciplines. See Verdery, 
The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change (Columbia University Press, 1999) 34. 
70 Niebuhr 32-35. It should be noted that this definition is formulated in the context of Christ and Culture; 
culture is being set up to function in contrast to ‗Christ‘—the emphasis in Neibuhr‘s definition is on 
culture as a human construct. 
 | 26 
 
as ‗the defining mark of human life‘, and an ‗entire way of life‘.71 In sharp opposition to the 
idea of a high culture that an individual may possess or lack, she maintains that  
culture is understood to constitute or construct human nature. Culture 
does not function to regulate or repress it. Indeed, there is nothing to 
human life with any definite form or shape of its own that might exist 
outside culture so as to be regulated or repressed.72 
However, neither Niebuhr nor Tanner makes a particularly strong distinction 
between culture and its artefacts, or outward signs. To an extent, such a distinction is 
impossible to make. If we construe culture as a thing entirely separate from its concrete 
artefacts, we can make very few definite statements about a specific culture itself. If we 
treat culture instead as a ‗complex whole‘,73 which encompasses both the intangible and its 
artefacts, we risk confusion between the artefact and the culture it represents—and, 
returning to Connerton, confusion between memory and its method of transmission.  
 At this juncture, it is enough to be aware—and wary—of the potential for such 
confusion. The important point to take from this discussion is that culture is both the 
‗taken-for-granted, tacit background‘ and a deliberate construction; collective memory is 
encoded and transmitted by both conscious and unconscious means. I am primarily 
interested in its conscious, or at least semi-conscious, manifestations; to emphasise this, I 
will henceforth use the term ‗cultural memory‘ to refer to collective memory deliberately 
constructed and transmitted through artefacts, rituals, and texts. 
 
To characterize cultural memory as memory deliberately constructed and transmitted 
through texts, as I have done above, opens up another set of questions: what difference, if 
any, is there between cultural memory and history? Why is Parshat Zakhor, with its 
commandment to remember, the important passage, the passage that gets read out loud in 
the synagogue twice during the liturgical year? Why not its cognate passage (Ex. 17.14), in 
which God commands Moses to write the fate of Amalek ‗as a remembrance in the record‘ 
( ) to be passed on to Joshua and the generations that followed? 
What we saw in the passages from Marx and Nietzsche discussed at the end of the 
second section of this chapter was a subtle shift in the way that memory has been 
                                                                                                                                               
71 Tanner 25, 27. 
72 Tanner 27. 
73 Edward B. Tyler, Primitive Culture: Research into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, 
and Custom, vol. 1, 2nd ed, (John Murray, 1873) 1, quoted in Masuzawa 78. 
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construed: at the time they wrote, ‗memory‘ was beginning to move from signifying an 
operation of an individual mind to signifying a mode of relationship between the present 
and the past. It is from this wider construal that 20th century theories of memory arose, 
striving to make distinctions between memory and history (as well as between different 
types of memory) that would have been unnecessary prior to this merging of terms. 
Halbwachs began to draw the line between the two in the second chapter of The Collective 
Memory.74 He characterizes history as an external framework, devoid of personal 
connection: 
Proper names, dates, formulas summarizing a long sequence of details, occasional 
anecdotes or quotations, are the epitaphs to those bygone events, as brief, general, 
and scant of meaning as most tombstone inscriptions. History indeed resembles a 
crowded cemetery, where room must constantly be made for new tombstones.75  
 
Paul Ricoeur writes that this passage in The Collective Memory marks a sharp division between 
‗living memory‘ and the abstract anonymity of history:  
History is first learned by memorizing dates, facts, names, striking events, 
important persons, holidays to celebrate. [...] At this stage of discovery, 
itself remembered after the fact, history is perceived, mainly by the student, 
as ―external‖ and dead. The negative mark placed on the facts mentioned 
consists in the student‘s not being able to witness them. It is the province 
of hearsay and of didactic reading. The feeling of externality is reinforced 
by the calendrical framework of the events taught: at this age one learns to 
read the calendar as one learns to read the clock.76 
It is worth noting that while Connerton identified the repetition of rituals within a calendrical 
framework as one of the primary methods of collective (or cultural) memory transmission, 
Ricoeur sees the calendar as enforcing the externality of the past, moving it away from the 
realm of memory and into the realm of history. It is also worth noting that, for Ricoeur, as 
for Halbwachs, memory is ‗living‘ and history ‗dead‘; this dichotomy is present, to greater 
or lesser extents, in most attempts to theorize the difference between history and cultural 
memory. 
 Thus, we have also Pierre Nora‘s assertion that ‗There are lieux de mémoire, sites of 
memory, because there are no longer milieux de mémoire, real environments of memory‘.77 
                                                                                                                                               
74 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, trans. Mary Douglas (Harper & Row, 1980) 50-87. 
75  Halbwachs, The Collective Memory 52.  
76 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (University of Chicago 
Press, 2004) 394. 
77 Pierre Nora, ‗Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire‘, trans. Marc Roudebush, Representations 
26 (1989), 7-24; 7. This article is identical to the preface to Les Lieux de Mémoire, vol. 1 (Gallimard, 1984), 
available in English as Realms of Memory : Rethinking the French Past, vol. 1, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, trans. 
Arthur Goldhammer (Columbia University Press, 1996). 
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Nora identifies the cause of the ‗memory boom‘78 as ‗the acceleration of history‘, the 
increased speed at which the past is overtaken by ‗our hopelessly forgetful modern 
societies‘.79 It does not take Nora long to arrive at the same point as Ricoeur:80  
Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in 
fundamental opposition. Memory is life, borne by living societies founded 
in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, 
vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long 
dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the 
reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer.81 
The two commands in Parshat Zakhor now become quite clear: to keep the wrongdoings 
perpetrated by Amalek in living memory (the commandment is not ‗Remember Amalek‘, 
but ‗Remember what Amalek did‘), but to let the Amalekites themselves fade from the 
immediacy of memory into the distant realm of history; to recite, but not relive, the details 
of the encounter.  
 This distinction (though not its relation to Parshat Zakhor) has also been made by 
the historian Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, in his influential book Zakhor: Jewish History and 
Jewish Memory. ‗The biblical appeal to remember [...] has little to do with curiosity about the 
past‘, he writes. ‗Israel is told only that it must be a kingdom of priests and holy people; 
nowhere is it suggested that it become a nation of historians‘.82 Rather than the distinction 
between living, immediate memory and dead, external history found in Ricoeur and Nora, 
however, Yerushalmi argues that memory is selective in nature. History is neutral, 
recording the past in its entirety; memory transmits only the fragments of past that it deems 
relevant—in the case of Jewish memory, only the moments of God‘s intervention into 
                                                                                                                                               
78 This phrase is widely used to describe the surge of interest in memory, and especially collective memory, 
evident in the humanities since the 1980‘s. See David C. Berliner, ‗The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on 
the Memory Boom in Anthropology‘, Anthropological Quarterly 78, no. 1 (2005): 197-211; David G. 
Rosenfeld, ‗A Flawed Prophecy? Zakhor, the Memory Boom, and the Holocaust‘, Jewish Quarterly Review 
97, no. 4 (2007): 508-520; Volf 39-40; Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and 
History in the Twentieth Century (Yale University Press, 2006) 1. 
  The introduction to an earlier volume, edited by Jay Winter and Emmanual Sivan, War and 
Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), is quite critical of 
Nora‘s project, accusing him of narrowness and parochialism in his exclusive focus on France, which 
leads to a suggestion that his central thesis (that collective memory is no longer a widely operating social 
force) may not be applicable outside of France. They further suggest that the large amount of money the 
French government spends on museums may be better explained by recourse to economics (museums 
and culture are a sound investment with a good rate of return) than by hypothesizing that ‗the sacred is 
dead and we need a set of symbolic substitutes‘ (2). However, Winter and Sivan do not attempt to 
account for the public interest that makes museums popular enough to be considered a sound investment 
in the first place. 
79 Nora, Realms of Memory  8. 
80  Ricoeur actually wrote Memory, History, and Forgetting after Nora‘s Realms of Memory was published, and 
includes Nora in his analysis. 
81 Nora, Realms of Memory  8. 
82 Yerushalmi 10. 
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history are worthy of passing into memory.83 This distinction perhaps ignores the claim that 
history is itself not a set of events, but rather a set of texts, a narrative constructed after the 
events themselves have passed.84 It does, however, highlight the constructed nature of 
cultural memory. This process of construction is my concern in the remainder of this 
thesis. 
 Rabbi Shapira‘s reading of Parshat Zakhor placed the deeds of Amalek firmly in the 
realm of living memory by relating those deeds to the situation in which Shapira and his 
congregation found themselves. The Jews hearing Shapira‘s sermon in the Warsaw Ghetto 
did not have to strive to recall the details of what Amalek did to them on their journey, 
after they left Egypt, as Ricouer imagined the young Maurice Halbwachs straining to recall 
the details of his history lessons; they knew perfectly well how the SS took advantage of 
their famine and weariness, cutting down those too weak to defend themselves.85 Shapira‘s 
sermon built a connection between the two oppressions, enabling his listeners to reach 
back beyond their own personal memory to interpret their experiences within the narrative 
framework provided by the cultural memory transmitted through the regular recital of 
scripture. In turn, the personal memories of the members of the community buttressed the 
viability of the Amalek narrative as a cultural memory, a part of their own living (and lived) 
experience.  
 This, I suggest, is the primary function of a memorial: to move the past from the 
realm of history into the realm of memory, by forging an active connection to the lived 
experience of the individuals who encounter it. A memorial, as I understand it, should not 
be confused with Nora‘s lieu de mémoire, although many of the lieux that Nora describes 
could also, given the proper circumstances, function as memorials. However, Nora believes 
that lieux de mémoire are little more than archives, sorting facilities which help to shepherd 
the last vestiges of living memory into the storehouse of history; a memorial functions in 
the opposite direction. A memorial forges an emotional link between an individual and a 
                                                                                                                                               
83 Yerushalmi 10-11. 
84 See, for example, Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley (Columbia University Press, 
1988): ‗It appears to me that in the West, for the last four centuries, ―the making of history‖ has referred 
to writing‘ (pp. 5-6). See also Elizabeth A. Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn 
(Harvard University Press, 2004): ‗The historical fact must be recognized not as ―what really happened,‖ 
but as ―what the evidence obliges us to believe‖‗ (19). 
85 Compare with Emil Fackenheim‘s description of the search for a Biblical parallel to Hitler: ‗Though 
foredoomed to failure—Hitler is without precedent—inevitably the search goes on, must go on. It fails 
with the Pharaohs, for these were pragmatic enemies only [...] Failing with Pharaoh, the search then turns 
to Amalek, but this too fails, for this Biblical enemy attacks the weakest only because they are easiest to 
defeat. The enemy of our time has only one Biblical type that comes close to being his prototype, but this 
one is uncannily close: the Haman of Esther, who wants to kill all Jews because of the trifling slight of a 
single Jew‘. Fackenheim, The Jewish Bible after the Holocaust: A Re-reading, (Indiana University Press, 1990) 
60-61.  
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past event which they themselves did not experience directly, enabling them to relate to the 
past as if they had personally encountered it, and through that relation renders the past an 
active part of that individual‘s living experience. This is a well-documented function of 
Jewish liturgy, but such functionality is not limited to Jewish tradition, nor to liturgy; 
architectural sites (the classic ‗memorial‘ form, although I hasten to point out that not every 
monument provides the emotional conduit necessary for it to be a memorial in the 
technical sense that I am proposing), literature, even film, music, and visual art can act as 
memorials.  
 
 
In the following pages, I will examine a sample of memorial sites and texts from the last 
century, a timeframe recent enough that the boundaries between living (individual) 
memory, cultural memory, and history are constantly being re-negotiated. None of these is 
neutral. Each one is a construction; each both presents a particular interpretation of the 
event(s) it represents and is itself subject to interpretation and re-interpretation. 
In the next chapter, I will return to an examination of the commandments of 
Parshat Zakhor, reading them from an ethical, rather than linguistic standpoint. This 
reading becomes the basis for a more broad discussion of the role that narrative and 
language play in creating spaces in which violence can become not only ethically 
permissible, but necessary. The history of ‗Just War‘ rhetoric is a long and bloody lesson in 
what is at stake in choices about how collective memory ought to be constructed, 
transmitted, and interpreted. 
In Part Two, I will engage in a closer study of the way memorialisation contributes 
to the formation of identity, both individual and cultural. Due to the strong parallels 
between the social situation of the Athenian Empire in the 5th century BCE and that of the 
British Empire in the early 20th century CE, as well as to the great influence classical forms 
had on the accoutrements of memorialisation in the First World War, I begin by briefly 
returning to ancient Greece, to examine what light the conflict over the burial of Polynices 
portrayed in Sophocles‘ Antigone may shed on the issue of how, and by whom, the meaning 
of history is negotiated.  
This discussion provides the foundation for my investigation of the way the 
memory of the First World War was constructed in Canada. Throughout Part Two, I argue 
that the dead (or wounded, or missing) bodies of soldiers are the locus of such 
negotiations. I further argue that the dominant Christian theology of the time neither 
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challenged nor was challenged by the events of the war; rather, commemorative activity 
freely borrowed images of sacrifice and atonement, and the churches incorporated the 
transformed images back into their regular vocabulary of worship. Focusing on Canada 
permits me to draw on a particular set of historical circumstances which, taken together, 
provide a useful interruption to more dominant (British and American) understandings of 
the war, thus underlining the element of selectivity at work in memorialisation. My main 
vehicle for this discussion is a parallel reading of four novels from L. M. Montgomery‘s 
Anne of Green Gables series (the publication of which spanned the years 1908 to 1921) and 
the work of the Imperial War Graves Commission (now known as the Commonwealth 
War Graves Commission). 
I conclude Part Two with a close examination of one particular Canadian 
monument to the First World War, the Walter Allward-designed Canadian National Vimy 
Memorial. ‗Reading‘ the monument alongside Jane Urquhart‘s fictional account of its 
creation in The Stone Carvers permits me to unpack the way the memory of the First World 
War has evolved from the time it was being constructed by Allward, Montgomery, and a 
host of other Canadian culture-makers, until the present day, when more nuanced historical 
readings are available to undermine the triumphant, nation-building myth of Canada‘s War. 
One of the great risks of constructing memorials which carry the past forward into the 
present is that the consciousness of the present can, then, also infect the past. Memorials 
are too dependent on their readers ever to be truly stable texts. 
In Part Three, I begin by conducting a similar, though briefer, examination of the 
presentation of memorials to the Holocaust. I suggest that, where the First World War 
memorials were originally designed to serve an existing community of mourners, acting as 
substitutes for the bodies of dead soldiers, the Holocaust memorials, particularly those 
which take the form of museums, have been designed to create a community of mourners, 
guiding the visitor towards a sense of sympathy for and responsibility to the victims they 
commemorate. 
Two churches bombed during the Second World War and rebuilt afterwards 
provide the framework for my consideration of the relationship between the history of the 
years 1933-1945 (the total span of Nazi rule in Germany) and religious practice since that 
time. Where the vocabulary of memorialisation at work in the First World War was well in 
tune with the Christian theological language of the time, the memory of the Holocaust 
poses a direct challenge to Jewish theological understanding. It is the negotiation between 
theology and history, and the role that memorialisation plays in this, which is my primary 
concern in this part. After a survey of several notable academic theologians, I focus 
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primarily upon the relatively recent work of David Blumenthal and Melissa Raphael, both 
of whom, in different ways, are concerned particularly with the issue of encounter between 
God and humanity, and how the understanding of and approach to such an encounter is 
altered by understanding of the Holocaust. Thus, my focus returns to the issue of Jewish 
liturgy—not within a calendrical framework, as at the beginning of this thesis, but as a 
space of encounter.  I conclude with a reading of two contemporary novels by Canadian 
Jewish women, both of which point towards the possibility of, but do not actually 
accomplish, a reconciliation between liturgical and quotidian existence, a renewal of 
connection between God and Israel, accomplished in part by a re-interpretation of existing 
memorials. 
  
REMEMBERING AMALEK
  
he command to blot out the memory of Amalek, when it is taken as a poetic 
hyperbole meant to indicate complete obliteration, the most total form of 
total war imaginable, is ethically repulsive to most contemporary readers.1 It 
has tended to be read by Christian commentators as a relic of a savage era which humanity 
has long since abandoned: the totality of destruction described as a sharp contrast to the 
limited and methodical means by which contemporary nations now conduct their wars, and 
the divine commandment as a counterpoint to the deliberation with which we now engage 
before embarking upon military adventure. In this chapter, I will examine the complex of 
issues surrounding the ethical conduct of warfare which are opened up by such readings of 
the Amalek texts: the way that remembrance of Amalek has been constructed and 
interpreted within the tradition of debate over the ethics of war. 
 Biblical scholars frequently analyse Deut. 25:17-19 and its cognate passage in 
Exodus in terms of ‗the ban‘, .2 That they do so may be counted as slightly curious, 
given that word‘s utter absence from any passage in Torah which deals with Amalek; such 
analyses begin with an assumption of similarity between the treatment of Amalek and 
nations which are explicitly subjected to the ban. However lexicographically unjustified this 
assumption may be, it provides a ready point of entry into a discussion of the ethics of 
memory, the ways in which memorialisation or past events may be used (or misused) to 
justify action or inaction in the present. In her study, War in the Hebrew Bible, Susan Niditch 
divides passages dealing with into two types: those that treat the ban as a sacrificial 
system, in which ‗[i]mposition of the ban, so that dead enemies become an offering to 
God, is one way of making sense of the inevitable carnage of war‘,3 and those that treat the 
ban as a mechanism of God‘s justice, ‗rooting out [...] impure, sinful forces damaging the 
solid and pure relationship between Israel and God‘.4 Niditch links this latter interpretation 
to the idea of the just war.5 While the passages from Deuteronomy and Exodus with which 
I have been working do not make an appearance in this volume (presumably because 
Niditch is cognizant that the verb make an appearance in either passage), 
Niditch does analyse 1 Samuel 15 (the haftarah for Shabbat Zakhor), which details a later 
interaction between the Israelites, led by King Saul, and the Amalekites, led by King Agag 
(from whom Haman, the villain of the Book of Esther is said to descend) as an instance of 
                                                                                                                                               
1 See Chapter 1, note 4. 
2 See, for example, Childs, Exodus 313; Fox 352, 966; Meyers 135; Nelson 302; G. Ernest Wright‘s 
commentary in Buttrick, vol. 2, 482.  
3 Susan Niditch, War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in the Ethics of Violence (Oxford University Press, 1993) 50. 
4 Niditch 56. 
5 Niditch 57. 
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the ban as a measure of God‘s justice.6 It is worthwhile to quote Niditch‘s final analysis of 
this approach to warfare at some length: 
It is not easy for humans to kill others. To participate in mass killing in war 
is destructive of individual psyches and of the larger community‘s mental 
health. The ban in either trajectory is a means of making killing in war 
acceptable. [...] [T]he ban-as-God‘s-justice ideology actually motivates and 
encourages war, implying that wars of extermination are desirable in order 
to purify the body politic of one‘s own group, to eradicate evil beyond 
one‘s group, and to actualize divine judgment. In the ban as God‘s justice a 
sharp line is drawn between us and them, between clean and unclean, 
between those worthy of salvation and those deserving elimination. The 
enemy is thus not a mere human, an offering, necessary to win the 
assistance of God, but a monster, unclean, and diseased. The ban as God‘s 
justice thus allows people to accept the notion of killing other humans by 
dehumanizing them and the process of dehumanization can take place even 
within the group during times of stress, distrust, and anomie.7 
While Niditch does not make reference to the work of Elaine Scarry at any point in 
her book, the parallels between what she writes here and Scarry‘s 1985 book, The Body in 
Pain, are striking. Scarry discusses, at some length, the psychological necessity to disguise 
and obscure the actual injuring of bodies which, she argues, is the single inarguable fact of 
warfare.8 The main means by which this disguise is perpetrated is linguistic rearrangement:  
the act of injuring, or the tissue that is to be injured, or the weapon that is 
to accomplish the injury is renamed [...] as prisoners subjected to medical 
experiments in Japanese camps were called ‗logs‘, and as the day during 
World War I on which thirty thousand Russians and thirteen thousand 
Germans died at Tannenberg came to be called the ‗Day of Harvesting‘.9 
This inversion, in which people become inanimate (‗logs‘, or crops to be harvested) and 
weapons take on a life of their own (‗arms‘, parts of a body, as Scarry describes slightly later 
in the same paragraph as the passage quoted), acts just as the notion of holy war, the ban as 
justice, described by Niditch, in ‗allow[ing] people to accept the notion of killing other 
humans by dehumanizing them‘.  
 Scarry takes what may be rightly labelled a logically extreme view of the idea of the 
‗just war‘; by reducing war to two structural components (injury and competition), she is 
able to argue that, while there may be some justification for the existence of ‗a contest 
based on a reciprocal activity that would produce a nonreciprocal outcome abided by all‘, 
there is no necessity, and thus no justification of, or justice in, such a competition being 
                                                                                                                                               
6 Niditch 61-62. 
7 Niditch 77. 
8 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford University Press, 1985) 63. 
9 Scarry 66. 
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based on the injuring of human bodies.10 Niditch does not go nearly so far—which is to be 
expected, as her book is a descriptive study of war as it is portrayed in the Hebrew Bible, 
rather than an argument for or against war itself—but is, at times (such as in the passage 
quoted above) sharply critical of fictions (to use Scarry‘s terminology) which make the 
taking of human lives too easy by obscuring the basic humanness of the lives to be taken. 
However, both Niditch and Scarry note, however obliquely, that justifications for war rest 
on a removal of responsibility from those most immediately concerned (the soldiers 
involved in directly injuring other human beings) to a more remote authority. Holy war, 
which entirely removes the responsibility for moral discernment from humanity, may thus 
be construed as an extreme form of this tendency. 
 
 
The editors of a recent collection of readings on The Ethics of War, Gregory M. Reichberg, 
Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, identify three major approaches to the subject: pacifism, 
the position that war is always to be avoided; ‗realism‘, proponents of which tend to refuse 
the validity of ethical considerations (the classic ‗might makes right‘ viewpoint); and ‗the 
just war tradition‘, which attempts to mediate between those two extremes.11 This 
‗tradition‘ is polygenous; it is exceedingly difficult to identify any precise point of origin, or 
to trace its development neatly from one thinker to the next. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby 
have not attempted to impose a developmental narrative on their sources, preferring to let 
the multivocity of the tradition speak for itself; other sources which I have consulted tend 
to be somewhat narrower in their scope, but, with a few exceptions, there is no uniformity 
in the thinkers singled out as important from one source to another.12  
The original just war theory is usually credited to Augustine of Hippo, although 
recent scholars have been at pains to point out that Augustine was himself the inheritor of 
                                                                                                                                               
10 Scarry 142. 
11 Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, eds., The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary 
Readings (Blackwell, 2006) x. 
12 Nor is there, for the most part, much evidence that later thinkers referred heavily to the work of earlier 
thinkers. Most of the works in this area which I have examined rely upon case studies and appeal to 
reason, rather than tradition, for their authority. See, for example, Karma Nabulsi, ‗Conceptions of Justice 
in War: From Grotius to Modern Times‘ in The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions, ed. 
Richard Sorabiji and David Rodin, (Ashgate Publishing, 2006) 44-60; Richard J. Regan, Just War: Principles 
and Causes (The Catholic University of America Press, 1996); Richard Sorabji, ‗Just War from Ancient 
Origins to the Conquistadors Debate and its Modern Relevance‘ in The Ethics of War, ed. Sorabji and 
Rodin, 13-29; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Penguin 
Books, 1977), and Robert L. Holmes, ‗Can War be Morally Justified? The Just War Theory‘, in Just War 
Theory, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain (Blackwell, 1992) 197-233. The Holmes article has been especially helpful 
to the brief developmental sketch that follows. 
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a philosophical tradition stretching back at least as far as Thucydides.13 Moreover, 
Augustine‘s thought on war is, perhaps, too fragmentary to be properly termed a theory; 
Reichberg, Syse, and Begby have suggested (in my view correctly) that Augustine‘s ‗moral 
intuitions‘ required the input of later thinkers to be transformed into coherent doctrine.14 
In The City of God, Augustine suggests that war ought to be approached as a ‗necessity‘ 
rather than as a ‗happiness‘, though he does not illuminate precisely what constitutes 
‗necessity‘ or ‗happiness‘, or how the two are to be differentiated.15 The difficulty is 
somewhat illuminated later on in that same work, when he explains that it is natural and 
just that the earthly city seeks the good of peace, and ‗[t]his peace it strives to obtain 
through war‘.16 Since we may reasonably suppose that peace is, for Augustine, a happiness, 
it follows that the war leads to happiness, but is not happiness itself—‗happiness‘ is the end 
which is approached through the ‗necessity‘ of war. In Questions on the Heptateuch, Augustine 
clarifies the circumstances under which war may be deemed necessary: 
As a rule just wars are defined as those which avenge injuries, if some 
nation or state against whom one is waging war has neglected to punish a 
wrong committed by its citizens, or to return something that was 
wrongfully taken.17 
However, the important question of who has the authority to decide that these conditions 
have been met is not addressed here, but, rather peripherally, in Against Faustus the 
Manichean. There, Augustine suspends questions of justice as unnecessary to the subject at 
hand,18 focusing instead on the necessity of deference to those higher up the chain of 
command: 
No one can have any power against them but what is given him from 
above. For there is no power but of God, who either orders or permits. 
Since, therefore, a righteous man, serving it may be under an ungodly king, 
may do the duty belonging to his position in the State in fighting by the 
order of his sovereign,—for in some cases it is plainly the will of God that 
he should fight, and in others, where this is not so plain, it may be an 
                                                                                                                                               
13 Reichberg, et al., contest the idea of Augustine as the originator of the just war tradition, pointing to texts 
from Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero in support of their claim that Augustine‘s thought was built 
on a pre-existing tradition. See Reichberg et al. 70-71. 
14 Ibid. 
15 City of God Book IV, ch. 15: Augustine, The City of God: Books I-VII, trans. Demetrius B. Zema and Gerald 
G. Walsh (The Catholic University of America Press, 1949) 211-212. 
16 City of God Book XV, ch. 4: Augustine, The City of God: Books VIII-XVI, trans. Gerald G. Walsh and 
Mother Grace Monahan (The Catholic University of America Press, 1952) 419-420. 
17 Quaestionum in Heptateuchum 6.10, translated in Louis J. Swift, The Early Fathers on War and Military Service 
(Michael Glazier, 1983)135. 
The revenge motive is, of course, prevalent in Parshat Zakhor, although in present-day discourse 
vengeance is considered to be a poor excuse for warfare. 
18  Against Faustus Book XXII, ch. 74; Reichberg et al. 81.  
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unrighteous command on the part of the king, while the soldier is innocent, 
because his position makes obedience a duty19 
Just as it is not the place of mere humans to question the will of God, Augustine argues, it 
is not the place of a mere soldier to question the will of the ruler that soldier serves.20 
Augustine similarly defers the responsibility for the means by which a war is waged:  
the only thing a righteous man has to worry about is that the just war is 
waged by someone who has the right to do so [...] it does not matter at all, 
as far as justice is concerned, whether he wins victory in open combat or 
through ruses.21 
 A far more systematic theory of just war was put forth by Thomas Aquinas in the 
Summa theologiae II-II, Question 40 (On War). According to Aquinas,  
In order for a war to be just, three things are required. First, the authority 
of the prince by whose command the war is to be waged. [...] Secondly, a 
just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be 
attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. [...] Thirdly, it is 
necessary that those waging war should have a rightful intention, so that 
they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.22  
Aquinas refers directly to Augustine in support of the second and third points, and, indeed, 
neither revises nor greatly embellishes upon what Augustine had already asserted some 
eight hundred years previously. His great contribution is, rather, a focused and coherent 
compilation of the existing thought on the subject. He does differ slightly from Augustine 
on the question ‗Whether it is licit to lay ambushes in war?‘, taking the laying of an ambush 
as a specific instance of a more general question: whether it is licit to mislead the enemy.23 
Aquinas identifies two ways in which the enemy might be misled, and judges one, 
providing the enemy with false information, as illicit in war as it is in peace, while the other, 
concealing information from the enemy, he finds entirely permissible.24 Aquinas does not, 
in other words, ascribe a special status to actions undertaken in the context of war; to him, 
the moral test for acts in wartime is the same as for acts in peacetime. 
 The difficulty with Augustine‘s and, to a lesser extent, Aquinas‘s willingness to 
suspend as irrelevant questions of jus in bello, justice in the means by which war is waged, 
                                                                                                                                               
19 Augustine, Against Faustus 22.5, trans. Richard Stothert, Logos Virtual Library 
<http://www.logoslibrary.org/augustine/faustus/2275.html>, accessed 9 January 2010. 
20  This deference to authority has not been successfully deployed as a defence in the war crimes trials of the 
20th century. See, for example, Hannah Arendt‘s account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books, 1963), esp. 246-247. See also Arendt, ‗Personal 
Responsibility Under Dictatorship‘ [1964] in Responsibility and Judgment (Schocken Books, 2003) 17-48. 
21 Quaestionum in Heptateuchum 6.10; Swift 138. 
22 Summa Theologiae II-II q.40.1; Reichberg et al. 176-178. 
23 It is worth remembering at this point that, as mentioned in the previous chapter, ambush is one of the 
charges often levelled against Amalek. 
24 Summa Theologiae II-II q.40.3; Reichberg et al. 180-181. 
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provided that appropriate conditions for jus ad bellum, justice in the reasons for which war is 
waged, have been met, has been highlighted by Robert L. Holmes.25 Holmes notes that it 
would appear theoretically possible for both sides in a war to at least believe that they have 
just cause, and, thus, to hold themselves licensed to pursue that cause by any means 
necessary.26 This issue was addressed by Francisco de Vitoria in two lectures delivered in 
1539 (and published in 1557) concerning the Spanish conquest of the New World.27 In the 
second of these, De Jure Belli (On the Law of War), Vitoria points out that this possibility is, 
in fact, a probability; ‗[i]t does not usually happen that princes wage war in bad faith‘, and 
most wars are fought by two opponents who both believe that their cause is just.28 In 
addition to displaying a somewhat remarkable faith in the usual virtue of princes, Vitoria 
considers this dilemma to be evidence that not all wars which are deemed just and carried 
out by a legitimate authority actually are just. Otherwise,  
all the belligerents would be innocent, and consequently it would not be 
lawful for either side to kill anyone on the other. Even the wars of Turks 
and Saracens against Christians would be justified, since these peoples 
believe that they are serving God by waging them.29 
The distinction between what Holmes identifies as the objective moral status and 
subjective perception of a just war renders the conclusions regarding conduct in war 
reached by Augustine and Aquinas problematic. In such circumstances, not only does 
concern for justice cease to mediate the means by which a war is conducted, as each side 
may increase its use of force to match its subjective perception of the justice of its cause, 
but those who engage in war do so without any guarantee that their use of force will be 
licensed as just, since that license depends on the objective, rather than perceived, justice of 
their cause.30  
                                                                                                                                               
25 Holmes 197-233.  
  Aquinas‘s conclusion regarding the legitimacy of ambushes (‗For a man would have an inordinate 
will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him‘) seems to imply that warfare ought to 
be conducted by the same set of rules as the rest of life (Aquinas speaks of deception in general terms, 
and applies those general conclusions to the specific case of the ambush). His conclusion regarding the 
permissibility of warfare on holy days, Article 4 of the same question, is also an application of a general 
principle to the specific case of warfare (‗The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those things 
which are ordained to man‘s safety‘). However, the legitimacy of that application rests upon a subjective 
perception of the necessity of warfare (‗However, as soon as the necessity [of warfare] ceases, it is no 
longer licit to wage war on a holy day‘); in Aquinas‘s scheme, whether an action is just in war is still 
dependent upon the justice of the war itself. 
26 Holmes 201. 
27 Reichberg et al. 288. 
28 Francisco de Vitoria, ‗On the Law of War‘ 2.1 in Political Writings, Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence 
ed. and trans.  (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
29  Ibid. 
30 Augustine, Aquinas, and Vitoria are reasonably in agreement that this difficulty extends only to those 
under whose authority the war is carried out (the princes), and not the common soldiers who actually 
carry out the war. As discussed above, Augustine maintained that a soldier is justified in waging war so 
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 This difficulty in contemporary just war theory is addressed in two ways. First, 
focus has shifted from just and unjust causes and towards a distinction between aggressive 
and defensive warfare, as demonstrated especially by chapter seven of the United Nations 
Charter, which will be discussed at greater length below.31 Second, there is an increased 
emphasis on jus in bello.32 Thus, the Just War Criteria published by the U.S. Council of 
Catholic Bishops in the 1983 pastoral letter, ‗The Challenge of Peace‘,33 includes, in 
paragraphs 85-100, jus ad bellum criteria as laid out by Augustine and Aquinas (just cause, 
competent authority, right intention, last resort),34 as well as by Vitoria (comparative 
justice), but also adds ‗probability of success‘ and ‗proportionality‘ (paragraphs 98 and 99-
100, respectively), with paragraph 100 forming a conceptual and stylistic bridge between 
the list of criteria for jus ad bellum and the more flowing narrative which describes the 
considerations of jus in bello (paragraphs 101-110). This latter discussion is focused on two 
areas of concern which the bishops believe ought to inform ‗strategy, tactics, and individual 
actions‘ during war-time: proportionality (the idea that the good achieved by the war must 
be sufficient to outweigh the evil of the war itself) and discrimination (the limitation of 
violence to persons and targets that can be reasonably classed as military, rather than 
civilian).35 Proportionality is, in this scheme, the key concept; its inclusion under both 
headings renders jus in bello a key criterion for jus ad bellum. In other words, the criteria for a 
just war are not just that it be fought for a just cause, but that it be fought in a just manner.  
                                                                                                                                               
long as he is sure of the authority of the king under whose command he does so. Likewise, Aquinas holds 
that ‗To have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of a prince or judge [...] is not to 
―take the sword,‖ but to use it as commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment‘ 
(Summa II-II Q. 40 Article 1). Vitoria alone admits the question of whether the common soldier bears any 
responsibility for determining whether the authority under which they fight is legitimate, or whether the 
cause of the war is just; he suggests that it is not required for the common soldier to closely examine the 
causes of the war (‗On the Law of War‘ 2.2.3), but that one who does come to the belief that the war is 
unjust must obey his (for Vitoria, the soldier in question is always a he) conscience and not fight, ‗even if 
he is ordered to do so by the prince‘ (‗On the Law of War‘ 2.2.1) and that, further, there are circumstances 
in which the lack of just cause is so apparent ‗that even citizens and subjects of the lower class may not 
use ignorance as an excuse for serving as soldiers‘ (‗On the Law of War‘ 2.2.4). 
31 United Nations, Charter (1946) <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml> (Accessed 
3 May 2009). 
32 This shift has not been instantaneous; Reichberg et al. trace its development over several centuries, noting 
especially movements towards jus in bello criteria in the works of Hugo Grotius (17th century) and Emerich 
de Vattel (18th century). 
33 United States Council of Catholic Bishops, ‗The Challenge of Peace‘ 
 <http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/TheChallengeofPeace.pdf> Accessed 14 April 2009. 
G.K.A. Bell, writing in 1940, found an earlier, but similar, document put forward by the Université 
catholique de Louvain to point towards a pacifist postion, as ‗It would seem exceedingly difficult for any 
modern war to satisfy all these conditions‘. Bell, G.K.A., Christianity and World Order (Penguin Books, 
1940) 81. 
34 While the ‗last resort‘ criterion is not made explicit by Aquinas, it is essentially a restatement of 
Augustine‘s dictum that war should be a matter of necessity rather than happiness. 
35 See also the discussion in Holmes 212-214. 
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This particular formulation of just war criteria continually returns attention, if not 
to the concrete reality of injured flesh which Scarry places at the centre of her analysis, to 
the reality of the human lives at stake in warfare. It is, however, worthwhile to note that the 
strongest language regarding the preservation of life occurs in paragraph 104, which 
advocates against the taking of ‗innocent‘, which is to say civilian, lives; the injury or death 
of soldiers is entirely absent from the discussion.  
 
 
The previous chapter‘s discussion of collective memory revealed a long philosophical 
tradition which, until rather recently, did not engage with the concept of memory found at 
work in the Torah. The case of just war theory is somewhat more complex. There is a 
parallel Jewish tradition, which developed mostly without engaging or being engaged by the 
theorists discussed above; there is not a single Jewish thinker excerpted in the Reichberg, 
Syse, and Begby volume. However, both traditions work largely from the same source 
texts—Vitoria, for example, frequently appealed to the Hebrew Bible to support his 
arguments.36 In working from the same, or similar, starting points, the traditions are 
capable of having moments of convergence just as frequently as their lack of reference to 
each other leads to moments of divergence.  
 Norman Solomon has presented a sound overview of the historical development of 
Jewish attitudes towards warfare, beginning with the text of Parshat Shofetim (Deut. 20), 
which outlines the rules by which the Israelites are to conduct their wars.37 This code of 
conduct has a smaller echo in Deut. 23:9-14, which dictates safeguards for ritual purity 
within the camp during a military campaign.38 These early texts are concerned with the 
means by which the war is conducted: the men in the army must be ritually pure, and free 
of any motivation to avoid battle, whether that motivation is intrinsic (fear of battle) or 
extrinsic (domestic obligations, such as a new wife, new vineyard, etc.); fruit-bearing trees 
should be preserved for food, rather than used to manufacture siege equipment; no city 
should be attacked before an offer of peace is made (the exact terms of which are outlined 
in Deut. 20:11), and in the event that offer is rejected, the city is besieged, the men killed, 
and women, children, livestock, and everything else in the city is plundered (Deut. 20:12-
14)—with the exception of cities belonging to the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, 
                                                                                                                                               
36 Norman Solomon, ‗The Ethics of War: Judaism‘ in The Ethics of War, ed. Sorabji and Rodin, 109. 
37 Solomon 108-109. 
38 Richard Nelson has also noted that Deut. 23:4-7 is a thematic precursor to Parshat Zakhor (Nelson 302). 
This turns Deut.23: 4-14 into a lynchpin, connecting the text of Deut. 20 to that of Deut. 25:17-19.  
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Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites (‗the seven nations‘), in which case ‗everything that 
breathes‘ is to be killed (Deut. 20:17).39 It is worth noting that the Hebrew word here is 
; Niditch analyses this passage as an instance of ‗The Ban as God‘s Justice‘, noting that 
the justification given for the slaughter is that survivors might ‗influence Israel to turn away 
from God‘.40 Two issues stand out to later commentators on this code of warfare: the 
obligatory offer of peace, and the harshness of the treatment extended to the tribes 
inhabiting the land promised to the Israelites. 
 While contemporary commentaries tend to question the historical validity of the 
ban, suggesting that the Deuteronomic text is far harsher than any Israelite military 
campaign,41 the Rabbinic tradition was built on reading strategies which softened the 
dictates of Deut. 20:17.42 Notably, the Rabbis read the verses dealing with the treatment of 
the tribes inhabiting the promised land as an exception only to the commandment given 
regarding the treatment of women, children, and livestock in verse 14; following a 
reference in Joshua 11:19, they held that terms of peace were to be offered even to those 
tribes.43 Moreover, Joshua ben Hananiah‘s assertion that ‗Sennacherib mixed up all the 
nations‘ (c. 100 CE) meant that commandments pertaining to the treatment of specific 
nations (such as Deut. 20:17, or, for that matter, Deut. 25:19) could no longer be carried 
out.44  
 
  
As with Augustine‘s gestures towards a theory of just war, Rabbinic writings on the subject 
are spread across a relatively wide body of text. However, the tradition was mostly 
compiled, explicated, and occasionally expanded upon by the Rambam, Moses 
Maimonides, at the end of the twelfth century of the Common Era, in the last treatise of 
the Mishneh Torah.45 This treatise, ‗Laws Concerning Kings and Wars‘, is first and foremost 
a fantastic work of imagination. Unlike the Christian theorists who I discussed earlier, all of 
whom wrote in response to their immediate political situations, in and for societies in 
                                                                                                                                               
39 Solomon notes that ‗the seven nations‘ comprises a total of ten tribes named at various points in the 
Torah (134). 
40  Niditch 67. 
41 See especially Solomon 109-110; Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Clarendon Press, 
1972) 51. 
42 Solomon notes that due to the political situation of the Jews following the destruction of the second 
Temple, these re-readings lack ‗firm contact with contemporary reality [...] it is historical reconstruction or 
messianic speculation, not the operational law of an actual society‘ (Solomon 110). 
43 Solomon 110. 
44 Mishna Yadayim 4:4; Solomon 110. 
45 Solomon 115. 
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which Christianity was the socially dominant religion, Maimonides wrote as a religious 
minority, in an Islamic society, at a time when there was no Jewish kingdom, nor any 
realistic indication that one might ever exist.46 The goal of his writing was not to instruct 
any ruler contemporary to him, but, rather, to extrapolate from Torah what laws a 
hypothetical Jewish kingdom might be governed by. He discerned ten positive and thirteen 
negative commandments; of these, eight positive and six negative commandments pertain 
specifically to warfare, and a further three (one positive and two negative) relate to the 
treatment of women captured in warfare.47  
 Maimonides begins his treatment of war in the fifth chapter of the treatise (the first 
four, as the title would suggest, are dedicated to laws concerning the hypothetical Jewish 
king) by noting the distinction between religious and optional wars.48 Although 
Maimonides addresses the rules specific to religious wars before the rules for optional wars, 
or those applicable to both kinds of war, my discussion will begin with the latter, which is 
more immediately relevant to the preceding discussion, before returning, briefly, to the laws 
which are specifically relevant to Parshat Zakhor. 
 
 
 An optional war is one engaged in ‗against neighboring nations to extend the borders of 
Israel and to enhance his greatness and prestige‘; to engage in optional warfare requires the 
consent of ‗the court of seventy-one‘.49 Solomon notes that such a court has not existed for 
the past two thousand years or more, and, thus, ‗the definition of ―competent authority‖ 
virtually rules out the possibility of non-defensive war‘.50 However, Maimonides still finds it 
important to lay out rules for provinces conquered in an optional war, even going so far as 
to debate whether such a war would be permissible against Egypt, weighing the 
commandment against returning to settle in Egypt against the authority of the king and 
                                                                                                                                               
46  There is now a Jewish state, of course, but Maimonides could not have imagined the structure its 
government has taken, as the parliamentary system developed several hundred years after he wrote. The 
extent to which the law he extrapolated from Torah may or may not be relevant to the now very real state 
of Israel is a question open to debate, as Maimonides‘s imagined Jewish kingdom would have derived 
much of its religious legitimacy from being under the rulership of a king from the restored Davidic 
dynasty. 
47 For a complete listing, see Hershman 205-206. 
48 Solomon traces this distinction to a statement by Rava, in the Babylonian Talmud Sotta 44b. See Solomon 
111. 
49 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 5:1-2 (Hershman 217). 
50 Solomon 111. 
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court to expand the borders of Israel—he does decide that under such circumstances, 
settling in a portion of Egypt annexed to Israel would be permissible.51  
 More importantly, Maimonides re-iterates the obligation to offer peace to any city 
before waging war against it. Moreover, he insists that after a peace offer has been made 
and rejected, the city ‗may not be surrounded on all four sides but only on three in order to 
give an opportunity for escape to those who would flee to save their lives‘, a move which 
Solomon finds puzzlingly impractical—he traces the origin of that command to Rabbi 
Nathan, and hypothesizes that Nathan was searching for an explanation of ‗how, despite 
the annihilation of the Midianites alleged in Numbers, Midianite raids are reported in 
Judges 6‘.52 Maimonides expands the commandment against cutting down fruit trees to also 
forbid depriving the trees of water, ‗smash[ing] household goods, tear[ing] clothes, 
demolish[ing] a building, stop[ping] up a spring, or destroy[ing] articles of food with 
destructive intent‘.53 These commandments, taken together, form a powerful prohibition 
against engaging in total war. 
 
 
While the issue of injury is even more ignored in the code of Maimonides than it is in the 
sources discussed in the previous section, the bodies of the soldiers themselves are quite 
central to the proper conduct of warfare, regardless of the causes of the war. The soldiers‘ 
bodies must remain in a ritually pure state, although certain requirements are relaxed, 
presumably in a concession to the demands of military life. Thus, the soldiers in camp are 
exempt from the ritual washing of hands before eating, certain regulations concerning the 
Sabbath (a siege may continue on the Sabbath, and provided certain conditions are met in 
the construction of the camp, the soldiers ‗are permitted to carry objects from tent to tent 
and hut to hut‘, a thing which is normally forbidden on the Sabbath), and from certain 
dietary laws—they may eat of dubious produce as well as forbidden meat and wine.54 
Nontheless, the purity of the camp is to be maintained; both Deut 23.13-15 and 
Maimonides devote significant attention to the requirement that a location outside the 
camp must be specified for urination and defecation (Maimonides also specifies that this 
place must be separate from the field of battle), and excrement is to be buried by means of 
a stick or paddle which every soldier must keep with his weapons. Maimonides does not, 
                                                                                                                                               
51 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 5:6-8 (Hershman 217-218). 
52 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 6:7 (Hershman 222). 
53 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 6:8; 6:10 (Hershman 222-223). 
54 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 6: 11; 6:13; 8:1 (Hershman 223; 228).  
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however, address the strictures regarding night-time impurity found in Deut. 20:10-11—a 
somewhat uncharacteristic oversight on his part.  
 The bodies of dead soldiers are mentioned, although only briefly: ‗Whoever is killed 
in battle is buried on the spot where he falls; he acquires the right to the place as does one 
who is found lying in the road‘.55 Maimonides offers no elaboration on whether these 
burials conform to or depart from normal burial customs, whether, for example, the bodies 
are cleaned first, whether they may be moved temporarily from the spot on which they fall, 
or how much time is permitted to pass before burial. This passage is, however, interesting 
when read in light of the war graves projects that I will discuss in the Part II. 
 
 
Maimonides also gives considerable attention to another type of body—the bodies of 
captured women. Immediately after the passage in which he rules it permissible for soldiers 
to eat unclean meat, he also expounds on Deut. 21:11-12‘s ruling that it is permissible for a 
soldier to rape a captive woman.56 This is a tremendously problematic text, and 
Maimonides‘s interpretation renders it even more repulsive.57 A full critique is, 
                                                                                                                                               
55 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 6:12 (Hershman 223). 
56 The first question that ought to be put to the text—both the Biblical passage and Maimonides—is, of 
course, whether the actions being licensed actually qualify as rape. See Sandie Gravett, ‗Reading ―Rape‖ in 
the Hebrew Bible: A Consideration of Language‘, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 28 (2004): 279-
299. Gravett‘s consideration of this passage suggests its closest linguistic parallel is Lamentations 5:11, in 
which the rape of captive Israelite women is listed among the atrocities endured by the Israelites during 
the exile (Gravett 287). It seems to me that even the most charitable reading of these passages simply 
sidesteps the issue of the female captive‘s consent—and the word in contemporary English which best 
describes sexual intercourse without regard to the consent of one party or the other is ‗rape‘. 
  The irrelevance of the woman‘s consent is emphasised earlier in MT, Hilkhot Ishut 14:8, which rules 
that the husband of an Israelite woman who does not wish to have intercourse with him must divorce her 
immediately, ‗for she is not like a captive woman who must submit to a man that is hateful to her‘. 
  See also Tikva Simone Frymer-Kensky, Studies in Bible and Feminist Criticism (Jewish Publication 
Society, 2006) 243-244; 251-252n8. 
57 It is especially notable that the passage concerning meat is at the beginning of Chapter 8; the passage that 
details all other dietary laws is near the end of Chapter 6. They are separated by a lengthy and unrelated 
detailing of the reasons for which soldiers may be discharged prior to a battle, and the means by which 
such discharges are accomplished. The movement of the passage concerning meat away from the other 
food laws and into proximity with the laws regarding captive women creates a relationship of equivalence 
between the two which is made clear in the first line of the first passage concerning captive women: ‗A 
soldier in the invading army may also [that is, in addition to eating unclean meat], if overpowered by 
passion, cohabit with a captive woman‘. (MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 8:2 (Hershman 228)). This parallel is 
strengthened further by the conditions placed on the consumption of unclean meat: it is permitted only to 
‗[t]he armed men who invade heathen territory, conquer the (enemy) forces, and take captives‘—it, like 
the captive woman, is a spoil of war, rather than a relaxation of purity codes due to the necessities of 
camp life. 
  Pearl Elman‘s analysis of earlier Rabbinic sources shows that this comparison is not original to 
Maimonides, but is also found in Midrash Hagadol, Midrash Tannaim, and the Babylonian Talmud 
(Kiddushin 21b). See Elman, ‗Deuteronomy 21:10-14: The Beautiful Captive Woman‘, Women in Judaism: A 
Multidisciplinary Journal 1, no. 1 (1997); 
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unfortunately, outside the scope of my argument here, although the text is certainly 
deserving of one.58 We should pause to note, however, that this passage in Deut. is typically 
read as improving the treatment of a female captive.59 All this being said, I am interested here 
in the focus given to the ways in which the body of the captive woman is presented as 
threatening to the bodily purity of the soldier, and the ways in which this threat is 
mitigated.  
 The contact between the captive woman and the soldier is to be limited: ‗Coition 
with her is permitted only at the time when she is taken captive‘.60 The soldier is permitted 
to have intercourse with only one woman, only once, after which he must bring her into his 
home (presumably acquiring some degree of responsibility for her wellbeing) for at least 
three months.61 During this time, the woman ‗lets her nails grow, shaves her head, in order 
to become repulsive to him‘.62 Pearl Elman notes that the earlier commentaries suggest that 
repulsion is the inevitable result of a union between an Israelite and a foreign woman 
(regardless of her conversion status), rather than something which must be cultivated via 
grooming practices; Saul M. Olyan‘s reading of the biblical text supports this, interpreting 
the shaving of the head as part of a ritual meant to separate the captive woman from her 
previous identity, in preparation for her conversion and marriage.63 However, Maimonides 
mentions no specific grooming rituals for a woman who has indicated her willingness to 
                                                                                                                                               
 <http://www.utoronto.ca/wjudaism/journal/vol1n1/v1n1elma.htm> Accessed 26 April 2009. 
58 At this point, I would very much like to be able to cite critiques of this section of Maimonides, or at the 
very least of the root passage in Deuteronomy, but in truth there are very few. Elman, above, has 
addressed earlier Rabbinic sources. James A. Diamond‘s article on medieval Rabbinic readings of the 
passage in Deuteronomy focuses on Nahmanides (whose interpretation is considerably more gentle and 
less problematic); when he makes reference to Maimonides, it is never to this section of the the Mishneh 
Torah. See Diamond, ‗The Deuteronomic ―Pretty Woman‖ Law: Prefiguring Feminism and Freud in 
Nahmanides‘, Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society 14, no. 2 (2008): 61-85. 
  It is perhaps telling that of all the volumes of work by Jewish feminists, the one most likely to 
address the issue of the captive woman is Rachel Biale‘s Women in Jewish Law: The Essential Texts, Their 
History, & Their Relevance for Today (Schocken Books: 1995) which includes an entire chapter on rape, is 
silent—not just on Maimonides (though Biale engages with passages from the Mishneh Torah elsewhere) 
but on the root passage from Deuteronomy. 
59 Solomon 109; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 134-5. 
60 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 8:3 (Hershman 228). 
  Elman notes that this represents an innovation in interpretation that occurred in the Babylonian 
Talmud; earlier midrashim and the Jerusalem Talmud ruled that intercourse could only take place after the 
thirty-day waiting period, purification rituals, conversion of the woman, and contracting of a valid 
marriage. 
61 Elman also notes that several of the earlier commentaries suggest that marriage to a captive woman will 
result in a disharmonious household because the sons born of such a marriage will be rebellious. Implicit 
in this is the idea that the mother‘s foreign nature will be transmitted to her children. 
62 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 8:5 (Hershman 229). 
63 Saul M. Olyan, ‗What Do Shaving Rites Accomplish and What Do They Signal in Biblical Ritual 
Contexts?‘, Journal of Biblical Literature 117, no. 4 (1998): 611-622; 617-19. 
  The Ramban interpreted these grooming practices as rites of mourning which accompanied a forced 
conversion; see Olyan 618 n33. 
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convert.64 Rather, he mandates alterations in personal appearance only for a woman who 
refuses conversion; in his scheme, there appears to be no other purpose behind these 
alterations than to repel the soldier, thereby diminishing his desire for further intercourse 
with her—unless and until she consents to conversion. 
Maimonides twice emphasises the importance of the captive woman‘s conversion: 
‗He [the soldier] puts up with her, in the hope that she might accept Judaism‘, and, later, ‗If 
she refuses to be converted, she is put up with for twelve months‘.65 If the woman remains 
unwilling to convert to Judaism, but willing to accept and abide by the Noahide laws, then 
at the end of the twelve months she is released to become a resident alien; if she does not 
accept those laws (which is to say, will not denounce her own religion as idolatry), she is to 
be killed.66 The reason for the twelve-month waiting period is not given explicitly, but can 
be discerned from the abrupt shift in focus after the description of the woman who is 
granted resident alien status, but prior to the ruling on the woman who refuses to accept 
the Noahide laws.67 In between the descriptions of the legal fates of each of these women, 
there is an interjection: 
If she conceived on her first intercourse, the child is a proselyte, and is in 
no respect to be regarded as his [the soldier‘s] son, because his [the child‘s] 
mother is a heathen. But the court on its authority arranges for his 
ablution.68 
By mandating that the woman must be ‗put up with‘ for twelve months following her rape, 
Maimonides ensures that any child conceived will have been born—that is to say, separated 
from the body of its mother—prior to the woman‘s execution. The underlying theme in 
this entire section is the separation between the bodies of Israelites (the soldier, the 
proselyte child) and non-Israelites (the unconverted captive woman). As the issue of 
captives only arises in an optional war, and this set of laws is thus purely theoretical, the 
degree to which it is worked out in Maimonides and in earlier Rabbinic writings points to a 
more general concern with bodily purity, conversion, and intermarriage, with the 
boundaries between Jew and non-Jew, than a specific concern about conduct in warfare; 
this is apparent in the shift from the discussion of the captive woman to the following 
section‘s discussion of laws governing Noahides living amongst Jews. 
                                                                                                                                               
64 ‗If after the first coition, while she is still a heathen, she expresses her willingness to accept Judaism, 
arrangements are forthwith made for her ablution for the purpose of conversion‘. MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 
8:5 (Hershman 228-9). 
65 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 8:5; 8:7 (Hershman 229). 
66 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 8:7; 8:9 (Hershman 229-30). 
67 In fact, paragraph 9 begins a transitional section between the discussion of the rape of the captive woman 
and the discussion of laws governing resident aliens within Israel. 
68 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 8:8 (Hershman 229-30). 
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In contrast to the optional war stands the religious war: ‗the war against the seven nations, 
that against Amalek, and a war to deliver Israel from the enemy attacking him‘.69 A religious 
war does not require the approval of the court.70 As mentioned earlier, an offer of peace 
must be made to any city before a siege is begun; the sole exception to this is cities 
belonging to Amon or Moab, ‗but though no peace offer is made to them, if they of their 
own accord sue for peace, it is granted to them‘; and as mentioned previously, a siege must 
still provide an escape route to the residents of the city.71 Maimonides neither departs from 
nor elaborates greatly upon the commandment given in Deut. 20:17; cities, belonging to 
the seven nations or to Amalek, which reject a peace treaty are to be conquered and 
‗everything that breathes‘ is to be killed—no captive woman scenario can arise in a religious 
war.72 However, Maimonides is quick to point out that war against the seven nations is only 
a theoretical concern, as ‗their memory has long perished‘.73 
 Maimonides does not extend this statement to Amalek, nor does he make any 
reference to the extermination of Amalek recounted in 1 Chronicles 4:43; he merely 
reminds his readers that it is a positive commandment to blot out the memory of Amalek 
and a positive commandment to remember the deeds of Amalek.74 Maimonides may have 
assumed that his audience would have been well aware that Amalek is no longer a viable 
nation; however, his rhetorical choice in this passage keeps open the possibility that 
contemporary ‗Amaleks‘ may be identified, and war against them licensed for religious 
reasons, without the approval of the court.75 Since, as was noted earlier, the court is no 
longer available to approve wars, the only just causes for war currently available within the 
Jewish tradition are religious; according to Maimonides, the only viable religious wars are 
defensive wars and the war against Amalek.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
69 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 5:1 (Hershman 217). 
70 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 5:2 (Hershman 217). 
71 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 5:6 (Hershman 218). 
72 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 5:4-5 (Hershman 217-218). 
73 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 5:4 (Hershman 217).  
74 MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 5:5 (Hershman 217). 
75 Horowitz believes that Maimonides meant to ‗make it quite clear [...] that there were still authentic 
Amalekites to be found in the world—in contrast to the descendents of the ―seven nations,‖ who were in 
theory also to be destroyed [...] but whose memory, he asserted, ―had long perished.‖‗ (131). However, 
Horowitz also details the efforts of later scholars working from Maimonides‘s text to mitigate the 
implications of this reading—notably Rabbi Moses of Coucy, who defers the commandment to war 
against the Amalekites to the messianic era (ibid.). 
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We have already seen, in the previous chapter, the way that Rabbi Shapira‘s sermons 
navigated the shift between a consideration of Amalek as a particular people and Amalek as 
a particular type of people. The danger of this shift becomes apparent when we examine 
another set of sermons on the same passage, preached by the German-American Reform 
Rabbi David Einhorn, in 1864 and 1870. At the height of the American Civil War, Einhorn 
drew an analogy between Amalek and the contemporary practice of slavery, warning his 
congregation both of the spiritual danger posed by the actual practice of slavery (and, not 
coincidentally, the Orthodox interpretation of Torah which might lead the more literally 
minded to conclude that the practice of slavery was divinely sanctioned), but also of 
various forms of spiritual slavery that Einhorn felt posed a high risk: a proposed 
Constitutional amendment which would have made Christianity the official religion of the 
United States, and the materialism which he believed characterised much of American 
Jewish life.76 Einhorn‘s invectives against both Christianity and Jewish materialism were 
repeated in his 1870 sermon, although the issue of actual slavery had, by then, been 
resolved.77 In contrast to Shapira, whose sermons identified Amalek as a purely external 
force which, nevertheless, had a negative spiritual impact on the Jewish community, 
Einhorn clearly admitted the possibility of Amalek-like behaviour, and, by extension, the 
existence of Amalek, within the Jewish community. Nor did he confine himself to finger-
pointing across denominational lines; while certainly the Orthodox community was, in both 
sermons, the subject of the heaviest criticisms he levelled at fellow Jews, his own Reform 
community was not exempted from the charges of materialism and spiritual indifference.  
Einhorn‘s sermons are an example of the way that the shift from understanding 
Amalek as a particular people to understanding Amalek as representative of a particular 
type of people can undermine the precise distinctions—between ally and enemy, Jew and 
non-Jew, ritually pure and ritually impure—which the Deuteronomic code sought to 
uphold and imprint on the very bodies of the Israelites. In his recounting, Amalek ceases to 
be a nation, distinct from and external to the descendants of the Israelites; it is no longer 
the distant other that is de-humanised and marked for extermination. Blotting out Amalek 
becomes a mission ‗to purify the body politic of one‘s own group‘; it is Einhorn‘s own 
                                                                                                                                               
76 Naomi Cohen, What the Rabbis Said: The Public Discourse of Nineteenth-Century American Rabbis (New York 
University Press, 2008) 63-65. 
77 Cohen 65. 
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friends and neighbours who are marked as less than human and expendable.78 This is, 
however, a rare example of the use of Amalek as a rhetorical device. Far more common, in 
the texts which I have examined, is an approach such as Shapira‘s, which identifies Amalek 
with an already existing enemy—a type of conflict already justified as a defensive war.  
 
 
As previously mentioned, self-defence is the cause of war most readily recognised as valid 
by current international law, as is evident in a reading of the United Nations Charter, Ch. 
VII.79 Notably, this chapter is titled ‗Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches 
of the Peace, and Aggression‘. At no point in the chapter is the word ‗war‘ actually used; 
the strongest phrase employed is ‗armed attack‘ (Article 51), followed closely by ‗urgent 
military measures‘ (Article 45), and reference to ‗force‘ or ‗armed force‘ (Articles 42, 43, 
and 46).80 Rather, the Security Council and its Members ‗take such action [...] as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security‘ (Article 42). The language 
of ‗maintain[ing] or restore[ing] international peace and security‘ dominates Ch. VII, 
appearing in Articles 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, and 51; it forms a frame around the chapter, 
appearing as the last phrase in both the first and last articles in the chapter, as well as a full 
half-dozen times in between.81  
                                                                                                                                               
78  Niditch 77. 
79  See above, note 31. 
80 ‗[...] take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary [...]‘ (Article 42); ‗When the Security 
Council has decided to use force [...]‘ (Article 43); ‗Plans for the application of armed force [...]‘ (Article 
46). 
81 ‗The Security Council shall [...] decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, 
to maintain or restore international peace and security‟. (Article 39); ‗Should the Security Council consider that 
measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take 
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security‟. 
(Article 42); ‗All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a 
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, 
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security‟. (Article 43); ‗There shall be 
established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to 
the Security Council‘s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security [...]‘ (Article 
47); ‗The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international 
peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the 
Security Council may determine‘. (Article 48); ‗Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective in self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall [...] not in any way effect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security‘. (Article 51). 
Emphases added. 
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 An analysis of this text in Scarry‘s terms may appear to belabour the point: the 
language of the Charter obscures to the greatest extent possible the precise nature of the 
‗actions‘ which may be ‗necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security‘ 
(and let us not overlook the shades of St. Augustine in that formulation: the ambiguous 
actions are necessary, and the Security Council derives no happiness from them). Article 41 
enumerates acceptable preludes to the use of force, including 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations.82 
Should these actions fail to produce the desired outcomes, then ‗demonstrations, blockade, 
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations‘ are 
permissible.83 Note the sharp decrease in specificity, from the exhaustive listing of ‗rail, sea, 
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication‘,84 to the completely 
unspecified ‗other operations‘.  
There are no bodies at stake here; there are not even states (save for the member 
states of the United Nations, which appear to act in concert at all times.). There is only, in 
the words of Article 39, a ‗threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression‘. In 
the language of the Charter, this act of aggression lacks an actor; the peace is not threatened 
or breached by any person, state, or thing. Threat and breach appear as though from 
nowhere—but from a very specific nowhere. Aggression, threat, and breach are always 
presumed to be outside of the Security Council. The ‗attack‘ of Article 51 is an attack 
‗against a Member of the United Nations‘ (emphasis added); at no point in this section of 
the Charter is there any admission of the possibility of an attack by a Member of the United 
Nations—a curious, or perhaps canny, omission for the document that governed 
international politics in the Cold War era. The Charter admits no jus ad bellum, no competing 
interests between members of the United Nations. There are only the Members, the peace, 
and the aggression which threatens it.  
 The contemporary political philosopher Michael Walzer suggests that this is a 
flattening of language endemic to the discourse of international relations: 
Aggression is remarkable because it is the only crime that states can 
commit against other states: everything else is, as it were, a misdemeanour. 
There is a strange poverty in the language of international law. The 
equivalents of domestic assault, armed robbery, extortion, assault with 
intent to kill, murder in all its degrees, have but one name. Every violation 
                                                                                                                                               
82 United Nations, Charter, Ch. VII, Article 41. 
83 United Nations, Charter, Ch. VII, Article 42. 
84 The Charter predates internet communication; the list provided is fairly exhaustive for its time. 
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of the territorial integrity of political sovereignty of an independent state is 
called aggression.85 
Walzer goes on to argue for a complex relationship between the ‗duties and rights of states‘ 
and ‗the duties and rights of the individuals that compose them‘.86 He suggests that it is this 
complexity which leads to the flattening (and, in the case of the UN Charter, the 
dislocation) of language. States do not derive their rights directly from the individuals who 
make up the state, but rather acquire them in a fashion which Walzer himself characterises 
as ‗harder to describe‘.87 What he does describe is a social contract which is the result of a 
complex negotiation, which we should now find familiar from our previous discussion of 
culture and cultural memory:  
Over a long period of time, shared experiences and cooperative activity of 
many different kinds shape a common life. ―Contract‖ is a metaphor for a 
process of association and mutuality, the ongoing character of which the 
state claims to protect against external encroachment. The protection 
extends not only to the lives and liberties of individuals but also to their 
shared life and liberty, the independent community they have made, for 
which individuals are sometimes sacrificed.88 
Reading Maimonides through Walzer, we are able to understand that what he imagines as 
defensive war is not just a war in defence of the borders of the land of Israel, or even in 
defence of the geographically diffuse bodies of the individual people of Israel, but in 
defence of the culture of Israel, of its concrete artefacts and of its ‗taken-for-granted, tacit 
background of beliefs, concepts, values, attitudes, and so forth‘—though only insofar as 
these artefacts and beliefs, concepts, values, attitudes, etc. are integral to the communality 
of the state.89 This suggests that the difficulty of determining which side of a conflict is in 
the right has not been ameliorated, and may in fact have been intensified, by the shift of 
focus from justice to aggression. Who determines what is and is not integral to a 
community? How is this determination made?  
 
 
As we have seen, much has been written about the origins of the conflict between Israel 
and Amalek, and a number of commentators, both Jewish and Christian, have been 
                                                                                                                                               
85 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 51-52. 
86 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 53. 
87 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 54. 
88 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 54. 
89 Tanner 30-1. It should be noted that Walzer is himself Jewish, although his sphere of influence extends 
more into the political sphere than the religious. 
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anxious to uncover the reason behind Parshat Zakhor‘s commandment to blot out the 
memory of Amalek. These commentaries tend to operate within the assumptions of the 
just war tradition as explored above: Amalek violated some principle of natural law, or 
threatened the territorial integrity of the Israelites, or presented a way of life that 
undermined an integral element of Israel‘s communal life (this last being the favoured 
position in Einhorn‘s and Shapira‘s sermons).90 This approach seeks to mitigate the 
discomfort readers may feel at the perceived harshness of the command against Amalek—
but in so doing, it largely confuses isegesis for exegesis; it reads back into the text concepts 
that have developed over the last two thousand or so years of scriptural interpretation, 
even if those concepts frequently have been developed in conversation with the text itself.91 
What is missing from this approach is the recognition we find in Maimonides: that war 
against Amalek is not a subset of defensive war at all, but an entirely different form of holy 
war. Natural law, territorial integrity, or communal life are explanations of the real or 
metaphorical war that has typically accompanied efforts to blot out the memory of a real or 
metaphorical Amalek, but they are not the reasons for the blotting out itself. The reason 
that Maimonides concludes that war against Amalek is, if not always just (by whatever 
metric of justice one happens to apply), then always permissible, is that the Torah 
commands war against Amalek. All other concerns are secondary. 
 This is not as sharp a contrast with the just war tradition as it may at first appear. 
James Turner Johnson has argued, based on a reading of many of the same texts which I 
have discussed above, that ‗within Western culture holy war has developed as a subcategory 
within the just war tradition; they are [...] ―analogous‖ rather than antithetical‘.92 The just 
war tradition evolved, in part, from a reading of texts concerned with holy war, and 
Johnson is at pains to point out that many of its seminal moments—such as the work of 
Augustine and Vitoria—occurred in response to questions of war for the sake of religion.93 
We might question whether ‗war for the sake of religion‘ is truly the equivalent of holy war, 
in the technical sense put forth by Maimonides. That Johnson appears happy to collapse 
the one into the other is merely a symptom of his lamentable tendency to collapse 
Christianity and Judaism into a single continuous philosophical system (‗the West‘), the 
better to facilitate the comparison between that system and Islam, which is the focus of his 
volume. However, he presents a persuasive argument that, just as Christianity is often cast 
                                                                                                                                               
90 For a full recounting of these various reasonings, see above, Ch. 1, as well as Sagi 325-330. 
91 Two thousand years here being the approximate time since the sages of the Mishnah began their debates. 
92 Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions, (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) 
43.  
93 Johnson 52-60. 
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as inheriting the covenant between God and Israel, Christian thinkers have also considered 
themselves to be the inheritors of the commandment to war in defence of that covenant.94 
Moreover, if we accept the hypothesis put forth at the end of the last section, that war in 
defence of an aspect of culture which is integral to a society‘s communal life is included 
under Maimonides‘s definition of obligatory or religious wars, then we must also admit at 
least the possibility that the broader term, ‗war for the sake of religion‘, may be used 
interchangeably with the more narrowly defined ‗holy war‘. The distinguishing factor 
between the two is the issue of defence: a war in defence of religious principles, provided 
those principles are integral to a society‘s communal life, may rightly be called a holy war; a 
war intended to spread religion—an aggressive war—may not. 
I have tried to demonstrate in my analysis thus far that all attempts to justify or 
limit war involve language that obscures the reality of individual bodies, of injured flesh, 
that is at stake in war, and defers responsibility away from the individuals actively engaged 
in creating injury and towards a higher authority; in my next chapter I will attempt to 
demonstrate that the vocabulary of war memorials is designed to accomplish something 
quite similar. Johnson argues that:  
when the state itself develops a state ideology, something very much like 
holy war reasoning reasserts itself in a secular guise. Examples include the 
ideologies of nationalism, nazism, communism, ethnicity, and even 
democracy. The West, then, has not completely rejected war for religion, 
for something very like it lives on in the form of wars for various justifying 
ideologies.95 
What Johnson omits is the extent to which the language of holy war, when employed in the 
service of a secular ideology, contributes to a flattening of language, an uncritical 
acceptance of one group‘s inherent correctness, and a dehumanization of the enemy. This 
comes about, in part, because the language of holy war functions by deferring the 
responsibility for moral judgement away from humanity and towards the divine; no 
questions of authority or proportionality arise in discourse about holy war. We shall see this 
to be the case in the religious discourse about the First World War which will be discussed 
in Part Two.
                                                                                                                                               
94 Johnson 58-9; see also Niditch 3-4. 
95 Johnson 60. 
  
  
He would search out graves in fields and even in private gardens. Some 
were marked with wooden crosses roughly made by the dead men‘s 
comrades out of the inevitable army ‗soap boxes‘, but because of the haste 
in which they had been erected many bore inscriptions that were soon 
washed away. These he would replace with ‗well-made crosses with a 
painted inscription and a tarred base‘. 
Philip Longworth, The Undending Vigil: A History of the Commonwealth War 
Graves Commission 1917-1984 (Leo Cooper, 1985) 3. 
 
He fell in love over and over again with the clay and then the plaster 
renditions of the young women he created, though never with the models 
themselves, who seemed too actual, too specifically human to be fully 
interesting. For the young men, once they had evolved into the perfection 
of plaster, he experienced huge compassion, knowing that he had caught 
them just as they were letting their individual personalities go, beginning to 
understand that they were part of a collective, moved by the lunatic actions 
of war. 
Jane Urquhart, The Stone Carvers (Bloomsbury, 2002) 350.
  
n October 1914, an officer of the British Red Cross by the name of Fabian Ware, 
accompanying a superior on an inspection tour, visited Béthune Cemetery in 
Northern France. There, he saw ‗a number of English graves all with plain but 
carefully made wooden crosses on them‘, but no sign that anybody had recorded their 
presence or made arrangements for their maintenance.1 In conversation with his superior, 
Dr. Stewart, Ware committed his unit to locating and registering ‗all the British graves the 
Unit could find‘.2 Over the next three years, the scope of his project grew. On 2 March 
1915, Ware informed his superiors at the Red Cross that the War Office had recognised 
them as the ‗Graves Registration Commission‘, solely responsible ‗to deal with the question 
of the locality, marking, and registration of the graves of the British officers and men in 
France‘; by May of that year Ware‘s unit gave up normal Red Cross ambulance work, and 
by September the Commission was absorbed into the British military command structure 
and separated from the Red Cross entirely.3 The Graves Registration Commission‘s 
mandate eventually expanded beyond France, to include all areas in which British troops 
had been active, and in May 1917, the Imperial War Graves Commission was officially 
established by Royal Charter.4 
In the wake of war‘s attempted obliteration of humanity, the blotting out of 
Amalek, comes a pressing desire—one might even say a necessity—to memorialise both 
individuals and the events which led to their deaths, to testify to the value and continuation 
of human life. It is this desire which Ware began to act upon, and the speed with which his 
enterprise grew is a testament to the strength with which the need was felt by others, as 
well. Much of what residents of Commonwealth nations now associate with war and 
remembrance is a direct result of the work of the Commission. The uniform character of 
the battlefield graveyards, the rows of identical gravestones, the Cross of Sacrifice and 
Stone of Remembrance, the monuments to those with no known graves—all of these 
elements were consciously established by the Commission in the years during and 
immediately following the Great War.  
One of the great disruptions the war brought to the ordinary system of mourning 
and remembrance was the absence of a body, a fixed point for grief to focus on. Not only 
were the numbers of the missing—both names lacking bodies and bodies lacking names—
exceptionally high, but even when bodies were successfully found, identified, and buried, 
they were found, identified, and buried near the battlefield. This meant that, especially in 
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the British Empire (and later on the Commonwealth) where a policy against the 
repatriation of bodies was developed early in the war, the body of the soldier was not 
available to the soldier‘s family as an object of consolation. Mourning thus became less a 
process of coming to terms with death, and more an exercise in coping with permanent 
and unalterable absence. This is attested to not only in novels, from L. M. Montgomery to 
Jane Urquhart, but also by the requests Fabian Ware‘s unit received for photographs of 
gravesites—according to an historical pamphlet published by the Commonwealth War 
Graves Commission, 12,000 of these requests had been fulfilled by 1917—as well by 
alterations in the liturgy of the Church of England and the young Presbyterian Church in 
Canada.  
While the carnage of the First World War necessitated significant adjustments to 
the practice of memorialisation, these adjustments took place within the socially dominant 
Christian theological framework. Although the war certainly contributed to social upheaval 
which left its mark on German theology, in Canada (and the rest of the British 
Commonwealth) the socially dominant Protestant Christian theology and national myth 
played a mutually reinforcing role.5 This theologically-driven commemoration set the stage 
for the further transformation of memorialisation which would come during and after the 
Second World War; that war heralded a far greater transformation of theological 
imagination, the effects of which are still being felt. Because of this, I have chosen to locate 
the First World War as the starting point for the historical portion of this study. It is, 
however, a mistake to understand First World War commemorative activities as themselves 
unprecedented; the roots of many practices today associated with the First World War can 
be traced back as far as the Athenian Empire. The parallels between Athens in the 5th 
century BCE and Britain in the 20th century CE are striking: both empires engaged in major 
military activity beyond their borders, both were faced with the problem of how to adapt 
the rituals of public mourning to accommodate the large numbers of soldiers who died in 
foreign combat, and both, in so doing, entered into a large-scale negotiation between civic 
and familial modes of identity. The literary record of the Athenian struggle over 
commemoration thus provides an instructive framework for considering the approach 
taken to the death, burial, and commemoration of British soldiers in the First World War.
                                                                                                                                               
5  See, for example, Douglas J. Cremer, ‗Protestant Theology in Early Weimar Germany: Barth, Tillich, and 
Bultmann‘, Journal of the History of Ideas, 56, no. 2 (1995): 289-307. 
  
ANTIGONE  
AND ATHENIAN WAR-DEAD: 
BODY AND IDENTITY IN THE GREEK 
TRADITION
  
 
iblical texts are not the only ancient texts with a significant interpretative 
afterlife. Western culture has also had a lengthy relationship of re-reading with 
the literature of ancient Greece and Rome—this is the origin of the ‗Western 
philosophical tradition‘ which I contrasted with the Jewish tradition of Biblical 
interpretation in Chapter One. In this chapter, I will turn to a brief examination of 
Sophocles‘ Antigone and its history of interpretation as a window into the way that discourse 
over mourning and ownership of the dead has developed. This discussion will provide a 
framework for the readings of Canadian material that I will undertake in the remaining 
chapters of this part of the thesis, and especially my reading of Jane Urquhart‘s The Stone 
Carvers. 
 George Steiner locates Jacques Barthélémy‘s 1788 work, Le Voyage de jeune 
Anacharsis, at the beginning point of Antigone‘s entrance into modern Western cultural 
consciousness after a lengthy period of textual obscurity. ‗In chapter XI‘, he writes, ‗the 
hero is taken to see his first Attic tragedy. It is Sophocles‘ Antigone and the young 
Anacharsis is overwhelmed: ―Quel merveilleux assortiment d‘illusions & de réalités! Je 
volois au secours des deux amants...‖‘1 It is a rather peculiar sort of reading that would 
characterise Sophocles‘ tragedy as first and foremost about the love between Antigone and 
Haemon; however, Barthélémy was simply the beginning of a long tradition of readings 
which have inserted emotional motivations into the play at the cost of obscuring its more 
substantial discourse on the opposition between state and familial power. 
Simon Goldhill argues that Greek tragedy as a whole is intimately bound up in the 
political concerns of the time and place in which it was first written and performed, as a 
contribution to the ‗continuing public debate on internal political developments.‘2 A 
number of readings of Sophocles‘ Antigone link it to a debate over public burial in Athens 
during the 5th century BCE, as the city was in transition from an oligarchy to a democracy. I 
will briefly review these historically contextualised contemporary readings before returning 
to my own reading of the character of Antigone, in both the Sophoclean tragedy and a 20th 
century re-interpretation of the Antigone myth penned by Jean Anouilh. It should be noted 
at the outset—and repeated frequently—that I am not at all interested in a reading of 
Antigone which casts her as a tragic heroine defending religious values against the 
encroachment of the state. Rather, I am interested in the competing claims of authority 
                                                                                                                                               
1  Steiner, Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought (Oxford University Press, 1984) 7. 
2  Simon Goldhill, The Orestia (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 2. See also Goldhill, ‗Civic Ideology and 
the Problem of Difference: The Politics of Aeschylean Tragedy, once again‘, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 
120 (2000). While Goldhill‘s primary textual engagement is with Aeschlyus, rather than Sophocles, large 
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B 
  | 61 
 
exercised over the body of Polynices, and the way they are presented and negotiated, 
without attributing value to one position over or against the other. As my later analysis of 
the competing claims of Antigone and Creon shows, Sophocles presents both positions as 
significantly flawed, in startlingly similar fashions. 
 
 
The early 5th century BCE saw Athens transforming from a city-state (polis) into an empire.3 
Following a victory over the Persian army in the battle of Salamis (478 BCE), a number of 
Greek city-states banded together to form the Delian League; by 454 BCE, the League‘s 
treasury and governance were both firmly located in Athens.4 Over the next several 
decades, Athens consolidated its position as the centre of the Empire.5 This transition 
wrought many changes in Athenian daily life; I am interested here particularly in the 
relocation of mourning and burial practices for dead soldiers from the private to the public 
sphere.  
Prior to the 5th century, it is unclear whether most Athenian war-dead were 
cremated, and their ashes brought back to Athens for private burial, or whether internment 
on the field of battle was more common. Thucydides mentions the soldiers who were killed 
at the Battle of Marathon as receiving the exceptional honour of battlefield burial.6 
However, this passage is commonly known as ‗Thucydides‘ Blunder‘, due to a wealth of 
evidence indicating that battlefield burial was far more common than that passage 
indicates.7 Regardless of where soldiers were buried—in their native earth or the ground on 
which they fell—it is clear that both the internment of repatriated bodies and 
commemoration of un-repatriated soldiers were carried out by private families on public 
ground: the Acropolis was littered with military memorials erected by members of the 
                                                                                                                                               
3  I am greatly indebted in this section to Rebecca Futo Kennedy, for the many informative conversations 
we have had about the development of the Athenian empire. Most of what I now understand about the 
history of the period was learned in the process of editing her book, Athena‟s Justice: Athena, Athens, and the 
Concept of Justice in Greek Tragedy (Peter Lang, 2009). For the significance of Athenian imperialism in 
Antigone, see Cynthia B. Patterson, ‗The Place and Practice of Burial in Sophocles‘ Athens‘ Helios 33S 
(2006) 38. 
4  Kennedy 5. 
5  Kennedy argues that this process of consolidation took place largely through the transference of legal 
authority from the other cities in the League to the Athenian courts (Kennedy 22; 31-2), and also, 
importantly, through the spread of the cult of Athena from Athens to the rest of Greece (Kennedy 7). 
6  Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, in Thucydides vol. I, Loeb Classical Library, Charles Forster Smith, 
ed. and trans. (William Heinemann, 1928) 319 (Book 2, ch. 34, section 5). See also Christoph W. 
Clairmont, Patrios Nomos: Public Burial in Athens during the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B. C.: The archaeological, 
epigraphic-literary and historical evidence, (B. A. R., 1983) 16; Wm. Blake Tyrrell and Larry J. Bennett, Recapturing 
Sophocles‟ Antigone, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998) 7. 
7  See, for example, Mark Toher, ‗On ―Thucydides‘ Blunder‖: 2.34.5‘, Hermes 127, no. 4 (1999): 497-501; see 
also W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War, Part IV (University of California Press, 1985) 94-95. 
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aristocracy.8 There is a wide gap between the public burial of war dead described by 
Thucydides (and his description of the ceremony is still regarded as authoritative, regardless 
of the puzzle of the Marathon burial) and any picture that has been drawn of Athenian 
war-burial and commemoration prior to 508 BCE, and the transition from one practice to 
another was no more seamless than the advent of democracy, with which it coincided. The 
tensions that arose in 5th century Athens over burial, commemoration, and above all 
ownership of the bodies of the dead played out on the tragic stage, particularly in 
Sophocles‘ Antigone.9 These tensions echo into the present day, and a particularly strong 
parallel exists between the Athenian Empire in the mid-5th century (BCE) and the British 
Empire in the early 20th century (CE).10 
 Christoph Clairmont dates the genesis of public burial of war dead to the early 5th 
century BCE.11 Prior to that, he suggests the textual evidence indicates that ‗individual 
families cared for the burial of the sons who died in warfare‘, although he admits that 
public honours for particularly exceptional individuals were not unheard of.12 However, it 
would be incorrect to assume that the difficulty of repatriation or the honour associated 
with a public funeral made the removal of mourning and burial rites from the familial 
domain a simple matter. William Blake Tyrrell and Larry J. Bennett note that this removal 
signalled a sharp divide in Athenian society: 
The public funeral exacerbated the antagonism of the demos and the family 
over funeral celebrations by separating the dead from their families. 
Women had brought the dead into the world in the company of women, 
and they or other women of the family should have prepared the bodies for 
burial and mourned them. Bones and ashes brought home by family 
members could be tended in the house, but the public funeral replaced the 
body of the deceased and moved the place of grieving from the house with 
its familiar things and smells to the open sunny spaces of the men‘s agora. 
Although the public ritual allotted two days for the family to mourn the 
loss, twice that allowed for private funerals, such concessions paled before 
                                                                                                                                               
8  Greg Anderson, The Athenian Experiment: Building an Imagined Political Community in Ancient Attica, 508-490 
BCE (University of Michigan Press, 2003) 107; Clairmont 16-21. 
9  See Tyrrell and Bennett 7-14. See also the essays collected in Helios 33S (2006). 
10  Judith Butler traces the heritage of family/state tension through philosophical criticism of Antigone in 
Lacan, Irigary, and Hegel; her analysis of these readings need not be repeated here. It should be noted, 
however, that Butler‘s analysis focuses on Antigone herself as an agent against the state, and ignores the 
significance of the dead body as an object to be claimed by one group or another, lacking in voice, agency, 
or intrinsic identity of its own. See Butler, Antigone‟s Claim: Kinship Between Life & Death, (Columbia 
University Press, 2000) 1-25. See also Mark Griffith, ed., Sophocles Antigone (Cambridge University Press, 
1999) 48-50. George Steiner, of course, has produced a considerably longer recounting of the place of 
Antigone in the Western philosophical and literary traditions, though it will not be reproduced here. 
11  Clairmont 2. 
12  Clairmont 2. 
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the splendour of the third day, when the civic values underlying the 
ceremony came to the fore.13 
It is in this context that they suggest the confrontation between Antigone and Creon, 
staged by Sophocles circa 442-438 BCE, should be read, with Antigone representing the 
female, familial sphere usurped by the intrusion of Creon‘s male public law.14 This thesis 
has been questioned by Cynthia Patterson, who notes that ‗[p]ublic burial ―in their native 
earth‖ was a notable honor and distinction; there is no evidence that men and women (as 
groups) disagreed on that point‘, and that only the intrusion of the state permitted burial of 
war-dead in Athens (as opposed to on the battlefield where they fell) at all.15 I would 
suggest an interpretative middle ground between Tyrrell/Bennett and Patterson: while 
there may be no evidence to suggest that women, as a group, were unimpressed by the 
honour a public burial conveyed to their family members, neither is it unreasonable to 
suppose that women, as individuals, may not have been entirely happy to cede their authority 
over a previously private and familial ritual to the polis, no matter how much honour may 
have been involved. The error made by both Patterson and those she criticises is to treat a 
group of people as though it possesses but one mind—the same difficulty which I pointed 
out as plaguing most theories of collective memory in Chapter One.16 
                                                                                                                                               
13  Tyrrell and Bennett 9. See also Gail Holst-Warhaft, Dangerous Voices: Women‟s laments and Greek literature 
(Routledge, 1992) 121-123. 
14  The earliest date given for the first performance of Sophocles‘ Antigone is 442-441 BCE; see Sarah Brown 
Ferrario, ‗Replaying Antigone : Changing patterns of Public and Private Commemoration at Athens c. 440-
350‘, Helios 33S (2006) 79; Griffith 1-2; Patterson 34. Tyrrell and Bennett place the first performance at 
438 BCE (Tyrrell and Bennett 3-4). Tyrrell and Bennett make a convincing case for their dating, especially 
when they read the punishment inflicted on the corpse of Polynices as an echo of the punishment 
inflicted on the commanders of the Samian ships in the aftermath of the Samian war (440-439 BCE)--see 
Tyrrell and Bennett 4-5. As the precise date is largely irrelevant to my discussion here, I have opted to 
maintain the range of possible dates. 
For the gender divide in Antigone, see Griffith 51-4; Steiner 9-11, 236-242. For a discussion of the 
division between and overlap of public and private spheres of influence in the play, see Katherine 
Derderian, Leaving Words to Remember: Greek Mourning and the Advent of Literacy (Brill, 2001) 139-140. 
Philip Holt, ‗Polis and Tragedy in the ―Antigone‖‗, Mnemosyne 52, no. 6 (1999), presents an historical 
reading of Antigone which largely ignores the tensions over burial practices in 5th century Athens, but 
instead takes for granted—and assumes an Athenian audience would also take for granted—the innate 
right of the polis to grant or deny burial according to political expediency; he argues that ‗[t]he audience 
did not come to a tragedy to vent its orthodoxies upon the characters; it came [...] partly for the more 
interesting and exciting experience of watching the characters defy the orthodoxies‘, and suggests that the 
audience‘s recognition of Creon‘s inherent correctness forms the perfect backdrop for high melodrama, 
as Antigone‘s stubborn challenge causes the family to crumble (Holt 670). While Holt is correct that 
Greek theatre was no more slavish imitator of life than is modern drama, he sorely underestimates the 
potential for political division over burial practices (indicated by the proliferation of tragedies focused on 
burial—not just Antigone, but Ajax, Suppliants, Hericlidae, etc.), as well as the extent to which, as Kennedy 
has argued, theatre served as a platform for political debate and commentary. 
15  Patterson 26-7; 36. 
16  Joan V. O‘Brien points out that the ‗dialectical tension between individual and community‘ was peculiar to 
Athens at this ‗brief moment in Athenian history‘, in which the value placed on the individual was higher 
than at other times or in other Greek cities. O‘Brien, Guide to Sophocles‟ Antigone: A Student Edition with 
Commentary, Grammatical Notes, & Vocabulary (Southern Illinois University Press, 1978) 34. See also 
Ferrario 104-5. 
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 At the heart of the ambivalence surrounding the public funeral lies a question of 
memorialisation and identity. A living body is complex, possessed of a personality and 
subjectivity, able to self-identify as a member of many different groups; a dead body loses 
the ability to self-narrate, and instead becomes an object to be claimed by one group or 
another.17 The corpse of an Athenian soldier could not be buried both in the family tomb 
and in the common grave of the public ceremony; in death, one facet of identity would be 
emphasised, to the detriment of any others.18 The honour of a public burial could 
obliterate, or threaten to obliterate, the private, familial identity of the soldier.19 Indeed, 
since the public burial was a mass burial, with the war-dead of each tribe placed together in 
a common chest, and one funeral oration for all the war-dead of Athens, the individuality 
of the soldier was subordinated to their role as a member of the Athenian military.20 
 
 
The conflict over the body of Polynices in Sophocles‘ Antigone, then, is a conflict between 
his civic identity and his familial role: between the meaning of his body to the state—as a 
traitor, an example, a locus of authority— and the meaning of his body in a more intimate 
                                                                                                                                               
  It is also worth noting that, at approximately this same time, Pericles felt the need to include a 
warning regarding the proper conduct of female mourners in his funeral oration for the dead from the 
Peloponnesian War (Thucydides 317-319; Book II, ch. 34). The presence of such an exhortation would 
appear to indicate some nonconformity on the part of the Athenian women. 
17  This transformation of body into object is similar to, but not the same as, the linguistic transformation 
described by Elaine Scarry and discussed in Chapter Two. The fundamental difference is that this 
transformation occurs after, and as a consequence of, death, whereas Scarry‘s transformation occurs prior 
to death, and, in her scheme, is what makes death (which is to say, the killing of one human being by 
another) possible. 
18  Wendy E. Closterman, ‗Family Members and Citizens: Athenian Identity and the Peribolos Tomb Setting‘ 
Helios 33S (2006) discusses at length the ways in which burial practices cemented the identity of not only 
the person being buried but also their surviving family members. Closterman notes especially a pair of 
monuments to a soldier named Dexilos (d. 394 BCE) which appears to accomplish precisely what I have 
just said cannot be accomplished: Dexilos was buried in a public gravesite with other soldiers, and his 
family erected a monument in their family burial ground, thus memorializing him in both of the contexts 
at issue here. However, the fact remains that Dexilos‘s body was only buried in one grave; the other 
monument marked the absence, rather than the presence, of a body. 
  It is, of course, possible for a corpse to be broken down into fragments and buried in different 
locations—this was, for example, common practice with saints‘ relics. However, I would argue that at that 
point the body ceases to be a body; moreover, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no evidence that this 
practice was ever utilised in ancient Athens, or in the British Commonwealth. Furthermore, the 
fragmentation of saints‘ bodies into relics is usually not the result of any ambiguity in their identities, but 
rather a way of making their already fixed identity available to a wider number of people.  
19  Although the Athenian war-dead were placed in ten separate caskets, one for each tribe, and memorial 
stele in the Agora listed the dead by tribe, restoring some measure of ownership to the larger, extended 
family. See Loraux 19. 
20  Nicole Loraux, The Invention of Athens, trans. Alan Sheridan (Harvard University Press, 1986) 55-56; Tyrrell 
and Bennett 7; Ferrario 85. See also Simon Goldhill, ‗Civic Ideology and the Problem of Difference‘ for a 
discussion of the role that public performances of tragedy (especially the ceremonies conducted prior to 
the play) played in subordinating the individual to the state. 
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context—as a brother, a link to the memory of a previously cohesive, now shattered family 
unit.21 This conflict of meanings is evident even in two short passages from the text. The 
first comes at the end of Creon‘s first speech, delivered with only the chorus onstage; 
Antigone is not present to hear it, although she related the substance of the decree to 
Ismene in the previous scene:22 
Creon:  Eteocles, who died fighting for this city, having excelled in 
battle, we shall hide in the tomb and we shall render to him 
all the rites that come to the noblest of the dead below. But 
his brother, I mean Polynices, who came back from exile 
meaning to burn to the ground and to enslave its people, as 
for him it is proclaimed to this city that none shall bury or 
lament, but they shall leave his body unburied for birds and 
dogs to devour and savage. That is my way of thinking, and 
never by my will shall bad men exceed good men in 
honour. No, whoever is loyal to the city in death and life 
alike shall from me have honour. 23 
Notable in this speech is Creon‘s strict adherence to a general civic principle (‗never by my 
will shall bad men exceed good men in honour‘) without regard to the particular familial 
circumstances in which it is applied; Creon can remember that Polynices is Eteocles‘ 
brother, but either cannot or will not recognise that that relationship means that Polynices 
is also a member of Creon‘s own family—and that the proper burial of his body is thus 
Creon‘s own responsibility.24 Creon‘s notion of family is entirely bounded by his notion of 
civic duty, and those who fall outside the latter (such as Polynices, and, later, Antigone) can 
have no claim on him in regards to the former. This rigidity of thought is also apparent in 
Antigone‘s last speech, delivered in front of the chorus and Creon, though not actually 
addressed to any living person.25 A portion of this speech (lines 904-920; the section of the 
quote below beginning ‗Yet in the eyes of the wise‘) is regarded by some relatively recent 
                                                                                                                                               
21  Again, note that the crucial point here is that Polynices himself is unable to exercise any agency in 
determining what meaning will be ascribed to his body by outside forces. See Butler 2-5. Butler points out 
that these two apparently contradictory meanings ascribed to Polynices‘ body are actually mutually 
dependent; the state rests on structures of kinship, and kinship requires ‗the support and mediation of the 
state‘ (5). Loraux expounds at great length on the ways in which and degree to which the bodies of 
Athenian soldiers were appropriated as part of a meaning-making exercise on the part of the Athenian 
polis. 
22  Sophocles 7 (lines 21-39). 
23  Sophocles, Antigone, in Sophocles vol. II, Loeb Classical Library, Hugh Lloyd-Jones, ed. and trans. (Harvard 
University Press, 1994) 20-23 (lines 194-210). 
24  See O‘Brien 35; Rush Rehm, Marriage to Death: The Conflation of Wedding and Funeral Rituals in Greek Tragedy 
(Princeton University Press, 1994) 60; Tyrrell and Bennett 46-9. 
25  There is some debate as to whether Creon is present during this speech, or whether he exits and returns; 
see Griffith 281; O‘Brien 101; Steiner 279. Regardless of whether he is onstage or not, the speech refers 
to him without being addressed directly to him. 
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scholars as an interpolation.26 However, those lines are firmly part of the textual tradition 
of the play, and, more importantly, illustrate the familial structure which undergirds 
Antigone‘s construction of Polynices‘ identity. 
 
Antigone:  But when I come there, I am confident that I shall come 
dear to my father, dear to you, my mother, and dear to you, 
my own brother; since when you died it was I that with my 
own hands washed you and adorned you and poured 
libations on your graves; and now, Polynices, for burying 
your body I get this reward! Yet in the eyes of the wise I did 
well to honour you; for never, had children of whom I was 
the mother or had my husband perished and been 
mouldering there, would I have taken on myself this task, in 
defiance of the citizens. In virtue of what law do I say this? 
If my husband had died, I could have had another, and a 
child by another man, if I had lost the first, but with my 
mother and my father in Hades below, I could never have 
another brother. Such was the law for whose sake I did you 
special honour, but to Creon I seemed to do wrong and to 
show shocking recklessness, O my own brother.27  
Antigone values familial relationships based on blood ties (to mother, father, and brothers) 
over and above those formed by choice (to a hypothetical husband, or any children she 
may have produced with him), but, like Creon, favours some blood ties over others. Just as 
Creon forgets his relationship and responsibilities to the dead body of Polynices, Antigone 
willfully forgets her relationship to the living Ismene (and her more distant relationship to 
                                                                                                                                               
26  This may say a great deal more about modern reading habits than it does about the text itself; there has 
been a tendency to read emotional motivations into Antigone‘s actions that are not supported by the text, 
and this bit of cold rationality runs counter to the image of Antigone as the distraught, devoted sister. 
Anouilh‘s re-imagining of Antigone, discussed below, is far more connected to this image than Sophocles‘ 
original. See Griffith 277-9; O‘Brien 102-3; Steiner 280-1. For an attempt at reading Antigone‘s 
motivations as equally emotional and duty-driven, see George F. Held, ‗Antigone‘s Dual Motivation for 
the Double Burial‘, Hermes 111, no. 2 (1983). 
George Steiner may shed some light on the modern tendency towards an overly emotional rendering 
of Antigone, when he traces the re-entry of the play into Western consciousness back to Abbé Jean-
Jacques Barthélémy‘s 1788 work, Le Voyage du jeune Anacharsis: ‗In chapter XI, the hero is taken to see his 
first Attic tragedy. It is Sophocles‘ Antigone and the young Anacharsis is overwhelmed: ―Quel merveilleux 
assortiment d‘illusions & de réalités! Je volois au secours des deux amants...‖‘ It is a rather peculiar sort of 
reading that would characterise the play as first and foremost about the love between Antigone and 
Haemon, but if this is, indeed, the vehicle by which the play came to popular attention, then the centrality 
of Antigone‘s love, albeit transferred somewhat more justifiably from Haemon to her brother, in later 
readings can better be understood. See Steiner 7. 
For discussion of the significance of Antigone as a whole, and these lines in particular, to the 
Victorian intelligentsia (especially interesting in light of the influence of Victorian culture upon the 
attitudes towards death and commemoration in the First World War discussed later), see Gerhard Joseph, 
‗The Antigone as Cultural Touchstone: Matthew Arnold, Hegel, George Eliot, Virginia Woolf, and 
Margaret Drabble‘, PMLA 96, no. 1 (1981). 
27  Sophocles 86-89 (lines 897-915). 
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Creon himself).28 Her family is defined by her contact with their bodies; they are those that 
she ‗with my own hands washed [...] and adorned‘.29  
The actual face to face confrontation between Antigone and Creon is quite brief, 
and the dialogue nowhere near as philosophically satisfying as the speeches each makes 
when the other is absent. Creon and Antigone do not really enter into a conversation about 
the body of Polynices; they do not have sufficient common ground to converse. Their 
argument consists of each repeating and elaborating upon their basic assertion, neither able 
to enter into the other‘s worldview sufficiently to engage with and challenge their own 
assertion.30 For both Creon and Antigone, one facet of Polynices‘ identity must override 
and obliterate the other: he is either a brother or an enemy; his body must be treated in the 
fashion appropriate for one or the other. It cannot be both. 
 What is markedly absent from all this debate over the appropriate role and 
placement of Polynices‘ body is any debate at all over Polynices himself. He exists for both 
Antigone and Creon almost entirely as a symbol of the principles, civic or familial, for 
which each of them argue. All of Antigone‘s speeches in defence of his right to burial 
concentrate on the strength of the familial bond. Not once does she mention that his 
behaviour in life merits any particular treatment of his body in death—that he was, for 
example, a kind man, fond of dogs and small children. All of Creon‘s invective against him 
is focused on his symbolic role as an enemy of the polis, the leader of an attacking army, a 
set of claims which make little sense in the larger context of the drama. If Polynices was 
attempting to conquer Thebes in order to gain what he almost certainly saw as his rightful 
place on the throne (and let us not forget that he was the elder brother), how seriously can 
we take the idea of him defiling his own temples, selling his own household into slavery?31 
Creon never tells us, never offers any proof, that Polynices is exactly the sort of person 
who would do such things; rather, he seems to expect his listeners both on stage and in the 
audience to understand that the position of Polynices‘s body outside the walls of the city as 
complete substantiation of his claims—the body‘s location once again serving as proof of 
one identity, at the cost of other possible identites.32 
                                                                                                                                               
28  This is a case of Antigone exercising the exact same limited approach to kinship as does Creon; Ismene 
(and Creon) has transgressed the principles by which Antigone measures relationship and so no longer 
counts—see Sophocles 11-13, 53-55 (lines 70-96, 538-549); Butler 9-10; Steiner 265-6. For Antigone‘s 
similarity to Creon, see Butler 6; Patterson 38-9; Tyrrell and Bennett 75. 
29   Sophocles 86 (lines 900-901). 
30  See Griffith 34-5. 
31  Sophocles 21 (lines 199-202). See Griffith 30-1, 161-2; Tyrrell and Bennett 49; Steiner 215-221. 
32  Of course, Polynices‘s willingness to bring foreigners to aid his capture of the city may have made it easier 
for Creon to paint him as a traitor. For commentary on this issue, see Griffith 161; Holt 663. 
It should be noted that the body lying outside the city walls is different from the body lying outside 
the territory of the city, as that territory extended beyond the walls. Athenian law provided for denial of 
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Jean Anouilh‘s rendering of the tragedy, written and produced in Nazi-occupied France, 
both fills in and highlights the gaps in Sophocles‘ text.33 This is an odd drama; its English 
debut included in the program a note from the translator, Lewis Galantière: ―The reader 
will have to take my word for it that only the citizen of a German-occupied country [...] 
would be able to come away from the play feeling that Antigone‘s case is stronger than 
Creon‘s‖.34 And yet, read with a strong consciousness that the play is meant to be about the 
French Resistance, that Creon‘s counsel that Antigone ought to live, and be happy, is the 
counsel of a totalitarian regime persuading its citizens to mind their own business and go 
about their daily activities uninterrupted, Anouilh‘s drama almost eclipses the pathos of the 
original. At the same time, however, we should remember that Sophocles‘ original 
Antigone, with her championing of aristocratic family values, was also a rather difficult 
character for the democratic Athenian audience to engage with; Anouilh‘s Antigone is, 
perhaps, true to the spirit of the problematic and unsympathetic original.  
Antigone‘s defense of Polynices on the basis of their kinship is fatally undermined 
by Creon‘s attack against Polynices‘ worthiness as a person: 
CREON: Poor Antigone! With her night-club flower. Do you know what 
your brother was? 
ANTIGONE: Whatever he was, I know that you will say vile things about 
him. 
CREON: A cheap, idiotic bounder, that is what he was. A cruel, vicious 
little voluptuary. A little beast with just wit enough to drive a car faster and 
throw more money away than any of his pals. I was with your father one 
day when Polynices, having lost a lot of money gambling, asked him to 
settle the debt; and when your father refused, the boy raised his hand 
against him and called him a vile name. 
ANTIGONE: That‘s a lie! 
                                                                                                                                               
burial within the ‗native earth‘ of Athens; it is Creon‘s refusal to permit Polynices‘ body to be moved 
elsewhere for burial that is shocking to Athenian sentiment. See Griffith 31; Holt 663-665; Patterson 33. 
Notably, Holt rejects the suggestion that there is anything shocking about Creon‘s denial of burial, and 
maintains that he acts perfectly within what an Athenian audience would recognise as the law. His, 
however, is a minority opinion, and does not produce a particularly coherent reading of the play. 
However, see L. A. MacKay, ‗Antigone, Coriolanus, and Hegel‘ Transactions and Proceedings of the American 
Philological Association 93 (1962), which argues that the controversy over the burial of Themistocles (c. 459 
BCE) provides a useful context for the debate between Antigone and Creon. 
33  For a point-by-point comparison between Anouilh‘s and Sophocles‘ versions of the drama, see Rosamund 
E. Deutsch, ‗Anouilh‘s Antigone‘, The Classical Journal 42, no. 1 (1946). See also the response to Deutsch‘s 
review by Alfred C. Schlesinger, ‗Anouilh‘s Antigone Again‘, The Classical Journal 42, no. 4 (1947).  
34  Cited in Edmund G. Berry, ‗Antigone and the French Resistance‘ The Classical Journal 42.1 (1946) 17. 
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CREON: He struck your father in the face with his fist. It was pitiful.35 
Here, the argument could be made that the conflict is really one of (symbolic) familial 
affection against actual merit, as Creon‘s recollection of Polynices‘s actual character 
overwhelms Antigone‘s blind loyalty to a brother she last saw when she was twelve years 
old. However, Antigone‘s attempt at refutation here is not, as it is in Sophocles, an 
assertion of the familial bond transcending any flaws in character. Rather, she attempts to 
deny that the flaws are real: ‗That‘s a lie!‘ Presumably, then, in this version of the tale 
Polynices‘ merit or lack thereof in life still has some impact on the way his body ought to 
be treated in death. Otherwise, Anouilh‘s Antigone would have no need to refute Creon‘s 
claims. They would be, as they are to the Antigone of Sophocles, simply irrelevant.36 
 The continuation of Creon‘s speech, however, re-introduces an element of 
uncertainty regarding the state of Polynices‘s body: 
Funny, isn‘t it? Polynices lies rotting in the sun while Eteocles is given a 
hero‘s funeral and will be housed in a marble vault. Yet I have absolute 
proof that everything that Polynices did, Eteocles had plotted to do. They 
were a pair of blackguards--both engaged in selling out Thebes, and both 
engaged in selling out each other; and they died like the cheap gangsters 
they were, over a division of the spoils. 
But, as I told you a moment ago, I had to make a martyr of one of 
them. I sent out to the holocaust for their bodies; they were found clasped 
in one another‘s arms--for the first time in their lives, I imagine. Each had 
                                                                                                                                               
35  Jean Anouilh, ‗Antigone‘, (1944) in Antigone and Eurydice: Two plays by Jean Anouilh, trans. Lewis Galantière, 
(Methuen & Co., 1951) 53-54.  
 Original:  
CRÉON: Pauvre Antigone, avec ta fleur de cotillion! Sais-tu qui état ton frère ? 
ANTIGONE : Je savais que vous me diriez du mal de lui en tout cas ! 
CRÉON: Un petit fêtard imbécile, un petit carnassier dur et sans âme, une petit brute tout 
juste bonne à aller plus vite que les autres avec ses voitures, à dépenser plus d‘argent dans 
les bars. Une fois, j‘étais là, ton père venait de lui refuser une grosse somme gu‘il avait 
perdue au jeu ; il est devenu tout pâle et il a levé le poing en criant un mot ignoble ! 
ANTIGONE : Ce n‘est pas vrai ! 
CRÉON: Son poing de brute à toute volée dans le visage de ton père ! C‘était pitoyable. 
Jean Anouilh, Antigone (Paris : La Table Ronde, 1947) 92-93. 
The Galantière translation has been noted to be problematic, especially with regards to its insertion 
of religious language where Anouilh‘s original text had none; see David J. DeLaura, ‗Anouilh‘s Other 
―Antigone‖‘, The French Review 35, no. 1 (1961). It remains, however, the most readily available English 
translation, and I use it with caution, having checked the passages with which I am working against the 
original French. I would also note that my own analysis is focused on the body/identity issue, rather than 
the invocation of a ‗higher law‘, where the presence or absence of religious language in the translation 
would be more intensely problematic. 
36  The divide between Anouilh‘s and Sophocles‘ Antigone has much to do with the divide Lars Albinus has 
identified as existing between the ancient and modern concepts of ψυχή (psyche): ‗The modern meaning 
of psyche, or soul, is basically conceived in terms of self or identity. With regards to the concept of ψυχή, 
the opposite is actually stated in the beginning of the Illiad, where [...] the deceased is clearly identified 
with the ‗corpse‘ (σώμα) and not with the psyche, which flies off to the invisible realm of memory‘. In 
other words, for Sophocles, Polynices is his body, whereas to Anouilh, there is a distinction to be drawn 
between the body and the person. See Lars Albinus, The House of Hades: Studies in Ancient Greek Eschatology 
(Aarhus University Press, 2000) 43-44. See also Donna C. Kurts and John Boardman, Greek Burial Customs 
(Cornell University Press, 1971) 331. 
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been spitted on the other‘s sword, and the Argive cavalry had trampled 
them down. They were mashed to a pulp, Antigone. I had the prettier of 
the two carcases brought in, and gave it a State funeral; and I left the other 
to rot. I don‘t know which was which. And I assure you, I don‘t care.37 
This now total ambiguity of the unburied body proves fatal to Antigone‘s position; she 
succumbs entirely to Creon‘s argument, and (briefly) resolves to let him cover up her 
disobedience so that she can live, marry Haemon, and be happy.38 Clearly, the issue of 
personal rather than symbolic identity matters more to Anouilh than it did to Sophocles; 
one would expect the latter‘s Antigone to respond here that the unburied body belongs to a 
brother, regardless of which particular brother it is. 
 In Anouilh‘s version, Antigone eventually chooses death, against all of Creon‘s 
arguments, as a protest against the banality of life, rather than out of deference to a higher 
authority or as a show of solidarity with her dead brother(s). The corpse of Polynices (or 
Eteocles) fades from the attention of both characters and audience—the revelation of the 
body‘s ambiguous personal identity is also a revelation of its unimportance, and the rest of 
the play focuses on the inexplicable and unavoidable mechanisms which compose 
Anouilh‘s vision of the tragic.39 Not so for Sophocles, who insists that Creon must bury 
Polynices before attempting to un-bury Antigone, thus keeping the body, with all its 
symbolic weight (but no personality), at the centre of the action right up until the end of 
the play. The burial and memorialisation practices of the First World War, as we shall see, 
                                                                                                                                               
37  Anouilh, trans. Galantière 55.  
Original: 
Oui, crois-tu que c‘est drôle ? Cette trahison pur laquelle le corps de Polynice est en train 
de pourrir au soleil, j‘ai la preuve maintenant qu‘Etéocle, qui dort dans son tombeau de 
marbre, se préparait, lui aussi, à la commettre. C‘est un hasard si Polynice a réussi son 
coup avant lui. Nous avions affaire à deux larrons en foire qui se trompaient l‘un  l‘autre 
en nous trompant et qui se sont égorgés comme deux petits voyous qu‘ils étaient, pour un 
règlement de comptes… Sulement, il s‘est trouvé que j‘ai eu besoin de faire un héros de 
l‘un d‘eux. Alors, j‘ai fait rechercher leurs cadavres au milieu des autres. On les a retrouvés 
embrassés—pour la première fois de leur vie sans droute. Ils s‘étaient embrochés 
mutuellement, et puis la charge de la calverie argyenne leur avait passé dessus. Ils étaient 
en bouillie, Antigone, méconnaissables. J‘ai fait ramasser un des corps, le moins abîmédes 
deux, pour mes funérailles nationales, et j‘ai donné l‘ordre de laisser pourrir l‘autre où il 
était. Je ne sais même pas lequel. Et je t‘assure que cela m‘est égal. (Anouilh 95-96) 
This passage shows also a sharp contrast between Anouilh‘s and Sophocles‘ Creon, the latter of which, 
‗by differentiating between them [the brothers] [...] is blinded to the more compelling reality of their 
sameness as corpses‘ (Tyrrell and Bennett 49). Anouilh‘s Creon sees Eteocles and Polynices as 
interchangeable in both death and life; he uses this interchangeablility to blind others to their sameness, by 
creating a hero of one and a villain of the other. Steiner notes that the description of the corpses here 
owes much to the condition dead bodies degenerated to in the no-man‘s land of WWI. See Steiner 141. 
38  This resolve, in turn, shatters under Creon‘s description of what happiness entails, and the remaining 
conflict in the play is over the personal and moral compromises Antigone is unwilling to make for the 
sake of that happiness. For further commentary on this scene as the hinge of the drama, and Creon as the 
ultimate victor in Anouilh‘s rendering, see Steiner 193. 
39 For a full discussion of Anouilh‘s tragic vision, see Donald Heiney, ‗Jean Anouilh: The Revival of 
Tragedy‘, College English 16, no. 6 (1955), and especially his discussion of Antigone, pp. 333-4. 
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reflect the tensions that have been uncovered here: between body and personality, between 
familial and civic group membership. Although there have been attempts to restore the 
body to prominence, either in burial practice or in discourse about the costs of warfare (as 
in the work of Elaine Scarry, discussed in Chapter Two), memorialisation since 1914 has 
focused increasingly on a more nebulous concept of identity—primarily through an 
emphasis on the names of individuals. The relationship between body and name remains 
ambivalent—sometimes it is a complementary substitution, flowers propped against a 
memorial plaque as they might be left on a grave; sometimes the two loci of identity appear 
to be in tension with one another. This will become especially clear in the final chapter of 
this section, ‗Making Memory Solid‘, which addresses First World War memorials from a 
contemporary perspective, and in which the main character, Klara Becker, plays an 
Antigone-like role, as she attempts to maintain familial control over the memory of her 
dead lover and the meaning of his death, while at the same time unravelling the puzzle of 
mourning without a body.
  
 
 
ANNE OF GREEN GABLES  
AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC MOURNING 
 
 
Figure 1: A typical depiction of an heroic death in the 18th century. Benjamin West, The Death of General Wolfe (1770). 
Ottawa: National Gallery of Canada. Used by permission. 
  
 
eople in the first war inherited their attitudes towards death from the Victorian 
period‘, writes Alan Wilkinson in his study, The Church of England and the First 
World War. ‗The Evangelical emphasis upon death as the moment of 
judgement, and the revival of Catholic rituals for dying and burial made the deathbed of 
crucial religious and moral importance; the pathos of the deathbed was believed to be 
morally purifying‘, not only for the dying person, but for the instruction of the survivors, as 
well.1 Burial and mourning had elaborate rituals associated with them, and the gravesite of 
the deceased was central to these rituals.2 It is this context which renders coherent the 
efforts of Fabian Ware and the Imperial War Graves Commission to create ‗gardens of the 
dead‘, and may go some ways towards removing the charge of whitewashing levelled 
against the Commission by Jonathan Vance in his study Death So Noble, when he writes that  
By turning soldiers‘ graveyards into gardens of the dead, the commission 
helped the relatives of the fallen to avoid the reality of death in battle. The 
ordered and charming cemeteries meant that visitors never had to confront 
the ugliness of their relative‘s death.3  
However, Wilkinson‘s work (and a similar treatise on death in the Victorian era by Michael 
Wheeler) is specifically concerned with the Church of England; no similar study of the 
Canadian churches has been published, and the extent to which the social rituals Wilkinson 
and Wheeler describe translated to a long-established British colony such as Canada (from 
which Vance writes), with its own culture, social structure, and (not least) religious millieu, is 
a more open question.4 
 To understand the disruption the First World War brought to life and death in 
what was then a Dominion of the British Empire, it is thus necessary to understand what 
constituted a normal Canadian death prior to the outbreak of war. Literature from the 
period immediately preceding the war can provide some insight into this question, 
provided it is approached with full consciousness that it is literature, not ethnography; we 
may approach a realist novel with the expectation that what it describes is life-like, but 
                                                                                                                                               
1 Alan Wilkinson, The Church of England and the First World War (SPCK, 1978) 173. 
 See also the discussion of ‗the Victorian cult of death‘ in Michael Wheeler, Death and the Future Life in 
Victorian Literature and Theology (Cambridge University Press, 1990) 25-68.  
2 Wheeler 27; 47-68. 
3 Jonathan F. Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 
65. 
4  It is also worth remembering that Ware himself hailed from an urban, upper-class, English background, 
which may have had some influence on the approach to commemoration taken by the unit under his 
command. According to the biography provided by the UK Service Personnel & Veterans Agency, Ware 
was born in Bristol, and ‗educated privately and at the Universities of London and Paris‘. See 
<http://www.veterans-uk.info/remembrance/ware.html> (Accessed 3 July 2009). 
P 
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must firmly maintain our awareness that it is not life itself.5 This is especially true when the 
author herself (or himself) deliberately attempts to blur such a distinction, as in the case of 
Lucy Maud Montgomery.6 
 Montgomery‘s Anne of Green Gables series was published between 1908 (Anne of 
Green Gables) and 1939 (Anne of Ingleside), although it is set between the 1880‘s and 1919.7 
The books begin and end as nostalgia pieces, in which Montgomery recounts stories and 
elements of an idealised girlhood on Prince Edward Island, or looks back from the shadow 
of the tensions which would give birth to the Second World War towards a simpler time 
before the First World War, as she does in Anne of Windy Poplars (1936) and Anne of Ingleside. 
But Rainbow Valley, published in 1919, is set only ten years earlier, and Rilla of Ingleside, set 
during the First World War, was published in 1921—it is, in fact, the earliest Canadian war 
novel still available in print, and precedes the general war book publishing boom by several 
years.8 I will return to a close reading of Rilla later, in order to discuss the way that 
                                                                                                                                               
5  It is also important to maintain an awareness of the class bias involved in analysing literature, as its 
production and its audience are restricted to those with sufficient leisure to become literate; Wheeler ‘s 
study, for example, is limited to a fairly upper-class vision of death, which is unchallenged by the literature 
he has chosen to work from: Tennyson, Newman, Hopkins, and Dickens, only the last of which hails 
from a working-class background or writes about working-class life. 
6  Montgomery‘s 1917 autobiography, The Alpine Path (Fitzhenry and Whiteside, reprint 1997), explicitly 
draws links between her own life and her stories, and as will be discussed below, her novels borrow 
liberally from her journals; Irene Gammell has argued that Montgomery‘s life writing and self-
presentation (not just her autobiography, but her journals and photographs) were ‗carefully crafted [...] as 
a literary and artistic artefact‘‘; see Gammell, ‗Life Writing as Masquerade: The Many Faces of L. M. 
Montgomery‘ in The Intimate Life of L. M. Montgomery, ed. Irene Gammell (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2005) 3. 
7  I am accepting the dates for the setting of the novels given by Owen Dudley Edwards and Jennifer H. 
Litster, ‗The End of Canadian Innocence: L. M. Montgomery and the First World War‘, L. M. Montgomery 
and Canadian Culture, ed. Irene Gammel and Elizabeth Epperly (University of Toronto Press, 1999) 31. 
8  Crawford Kilian, The Great War and the Canadian Novel, 1915-1926 (Simon Fraser University, 1972) claims 
that of all the Canadian war novels published during and immediately after the war, Rilla of Ingleside is one 
of only two that remain in print (the other being J. C. Stead‘s Grain, first published in 1926), all others 
having been swiftly forgotten, largely due to their rather dubious literary quality.  
Janet S. K. Watson notes a few reviews in the Times Literary Supplement dated 1919 and 1920 which 
indicated some degree of weariness with war stories, but she suggests that memoirs and novels dated that 
early were the exception, rather than the rule, and the ‗war literature‘ the Times complained of being 
overexposed to was primarily trench poetry; Watson argues that the real boom in war stories began in 
1927. See Watson, Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World War in Britain, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 185. While Watson‘s study is technically limited to ‗Britain‘, by which she seems to 
mean modern-day Great Britain, rather than the British Empire under whose banner Canada fought the 
war, and thus excludes Canadian literature, she includes authors such as the very American Hemmingway 
in her survey of publication dates, and so seems in this particular instance to be surveying a more general 
trend in Anglophone literature. Samuel Hynes notes a handful of trench novels written by Englishmen 
beginning in 1915, which would appear to have contributed to the development of a standardized set of 
tropes for war novels from which Montgomery very likely drew, but again, he restricts his field of enquiry 
to English culture. See Hynes, A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture (Atheneum, 1991) 
43-45, 93-95, 129-135, 206-215, 263-265. Hynes also provides some evidence that the weariness exhibited 
in the TLS reviews noted by Watson may not have needed terribly long to develop, as ‗[b]y November 
1914 there were enough bad war poems in print to inspire an anti-war-poem poem‘; see Hynes 28-29.  
Elizabeth R. Epperly asserts that Rilla of Ingleside is ‗the only contemporary fictionalized woman‘s 
account of the First World War‘. See Epperly, The Fragrance of Sweet Grass: L. M. Montgomery‟s Heroines and 
the Pursuit of Romance (University of Toronto Press, 1992) 112.  
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Montgomery‘s narratives recorded the shift in memorialization activities that occurred as a 
result of the First World War. I am first interested in Montgomery‘s earlier work, the 
novels written before the outbreak of war: Anne of Green Gables, Anne of Avonlea (1909), and 
Anne of the Island (1915), and what these might tell us of the ‗normal‘ process of death and 
grieving that the war disrupted. 
 Before approaching even these novels, however, I wish to draw attention to a 
passage from Montgomery‘s own autobiography, published 1917, in the middle of the war, 
in which she recounts her first experience of death: 
When I was twenty-one months old my mother died, in the old home at 
Cavendish, after a lingering illness. I distinctly remember seeing her in her 
coffin—it is my earliest memory. My father was standing by the casket 
holding me in his arms. [...] I looked down at Mother‘s dead face. It was a 
sweet face, albeit worn and wasted by months of suffering. My mother had 
been beautiful, and Death, so cruel in all else, had spared the delicate 
outline of feature, the long silken lashes brushing the hollow cheek, and the 
smooth masses of golden-brown hair. 
I did not feel any sorrow, for I knew nothing of what it all meant. I 
was only vaguely troubled. Why was Mother so still? And why was Father 
crying? I reached down and laid my baby hand against Mother‘s cheek. 
Even yet I can feel the coldness of that touch. Somebody in the room 
sobbed and said, ―Poor child.‖9 
Even if we are sceptical about Montgomery‘s ability to recollect events which occurred 
when she was less than two years of age with the crystalline accuracy with which she has 
recorded those events here, we might still note certain outstanding features of this scene: 
the sight of the dead woman in her coffin, her ‗sweet face‘ ‗worn and wasted by months of 
suffering‘, the cold touch of her cheek, the sounds of grief, muted by the anonymity of 
those who produce them (‗Somebody in the room sobbed‘). These are all sensory 
experiences, brought about by direct contact with the corpse—with the exception of the 
sound of sobbing, which is the sign of a community of mourners gathered together. 
Montgomery‘s recollection of her mother‘s funerary rites has very little of Montgomery 
herself in it—no reflection, very little emotion. Instead, the body of her mother dominates 
the scene, and Montgomery‘s experience is mediated through her contact with that body, 
up until she becomes frightened by ‗the coldness of that touch‘, and turns to grasp her 
living father, seeking in his body the warmth and comfort one would typically expect a 
child to find in contact with their mother. But even from the shelter of that paternal 
embrace, her consciousness is primarily of her mother: ‗Comforted, I looked down again at 
                                                                                                                                               
9  Montgomery, The Alpine Path 14-15. 
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the sweet placid face as he carried me away‘.10 Whether or not Montgomery actually had 
the set of memories she claims here, she evidently felt that such a scene was normal 
enough that she ought to have such memories; we may safely read this as reflective of 
Montgomery‘s idea of a normal and proper death scene in the 1870‘s. 
 
 
The first notable death in the Anne books occurs at the end of Anne of Green Gables. 
Matthew Cuthbert, the aged bachelor who, with his sister Marilla, adopted the eponymous 
heroine, Anne Shirley, collapses when he reads in the local newspaper that the bank in 
which he had invested the family‘s life savings has failed.  
―Matthew—Matthew—what is the matter? Matthew, are you sick?‖ 
It was Marilla who spoke, alarm in every jerky word. Anne came 
through the hall, her hands full of white narcissus,—it was long before 
Anne could love the sight or odor of white narcissus again,—in time to 
hear her and see Matthew standing in the porch doorway, a folded paper in 
his hand, and his face strangely drawn and gray. Anne dropped her flowers 
and sprang across the kitchen to him at the same moment as Marilla. They 
were both too late; before they could reach him Matthew had fallen across 
the threshold. 
`―He‘s fainted,‖ gasped Marilla. 11 
This passage comes at the very beginning of the chapter titled ‗The Reaper Whose Name is 
Death‘; the reader is not terribly surprised when a neighbour, the ever-practical Mrs. Lynde, 
appears, checks Matthew‘s pulse, and pronounces ‗gravely‘ that ‗I don‘t think—we can do 
anything for him‘.12 Anne and Marilla, however, lacking the benefit of chapter titles, take 
somewhat longer to come to terms with the news: 
―Mrs. Lynde, you don‘t think—you can‘t think Matthew is—is—‖ Anne 
could not say the dreadful word; she turned sick and pallid. 
―Child, yes, I‘m afraid of it. Look at his face. When you‘ve seen that 
look as often as I have you‘ll know what it means.‖ 
Anne looked at the still face and there beheld the seal of the Great 
Presence.13 
Anne‘s first reaction to Matthew‘s death—disbelief—is mitigated by her ability to see his 
body, or, rather, Mrs. Lynde‘s guidance leads her to recognise what she has already seen. 
Anne presumably has ample opportunity to continue this process of looking and 
recognising, as Matthew lies in his coffin in the parlour for two days, until he is carried out 
                                                                                                                                               
10  Montgomery, The Alpine Path 15. 
11  Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 352. 
12  Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 353. 
13  Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 353. 
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to be buried.14 Matthew‘s burial is narrated with an emphasis on the familiarity of his 
surroundings; he is ‗carried [...] over his homestead threshold and away from the fields he 
had tilled and the orchards he had loved and the trees he had planted‘.15 While ‗away‘ 
introduces an element of dissimilarity, and should signify the process of separation between 
the dead Matthew and the land on which he had lived, the weight of the sentence falls on 
repeated references to the connections between him and the land: ‗his homestead [...] the 
fields he had tilled [...] he had loved [...] he had planted‘ (emphases added). His grave is near 
the homestead; Anne visits it, tends it, and plants ‗a slip of the little white Scotch rosebush 
his mother brought out from Scotland long ago‘ on it—the rosebush forging a connection 
between Matthew‘s native land of Prince Edward Island and his ancestral land of 
Scotland.16 Later books in the series make frequent reference to Anne‘s visits to tend the 
grave; such visits often mark or herald significant plot developments.17 
 Irene Gammel has argued that Matthew‘s death was a plot device which permitted 
Montgomery to accomplish several things: to bring the novel to a satisfactory moral 
conclusion—Anne is called upon to perform a gesture of self-sacrifice, giving up her 
college scholarship to stay with Marilla, whose failing eyesight would otherwise necessitate 
the sale of Green Gables—to insert literary echoes of ‗the typical Victorian sacrifice tale‘ 
popular at the time of writing, and thus increase the book‘s marketability; and, not least, to 
come to terms with ‗her own heroic sacrifice, which had gone unrecognized‘, which is to 
say her own decision to live with and care for her grandmother Macneill.18 As alluded to 
previously, there is an undeniably close connection between Montgomery‘s novels and her 
life-writing—both her journals (passages from which frequently appear copied wholesale 
into her novels) and her autobiography; it is not surprising that a decision which shaped so 
much of her own life might find itself recorded in a novel, nor is it surprising that it would 
be cloaked in a pre-fabricated trope of popular fiction.19 It is, however, interesting for my 
purposes that this death is presented as, first and foremost, an opportunity for Anne‘s—
and, not incidentally, also Marilla‘s—moral development.20 
                                                                                                                                               
14  Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 355-356. 
15  Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 356. 
16  Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 357. Commemorative gardening is an ongoing theme in the Anne series; 
see also the repeated references to Hester Gray‘s garden (often in parallel with references to Matthew‘s 
grave): Anne of Avonlea (1909, repr. Puffin 1982) 96, 110, 114, 187, 203; Anne of the Island (1915, repr. 
Puffin 1981) 287. 
17  See Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 357; Anne of Avonlea 110, 203. 
18  Irene Gammell, Looking for Anne of Green Gables: the story of L. M. Montgomery and her literary classic (St. 
Martin‘s Press, 2008) 186-88. 
19  Nor is it particularly surprising that it would be entirely glossed over in her autobiography, which is 
perhaps more notable for its omissions than for any of the material it does include. 
20  It is Matthew‘s death which permits Marilla to finally confess affection towards Anne, breaking through 
the emotional reticence which has marked her character for the entirety of the novel. See Montgomery, 
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Matthew‘s death is quite sudden; there is no proper deathbed scene of the type alluded to 
by Wilkinson. Montgomery waits until the second novel, Anne of Avonlea, to write a death 
scene of that sort. Anne of Avonlea‘s ending is an inverse echo of Anne of Green Gables; 
Matthew‘s death at the end of Anne of Green Gables pushed Anne to make an heroic 
sacrifice, where near (though not exactly at) the end of Anne of Avonlea, the death of Rachel 
Lynde‘s husband, Thomas, frees Anne to pursue the college course she had previously 
given up, as Thomas Lynde‘s death leaves Rachel Lynde in a precarious financial position, 
the best solution to which is her moving into Green Gables with Marilla, taking over 
Anne‘s duties as companion and caretaker. Thomas Lynde ‗faded out of life‘ after a long, 
lingering illness,21 which provides an opportunity for Rachel‘s own moral redemption: 
Rachel had been a little hard on her Thomas in health, when his slowness 
or meekness had provoked her; but when he became ill no voice could be 
lower, no hand more gently skillful, no vigil more uncomplaining. 
―You‘ve been a good wife to me, Rachel,‖ he once said simply, 
when she was sitting by him in the dusk, holding his thin, blanched old 
hand in her work-hardened one. ―A good wife. I‘m sorry I ain‘t leaving you 
better off; but the children will look after you. They‘re all smart, capable 
children, just like their mother. A good mother... a good woman....‖ 
He had fallen asleep then; and the next morning, just as the white 
dawn was creeping up over the pointed firs in the hollow, Marilla went 
softly into the east gable and wakened Anne. 
―Anne, Thomas Lynde is gone. . .‖22 
Throughout the books prior to this, Rachel Lynde has been characterised as having a 
forceful, difficult personality, and being somewhat lacking in human sympathy. She is the 
first character introduced in Anne of Green Gables, ‗one of those capable creatures who can 
manage their own concerns and those of other folks into the bargain‘, observing and 
ruminating on the comings and goings of the Green Gables family while ‗Thomas Lynde—
a meek little man whom Avonlea people called ―Rachel Lynde‘s husband‖—was sowing his 
late turnip seed on the hill field beyond the barn‘.23 Mrs. Lynde‘s judgemental approach to 
all that she meets takes on an almost supernatural dimension, as we are told that even the 
                                                                                                                                               
Anne of Green Gables 355. See also Susan Drain, ‗Community and the Individual in Anne of Green Gables: 
The Meaning of Belonging‘ Children‟s Literature Association Quarterly 11, no. 1 (1986) 19. 
21  Thomas Lynde‘s illness is first mentioned in Montgomery, Anne of Avonlea 170-171; he dies in 
Montgomery, Anne of Avonlea 197-198. 
22  Montgomery, Anne of Avonlea  197-198. 
23  Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 1. 
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stream that passes by her door transforms from ‗an intricate, headlong brook‘, ‗with dark 
secrets of pool and cascade‘, and becomes, in her presence,  
a quiet, well-conducted little stream, for not even a brook could run past 
Mrs. Rachel Lynde‘s door without due regard for decency and decorum; 
it probably was conscious that Mrs. Rachel was sitting at her window, 
keeping a sharp eye on everything that passed, from brooks and children 
up [...]24 
Later commentaries on her character do not soften the sketch much; even Anne and 
Marilla privately confess that, while they admire some of her better qualities, they find 
Rachel Lynde exceedingly difficult to like.25 While Rachel does have sympathetic 
moments—for example, conspiring with Matthew to produce a fashionable dress as a 
Christmas present for Anne—for the most part, she has served as a foil for the main 
characters, offering an outsider‘s commentary on their actions and decisions.26 It is Thomas 
Lynde‘s dying that brings associations of softness (‗low-voiced‘), gentleness, and 
uncomplaining tenderness to her character, and it is his final benediction that removes 
Rachel from the ambivalent, mostly outsider, position she has occupied in the narrative, 
and permits her to move into the Green Gables circle, as a fully sympathetic character, a 
position she occupies for nearly the rest of the series, not disappearing from notice until 
Rilla of Ingleside. It is his deathbed pronouncement that transforms her into ‗a good woman‘; 
the reader has not been able to identify her as such with any certainty before.27 
 
 
Two other death narratives remain to be examined before we turn to Rilla of Ingleside, both 
in Anne of the Island. The first is the passion of Ruby Gillis, Anne‘s schoolmate, who dies of 
what Rachel Lynde calls ‗galloping consumption‘.28 Montgomery began writing Anne of the 
Island prior to the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914, but completed it in November of that 
year; Owen Dudley Edwards and Jennifer H. Lister suggest that Ruby may be 
                                                                                                                                               
24  Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 1. 
25  See especially Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 81; Anne of Avonlea 199-200. 
26  Even in the case of the dress, however, Rachel Lynde is acting against Marilla, and commenting upon 
Marilla‘s inadequacy with regards to childrearing. See especially Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables 240-
241. 
27  I do not mean to imply that her character itself changes, or the way that Montgomery presents her; she 
remains as forceful and opinionated as ever, and later books contain just as many narrative jokes at her 
expense. But the loss of her husband transforms the reader‘s view of Rachel Lynde into a far more 
sympathetic one; Anne of the Island shows Rachel Lynde located as one of the two stable, welcoming 
figures whose love for Anne transforms Green Gables into a permanent home (67). 
28  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 100. 
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Montgomery‘s ‗first war casualty‘.29 While this may be technically accurate—and this is far 
from certain, as Montgomery‘s journals provide very little detail on the progress of her 
writing, though they do provide a great deal of information on her disputes with the 
publisher—it is also a rather hyperbolic claim, as the book was completed on 20 November 
1914, early enough in the conflict that it is unlikely Montgomery would have yet felt the full 
force of the war‘s rearrangement of life and death—especially as casualty lists did not begin 
to make a regular appearance in the paper until spring of 1915.30 
 Like Rachel Lynde, Ruby is a generally unsympathetic character, whom the others 
confess to finding it difficult to like.31 Ruby‘s great flaw is her flirtatious nature; she sets her 
own value by her ability to attract men. Montgomery portrays Ruby as, at first, approaching 
death as blindly as she has lived her life; the narrative of her illness serves to magnify the 
flaws that have been part of her character throughout the series. Those around her see clear 
symptoms of her illness: 
She was even handsomer than ever, but her blue eyes were too bright and 
lustrous, and the colour of her cheeks was hectically brilliant; besides, she 
was very thin; the hands that held her hymn-book were almost transparent 
in their delicacy.32 
She, however, is wilfully blind: ‗But just see my color. I don‘t look much like an invalid, I‘m 
sure‘.33 The other characters find visiting her a grim chore, as she refuses all attempts at 
comfort, continuing to speak heedlessly of dresses and concerts and courting.34 But the 
process of dying transforms her: first, her character is reformed, in her final speech, and 
then her body is purified by death. 
 Ruby‘s final words in the novel are not, strictly speaking, a deathbed speech; she 
dies while all the other Avonlea young people are away at a party—a somewhat ironic end 
for the character who has previously cared for very little except parties—and her real last 
words go unrecorded in the novel.35 Instead, Montgomery relates a conversation between 
Ruby Anne the night before the former‘s death. This has some characteristics of a 
deathbed speech; Ruby looks ahead to what awaits her, and back upon how she has lived, 
                                                                                                                                               
29  Edwards and Lister 33. 
30  The completeion of Anne of the Island is noted in Montgomery‘s journal entry of 20 November 1914; see 
Mary Rubio and Elizabeth Waterston, eds, The Selected Journals of L. M. Montgomery, Volume II: 1910-1921 
(Oxford University Press, 1987) 156. For the appearance of casualty lists in Canadian newspapers, see 
Robert Craig Brown and Donald Loveridge, ‗Unrequited Faith: Recruiting the CEF 1914-1918‘, Revue 
internationale d‟histoire militaire 54 (1982) 59. 
31  See, for example, Anne of Avonlea 206;  Anne of the Island 48. 
32  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 100. 
33  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 108. 
34  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 129-130. 
35  Although, to take Edwards and Lister‘s point to heart, her lonely death may reflect Montgomery‘s 
growing consciousness of thousands of young men dying far from friends and family. 
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and there is an element of moral instruction in the exchange. Ruby confesses to Anne that 
she is afraid to die: 
Because—because—oh, I‘m not afraid but that I‘ll go to heaven, Anne. I‘m 
a church member. But—it‘ll all be so different. I think—and think—and I 
get so frightened—and—and homesick. Heaven must be very beautiful, of 
course, the Bible says so—but, Anne, it won‟t be what I‟ve been used to.36 
Anne reflects that this is  
sad, tragic—and true! Heaven could not be what Ruby had been used to. 
There had been nothing in her gay, frivolous life, her shallow ideals and 
aspirations, to fit her for that great change, or make the life to come seem 
to her anything but alien and unreal and undesirable.37 
She attempts to rise to the challenge and support Ruby, although she finds herself unable 
to ‗tell comforting falsehoods‘ which might alleviate the burden of anxiety Ruby feels in 
abandoning the frivolous life which she has led and loved so dearly.38 The scene ends with 
Ruby promising to face death bravely, to ‗think over what [Anne] said, and try to believe 
it‘.39 
 Anne leaves Ruby still struggling with the weight of eternity, and the next night, 
Ruby dies in her sleep, ‗and on her face was a smile—as if, after all, death had come as a 
kindly friend [...] instead of the grisly phantom she had dreaded‘, as if Anne‘s counsel to her 
on the previous night had been efficacious.40 In death, Ruby‘s body is transformed: 
Ruby had always been beautiful; but her beauty had been of the earth, 
earthy; it had had a certain insolent quality to it, as if it flaunted itself in the 
beholder‘s eye; spirit had never shone through it, intellect had never refined 
it. But death had touched it and consecrated it, bringing out delicate 
modelings and purity of outline never seen before—doing what life and 
love and great sorrow and deep womanhood joys might have done for 
Ruby. Anne, looking down through a mist of tears, at her old playfellow, 
thought she saw the face God had meant Ruby to have and remembered it 
so always.41 
In death, Ruby can shed her ‗earthy‘, ‗insolent‘, ‗unrefined‘ flirtatiousness, and become the 
perfect creation God intended; dying is a process of moral purification for her, and moral 
instruction for those who witness it. The perfected body in the coffin is the final sign of 
this transformation. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
36  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 131. Emphasis in original, in this and all other quotations from 
Montgomery unless otherwise noted. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 132. 
39  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 133. 
40  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 135. 
41  Ibid. 
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The idea of dying as a process of moral transformation is echoed later, in the novel‘s 
penultimate chapter, ‗A Book of Revelation‘. Anne returns to Green Gables from a visit 
and is informed that her rejected suitor and longtime friend, Gilbert Blythe, is dying of 
typhoid fever.42 This is consistent with the climactic structure of the previous books, both 
of which depended on a death (Matthew Cuthbert‘s and Thomas Lynde‘s) to resolve a 
major portion of their plot—in both cases, to move Anne on to the next stage in her life, 
first mature self-sacrifice, and then the delayed reward of that sacrifice, a fuller realisation 
of her individual potential. In this case, a major plot-line of the novel has been courtship; 
Anne has rejected five proposals of marriage, including Gilbert‘s own. Gilbert‘s death 
cannot advance the plot in the way that Matthew‘s, or Thomas Lynde‘s, did. Anne has 
rejected all of her suitors on their own merits, so Gilbert‘s absence would not cause 
another contender for her hand to suddenly become more appealing, and while a 
remorseful woman dedicating her life to mourning for her spurned lover is a scenario that 
the younger Anne may have found deeply romantic, Montgomery herself is a pragmatist, 
and much of the moral development to which she has subjected Anne has been to move 
her away from precisely that sort of sentiment. Gilbert‘s actual death would accomplish 
nothing—and so, breaking the pattern of the previous books, he does not die, but instead 
recovers the morning after Anne is told of his illness. Nonetheless, his near-death provides 
the same opportunity for moral development in those who witness it—especially Anne—as 
Ruby Gillis‘s actual death did earlier. Faced with the possibility of his death, Anne is able to 
realise her love for him, and repent of her foolishness in rejecting his earlier proposal. She 
keeps a miserable vigil through the stormy night, emerging from her room at dawn:43 
Anne rose from her knees and crept downstairs. The freshness of the rain-
wind blew against her white face as she went out into the yard, and cooled 
                                                                                                                                               
42  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 283. 
43  An astute reader may note that most of Montgomery‘s death scenes take place at dawn or twilight—even 
if the death itself occurs at another time, as with Ruby Gillis and Thomas Lynde, information of it will be 
communicated at these times; even the dedication of Rilla of Ingleside partakes of this trope: ‗To the 
memory of Frederica Campbell MacFarlane, who went away from me when the dawn broke on January 
25th, 1919‘. Vance notes that dawn (and, to a lesser extent, sunset) typically symbolises the resurrection, 
‗the promise of a new beginning and of God‘s infinite good‘; while Paul Fussell (who writes in a primarily 
modern British context, without accounting for social change in the Commonwealth) has argued that after 
the First World War this symbolism ceased to be used except in an ironic context, Vance maintains that in 
Canada ‗dawn continued to mean what it had meant in 1914‘ and earlier; this is clear in Montgomery‘s 
fiction from the death scene of Captain Jim in Anne‟s House of Dreams (1917, repr. Puffin 1981) 287-288. 
By contrast, however, Montgomery‘s The Blue Castle (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1926) opens with 
a reference to ‗the lifeless, hopeless hour just preceding dawn‘ (1). See Vance 48-49; Fussell The Great War 
and Modern Memory, repr. ed. (Oxford University Press, 2000) 61-64, esp. 63. 
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her dry, burning eyes. A merry rollicking whistle was lilting up the lane. A 
moment later Pacifique Buote came in sight. 
Anne‘s physical strength suddenly failed her. If she had not 
clutched at a low willow bough she would have fallen. Pacifique was 
George Fletcher‘s hired man, and George Fletcher lived next door to the 
Blythes. Mrs. Fletcher was Gilbert‘s aunt. Pacifique would know if—if—
Pacifique would know what there was to be known.44 
Anne emerges from her night of prayer and introspection both into enhanced and 
more mature self-knowledge, and also directly into a tightly-woven web of kinship 
associations: Gilbert‘s uncle/next-door-neighbour‘s hired boy, passing by en route to visit his 
own ailing father, brings news that Gilbert‘s illness has abated. With any of these 
connections missing, Pacifique would have been unable to deliver the crucial intelligence. 
At the moment that Anne finds herself able to undertake what Montgomery presents as the 
final step into the world of adult responsibility—marriage—she also finds herself 
dependent upon the social and familial web of the village to provide her with the 
information necessary for that step. This completes a process of integration that has been 
ongoing since the first novel, and which, again, has been advanced by the climactic deaths 
in each book: Matthew‘s death led Anne to choose to assume familial responsibility for 
Marilla, and Thomas Lynde‘s death enabled Rachel Lynde to take over from Anne, adding 
an element of reciprocity to Anne‘s relationship with the people of Avonlea—Anne 
acquires the means to fulfil her individual ambition, but only by also acquiring a deeper 
dependence upon the community. The tangled web of inter-relation that Montgomery 
chooses to spell out at the moment of Pacifique‘s appearance serves to underline the dense 
structure of relationships into which Anne is about to choose (or has already chosen) to 
enter fully.  
 
 
What have we learned from this reading of Montgomery‘s pre-war novels? In all of the 
passages examined above, death is a community affair, in which interpersonal relationships 
are both affirmed and renegotiated. Every narrative save for Montgomery‘s 
autobiographical recollection of her mother‘s funeral contains an element of moral 
instruction—sometimes, as in the case of Ruby Gillis, for the dying person, but always for 
those who witness the death, including, perhaps especially, the reader; in the cases where 
they are available, the last words of a character are especially significant. In all but one of 
                                                                                                                                               
44  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 285. 
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the narratives examined (excepting Gilbert Blythe‘s non-death), the body of the deceased 
has a central role; Thomas Lynde‘s does not, although this is well in keeping with his 
character, occasionally mentioned by others, but rarely appearing in person and even more 
rarely with any sense of agency. He is the only character whose funeral service is not 
described. The death narrative of Matthew Cuthbert places an emphasis on burial in his 
‗native earth‘, the land that he had farmed, loved, and taught Anne to love; although the 
other narratives do not mention the place of burial, it is reasonable to assume that this is 
because its proximity to the community is taken for granted, and only emphasised in the 
one instance because of particular resonances between land and character, rather than 
because the location is in any way unusual. The family‘s authority over the dead person‘s 
body and their memory is undisputed. 
 Thus, we have a fairly clear picture, though filtered through a literary and nostalgic 
lens, of what constituted ‗normal‘ death in Canada in the era immediately preceding the 
First World War; thus far, our picture harmonises with what Wilkinson and Wheeler have 
to say of normal British death at that time, at least as far as the focus on body and gravesite 
is concerned. A similar literary examination of Rilla of Ingleside will reveal how and to what 
extent these characteristics were altered during the First World War, and the role that 
theological language played in the changes.
  
 
 
RILLA OF INGLESIDE 
 
What was true of poetry was also true of fiction, and the same qualities 
were expected of a good fictional account of the war; it too had to be 
‗suffused with beauty of sentiment, [and] rich in noble ideas‘. Few novels 
approximated this ideal more closely than L. M. Montgomery‘s Rilla of 
Ingleside [...] 
Jonathan F. Vance, Death So Noble 175.
  
ontgomery began writing Rilla of Ingleside on 14 August, 1919, some nine 
months after the Armistice.1 Jonathan Vance notes that, at the time of its 
release, it was a critical favourite, ‗not for the author‘s finely drawn 
characters or deft handling of plot, but for a very specific reason: it captured the essence of 
small-town Canada during the war‘.2 Vance goes on to note that, ‗[b]y praising the novel‘s 
verisimilitude, reviewers shifted Rilla of Ingleside from fiction to history: it became a ‗true‘ 
record of Canada‘s war‘.3 Vance credits the book‘s popularity to Montgomery‘s ability to 
tap into the pre-existing popular myth of the war and repackage it for popular 
consumption. However, he reads Rilla of Ingleside and its critical reception in the context of 
war writing from ‗the 1920s and 1930s‘, and fails to account for the early publication date 
of Rilla and the extent to which it may have been actively involved in shaping Canadian 
memory of the war.4  
Nor does Vance care to credit Montgomery with any conscious historical accuracy; 
he attributes the promotion of the book as ‗a ―true‖ record of Canada‘s war‘ to reviewers, 
rather than the author herself. However, Montgomery herself strove to present a realistic 
picture of ‗Canada at war‘.5 In writing Rilla of Ingleside, she drew heavily upon her own 
wartime journal entries; the novel contains an exacting record of newspaper reports and 
Montgomery‘s own reactions to them, filtered through her characters.6 The book opens 
with Susan Baker, the Blythes‘ housekeeper, reading  
a big, black headline on the front page of the Enterprise, stating that some 
Archduke Ferdinand or other had been assassinated at a place bearing the 
weird name of Sarajevo, but Susan tarried not over uninteresting, 
immaterial stuff like that [...]7 
Montgomery‘s journal entry of 5 August 1914, the day that England declared war on 
Germany, recounts that ‗Sometime in June I picked up a Globe and read that a Serbian had 
                                                                                                                                               
1  Rubio and Waterson (eds), Selected Journals of L. M. Montgomery 339. 
2  Vance 176. Given Vance‘s other remarks about the book, it is safe to assume that ‗finely drawn 
characters‘ and ‗deft handling of plot‘ are meant to be read as sarcasm on Vance‘s part. 
3  Vance 176. 
4  Vance tells us that the book sold 27,000 copies in Canada between its publication and the outbreak of the 
Second World War (Vance 176), a rather high figure for the time—as a point of comparison, when the 
Presbyterian Church in Canada‘s Committee on Public Worship and Aids to Devotion reported on plans 
for the printing of The Book of Family Devotion (Oxford University Press, 1919) in 1915, the proposed print 
run was only 2,000-5,000 volumes (see the Committe‘s report in A&P 41 [1915] 279-280). As the final 
novel in the internationally popular Anne of Green Gables series, Rilla of Ingleside has been read by several 
generations of girls at a sufficiently young age (9-13) that they are unlikely to have encountered discussion 
of the First World War at any length in their schooling. 
5  Journal entry 5 March 1921: Rubio and Waterson (eds), Selected Journals of L. M. Montgomery 404. 
6  Susan Baker is an especially ready mouthpiece for quotations from Montgomery‘s journal. See Epperly 
124. Epperly also mentions the connection between Montgomery‘s journals and Rilla, although she does 
not seem to quite realize the extent to which the journals contribute to the novel‘s historical 
verisimultude.  
7  L. M. Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside (McClelland and Stewart, 1921; repr. Bantam Books 1992), 1-2. 
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shot the Archduke of Austria and his duchess. The news was of little interest to me—as to 
most people on the continent‘.8 Both the journal and Rilla go on to detail the enormous 
significance this seemingly distant and obscure headline would have for Canadian life—and 
death. However, the book has been generally underappreciated, both as a novel and as an 
historical document. In the interest of providing a fuller picture of the vocabulary of war 
and commemoration in Canada between the years 1914 and 1921, I will devote some space 
to a discussion of themes from Rilla of Ingleside which parallel themes from the wider social 
discourse on the war, before returning to a closer examination of the way that Montgomery 
portrays death in the novel. 
 Rilla of Ingleside follows Anne and Gilbert Blythe‘s youngest daughter, Bertha Marilla 
Blythe, from the war‘s beginning in 1914, when she is fifteen years old, until 1919. The 
central drama of the novel, however, is not Rilla‘s coming of age in wartime, or even her 
courtship with Kenneth Ford, the son of the beautiful and enigmatic Leslie Moore, whose 
own courtship story was the main plot of Anne‟s House of Dreams.9 Rather, it is Rilla‘s 
brother, Walter, with his struggle to overcome his fear of war‘s ugliness, his enlistment, and 
his eventual death, who provides the main force in the novel. 
                                                                                                                                               
8  Rubio and Waterson (eds), Selected Journals of L. M. Montgomery 150. For more on the link between 
Montgomery‘s wartime journals and Rilla of Ingleside, see Epperly 121-122, and for Susan as a mouthpiece 
for Montgomery, see Epperly 125.  
9  Anne‟s House of Dreams was also written during the war, and Edwards and Lister argue that Leslie‘s story, 
especially, contains a dark realism that would have been foreign to Montgomery‘s pre-war writing, while 
Leslie herself, depicted with ‗blood-red poppies at her waist‘ is an early image of the self-sacrifice of 
Canadian women for the greater good, which Montgomery aimed to promote in her novels at this time—
see Edwards and Lister 33, 43. Thus, the pairing of Rilla with Kenneth is the culmination and reward of 
two generations of selfless women, Leslie and Rilla. 
A brief summary, for those unfamiliar with the books: Leslie was married at a young age to Dick 
Moore, who was abusive towards her; she consented to the marriage only because he held the mortgage 
to her mother‘s home, and threatened to foreclose otherwise. Dick eventually went away to sea, and did 
not come home, until a sailor from the same village, Captain Jim, found him in Cuba, apparently suffering 
from amnesia after a bar fight. Jim brings him home, and Leslie takes him back in and cares for him, 
appreciating that his temper has become far more mild, although he has very little mental capacity. To 
supplement her income, Lesley takes in a summer boarder, Owen Ford; the two are strongly attracted to 
each other, and Owen feels compelled to leave before the situation becomes untenable. Gilbert Blythe, 
who by this time is the local physician and married to Anne, examines Dick Moore for an unrelated 
ailment and comes to believe, based on the latest medical literature, that his condition can be cured by an 
operation. Over Anne‘s objections, he informs Leslie of his suspicions, and she is forced to choose 
whether to allow the procedure, at the risk that if it is successful, her husband will return to his previous 
abusive behaviour. In a grand gesture of self-sacrifice, she agrees to the operation, which successfully 
restores the memory of her husband‘s nearly identical cousin, George, who brings news that ‗Dick Moore 
died of yellow fever thirteen years ago‘ (Montgomery, Anne‟s House of Dreams 180). This intelligence frees 
Leslie to marry Owen Ford, although the village gossips indulge in a small bout of speculation about her 
character, as she had, albeit unknowingly, cohabited with a man to whom she was not married for over a 
decade. The ethical twists in the novel, the layers of sacrifice and reward, are extremely complex, and 
deserving of a much deeper treatment than can be given here; it must suffice to say that Leslie‘s story is 
very much a foreshadowing of the feminine sacrificial ethos which Montgomery lays out more explicitly in 
Rilla of Ingleside. 
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 Walter is portrayed as very much his mother‘s son: sensitive, imaginative, a poet. 
Both Vance and Edwards and Lister have noted that, in this regard, Walter represents a 
type, ‗a Canadian version of Rupert Brooke‘.10 Where Anne‘s literary talent wanes over the 
course of the series into a slightly eccentric hobby that does not threaten her true vocation 
as a wife and mother, Walter‘s gift is intimated to be something larger, approaching the true 
genius that Montgomery only ascribes to men within the Anne series.11 At the beginning of 
the novel, he is recovering from typhoid fever, and his family has some concern over 
whether he will be well enough to attend college in the fall.12 Both his precarious health and 
his poetic vision place him in a position perpetually between life and death, from which he 
speaks with a prophetic authority.  
 
 
Walter is one of two characters in the novel given to prophetic visions. The other character 
with a prophetic gift is the schoolmistress, Gertrude Oliver, whose dreams—often based 
on dreams Montgomery recorded in her own journal—foretell important events in the 
war.13 While Walter‘s authority derives from his position of disinterest—being not entirely 
part of the world in which his family dwells, he is able to observe and comment on it with 
greater clarity—the reasons for Miss Oliver‘s clairvoyance are ambiguous; the text merely 
states that ‗life had been a struggle for her‘.14 The similarity between her dreams and 
Montgomery‘s journals suggests that she is functioning in the text as a stand-in for the 
author, and Montgomery is investing Miss Oliver‘s visions with an authority that the wife 
of a Presbyterian minister in a small Ontario town may have been wary of claiming for her 
                                                                                                                                               
10  Vance 175; see also Edwards and Lister 36. 
11  The obvious exception to this is Mrs. Morgan, the author of Anne‘s favourite romance novels, who 
appears in Anne of Avonlea, but the tone of the episodes surrounding her visit is ultimately comic, and the 
episodes themselves resurgences of the childish Anne‘s propensity for ‗getting into scrapes‘ and letting her 
romantic imagination run away with her (Montgomery, Anne of Avonlea 119-131,153-157); there is a trace 
of implication that Anne‘s judgment about Mrs. Morgan‘s literary value (not to be confused with her 
success as an author) is similarly immature. This is in contrast to Paul Irving, Owen Ford, and Walter 
Blythe, to whose literary aspirations Anne (and, in the case of Walter, Rilla) plays helpmeet. Walter‘s 
poetic genius is mentioned almost as soon as his character is introduced in the novel; see Montgomery, 
Rilla of Ingleside 13-14. 
  My colleague, Elizabeth Anderson, points out that this restriction of genius to men is characteristic 
of the Anne series, rather than Montgomery‘s work as a whole; the Emily series—Emily of New Moon 
(McClelland and Stewart, 1923); Emily Climbs (McClelland and Stewart, 1925); Emily‟s Quest (McClelland 
and Stewart, 1927)—follows a woman with authorial aspirations who does achieve success, and whose 
writing is presented as serious art. 
12  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 6. 
13  Gertrude Oliver‘s dreams are related in Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 19, 163, 246; Montgomery‘s own 
dreams are recorded in her journal entries dated 22 February 1916 (Rubio and Waterson (eds), Selected 
Journals of L. M. Montgomery 177-178); 30 October 1917 (227-228); 2 March 1918 (242). 
14  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 12. 
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own.15 Moreover, the use of prophetic language in the novel lends support to the idea of 
the war as both divinely sanctioned and inevitable—well in keeping with both the ‗Holy 
War‘ rhetoric which marked much of public discourse, and with Montgomery‘s own 
(somewhat naive) understanding of predestination.16 
 Where Gertrude Oliver‘s dreams are of immediate relevance and change depending 
upon the circumstances of the war, Walter has one recurring waking vision, the meaning of 
which alters as it is interpreted in different circumstances.17 This vision first appears in 
Rainbow Valley, written in the midst of the war, and heavy with foreshadowing:18 
―Some day,‖ said Walter dreamily, looking afar into the sky, ―the Pied Piper 
will come over the hill up there and down Rainbow Valley, piping merrily 
and sweetly. And I will follow him—follow him down to the shore—down 
to the sea—away from you all. I don‘t think I‘ll want to go—Jem will want 
to go—it will be such an adventure—but I won‘t. Only I‘ll HAVE to—the 
music will call and call and call me until I MUST follow.‖19 
The vision is repeated at the end of that book; the passage is worth quoting at length to 
emphasize the links between the vision and the war that Montgomery was planting in her 
readers‘ minds, as nowhere in Rilla of Ingleside does the narrative voice intervene and draw 
the connection out so clearly: 
                                                                                                                                               
15  Montgomery‘s journal entry of 19 July 1918 sheds some light on her attitude towards the paranormal: 
I have never for one moment believed in what is called ―spiritualism‖. Nothing I have 
ever seen or read has convinced me for a moment that any communication from the dead 
is possible by such means. But I do believe that the phenomena thus produced is produced 
by some strange power existent in ourselves—in that mysterious part of it known as the 
subconscious mind—a power of which the law is utterly unknown to us. But that there is 
a law which governs it and that the operations produced by that law are perfectly natural 
could we but obtain the key to them I am firmly convinced.  
Rubio and Waterson (eds), Selected Journals of L. M. Montgomery 256. She then goes on to explain the care 
she took to ensure that no word of her private amusement, ‗making tables rap‘, reached the general and 
skeptical public, for fear of the damage her reputation might endure. 
16  See, for example, The Alpine Path 6. Vance dedicates an entire chapter to Just War rhetoric at the First 
World War; see Vance 12-34. He also repeatedly returns to Holy War rhetoric, although he does not 
identify it as such; see, for example, Vance 35, 44, 65. 
17  In brief, the Piper vision, or reference to it, is repeated in L. M. Montgomery, Rainbow Valley (McClelland 
and Stewart, 1919; repr. 1987) 55, 224-225, and Rilla of Ingleside 20, 33, 124-125, 191. 
  In Rainbow Valley the Pied Piper first appears in a book of myths that Walter reads out loud; his first 
vision comes in the discussion afterwards, prompted by Mary Vance‘s categorization of the tales as 
‗in‘resting lies‘; Walter‘s speech, intended to frighten Mary into submission, also gives him ‗a queer little 
chill of some mysterious dread‘. The incident is immediately followed by Mary expressing her disbelief in 
the power of prayer, because the one thing she had been praying for had not been resolved—only to 
learn, instantly, that it had been, without her knowledge. The references to the vision at Rilla 20 and 33 
refer back to this first vision, and the debate over providence and prophecy that formed its context, with 
Walter called to defend the validity of his vision. The second—and last—appearance of the Piper in 
Rainbow Valley comes at the end, foreshadowing the outbreak of war at the beginning of the next book, 
and the interjection of the narrative voice in that episode removes any doubt regarding the prophetic 
nature of the vision; the references at Rilla 124-125 and 191—as well as the reference to the poem ‗The 
Piper‘ at 167—echo this later vision. 
18  Edwards and Lister‘s article is mostly concerned with analysis of Rainbow Valley as a product of the First 
World War, and the parallels between the children‘s play scenarios and their eventual fates in the war. 
19  Montgomery, Rainbow Valley 55.  
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―Oh, I wish we had the old days back again,‖ exclaimed Jem. ―I‘d love to 
be a soldier—a great, triumphant general. I‘d give EVERYTHING to see a 
big battle.‖ 
Well, Jem was to be a soldier and see a greater battle than had ever 
been fought in the world; but that was as yet far in the future, and the 
mother, whose first-born son he was, was wont to look on her boys and 
thank God that the ―brave days of old,‖ which Jem longed for, were gone 
for ever, and that never would it be necessary for the sons of Canada to 
ride forth  
[...] The shadow of the Great Conflict had not yet made felt any 
forerunner of its chill. The lads who were to fight, and perhaps fall, on the 
fields of France and Flanders, Gallipoli and Palestine, were still roguish 
schoolboys with a fair life in prospect before them; the girls whose hearts 
were to be wrung were yet fair little maidens a-star with hopes and dreams.  
[...] Twilight crept over the valley and the little group grew silent. 
Walter had been reading again that day in his beloved book of myths and 
he remembered how he had once fancied the Pied Piper coming down the 
valley on an evening just like this. 
He began to speak dreamily, partly because he wanted to thrill his 
companions a little, partly because something apart from him seemed to be 
speaking through his lips. 
―The Piper is coming nearer,‖ he said, ―he is nearer than he was 
that evening I saw him before. His long, shadowy cloak is blowing around 
him. He pipes—he pipes—and we must follow—Jem and Carl and Jerry 
and I—round and round the world. Listen—listen—can‘t you hear his wild 
music?‖20 
Walter‘s early visions convey a sense of the war‘s inevitability; he does not foretell any 
cause or conflict, only a mysterious call which he and all his brothers and playmates will be 
compelled to answer, willingly or not. The Piper motif, carried between Rainbow Valley and 
Rilla of Ingleside, is both prefigurative and elegaic: in the final chapter of Rainbow Valley, it 
casts the shadow of the forthcoming war over the children at play; in Rilla of Ingleside, it 
casts the shadow of those children over the young men going off to war, from almost the 
first hint that war may be possible. At the first news of impending conflict, Walter‘s 
brother Jem reminds him of his vision: 
―Oh, boy, Germany has declared war on France. This means that England 
will fight too, probably—and if she does—well, the Piper of your old fancy 
will have come at last.‖ 
―It wasn‘t a fancy, said Walter slowly. ―It was a presentiment—a 
vision—Jem, I really saw him for a moment that evening long ago. Suppose 
England does fight?‖21 
Early in the novel, Walter is put in the position of having to defend the validity of his 
vision (‗It wasn‘t a fancy‘; later he writes to his sister ‗I tell you I saw him—it was no 
                                                                                                                                               
20  Montgomery, Rainbow Valley 224-225. 
21  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 20. 
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fancy—no illusion‘)—and, in so doing, assert the seriousness of the war, as well, over 
voices such as that of Jem, who still would ‗give EVERYTHING to see a great battle‘.22 
Walter sees from the first the pain and destruction the war will bring, and recoils from it. 
When a dance at the local lighthouse is interrupted with the news that England has 
declared war on Germany, only Walter and Gertrude Oliver immediately grasp the darker 
implications of the situation: 
―God help us, whispered Gertrude Oliver under her breath. ―My dream—
my dream! The first wave has broken.‖ She looked at Allan Daly and tried 
to smile. 
―Is this Armageddon?‖ she asked. 
[...] Walter looked at [Mary Vance] and had one of his odd 
visitations of prophecy. 
―Before this war is over,‖ he said—or something said through his 
lips—―every man and woman and child in Canada will feel it—you, Mary, 
will feel it—feel it to your heart‘s core. You will weep tears of blood over 
it. The Piper has come—and he will pipe until every corner of the world 
has heard his awful and irresistible music. It will be years before the dance 
of death is over—years, Mary. And in those years millions of hearts will 
break.‖23 
It is worth noting that while Gertrude Oliver‘s dream is her own, and at no point 
does any character or narrator suggest an outside power is at work in this or any other of 
her dreams, Walter‘s visions are often characterised as ‗something apart from him [...] 
speaking through his lips‘.24 Gertrude‘s dreams are also more private, shared only with a 
few intimates among the Blythe family (there is no indication, for instance, that Jem is ever 
aware of them), where Walter‘s prophecies are more public, and occasionally, as in the 
lighthouse scene, openings for political debate. Walter‘s pronouncement there is met with 
the claim that the war will ‗be over in a month or two. England will just wipe Germany off 
the map in no time‘.25 In his rejoinder, Walter reveals a far stronger awareness of the stakes 
in the conflict than his opponents have: 
―This isn‘t a paltry struggle in a Balkan corner, Harvey. It is a death grapple. 
Germany comes to conquer or die. And do you know what will happen if 
she conquers? Canada will be a German colony.‖ 
―Well, I guess a few things will happen before that,‖ said Harvey 
shrugging his shoulders. ―The British navy would have to be licked for one; 
and for another, Miller here, now, and I, we‟d raise a dust, wouldn‘t we, 
Miller? No Germans need apply for this old country, eh?‖26 
                                                                                                                                               
22  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 191. 
23  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 33. 
24  Montgomery, Rainbow Valley 224. 
25  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 34. 
26  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 35. 
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Montgomery presents an interesting dichotomy between Walter and his interlocutors. The 
other local lads can see no rhyme or reason to the war; they view it as an obscure conflict 
between European nations into which they are drawn simply as a matter of honour (Jem‘s 
response to Walter‘s ‗Suppose England does fight?‘ is ‗Why, we‘ll all have to turn in and 
help her [...] we‘ve got to pitch in tooth and claw if it comes to a family row‘) and a grand 
opportunity for adventure, besides.27 Their greatest fear is that peace will come too soon 
for them to be able to join the battle.28 Walter, by contrast, sees the war as ‗a death grapple‘, 
an epic struggle between good and evil, civilisation and barbarism—a holy war, akin to the 
war against Amalek: ugly, but necessary.29 His understanding fills Walter with, perhaps, a 
deeper sense of duty than the young men who rush to enlist at the first opportunity, but 
also with a deeper terror of the war. He struggles greatly before eventually enlisting, torn 
between his sense of duty and his fear.30 
 Most of the local youth depicted in the novel are extras, appearing and disappearing 
around the edges of the action, offering, as Harvey Crawford does above, a few stock 
phrases where necessary; there is no evidence to indicate whether, or how, their view of the 
war changes over the next four years. This is not the case with Jem Blythe, whose 
occasional letters provide the reader with some insight into the development of his 
thoughts. A letter to the family at Christmastime in 1914, a few short months after he 
enlisted, reveals that exposure to the reality of war has brought Jem‘s views into deeper 
sympathy with Walter‘s: 
One boy—he was a Nova Scotian—was killed right beside me yesterday 
[...] It was the first time I‘d been close to anything like that and it was a 
nasty sensation, but one soon gets used to the horrors here. We‘re in an 
absolutely different world. The only things that are the same are the stars—
and they are never in their right places, somehow. 
Tell mother not to worry—I‘m all right—fit as a fiddle—and glad I 
came. There‘s something across from us here that has got to be wiped out 
of the world, that‘s all—an emanation of evil that would otherwise poison 
life for ever. It‘s got to be done, dad, however long it takes, and whatever it 
costs, and you tell the Glen people this for me. They don‘t realize yet what 
                                                                                                                                               
27  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 25. 
28  See, for example, Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 25, 35. 
29  It takes less than one hundred pages—and approximately four months of war—for Susan Baker to equate 
the Germans—specifically the Kaiser—with the devil; see Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 96. The language 
equating Germany with diabolical forces remains consistent throughout the rest of the novel. This 
language was commonly used in constructing what Vance has termed ‗the myth of the war‘; see especially 
Vance 20-29. 
Again, I am not the only person who has noted the undertones of holy war rhetoric in Rilla of 
Ingleside; Epperly notes that ‗Since to Montgomery the war against Germany was sacred, a holy cause, we 
should not be surprised to find the heroine, Rilla, and her war baby depicted as madonna and child‘ 
(Epperly 118). 
30  See especially Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 81. 
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it is has broken loose—I didn‘t when I first joined up. I thought it was fun. 
Well, it isn‘t!31 
While Jem has not acquired Walter‘s terror, and, in fact, is capable of seeing ‗horrors‘ as 
something that ‗one soon gets used to‘, he has both grown past the idea that war is fun and 
come to appreciate Walter‘s view of the war as a cosmic conflict. That Walter‘s view is also 
Montgomery‘s own, echoing the sentiments expressed in her journal entries, may have 
something to do with the speed with which the main characters of the novel recognise its 
validity, but this does not undermine the fact that the language with which Montgomery 
and Walter describe the war was also a dominant discourse at the time. 
 When, in the wake of the sinking of the Lusitania, Walter does enlist, Montgomery‘s 
description of his last evening home contains another reference to the Piper vision:  
Walter looked about him lingeringly and lovingly. This spot had always 
been so dear to him. What fun they had had here lang syne. Phantoms of 
memory seemed to pace the dappled paths and peep merrily through the 
swinging boughs [...] They were all there around him—he could see them 
almost as plainly as he saw Rilla—as plainly as he had once seen the Pied 
Piper piping down the valley in a vanished twilight. And they said to him, 
those gay little ghosts of other days, ―We were the children of yesterday, 
Walter—fight a good fight for the children of today and tomorrow.‖32 
Walter‘s childhood vision of the Piper leading him out of the valley has come true, but on 
the point of its fulfilment, he receives another vision which, in turn, transforms the Piper‘s 
call from the mysterious, inevitable summons of Rainbow Valley, or the eerie cry of the 
death-grapple between good and evil from earlier in Rilla of Ingleside, into a plea for the 
safety and sanctity of children‘s play.33 Walter, who has been unable to find the courage to 
fight in the great struggle between good and evil, finds his courage for the small struggle, 
and is able to go off to war to defend what is, to him (and Montgomery), familiar and 
familial.  
 
 
The layering of these two visions, the Piper and the children, drive Walter to acquit himself 
bravely in combat—he earns a D. C. Medal for rescuing a wounded man from No-man‘s-
                                                                                                                                               
31  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 97. 
32  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 124-5. 
33  Throughout the novel, Montgomery draws connections between the British/Canadian side of the war and 
the sanctity of childhood. See, for example, Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 95, 98, and especially 106, in 
which Jem‘s letter home (discussed above) draws the same connection. See also Vance 157-159. 
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In Flanders fields the poppies blow 
Between the crosses, row on row, 
That mark our place; and in the sky 
The larks still bravely singing, fly 
Scarce heard amid the guns below. 
  
We are the Dead. Short days ago 
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow, 
Loved, and were loved, and now we lie 
 In Flanders fields. 
 
Take up our quarrel with the foe: 
To you from failing hands we throw 
The torch; be yours to hold it high. 
If ye break faith with those who die 
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow 
 In Flanders fields. 
land—and bring his poetic gift to fulfilment.34 Walter composes a poem called ‗The Piper‘ 
which, though never printed (or even quoted) in the novel, becomes to the cast of Rilla of 
Ingleside what John McRae‘s poem, ‗In Flanders Fields‘ was (and, to a large extent, still is) to 
real-life Canadians.35  
McCrae‘s poem is an important piece of 
literature, both in terms of its historical value and 
in the pervasive role it has played in remembrance 
rituals since the war, in Canada as well as abroad. 
Paul Fussell tells us that it was ‗[t]he most popular 
poem of the war‘ and ‗one reason the British 
Legion chose that [the poppy] symbol of [...] 
remembrance‘.36 It has since become fodder for 
rote recitation by schoolchildren throughout the 
English-speaking world; quotes from it are 
inscribed on the back of the Canadian ten dollar 
bill, and painted inside the dressing room of the Montreal Canadiens hockey team.37 The 
poem was, Fussel points out, written in 1915, during the period when several public 
figures, including Woodrow Wilson (who is much maligned in Rilla of Ingleside), hoped to 
find a compromise capable of ending the war.
38
 Fussel contends that the last stanza 
especially serves as ‗a propaganda argument... against a negotiated peace‘.39  
                                                                                                                                               
34  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 167. 
35  John McCrae, ‗In Flanders Fields‘, first published in Punch 6 December 1915 (see Fussell 249). 
Since I first wrote this analysis, a new collection of poetry and short stories about the Blythe family 
has been published, The Blythes are Quoted (Penguin, 2009); ‗The Piper‘ is the first piece included in this 
volume, and actually bears very little resemblance at all to the McCrae poem. However, ‗The Piper‘ is 
accompanied by a note from Montgomery explaining that ‗[i]t has been written recently‘ after (and 
presumably in response to) many requests from readers of Rilla of Ingleside and Rainbow Valley (The Blythes 
are Quoted 3); and I do not believe the recently discovered existence of one poem negates the textual 
references made to the other in the novel.  
36  Fussell 248-249; see also John E. Hurst, ‗John McCrae‘s Wars‘ in Canada and the Great War: Western Front 
Association Papers, ed. Briton C. Busch (McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2003) 76. 
37  See also Vance 199-201; Suzanne Evans, Mothers of Heroes, Mothers of Martyrs: World War I and the Politics of 
Grief (McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2007) 72-73. 
38  See, for example, the discussion in Arthur S. Link, Review of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Volume 35: 
October 1, 1915-January 27, 1916., The Journal of Southern History 49, no. 2 (1983). Montgomery‘s treatment of 
Wilson in particular and the U.S.A. in general was not pleasing to her American publishers; see her journal 
entry of 5 March 1921 (Rubio and Waterson (eds), Selected Journals of L. M. Montgomery 404). 
Although Montgomery implies that Walter‘s poem is modelled after McCrae‘s, the biographies of 
the two men could not be more different. McCrae came from a family with a long tradition of both 
military service and loyalty to the Crown; his father David served in a Canadian militia regiment, seeing 
action in the 1856 Fenian uprising, an attempt by Irish Americans to invade Canada in the hopes of 
exchanging it for Irish independence, and helped to found an artillery unit in Guelph. At the outbreak of 
the First World War, David McCrae raised an artillery unit, but was not allowed to accompany it further 
than England due to his advanced age. John himself enlisted in a Cadet Corps at a young age, and 
continued his service through college, university, and his medical training; in fact, this training was 
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Walter‘s ‗The Piper‘ is composed around the time of the Battle of Verdun, in 1916, 
a year later than ‗In Flanders Fields‘, and thus at a remove from the direct charge of 
propaganda against the specific political issue of a negotiated peace that Fussel levelled 
against McCrae‘s poem. However, it seems to still speak to the same central issue as ‗In 
Flanders Fields‘, an appeal to patriotic fidelity, and Montgomery presents it as a close 
analogue to that poem. She carefully identifies its author as ‗A Canadian lad in the Flanders 
trenches‘, calling the title line of McRae‘s poem to the mind of her readers.40 McRae‘s 
poem is three stanzas long; ‗The Piper‘ is described as ‗the mighty conflict, crystalized in 
three brief immortal verses‘.41 Likewise, the reaction of a crowd hearing ‗The Piper‘ recited 
as another group of local men set forth for the war calls to mind the closing lines of ‗In 
Flanders Fields‘: ‗The soldiers cheered her like mad and cried ―We‘ll follow—we‘ll 
follow—we won‘t break faith‖‗, in a clear reference to the third-last line of McCrae‘s 
poem.42 The opening stanza of that poem evokes the same sort of quiet pastoralism as do 
Walter‘s letters reminiscing about the beauty of his home.43 By linking ‗The Piper‘ so 
strongly to ‗In Flanders Fields‘, Montgomery not only provides an easy point of reference 
for the degree of poetic popularity Walter achieves, but also suggests the same layering of 
pastoralism and patriotism evident in Walter‘s vision of the children overlaid with the 
memory of the Piper. She suggests that, while the war is a conflict of lofty ideals, these do 
not inspire the same urge to personal sacrifice as the smaller, more intimate, often familial 
details of everyday life. This point is made more explicitly in Walter‘s last letter to Rilla, 
written the night before he is killed at Courcelette: 
I‘m not afraid, Rilla-my-Rilla, and I am not sorry that I came. I‘m satisfied. 
I‘ll never write the poems I once dreamed of writing—but I‘ve helped to 
make Canada safe for the poets of the future—for the workers of the 
future—ay, and the dreamers, too—for if no man dreams, there will be 
nothing for the workers to fulfil—the future, not of Canada only but of the 
world [...] It isn‘t only the fate of the little sea-born island I love that is in 
the balance—nor of Canada, nor of England. It‘s the fate of mankind. This 
is what we‘re fighting for. 
                                                                                                                                               
interrupted by his service in the Boer War. McCrae thus entered the First World War at the rank of Major, 
as both a brigade surgeon and the second in command of an artillery brigade, and no stranger to combat. 
He died in 1918, not in combat, but as a result of pneumonia complicated by meningitis—although his 
lungs, which had been weak throughout his life, may have been further compromised by gas inhalation. 
See Hurst 66-77. 
39  Fussell 250. 
40  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 167. 
41  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 167. It should be noted that the recently published poem contains only two 
stanzas. 
42  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 179. See also Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 230. Hurst notes that Moina 
Michael, who he credits with ‗the first sale of the Flanders Fields memorial poppy‘, was, in 1918, inspired 
by McCrae‘s poem not only to begin selling poppies, but to pen her own verse, ‗We Shall Keep the Faith‘, 
in response (Hurst 75-76). 
43  For the pastoralism of ‗In Flanders Fields‘, see Fussell 249. 
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[...] I‘ve a premonition about you, Rilla, as well as about myself. I 
think Ken will go back to you—and that there are long years of happiness 
for you by-and-by. And you will tell your children of the Idea we fought and 
died for—teach them it must be lived for as well as died for, else the price 
paid for it will have been given for nought. This will be part of your work, 
Rilla.44 
When Walter dies, he does so with a clear sense of purpose. Both he and Montgomery 
present his death as a sacrifice, not just for ‗the fate of mankind‘, as he argued at the 
lighthouse dance, but also for ‗the fate of the little sea-born island‘, not just for the workers 
of the future, but the poets and dreamers, those closer to Walter‘s own understanding. He 
fights and dies for a grand Idea, but also for that idea to be passed on to his sister‘s 
children, the ‗children of tomorrow‘ of his vision. 
 
 
The theme of sacrifice, and predominantly self-sacrifice, dominates both Rilla of Ingleside 
and more general discourse surrounding the First World War, especially theological 
discourse.45 Walter‘s life and death epitomize a popular sacrificial narrative, in which one 
finds fulfilment by surrendering one‘s self to something greater. The notion of sacrifice as 
exchange is extremely important here: if Walter simply died, without dying for something, 
without receiving some sort of personal fulfilment, his death and life could not be analysed 
                                                                                                                                               
44  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 191-192. 
45  A firm line needs to be drawn between the popular notion of self-sacrifice I discuss in relation to the First 
World War and the more technical understanding of sacrifice within the discipline of Religious Studies. 
While the former does have a number of characteristics in common with the latter, and almost certainly 
derives (as a metaphorical extension) from it, the latter involves a very precise system of actions, not all of 
which are relevant here. Kathryn McClymond breaks religious sacrifice down into seven constituitive 
elements: selection, association, identification, killing, heating, apportionment, and consumption; see 
McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence: a comparative study of sacrifice (The Johns Hopkins University Press 2008) 
29-33. While she is clear that not every element must be present for a ritual to qualify as a sacrifice, the 
ability of a number of the ‗self-sacrifice‘ narratives I describe here to fit into her scheme is still extremely 
tenuous. One may describe the death of a soldier in battle with the formal language of McClymond‘s 
system (selection-association-identification-killing), and the question of whether the soldier can function 
as priest, patron, and victim, or whether some of those roles must be transferred to other actors may be 
an interesting avenue for investigation, incidents such as Anne‘s ‗sacrifice‘ of her literary ambition is 
difficult to fit into a schematic predicated on the manipulation of physical elements. I focus on 
McClymond‘s system here because it is both the most recent and the most flexible attempt at a theory of 
sacrifice; earlier works tend towards even narrower ritual schematics. See, for example, Walter Burkert, 
Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth, trans. Peter Bing (University of 
California Press, 1982); René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1972); Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions, trans. W. D. 
Halls (University of Chicago Press, 1964). Theologians have tended to be looser in their use of language, 
and there is overlap between the technical, anthropological notion of sacrifice and the popular usage (see, 
for example, my discussion of Bushnell, below); it is from this intellectual tradition that my own use of 
language here derives. 
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as sacrificial narratives.46 As we have seen, this has been a theme throughout Montgomery‘s 
Anne of Green Gables series—both because, as Irene Gammel has asserted, it was a popular 
literary theme at the time (even prior to the outbreak of war), and most likely because of 
the author‘s own religious convictions. The outbreak of war served to heighten the 
immediacy of this discourse, and political expedience may have contributed to its gaining a 
somewhat wider currency.  
 Where Anne‘s literary ambitions were a mark of a selfish individuality she had to 
surrender after Matthew‘s death in order to integrate herself into the local community, a 
first step towards her fulfilment as a wife and mother, Walter‘s literary gift stems from 
something beyond himself, and reaches fulfilment when he accomplishes his self-surrender. 
Both the Piper and ‗The Piper‘ come through, rather than from, Walter; he says of the poem: 
‗it came to me [...] I didn‘t feel as if I were writing it—something else used me as an 
instrument‘.47 Barely twenty-two pages elapse between Rilla learning of the poem Walter 
has written and her learning of his death, with no news of him appearing in the meantime.48 
There is, then, an implicit relationship between Walter‘s surrender to the force that brought 
forth his one great poem and his surrender to death; ‗The Piper‘ (the poem) and the Piper 
(Walter‘s visionary gift) appear to come from the same mysterious source. Where Walter‘s 
second-last letter brings news of his artistic achievement, his last letter details his final 
vision: 
One evening long ago [...] I saw the Piper coming down the Valley with a 
shadowy host behind him. The others thought I was only pretending—but 
I saw him for just one moment. And Rilla, last night I saw him again. I was 
doing sentry-go and I saw him marching across No-man‘s-land from our 
trenches to the German trenches—the same tall shadowy form, piping 
weirdly—and behind him followed boys in khaki. Rilla, I tell you I saw 
him—it was no fancy—no illusion. I heard his music, and then—he was 
gone. But I had seen him—and I knew what it meant—I knew that I was 
among those who followed him. 
Rilla, the piper will pipe me ‗west‘ tomorrow. I feel sure of this. 
And Rilla, I‘m not afraid. When you hear the news, remember that.49 
This is not the first instance of Montgomery linking literary accomplishment with the 
notion of sacrifice; in her autobiography, she not only makes that link explicitly, but also 
makes an implicit connection between the self-sacrifice of the writer and the soldier: 
                                                                                                                                               
46  See especially McClymond; Marcel Maus, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Arabic Societies, trans. 
Ian Cunnison (Norton, 1967); Gregory Alles, ‗Exchange‘, in Guide to the Study of Religion , ed. Willi Braun 
and Russel T. McCutcheon (Academic Press, 1980). 
47  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 167. 
48  The poem is introduced on 167; news of Walter‘s death comes at pages 187-188. ‗The Piper‘ is mentioned 
on 179, and Walter mentioned briefly on 185 as Rilla recalls the lighthouse dance, but he is otherwise 
absent from the narrative at this point. 
49  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 191. 
     | 98 
 
The very day on which these words are written has come a letter to me 
from an English lad of nineteen, totally unknown to me, who writes that he 
is leaving for ―the front‖ and wants to tell me ―before he goes‖ how much 
my books and especially Anne have meant to him. It is in such letters that a 
writer finds meet reward for all sacrifice and labor.50  
This linkage may appear somewhat odd at first blush, but it has its roots in theology 
with which Montgomery would likely have been familiar, such as Horace Bushnell‘s 1877 
work, The Vicarious Sacrifice.51 Bushnell‘s book opened with an argument that Christ‘s 
substitutionary atonement involved his ‗bearing of our[sic] sins‘ just as a mother bears the 
‗pains and sicknesses‘ of her child, or  
the patriot or citizen who truly loves his country [...] how does it wrench 
feeling, what a burden does it lay upon his concern [...] when that country, 
so dear to him, is being torn by faction [...] Then you will see how many 
thousands of citizens, who never knew before what sacrifices it was in the 
power of their love to make for their country‘s welfare, rushing to the field 
and throwing their bodies and dear lives on the battle‘s edge to save it!52 
At least two sides of the sacrificial trifecta of Christ, mother, and soldier laid out by 
Bushnell are illustrated in Rilla of Ingleside; the analogy between feminine affection and 
military service is drawn out explicitly at several points (one of which is in the portion of 
Walter‘s last letter quoted above, in which he refers to Rilla‘s work as a continuation of his 
own), but the linkage between these and the sacrifice of Christ is left undeveloped in the 
novel. This is not the case in the more general public discourse surrounding the war, in 
which the analogous relation between the soldier and Christ is drawn out explicitly.53 
 Jonathan F. Vance has already detailed the myriad ways in which this analogy is 
presented in both discourse during the war and in monuments and memorials produced 
after the war. In brief, Vance contends that the equation between Christ and the soldier 
serves both a justificatory and a consolatory purpose. The justificatory purpose, as already 
mentioned, aligned Britain and the Allied nations with the side of God, transforming what 
may have otherwise been a rather obscure political conflict into a Holy War, in which 
                                                                                                                                               
50  Montgomery, The Alpine Path 75. 
51  I cannot, of course, speak to what Montgomery may have thought of Bushnell, the controversial 
American Congregationalist minister; however, his work was sufficiently influential that it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that her husband would have at the very least have been conversant with the 
ideas therein.  
52  Horace Bushnell, The Vicarious Sacrifice, Grounded in Principles Interpreted by Human Analogies, vol. 1 (Scribner, 
Armstrong & Co., 1877) 46-7. Bushnell is presumably writing here in response to the American Civil War, 
rather than the First World War, which points to an interesting dichotomy between Canadian and 
American experience entering into the First World War: the American Civil War was the last war fought 
in North America, and the last war fought by American troops prior to their entry into the First World 
War. By contrast, Canadians (such as John McCrae) fought under the banner of the British Empire in the 
Boer War, at the turn of the century. Although the Boer War was geographically more distant, it was a 
more recent memory of conflict. 
53  Especially notable in this regard is the myth of the crucified (Canadian) soldier, described in Evans 52-58. 
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Germans and their allies ceased to be viewed as human but instead represented the sin 
from which Christ died to cleanse the world.54 The consolatory purpose did not simply 
align the soldier‘s sacrifice with that of Christ, but also the soldier‘s reward; the soldier, like 
Christ, willingly gave up his earthly life, but in so doing gained the rewards of resurrection 
and life eternal.55 This latter treatment of the sacrificial theme grew quickly beyond a mere 
consolatory gesture and transformed war service into a religious and moral purification, 
participation in which was highly desirable. This is the attitude which prompted 
Montgomery‘s somewhat bizarre equation between her sacrifices as a writer and the soldier 
about to depart for the front.  
 The pages of Rilla of Ingleside are filled with arguments for women‘s place in the 
sacrificial endeavour; when Walter enlists, Rilla protests that ‗Our sacrifice is greater than his 
[...] Our boys give only themselves. We give them‘.56 This was, until August 1915, quite 
literally true, as until then Canadian men who wished to enlist required the written consent 
of their wife or their mother.57 It was natural, then, that the language of sacrifice would 
extend to women who actually did sacrifice their loved ones to the war, both to encourage 
and to acknowledge their contribution, even after the requirement had been lifted.58 In her 
study on motherhood and the First World War in Canada, Suzanne Evans notes that some 
of the earliest war recruiting in Canada and Great Britain relied on images of women and 
                                                                                                                                               
54  See above, note 16. See also Evans 43-76. Note especially Evans 58-60, which discusses the Charles Sims 
painting Sacrifice (c. 1918), from the Canadian War Memorials Fund Collection, which now hangs in the 
Canadian War Museum at the top of the staircase leading down into the gallery in which the plaster 
models for the allegorical figures on the Vimy memorial (discussed below) are displayed. The image is 
dominated by a crucifix, seen from behind, with hints of Christ‘s legs, arms, and torso peeking out from 
behind the central beam; beyond that is a pastiche of wartime scenes—figures in civilian dress, mostly 
women and children, with two elderly men, occupy a narrow strip of snow in the foreground which, 
judging by the shape of the rustic cabin intruding from the right-hand edge of the frame, as well as the 
presence of one mother and child figure in First Nations costume, is meant to be Canada; beyond that lies 
a vast muddy landscape with various scenes of trench warfare; along the top edge of the painting, along 
the horizontal beam of the cross, is a row nine provincial crests, and immediately below the crests the 
word SACRIFICE appears in gold lettering. The equation of Canada with Christ (especially through the 
placement of the provincial crests) or the battlefield with sin, is far from subtle. 
55  Again, Vance dedicates an entire chapter to ‗Christ in Flanders‘; see Vance 35-72. The emphasis on the 
soldier‘s reward of eternal life, and the lengths to which civilians went to claim some connection to the 
sacrificial endeavour for themselves, seems to imply a background assumption of limited atonement, that 
Christ‘s death did not purchase a remission of sins and eternal life for all humanity, but only a select 
portion thereof.  
  Evans cites a pamphlet put out by the Mothers‘ Union which instructs mothers whose children are 
killed in the war that they ‗would have ―a yet deeper cause for thankfulness that he is among the long roll 
of English heroes ... [and] far better even than that—the welcome of the King of Kings will greet him—
‘Well done, good and faithful servant, enter thou into the joy of the Lord.‖‗ Maurice Rickards and Michael 
Moody, The First World War: Ephemera, Mementos, Documents (Jupiter Books, 1975) 20, quoted in Evans 85-
86. 
56  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 120. See also Epperly 121-122, 125. 
57  Evans 81-82. 
58  Indeed, beginning December 1919, a special medal was struck for wives and mothers of men killed in 
service to the British Empire: the Memorial Cross. Eventually, an equivalent, and specifically Canadian, 
medal was struck for mothers only: the Silver Cross. See Evans 101-109. 
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captions entreating men to fight in their defence.59 This trope appears several times in Rilla 
of Ingleside; Ken Ford ‗carried the picture of [Rilla] in his heart to the horror of the 
battlefields of France‘, and Walter boards the train that will take him to war thinking that 
‗[a]fter all it was not a hard thing to fight for a land that bore daughters like this‘.60 Rilla and 
her mother consciously strive to embody the image of womanhood that encourages men to 
fight in defence of the homeland; ‗When our women fail in courage/shall our men be 
fearless still?‘ is an oft-repeated maxim in the book.61 
 The link between the soldier and Christ is clearest in attempts to derive moral 
meaning from the soldier‘s sacrificial death—in much the same way that moral 
development was derived from attendance at a deathbed prior to the war. However, the 
latter seemed to require only attendance to be effective; as the war made witnessing death 
itself, or the moments leading up to it, impossible, survivors had to work harder to derive 
moral benefit from it. After Walter‘s death, Rilla writes in her journal that 
my work is here at home. I know Walter wouldn‘t have wanted me to leave 
mother and in everything I try to ‗keep faith‘ with him, even to the little 
details of daily life. Walter died for Canada—I must live for her. That is 
what he asked me to do.62 
Just as generations of Sunday School teachers enjoined children to give meaning to Christ‘s 
death by living their lives in accordance with the principles which his sacrifice represented, 
Rilla and her real-life analogues strive to render the sacrifice of their loved ones meaningful 
by identifying some principle that they can ‗live for‘ as their relatives ‗died for‘.63  
 Montgomery, however, also offers an implicit critique of an overly simplistic notion 
of sacrifice-as-exchange at the end of Rilla of Ingleside, when, as the war draws to a close, and 
Jem Blythe is numbered among the missing (he is in a German Prisoner of War camp, 
although the Ingleside family have no way of knowing this), Bruce Meredith, the son of the 
local Presbyterian minister, drowns his beloved pet kitten:64 
‗Why did you do that?‘ Mrs. Meredith exclaimed. 
                                                                                                                                               
59  Evans 78-81; more generally, Evans 77-112. See especially Evans‘ discussion of the White Feather 
Campaign, in which women attempted to shame men into enlisting by presenting them with white 
feathers, meant to denote cowardice—Evans 82-84; see also J. L. Granatstein and J. M. Hitsman, Broken 
Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Oxford University Press, 1977) 39; also Desmond Morton, 
Marching to Armageddon (Lester & Orpen 1989) 27; Morton, When Your Number‟s Up: The Canadian Soldier in 
the First World War (Random House, 1994) 50, 59. Montgomery‘s Walter is himself the recipient of a white 
feather prior to his enlistment; see Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 81, 166. 
60  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 134, 127. 
61  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 40, 116; see also also 162, 221, and especially 247. 
62  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 230. 
63  See especially Vance 50-51, 72, 89, 126, 217, 219. 
64  Montgomery tends to use the motif of a dead kitten to signify a corruption or betrayal of innocence. See 
also Montgomery, A Tangled Web (McClelland and Stewart, 1931) 303-306. 
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‗To bring Jem back‘, sobbed Bruce. ‗I thought if I sacrificed Stripey 
God would send Jem back. So I drownded him—and, oh mother, it was 
awful hard—but surely God will send Jem back now, ‗cause Stripey was the 
dearest thing I had [...] 
Mrs. Meredith didn‘t know what to say to the poor child. She just 
could not tell him that perhaps his sacrifice wouldn‘t bring Jem back—that 
God didn‘t work that way.65 
This passage stands in sharp contrast to earlier passages in which Mr. Meredith himself 
employed a sacrificial discourse.66 Young Bruce is portrayed as taking his father‘s doctrine 
too literally, lacking an adult perspective that would enable him to discern between the 
(national) self-sacrifice his father calls for and the other-sacrifice in which he himself 
engages. 
                                                                                                                                               
65  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 261 
66  e.g., Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 50-51, in which he argues that ‗Without shedding of blood there is no 
remission of sins [...] Without shedding of blood there is no anything‟. 
Figure 2: Cross of Sacrifice, Givenchy Road Canadian Cemetery, Neuville-St. Vaast 
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The sacrificial theme carried over into the construction of post-war monuments. When 
constructing the battlefield cemeteries, the Imperial War Graves Commission strove to 
maintain a uniform treatment of every grave in every cemetery, obliterating any differences 
in rank or social standing between the men (and they were almost exclusively men) buried 
there, emphasizing the equality of each soldier‘s sacrifice, as well as the commonality of 
their service to the Empire (in much the same way as the group funerals of 5th century BCE 
Athens).67 Thus, not only were the headstones absolutely uniform in size and shape 
(though their inscriptions varied widely), the cemeteries themselves each contain roughly 
the same elements.68 Graveyards of 1,000 occupants or more include the Stone of 
Remembrance, designed by Sir Edwin Lutyens, the same architect responsible for the 
London Cenotaph.69 The Stone is large, about twelve feet long, and in both its horizontal 
orientation and its situation on top of three steps is meant to resemble an altar.70 It bears 
the simple inscription, chosen by Rudyard Kipling: ‗Their name liveth for evermore‘. The 
inscription is from Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 44. 
Let us now praise famous men, and our fathers that begat us.  
The Lord hath wrought great glory by them through his great power from 
the beginning. Such as did bear rule in their kingdoms, men renowned for 
their power, giving counsel by their understanding, and declaring 
prophecies;  
Leaders of the people by their counsels, and by their knowledge of learning 
meet for the people, wise and eloquent in their instructions:  
Such as found out musical tunes, and recited verses in writing;  
Rich men furnished with ability, living peaceably in their habitations;  
All these were honoured in their generations and were the glory of their 
times.  
There be of them, that have left a name behind them, that their praises 
might be reported.  
And some there be, which have no memorial; who are perished, as though 
they had never been, and are become as though they had never been born; 
and their children after them. But these were merciful men, whose 
righteousness hath not been forgotten.  
With their seed shall continually remain a good inheritance, and their 
children are within the covenant.  
Their seed standeth fast, and their children for their sakes.  
Their seed shall remain for ever, and their glory shall not be blotted out.  
                                                                                                                                               
67  See Hynes 271; Longworth 13-14; Vance 61. 
68  Longworth 34. 
69  ‗The Structural Maintenance of the Commission‘s Cemeteries and Memorials‘, pamphlet, Commonwealth 
War Graves Commission, Maidenhead. 
70  Longworth 36. 
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Their bodies are buried in peace, but their name liveth for evermore.71 
The context of the quote chosen for the Stone is nearly as important as the quotation itself; 
the parallel drawn between ‗famous men‘ and those ‗which have no memorial‘ in 
Ecclesiasticus finds concrete expression in the design of the cemeteries put forth by the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, which does not differentiate between the graves of 
generals and those of soldiers ‗Known Unto God‘. In spite of the scriptural source of the 
quotation, however, the Stone is, generally speaking, a fairly nondescript and religiously 
neutral memorial; it promises eternal life, but no bodily resurrection; it makes no appeal to 
any specific faith.72 In this, it is unlike the Reginald Blomfield designed Cross of Sacrifice, 
which is present in every cemetery, regardless of size, ‗a tall finely proportioned stone cross, 
with a symbolic sword of bronze attached to its face, thus emphasising both the military 
character of the cemetery and the religious affiliation of the majority of the dead‘.73 More 
importantly, however, the conflation of sword and cross emphasizes the link between the 
soldier‘s sacrifice and that of Christ, suggesting that the eternal life promised by both the 
Christian faith and the inscription on the Stone of Remembrance was directly linked not 
just to the soldiers‘ostensibly voluntary surrender of their lives, but to the militant context 
in which that surrender occurred. In the larger graveyards, where the Cross of Sacrifice and 
Stone of Remembrance are both present, there is usually an area of tension between them, 
a line of sight from which the headstones radiate outwards—a wide spread of death 
between resurrection and eternal life. In the Tyne Cot Cemetery at Passchendaele, the 
largest of the Commission‘s cemeteries, there is a clear line of sight between the Stone, the 
Cross, and the entrance gate. The Cross stands at the centre of this configuration, clearly 
visible from either end of the cemetery, but obscuring the view between the Stone and the 
entrance. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
71  Ecclesiasticus 44:1-14, King James Version. I have chosen here to refer to the translation from which 
Kipling took his quote, rather than the more technically accurate NRSV. 
72  Indeed, James Stevens Curl notes that ‗[m]uch of the classical language used for the cemeteries was 
criticized for being pagan‘; see Curl, A Celebration of Death: An introduction to some of the buildings, monuments, 
and settings of funerary architecture in the Western European tradition (Constable, 1980).  
73  Longworth 36. 
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Figure 3: Stone of Remembrance, Canadian Cemetery No. 2, Neuville St. Vaast
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As we have seen, Montgomery‘s war writing tends to utilize language and imagery that was 
quite common to the more general Canadian (and, indeed, British) discourse regarding the 
war, in both the wartime and the post-war years. It should not be a surprise, then, that her 
images of death and mourning in Rilla of Ingleside also represent, or hint towards, a set of 
images and experiences more common to Canadians in general than specific to one 
(fictional) family on Prince Edward Island. While Walter‘s life is filled out with unusual 
details such as his poetic and prophetic gifts, his death is narrated sparingly, with very little 
detail to distinguish him from the hundreds of thousands of other young men who died in 
combat.  
 The striking elements which distinguish the narration of Walter‘s death from the 
deaths in previous novels are delay and distance.74 Five days pass between Walter‘s death 
and his family hearing of it; a further unspecified length of time passes before Walter‘s last 
words are delivered to Rilla—along with a letter from his commanding officer, assuring the 
family that ‗he had been killed instantly by a bullet during a charge at Courcelette‘.75 Vance 
notes that such letters were sent to comfort rather than inform; they were ‗more often than 
not used to hide from relatives the horror of the facts. After the war, this subterfuge was 
accepted as reality‘.76 He goes on to note the common trope of the soldier dying with a 
smile on his face: ‗The beauty of the passing, manifest in a beatific smile, grew out of a 
sense of deep satisfaction of a job seen through to the end‘, the same sort of satisfaction 
expressed by Walter in his final letter to Rilla (discussed above).77  
 The events of Walter‘s death are exactly reversed from the events of Montgomery‘s 
pre-war death narratives. His final words do not precede his dying, but rather arrive a 
considerable time afterwards. His body is entirely absent, save for the brief mention of his 
‗painless‘ passing in his commanding officer‘s letter, which Montgomery may have 
intended sincerely, but a contemporary reader conscious of the trope behind the letter 
cannot read as an honest representation of Walter‘s demise. There is no funeral, and no 
memorial service is recorded in the novel. Walter has no grave. 
                                                                                                                                               
74  The other death which features these elements is that of Dick Moore, whose death in Cuba went 
unreported for thirteen years (see above, note 9) in Anne‟s House of Dreams, the other novel Montgomery 
wrote during the War. 
75  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 190.  
76  Vance 99. 
77  Ibid. 
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 Instead of the body and grave which were the focus of Montgomery‘s earlier death 
narratives, Walter is mourned through words. Rilla carries his last letter ‗unopened to 
Rainbow Valley and read it there, in the spot where she had had her last talk with him‘.78 
Where Anne‘s sight of Matthew‘s body opened her eyes to the reality of his death, Rilla‘s 
contact with Walter‘s final letter convinces her of his eternal life: 
For the first time since the blow had fallen Rilla felt—a different thing from 
tremendous hope and faith—that Walter, of the glorious gift and the 
splendid ideals, still lived, with just the same gift and just the same ideals. 
That could not be destroyed—these could suffer no eclipse. The personality 
that had expressed itself in that last letter, written on the eve of 
Courcelette, could not be snuffed out by a German bullet. It must carry on, 
though the earthly link with things of earth were broken.79 
The repetition of ‗earthly/earth‘ in the final line here is reminiscent of the description of 
Ruby Gillis‘s body before it underwent the purification of death: ‗her beauty had been of 
the earth, earthy‘.80 Walter has no body in which this purification may be observed; rather, 
it is his personality that is cleansed—primarily cleansed from fear, as detailed in the final 
letter that Rilla holds in her hands. The letter becomes a substitute for Walter‘s body, the 
site at which the morally instructive effects of his death may be observed. It also substitutes 
for his body as the site at which those who mourn him can make their final contact with 
him, as Montgomery did by kissing her dead mother‘s cheek. Rilla shares the letter with 
Una Meredith, a childhood friend who she strongly suspects was in love with Walter; 
moved by Una‘s silent grief (‗her eyes were the eyes of a woman stricken to the heart, who 
yet must not cry out or ask for sympathy‘), Rilla offers her the letter to keep, and ‗Una took 
the letter and when Rilla had gone she pressed it against her lonely lips‘.81 It is worth noting 
that through all of this, Rilla and the rest of the Ingleside family do manage to maintain the 
role of gatekeeper to Walter‘s memory that is accorded to family members in 
Montgomery‘s earlier death narratives, although they must defend that role against 
outsiders who attempt to ascribe alternate meanings to Walter‘s death.82 
                                                                                                                                               
78  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 190. 
79  Ibid. Compare with the sources quoted in Vance 44-47. 
80  Montgomery, Anne of the Island 108. 
81  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 193. 
82  See especially Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 189, in which Susan argues with a neighbour who refers to 
‗Pore, pore Walter‘, maintaining that ‗He was not poor. He was richer than any of you. It is you who stay 
at home and will not let your sons go who are poor—poor and naked and mean and small—pisen poor, 
and so are your sons [...]‘, and 194-195, in which the one of the village girls criticises Rilla‘s refusal to don 
full mourning as indicative of a lack of feeling. 
Montgomery‘s patriotic Blythe family defend Walter‘s memory from being used to undermine the 
state, whereas Antigone and Klara Becker from The Stone Carvers, discussed below, attempted to defend 
their loved ones‘ memories from being appropriated by the state; in all cases, however, the principle is that 
the family of the dead person must defend their right to ascribe meaning to that person‘s death. 
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 Anne planted a rosebush on Matthew‘s grave, and returned frequently, often at 
significant points in the narrative (and her life) to tend the bush and the grave. Rilla, 
instead, sits in church as the war draws to a close, ‗looking up at the memorial tablet on the 
wall above [the family] pew, ―sacred to the memory of Walter Cuthbert Blythe,‖‗ and feels 
‗filled anew with courage‘, and the certainty that ‗Walter could not have laid down his life 
for naught‘.83 Rilla seeks consolation from the tablet much as she might have from a grave; 
the notable difference between the two is that Walter‘s body is in no way present at the 
tablet.  
 Walter‘s body is unavailable as an object of consolation not simply because of the 
difficulty involved in recovering it from France, but because in 1915 or 1916 the British 
government determined that no soldier‘s body should be repatriated, whether they be 
English, Canadian, or Australian; instead, the soldier was to be ‗buried on the spot where 
he falls‘.84 At first, this practice was simply a practical response to the realities of combat; 
Fabian Ware‘s unit began its work of registering graves simply to have a record of where 
bodies were, so that when hostilities ceased they could be interred in a more permanent 
fashion—most likely in a common ossuary, as were Athenian soldiers in the 5th century 
BCE.85 However, as the war progressed from a race to capture territory into the trench 
warfare that characterised the majority of action on the Western Front, ‗burials became 
concentrated rather than scattered‘, and Ware began to feel pressure to seek a more 
permanent solution to the problem of burial.86 He eventually negotiated a permanent grant 
of land from France for British cemeteries; the death of British soldiers bought the Empire 
the right to the land on which they fell.87  
 The negotiations over the land France grated for cemeteries reveals the importance 
accorded to gravesites. The French government originally proposed to provide both the 
land and the maintenance of the cemeteries; Ware objected to this ‗since, in providing for 
                                                                                                                                               
83  Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 235. It should go without saying that the sense in which Montgomery uses 
‗memorial‘ here is to indicate a commemorative marker, rather than in the technical sense which I 
proposed in Chapter One. 
84  MT, Hilkhot melakhim, 6:12 (Hershman 223)--although it is highly unlikely that the British authorities were 
thinking of Maimonides when this decision was made. Samuel Hynes, who dates this decision to 1916, 
notes that ‗the spot where he falls‘ was a rough guideline only; ‗there were more than twelve hundred 
patches of soldiers‘ graves in France alone at the end of the war, and these were eventually consolidated‘. 
See Hynes 271. The 1916 date is also cited by Curl 319. Phillip Longworth suggests that the decision 
against repatriation originates in a March 1915 order issued by Marshall Joffre ‗banning exhumations 
during the period of the war‘, and that eventually this order took on more permanent force; see 
Longworth 14.  
85  Longworth 1-2, 11, 14. 
86  Longworth 11. 
87  Longworth 11-12. 
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upkeep it might have prevented Britain from caring for the graves of her own soldiers‘.88 
The activity of tending a grave, as Anne did Matthew‘s, or as Antigone wished to do for 
Polynices‘, was understood to be significant enough that ensuring that those who did the 
tending were of an appropriate relation to the deceased (even if the relation was no 
stronger than ‗fellow citizen‘) entered into an international negotiation as a major concern. 
However, there does not appear to have been a similar drive to ensure that those whose 
particular relationship to the deceased (ie, familial) would, by custom, entitle them to tend 
the grave were able to do so. In this regard, the military burial practices of the British 
Empire in the early 20th century CE are a strong parallel to the military burial practices of 
the Athenian Empire in the mid 5th century BCE. And just as in Athens, the public reaction 
was mixed. At least one body was disinterred and repatriated during the war, in spite of the 
general order to the contrary; Ware became concerned that this might set a precedent that 
‗would increase the demand at home for repatriation‘.89 Likewise, Vance recounts two 
separate instances of Canadians attempting to reclaim their relatives‘ remains after the war. 
In both cases, the bereaved relations (parents of the dead soldiers) eventually travelled to 
France to dig up their sons‘ graves in the hopes of personally transporting their remains 
back to Canada; both attempts failed.90  
 While public demand for repatriation may have been high enough to concern Ware, 
the majority of public concern was directed at the gravesites, rather than the bodies 
themselves. Providing photographs of graves—images of names—became part of the 
Graves Registration Commission‘s regular work from March 1915 onwards.91 By August of 
that year, demand was such that the Commission had developed a standard system for 
responding to such requests: letters of enquiry were answered with a photograph that 
showed four graves, one of which would be the grave of the soldier enquired about 
(photographing the graves in groups of four permitted a more efficient use of time and 
film than would photographing individual graves), and a card on which ‗were given certain 
particulars, including the best available indication as to the situation of the grave and, when 
it was in a cemetery, directions as to the nearest railway station which might be useful for 
those wishing to visit the country after the war‘.92 The demand for these photographs 
indicated a concern for the care and upkeep of the graves, but also points towards the 
                                                                                                                                               
88  Longworth 12. 
89  Longworth 14; the body was ‗of a British officer, a Lord Lieutenant, and a grandson of W. E. Gladstone‘; 
it was ‗disinterred under fire at Poperinghe and sent home ―in obedience to pressure from a very high 
quarter‖‗.  
90  Vance 62-63. 
91  Longworth 15. 
92  Fabian Ware, introduction to Sidney C. Herst, The Silent Cities (Methuen 1929) vii, quoted in Longworth 
15. 
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development of a system of substitutionary mourning.93 Where a body and grave were 
unavailable, mourners compensated with artefacts (such as letters) and images of the grave. 
 
 
Mourners in the British Empire did not compensate for the inaccessibility of the body of 
the deceased soldier through material memorials alone. Alan Wilkinson informs us that ‗In 
1914 public prayer for the dead was uncommon in the Church of England; by the end of 
the war it had become widespread‘.94 As the elaborate Victorian system of public mourning 
steadily eroded, public prayer for the departed gained popularity.95 While Montgomery 
omits mention of prayer from Rilla of Ingleside, a similar, though not identical, move is 
evident in the worship resources produced by The Presbyterian Church in Canada (to 
which Montgomery belonged) at the time; while there are still no prayers for the dead 
present in Canadian Presbyterian post-war liturgy, there is a marked increase in prayers 
which mention the dead and appeal to their memory as a moral exemplar.96  
In June 1914, prior to the outbreak of war, the Committee on Public Worship and 
Aids to Devotion reported that a volume which would eventually be printed as The Book of 
Family Devotion was ‗on the way to completion‘ and may be ‗ready for June or October‘.97 
Although the book was not actually published until 1919, due largely to the interruptions of 
the War, its form was mostly set before war was declared. It contains only one prayer that 
mentions the dead at all, ‗A Memorial of those who are at Rest‘, under the heading of 
‗Occasional Prayers/Within the Family‘: 
O Thou Lord of all worlds, we bless thy Name for all those who have 
entered into their rest and reached the Promised Land where thou art seen 
face to face. Give us grace to follow in their footsteps, as they followed in 
the footsteps of thy holy Son. Encourage our wavering hearts by their 
example, and help us to see in them the memorials of thy redeeming grace 
and pledges of the heavenly might in which the weak are made strong. 
Keep alive in us the memory of those dear to ourselves whom thou hast 
called out of this world, and make it powerful to subdue within us every 
                                                                                                                                               
93  Concern for upkeep of graves led to the development of a horticultural program as early as 1915; see 
Longworth 15-16, 20-21; Vance 61. 
94  Wilkinson 176. 
95  See Wilkinson 173. 
96  In both the case of the Church of England and The Presbyterian Church in Canada, however, caution 
should be exercised to avoid confusing the available documentary evidence with the totality of liturgical 
practice—ministers may have composed ex tempore prayers of which there is no remaining record. See 
Nigel Yates, Liturgical Space: Christian Worship and Church Buildings in Western Europe 1500-2000 (Ashgate, 
2008) 139-140. The following discussion refers only to the official resources published by The 
Presbyterian Church in Canada, and makes no attempt to account for liturgical innovation on the part of 
individual ministers. 
97  A&P 40 [1914] 279. 
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vile and unworthy thought. Grant that every remembrance which turns our 
hearts from things seen to things unseen may lead us also upwards to thee, 
till we, too, come to the eternal rest which thou hast prepared for thy 
people.98 
By contrast, the 1922 Book of Common Order, the preparation of which began during 
the war, contains a prayer of thanksgiving or remembrance for the departed in every 
morning and evening service, as well as including three different prayers of Special 
Intercession under the heading ‗Commemoration of Those Faithful Unto Death for the 
Commonweal‘, and inserting mention of the dead into one of the prayers of General 
Intercession.99 Although the dead are mentioned with a much greater frequency, the 
language of the prayers is mostly consistent with that of the single prayer in the 1919 Book 
of Family Devotion, with the focus falling on expressions of gratitude to God for the lives of 
the departed, and petitions that their memories may continue to set examples of faithful 
living to those who remain. However, several prayers are clearly influenced by the events of 
the war: a prayer in the First Morning Service, and the first two Special Intercessions for 
‗Those Faithful Unto Death‘.  
 The ‗Thanksgiving for the faithful ‘departed‘ in the First Morning Service is 
remarkable primarily for the militance of its language: 
Blessed Lord, with whom do live the spirits of those departed in the faith, 
and who hast said unto us by Thy Spirit, Blessed are the dead which die in 
the Lord: enable us to be followers of them as they were followers of 
Christ; and so to run our race with patience, and to fight the good fight of 
faith, that, our course being finished and our warfare accomplished, we 
                                                                                                                                               
98  The Book of Family Devotion 59. 
99  The preparation of the book was recommended in the 1915 Report of Committee on Public Worship and 
Aids to Devotion, A&P 41 [1915] 279. The prayers mentioned may be found in the Book of Common Order 
for use in Church Services and Offices (Oxford University Press, 1922) 14 (First Morning Service), 21 (First 
Evening Service), 28 (Second Morning Service), 34-35 (Second Evening Service), 64 (General 
Intercession), 89-90 (Special Intercessions). 
It should be noted that, unlike what Wilkinson claims for the Church of England, the Church of 
Scotland‘s liturgy (on which The Presbyterian Church in Canada‘s liturgy was partially based) included a 
very brief prayer of remembrance in the ‗Short Form of Intercession especially for use when there is a 
celebration of Holy Communion‘: 
We remember before Thee all those departed in the faith; the holy apostles and prophets, 
the evangelists and pastors; the blessed martyrs and confessors; and all Thy saints who 
have gone before. 
See A Book of Common Order: Being Forms of Prayer and Adminstration of the Sacraments, and Other Ordinances of 
the Church, fifth edition (William Blackwood and Sons, 1884) lxxiv. This prayer appears, unchanged, in the 
twelfth edition of the same book, published 1929. No such prayers appear in the Free Church‘s A New 
Directory for the Public Worship of God: founded on the Book of Common Order (1560-64) and the Westminster 
Directory (1643-45) and prepared by the Public Worship Association in Connection with the Free Church of Scotland , 
second edition (MacNiven & Wallace, 1898). However, James Ferguson, Prayers for Common Worship: 
Morning and Evening Every Lord‟s Day Throughout the Course of the Christian Year (Allenson & Co., 1936) treats 
‗The Remembrance of the Blessed Departed‘ as a distinct moment in the order of prayers (following, as it 
does in the Canadian Book of Common Order, the general Intercessions); while Ferguson did not compile his 
volume at the behest of any church committee, this does indicate an eventual increase in the importance 
ascribed to such prayers of remembrance. 
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may join the innumerable company of the redeemed: through Jesus Christ 
our Lord, who ever liveth and reigneth with the Father and the Holy 
Ghost, world without end.100 
The petition for aid to ‗fight the good fight of faith, that, our course being finished and our 
warfare accomplished, we may join the innumerable company of the redeemed‘ is strikingly 
similar to the just war rhetoric employed by preachers during the war—as well as an 
invocation of the specific memory of the soldiers who died in the war, rather than the more 
general population of the dead (those who died primarily of illness or old age).101 The desire 
expressed to be ‗followers of them as they were followers of Christ‘ constructs an 
analogical relationship between ‗the dead which die in the Lord‘ and Christ.102 This analogy 
is that of a moral exemplar, in which Christ‘s example of self-sacrifice leads others to 
emulate it, just as the ‗Memorial of those who are at Rest‘ in the 1919 Book of Family 
Devotion included a petition to ‗Give us grace to follow in their footsteps, as they followed 
in the footsteps of thy holy Son‘. In both cases, the example of the dead points the living 
towards the example of Christ, turning their hearts from things seen to things unseen and 
leading also upwards to God; the striking difference is that the 1922 Book of Common Order 
appeals specifically to a violent exemplar. It is, however, a bloodless violence; nowhere 
does the prayer indicate that ‗to fight the good fight of faith‘ or to ‗accomplish‘ warfare 
might involve inflicting actual physical damage upon another person‘s body, or suffering 
the infliction of physical damage upon one‘s own body—although, by 1922, the presence 
of veterans returned home with missing arms, legs, or eyes (to name but a few of the more 
immediately obvious physical injuries that marked veterans) may have been a sufficient 
reminder of the actualities of warfare that there would be no need to elaborate further.  
 The language of the first two Special Intercessions for ‗Commemoration of Those 
Faithful Unto Death for the Commonweal‘ is, theologically speaking, a far greater 
departure from earlier forms. The second of these makes recourse to the language of John 
15, but subtly shifts the emphasis away from God‘s action through humanity (and 
especially the dead) and onto the actions of the dead: 
O Lord, who hast taught us that man hath no greater love than this, that he 
lay down his life for his friends: grant that their devotion may bear good 
fruit in us and in the generations coming after them, that we leave not their 
work unfinished, but in the might of such love likewise ever strive for a 
cleaner earth and a closer heaven.103 
                                                                                                                                               
100  PCC Book of Common Order 14. 
101  Vance 36-36. 
102  In formal terms, the relationship is [congregation : dead :: dead : Christ]. 
103  PCC Book of Common Order 89-90. 
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The role of God in this prayer is to guarantee the success of the mission begun by the 
dead: ‗grant that their devotion may bear good fruit in us [...] that we leave not their work 
unfinished‘, rather than to engage in any form of ‗work‘ directly or through the 
congregation (the line is not ‗that we leave not Your work unfinished‘, or even ‗that we 
leave not the work You began through them unfinished‘). Likewise, the first of the three 
Special Intercessions under the heading offers praise to God ‗for all those through whom 
Thou hast blessed us in our earthly welfare‘, including  
those who gave themselves mightily in defence of freedom, mercy and 
good faith among the nations; especially for comrades and dear kindred 
whom we remember before Thee with undying affection; for those who in 
life and death have quickened our lives, and through whose sacrifice we 
live.104 
This is a sharp shift from the idea of Christ and the dead—especially the war-
dead—as co-workers of atonement, twin moral exemplars. Instead, the soldiers ‗who gave 
themselves mightily in defence of freedom, mercy, and good faith among the nations‘ are 
figured as offering a substitutionary atonement; it is they, rather than Christ, ‗through 
whose sacrifice we live‘.105  
 The conflation of the dead soldier with Christ was an understandable move during 
and immediately after the war, when the familiarity of the sacrificial discourse could help to 
reassure an unusually large number of mourners that, in spite of the widespread disruption 
of accepted and expected structures of grief, some portion of the world retained a 
semblance of normalcy.106 However, the sacrificial narrative became suspect as the years 
                                                                                                                                               
104  PCC Book of Common Order 89. 
105  This language remains in use in The Presbyterian Church in Canada, especially in Remembrance Day 
services—see the two sample liturgies available through the PCC‘s website: ‗A Liturgy for Remembrance 
Day‘ <http://www.presbyterian.ca/webfm_send/269> accessed 11 August 2009; ‗A Remembrance Day 
Service for November 11, 2007, Theme: The way to peace‘ 
<http://www.presbyterian.ca/webfm_send/899> accessed 11 August 2009. 
106 The progression of discourse about the war can be analysed according to stage models of grieving, such as 
those put forth by J. Bowlby and C. Parkes, ‗Separation and Loss‘, in The Child and His Family: vol. 1, The 
InternationalYearbook of Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions, ed. E. J. Anthony and C. Koupernik (Wiley, 
1970) 197-216 [numbness, yearning/protest, disorganization/despair, reorganization] or Elisabeth 
Kübler-Ross, On Death and Dying (Tavistock, 1973) [denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance]--
although Kübler-Ross‘s work focused on the stages of a population of terminally ill patients‘ acceptance 
of their own deaths, rather than grief over other people‘s deaths. Recent research has problematised the 
stage model; see Paul K. Maciejewski, Baohui Zhang, Susan D. Block, and Holly G. Prigerson, ‗An 
Empirical Examination of the Stage Theory of Grief‘, Journal of the American Medical Association 297, no. 7 
(2007). Maciejewski et al. argue that the process of mourning is not as clear-cut a progression as the image 
of distinct stages would imply; each of the classic ‗stages‘ are present to a certain extent throughout the 
process of mourning, with disbelief or denial declining sharply over the first year post-loss.  
  At the beginning of the grieving process, when numbness/denial are prevalent, the impulse to 
maintain the status quo comes to the forefront; this, as well as the yearning impulse identified by Bowlby 
and Parkes, is apparent in the development of the system of substitution which I have discussed above. 
The interest in photographs of gravesites—and the drive to make these gravesites as attractive as 
possible—can be read not as an attempt to deny the traumatic nature of the war, or the reality of death, 
but as an attempt to maintain a link to both the absent body and to the customs that previously 
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passed on and the majority of society moved from an expression of grief based primarily in 
denial and yearning to one mostly characterised by anger and disillusionment.107 The result 
of this is a marked contrast between what the First World War memorials were designed to 
convey and the way that contemporary visitors read them. This contrast will be explored in 
the final chapter of this section.
                                                                                                                                               
characterised the normal course of life and death. The engagement with sacrificial discourse serves a 
similar purpose; Vance has argued that such language primarily served to assure the civilian public that 
‗whatever concerns they may have had about the losses of war, God was in his place and all was right with 
the world‘ (Vance 65). The progression beyond these early stages to the point at which protest, despair, 
and anger are prevalent is apparent in the shift to the literary discourse of disillusionment chronicled by 
Watson.  
This is an imperfect analogy, as the models of grieving processes cited above are oriented towards 
individuals, and the transformation of mourning in the First World War was a broader cultural shift. 
However, just as individual models of memory have provided a framework for describing social and 
cultural memory, the language of grieving stages provides a framework for describing the way a society 
copes with large-scale loss. 
107  This shift is apparent even within Montgomery‘s work; the second half of The Blythes are Quoted is a 
collection of vignettes from after the First World War; it concludes with the following exchange between 
Anne and Jem: 
ANNE, steadily:- ―I am thankful now, Jem, that Walter did not come back. He could never 
have lived with his memories ... and if he had seen the futility of the sacrifice they made 
then mirrored in this ghastly holocaust ...‖ 
Jem, thinking of Jem, Jr., and young Walter:- ―I know ... I know. Even I who am a tougher 
brand than Walter ... but let us talk of something else. Who was it said, ‗We forget because 
we must‘? He was right.‖ 
 Montgomery, The Blythes are Quoted 510. 
  
MAKING MEMORY SOLID: 
JANE URQUHART AND THE CANADIAN 
NATIONAL VIMY MEMORIAL1 
 
The moon sank lower into a black cloud in the west, the Glen went out in 
an eclipse of sudden shadow—and thousands of miles away the Canadian 
boys in khaki—the living and the dead—were in possession of Vimy Ridge.  
Vimy Ridge is a name written in crimson and gold on the Canadian annals 
of the Great War. ―The British couldn‘t take it and the French couldn‘t 
take it,‖ said a German prisoner to his captors, ―but you Canadians are 
such fools that you don‘t know when a place can‘t be taken!‖ 
So the ―fools‖ took it—and paid the price. 
L. M. Montgomery, Rilla of Ingleside 208.
  
ontgomery‘s1 fiction provides a useful window into the way that practices 
and understandings of death, mourning, and commemoration shifted 
from before the First World War to the period immediately following the 
war. However, the view from that window is necessarily limited: it the perspective of one 
woman, close to the events about which she writes. However influential Rilla of Ingleside has 
been in terms of carrying and constructing the memory of small-town Island life during the 
First World War, and in the minds of young girls (the intended audience of the Anne of 
Green Gables series) throughout the world, it does not tell much about the way that the 
memory of the war has changed over the decades since its end, nor does it tell us much 
about the ways in which the dominant narrative of the war (of which Rilla is very much a 
part) has been contested or undermined.  
 Montgomery, for example, recognises that ‗Vimy Ridge is a name written in 
crimson and gold on the Canadian annals of the Great War‘, but was in no position to 
predict the mythology of nation-building that sprang up surrounding the Battle of Vimy 
Ridge in the years following the war. The assault on Vimy Ridge the morning of 9 April 
1917 marked the first time the Canadian Corps fought together as a unit, and therefore, 
according to a pamphlet put out by the Canadian Battlefield Memorials Commission, 
marked ‗the first appearance of [a] young nation in arms‘.2 The post-war years were 
dominated by the need to demonstrate that the war had been fought—and won—for a 
purpose; Vance notes that, on the whole, ‗Historians have been only too happy to aid and 
abet this process by articulating a vision of the war as a nation-building experience of signal 
importance‘, and the battle of Vimy Ridge has been widely figured as the root of that 
nation-building experience.3  
 Vance suggests that Vimy‘s place at the centre of the Canadian nation-building 
myth is as much a result of the post-war monument-building activity as the decisions made 
by the CBMC were reflective of the historical and military significance of the Battle of 
Vimy Ridge. The original commemorative scheme put forth by the CBMC called for 
                                                                                                                                               
1  A much earlier—and shorter—version of this chapter appears under the same title in Bringing Landscape 
Home in the Writings of Jane Urquhart, ed. Dorota Filipczak (University of Łodz Press, 2009); while my 
reading of The Stone Carvers has not altered significantly, my understanding of the monument has 
benefitted from additional historical and archival research. I hope I may be forgiven for re-using the title, 
which I have found to be too apt an expression of the themes under examination to abandon. 
2  Canadian Battlefields Memorials Commission (CBMC), Canadian Battlefield Memorials, (King‘s Printer, 
1929) 80-81; quoted in Vance 67. 
3  Vance 9-10. See also the essays collected in the volume edited by Geoffrey Hayes, Andrew Iarocci, Mike 
Bechthold, eds., Vimy Ridge: a Canadian Reassessment (Wilifred Laurier University Press, 2007), especially 
Hayes, Iarocci, and Becthold, ‗Afterthoughts‘ 313-317. See also Pierre Berton, Marching as to War, 
(Doubleday Canada, 2001) 178; John Marteinson, We Stand on Guard: An Illustrated History of the Candian 
Army (Ovale, 1992) 154. 
M 
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identical monuments at the eight battlefields (including Courcelette, where Walter Blythe 
was killed) put into that Commission‘s charge by the Imperial War Graves Commission.4 A 
general competition for the design of all the monuments, announced in December 1920, 
yielded two entries which ‗were of too high a standard to be rejected and were too original 
to be repeated eight times‘.5 One of these was an entry by the Ontario sculptor Walter 
Allward. 
 Allward described his design in a letter to André Ventre, the Chief Architect of the 
French Historic Monument Commission, as follows: 
I am enclosing a description of the Memorial which accompanied my 
model in the competition.  
[...] The long walls are intended to suggest a line of defence, and 
also to be in harmony with the long and clean cut line of the Ridge. 
The two Pylons were an endeavor to create an outline against the 
sky, that would not be easily confused with towers or other landmarks, 
also, the pylons and walls suggest the upper part of a Cross. In the 
afternoon when a shaft of sunlight will break through the space between 
the pylons, and, illuminating part of the sculptures, will suggest a cathedral 
effect. 
[...] From my youth I have admired the qualities in the work of your 
great sculptors, and in making my design for Vimy, I endeavored to erect a 
memorial which might be acceptable to your people, fully appreciating their 
high regard for Art, and consequently the necessity for something artistic 
spiritual and broadly human in its expression6 
This letter suggests that Allward‘s original design was drafted with Vimy Ridge in mind, 
contrary to Vance‘s recounting of the Commission‘s competition and deliberations; the 
copy of Allward‘s original competition submission available on the Veterans Affairs 
Canada website shows a design not substantially different from the monument that now 
stands, although the entry does note that it is ‗intended for Vimy Ridge or any site on high 
ground or a slight grade – base of pylons can be altered to suit perfectly level sites.‘7  
The papers stored in the Allward Archive at Queen‘s University in Kingston, 
Ontario include a large number of sketches, showing what appear to be iterative re-
workings of the concept for the Vimy memorial, varying the number of pylons and their 
                                                                                                                                               
4  Vance 66; Laura Brandon, Art or Memorial? The forgotten history of Canada‟s war art (University of Calgary 
Press, 2006) 8-9. 
5  Vance 67. 
6  Letter from Allward to Ventre, dated 12 April 1926, from the Walter S. Allward Archive, Queen‘s 
University, Kingston, ON. I have taken the liberty of correcting obvious typing errors. 
7  <http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/images/vimy90/galleries/04_monument/01_competition/compete20_lg.jpg> 
Accessed 20 January 2010. The alterations from the proposal are very slight: in the final structure, the area 
of the platform behind the pylons is enlarged to permit visitors to approach from behind the monument, 
and all the figures are carved out of marble, rather than cast in bronze as originally proposed. 
Other entries in the competition may be seen at <http://www.vac-
acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=memorials/ww1mem/vimy/sg/04_monument/01_competition>. 
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spatial relationship to one another, shifting their orientation from horizontal to vertical, 
and altering the location of the figure groups on and around them.8 As Allward was not in 
the habit of dating or labelling his sketches, it is impossible to determine which of these are 
preliminary and which represent him reworking the visual elements of the Vimy memorial 
at a later date, either for his own amusement or as a beginning point for other projects.9 
The sketches do, however, speak to certain formal and symbolic preoccupations which 
governed Allward‘s creative life. 
 Allward‘s letter to Ventre maintained that his goal in constructing the two pylons 
was ‗to create an outline against the sky, that would not be easily confused with towers or 
other landmarks‘, but his sketches tell a slightly different story. He arranges and rearranges 
clusters of rectangular pylons in forms that are reminiscent of the skyline of a medieval 
cathedral city. In the final monument, this effect is less obvious, but still evident in the 
stepped shaping at the tops of the pylons.  
 Allward‘s praise of French artistry in his letter to Ventre is no empty platitude; both 
his sculptural work and his figure drawings reflect a strong awareness of the conventions of 
French academic art, in sharp contrast to the modernism that was making its mark on the 
art world at the time.10 His employment of classical idiom made him an extremely popular 
                                                                                                                                               
8  Jay Winter‘s essay in the forthcoming volume, Memory, Mourning and Landscape, ed. Elizabeth Anderson, 
Avril Maddrell, Kate McLoughlin, and Alana Vincent (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010) proposes a distinction 
in the symbolism between horizontal and vertical axes, in which ‗The horizontal is the axis of mourning. 
The vertical is the axis of hope‘. This distinction holds well both in Allward‘s sketches and in the final 
memorial (the ‗Mourners‘, for example, and the ‗Helpless‘ female figure, recline along a horizontal axis, 
while the allegorical figures stand in triumph on top of the very tall, vertical pylons). 
9  There is, for example, a strong resemblance between the Vimy sketches and a set of sketches for an 
unrealised monument to Sir Fredrick Banting (who discovered insulin), and a similarly unconstructed 
monument to the Second World War. The Banting monument is more horizontal in orientation, but there 
is at least one sketch with an arrangement of horizontal elements similar to sketches positively identified 
as Banting sketches by the Queen‘s archivist, and with lettering on the front suggesting it is meant to be a 
monument to the Great War. 
The lack of dates on the sketches is not the only difficult puzzle in the Allward archive; his son, 
Hugh, records in a letter to E. A. Gardner dated 19 November 1968 that ‗On return from England, 
probably with a sense of frustration or even fury, I believe Dad in all or in part edited and destroyed 
correspondence relating to the Memorial‘. The correspondence which survives sheds some light on the 
creation of the memorial, but, like the sketches, or Montgomery‘s journals, should be approached with 
caution, and by no means as a complete record. A majority of the letters from Allward, for example, 
survive without signature, indicating that they are quite probably drafts and may differ slightly from what 
was actually sent. (The reliability of Hugh Allward‘s allegation is itself undermined, as he goes on to say 
that his father ‗had no office in London only the Studio and hence his letters were written longhand‘, a 
remark which is belied by a fair number of typewritten letters with letterhead from Allward‘s studio at 16 
Maida Vale, London. 
10  Evans 124; see also Vance 102-110. Modernism was rendered especially unpopular by the war; the art 
critics of Britain and Canada ‗linked modern painting to German Kultur, then, after the October 
Revolution, to Bolshevism‘, Maria Tippett, Art at the Service of War: Canada, Art, and the Great War 
(University of Toronto Press, 1984) 6. Hynes notes a ‗War Memorials Exhibition‘ held at the Victoria and 
Albert Museum in London, 1919, which ‗amounted to a demonstration of what tradition meant; here were 
the forms in which the dead had been memorialized over the past two thousand years, and here was 
evidence that those forms were still alive [...] And no doubt the grieving families [...] took comfort in the 
fact that their memorials looked like the others that commemorated earlier deaths in earlier wars‘ (Hynes 
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designer of public monuments, and lent a comforting veneer of familiarity to projects 
which may otherwise have been too complex, costly, or avant-garde.11 The Vimy memorial 
project was all three. Its construction took sixteen years, and its final cost severely over-ran 
the original budget.12 The twin pylons are reminiscent of the classic cenotaph form, but 
their proximity causes them to resemble, especially from a distance, a cenotaph cleft down 
the middle—a fractured monument.13  
 Allward‘s design was, as indicated in his letter to Ventre, intended to convey the 
ideas of sacrifice (the horizontal and vertical elements of the monument representing ‗the 
upper part of a cross‘, the entire monument suggesting a cathedral, and the ‗Spirit of 
Sacrifice‘ stretched out cruciform on the altar between the two pylons) and unity (the twin 
pylons representing the continuing allegiance and goodwill between Canada and France). 
The form of the monument, however, the large cleft running down the centre of the 
‗united‘ pylons, undermines these ideas, just as the years since the monument‘s design and 
construction have brought a change in popular understanding of the war. The 
disillusionment that Watson charted through English literature can be readily read into the 
imagery of the monument; walking through the site brings the visitor into contact with not 
only the high ideals which characterised the discourse of the war, as recorded by 
Montgomery, but also the transformation those ideals have undergone in the decades since. 
 It is somewhat telling that the unity that Allward and the CBMC were most 
concerned with expressing at the Vimy monument was between France and Canada, rather 
than between the French and English populations within Canada. Nowhere in the 
correspondence archived at Queen‘s is there any expression of concern that the monument 
                                                                                                                                               
273). However, Hynes is unconvinced that the standard vocabulary of war monuments was truly 
satisfying to postwar society, moving quickly from his discussion of the V&A exhibit to an investigation 
of ‗new‘ forms of memorials, such as books and paintings, which were generated after the war. One 
might, however, recall works such as Caesar‘s Commentarii de Bello Gallico, or Turner‘s 1824 painting of the 
Battle of Trafalgar (or even Benjamin West‘s depiction of the death of General Wolfe at the battle of the 
Plains of Abraham, which appears at the opening of the previous chapter), and question how truly new 
these forms were; Hynes is more convincing when he turns his attention to an exhibit entitled ‗The 
Nation‘s War Paintings‘ and the critical incomprehension which greeted images by men who had served 
in the war, concluding that ‗[w]hat the ―War Paintings‖ show demonstrated was that the war‘s paintings 
could never be made to constitute a monument in the customary sense, that such a collection would 
continually refute itself, continually shift, in any viewer‘s eyes, from monument to anti-monument, from 
glory to death‘ (Hynes 275). What Hynes finds fatal to ‗a monument in the customary sense‘, the ability 
for a work‘s meaning to exist in a constant state of renegotiation with its audience, is precisely what I find 
compelling about memorials such as Vimy. 
11  See Brandon 11-12. 
12  Vance 68-69. 
13  Brandon also notes the similarity of the Vimy memorial‘s structure to more traditional monument forms, 
and further notes that ‗the most traditional memorial in Canada was a column—for example, that to 
Generals Wolfe and Montcalm in Quebec City‘ (Brandon 11). 
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be hospitable or comprehensible to French Canadian soldiers or their families.14 Rather, the 
memorial, and the committee behind it, relies on the assumption of a united Canada. Vance 
writes that  
on a domestic level, historians have had to admit that the Great War was as 
divisive as it was unifying. Four years of battle, both in the trenches and at 
home, did not create a single nationalism, but instead strengthened the two 
nationalisms of French and English Canada; both societies gained a greater 
appreciation of their separate identities from the experience of war.15 
The division between French and English Canada was apparent from the earliest stages of 
the war. The first wave of 36,267 volunteers to sail for England with the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, beginning 29 September 1914, included only 1,245 French 
Canadians.16 Admittedly, only 9,635 of the others were English speakers born in Canada; 
the rest were immigrants, primarily from the British Isles. While provincial borders are not 
a sure guarantee of ethnicity, it is still notable that the percentage of the adult male 
population that enlisted from Quebec—the main centre of French Canadian population—
was not terribly different from the percentage that enlisted from Ontario (0.7, compared to 
0.9).17 However, as the war wore on, the numbers of volunteers from Quebec dropped 
sharply in relation to the other provinces.18 By 1917, the proponents of the Military Service 
                                                                                                                                               
14  By contrast, there are a number of letters concerned with the monument‘s reception in France. In 
addition to the above cited letter to Ventre (in which Allward indicates that ‗because of the sympathy 
which existed between the French, and the Canadian soldiers, and the people, I have taken the liberty of 
introducing the Fleur-de-lis on a corner of the second wall‘), there is a letter from Walter Allward to 
Colonel Osborne, 1st May 1927; Osborne to Allward 6th December 1928; Allward to Osborne 16th 
December 1928. Two letters discuss the necessity of repeating inscriptions in both English and French 
(Allward to Osborne, 6th August 1929; Osborne to Allward, 1st April 1935) with no mention made of why 
this repetition was deemed necessary. 
15  Vance 10. 
16  Granatstein and Hitsman 23. 
17  Nearly half (15,232）of the first contingent of the CEF were English, with an additional 7,979 volunteers 
of Scots, Irish, and Welsh origin—see Granastein and Hitsman 23. Percentages of adult male population 
to enlist taken from Brown and Loveridge 78, Chart F. Brown and Loveridge base their percentages on 
the population figures from the 1913 Canada Year Book, which measured male population 15-44 years old 
in 1911; the lower end of that spectrum would have been old enough to be eligible for military service by 
the time war broke out in 1914. 
18  Only 2.4% of the adult male population of Quebec volunteered during the militia recruiting conducted 
1914-1915, compared to 3.6% of the adult male population from the Maritime Provinces (including 
Prince Edward Island), which had the next lowest volunteer rate (and, in fact, had the lowest rate of 
volunteers—0.4%—in the initial wave). In the period from 1915-1917, only 1.6% of the adult male 
population of Quebec volunteered, compared to 6% from the Maritimes, which again had the next lowest 
volunteer rate. By the end of the war, even after conscription, only 9% of the adult male population of 
Quebec had served, half the 18% of adult male population that served from the Maritimes (the Western 
Provinces—Manitoba, Saskatechewan, Alberta, and British Columbia—had the highest rate of military 
service, with 20% of the adult male population serving by the end of the war). See Brown and Loveridge 
78, Chart F.  
Incidentally, these figures (as well as other literature on military volunteerism and conscription at the 
time) suggest that Montgomery‘s Blythe family, who, without prior militia affiliation or close ties (within 
two generations) to the British Isles, sent all of their sons into the military by the end of the war, were 
somewhat unusual for Prince Edward Island. 
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Act were able to put forth a compelling argument that the Act would, by introducing 
conscription, ‗at last, force French Canadians to assume their share of the military 
burden‘.19 The battle of Vimy Ridge itself was fought by a volunteer army, but a mere 
thirty-eight days afterwards, the threat of conscription caused riots in Montréal.20 The 
deeply divisive Parliamentary election of 1917 was fought mostly over the issue of 
conscription, and the eventual victors, Robert Borden and his Union Government, 
‗deliberately set out to create an English-Canadian nationalism, separate from and opposed 
to both French Canada and naturalized Canadians‘.21 The schism between the pylons, 
though originally meant to represent the mutual accord between Canada and France, also 
appears, however unintentionally, to represent the schism in relations between French and 
English Canada that was deepened by the war, and especially by the conscription crisis.22 
 The ambivalence of the monument extends beyond the two pylons, however. The 
figures on and around the pylons also tell, perhaps, more than the story that Allward 
originally intended. As a visitor approaches the monument from the back (the main 
approach, although it is unclear whether this is by Allward‘s own design, or an unintended 
consequence of the layout of the rest of the memorial park in which the monument is 
situated), they pass between two reclining figures, one male and one female ‗mourner‘.23 
The female holds an open book in her lap, although the pages appear blank (the plaster 
                                                                                                                                               
   Granatstein and Hitsman argue that the roots of volunteerism or lack thereof go back to the local 
militias of the 1700s, and that Québécois antipathy to service in the military of the British Empire was a 
long established cultural phenomenon. See Granatstein and Hitsman 5-19.  
19  Brown and Loveridge 64; see also Granatstein and Hitsman 44-46. Granatstein and Hitsman note that 
animosity between French and English Canada was particularly high at the war‘s beginning, and thus 
divisive political maneuvers would have been particularly effective in that political climate; in 1911, 
Wilfred Laurier  
had been driven from office [as Prime Minister] on the grounds that he, as a Québécois, was 
disloyal to Empire [...] Then in 1912 and after came the Ontario Bilingual Schools 
Question; as French Canadians across the country perceived it, the provincial government 
was trying to eliminate the French language in Ontario by destroying it in the schools 
(Granatstein and Hitsman 27).  
See also Morton, Marching to Armageddon 28. 
20  Hayes, Iarocci, and Bechthold 316. 
21  Granatstein and Hitsman 78. In turn, the harsh rhetoric directed against Quebec led to an upsurging of 
Québécois nationalism; a motion ‗That this house is of the opinion that the province of Quebec would be 
disposed to accept the breaking of the Confederation Pact of 1867‘ was introduced to the Quebec 
legislature in January 1918 (Granatstein and Hitsman 82). 
22  This impression is deepened by the placement of all French language inscriptions on the east side of the 
monument and all English language inscriptions on the west. 
23  The landscaping of the park around the memorial is discussed in a memo Walter Allward‘s son, Peter, 
dictated into his personal file, dated 9 November 1971: 
Main approach by 24‘ gravel walkway is to the ―rear‖ of the monument; ―front‖ faces the 
old plain, i.e. the long occupancy by Germans during the siege of the ridge. ―Somebody‖ 
has levelled and sodded the plain side of the monument and as a result, during wreath 
laying ceremonies dignitaries have to climb an approximate thirty degree slope to reach the 
centre of the ceremonies.  
If information is not available, it is necessary for D.V.A. to modify on their own 
and under their own design. 
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model of the figure on display at the Military Communications and Electronics Museum in 
Kingston, Ontario, shows a Greek cross on what is, from the figure‘s vantage point, the 
top left-hand corner of the page, but either this detail was not included in the final carving 
or it has weathered away at the monument itself—see figures 4 and 5).24 The Angel of 
Knowledge (figure 6), a highly androgynous figure holding a closed book under one arm, 
looks down from the west pylon; opposite, above the male mourner, the Angel of Truth 
(figure 7) adorns the east pylon, clutching an olive branch in her right hand. Walking 
around to the front of the platform from which the pylons rise, the visitor sees the lone, 
bent figure of Canada in stark outline against the sky (figure 8); turning to face the pylons, 
there is only a short staircase between the visitor and the figures of the Torchbearer and 
the Spirit of Sacrifice (figure 9).25 There are other figures clustered on the top of the pylons. 
At the top of the eastern pylon is the allegorical figure of Justice, almost hidden behind the 
large, unbroken sword held in the figure‘s arms (figure 10); below that figure are Faith and 
Hope, both with their gaze, and left hands, uplifted; Faith‘s arm stretches fully above her 
head, while Hope‘s is bent at the elbow, the hand level with her shoulder. Faith‘s right hand 
clutches a small cross to her heart (figure 11), while Hope‘s right hand rests by her side, on 
a larger cross inscribed in the marble behind her (figure 12). On the western pylon, Peace 
holds  a  triumphant  olive  branch  above her head, echoing  the  pose  of  the  torchbearer  
                                                                                                                                               
24  The three plasters at the Military Communications and Electronics Museum—the male and female 
mourners and the figure of Canada—are kept in very different condition from the ones housed at the 
Canadian War Museum in Ottawa. Where the curators at the latter have chosen to preserve the pencil 
marks employed by the sculptors at Vimy, and the grime that accumulates in the wax coating used to seal 
plaster models, the plasters at the Communications Museum appear to have been treated to a generous 
coat of slightly glossy white paint, which no doubt renders them more presentable, but has the 
unfortunate effect of obscuring most traces of the sculptor‘s hand and the passage of time. 
Brandon writes that ‗[a]n article published just before the memorial‘s unveiling claims that the 
mourning figure at the back holding an open book is reading the ―roll of death‖‗ (Brandon 14), though 
she ventures no explanation of the other books on the monument. 
25  Evans reads the figure of Canada, especially, as an example of classical iconography, with her half-bared 
breast reminiscent of Greek literature, in which it represented the bond of nourishment between mother 
and son (she also reads the bared chest of Charity in this way, although she fails to account for the 
similarly exposed breast(s) of Hope, Honour, Truth, or Peace in her scheme); her cowl resembles a 
mourning veil, and also refers to ‗many depictions of Mary‘, and her gesture, ‗reminiscent of Rodin‘s The 
Thinker‘, lends her an air of contemplation. More interestingly, Evans notes the proximity between Canada 
and the Spirit of Sacrifice as highlighting ‗the sacrificial element of her character‘. See Evans 124-126. 
Brandon reads the figure of Canada solely as a Mater Dolorosa figure, although she acknowledges the 
Greco-Roman influences in other figures—as well as the influence of Rodin; see Brandon 12-13. The 
resemblance between Allward‘s figures and those of Rodin is also noted by Robert Shipley, who contrasts 
the neo-classical style of figure evident on the Vimy memorial, with the ‗naturalistic‘ style of figure evident 
on Allward‘s earlier Toronto Boer War Memorial; see Shipley, To Mark Our Place: A History of Canadian 
War Memorials (NC Press Limited, 1987) 134. 
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Figure 2 (above): Female Mourner, Canadain National Vimy 
Memorial 
 
 Figure 3 (left): Female Mourner (plaster figure, ½ scale), 
Military Communications and Electronics Museum, Kingston, 
Ontario. 
 
Note the small Greek Cross on the corner of the book held by 
the plaster figure, and its absence from the book held by the 
figure in situ on the monument itself. 
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Figure 6: Angel of Knowledge (plaster, 1/2 scale). 
War Museum, Ottawa, Ontario. 
Figure 7: Angel of Truth (plaster, 1/2 scale). War 
Museum, Ottawa, Ontario. 
Figure 8: Figure of Canada, Canadian National Vimy Memorial, France. 
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Figure 9: Torchbearer and Spirit of Sacrifice, Canadian National Vimy Memorial. 
 | 125 
 
Figure 10: Justice (plaster, 1/2 scale). War Museum, 
Ottawa, Ontario.
 
Figure 11: Faith (plaster, 1/2 scale). War Museum, 
Ottawa, Ontario. Note the pencil marks, which were used to 
translate the design from the plaster to the full-scale marble 
carving.
 
Figure 12: Hope (detail of plaster 1/2 scale model). War 
Museum, Ottawa, Ontario.
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Figure 13: Peace (plaster, 1/2 scale). War Museum, Ottawa, 
Ontario.
 
Figure 14: Torchbearer (plaster, 1/2 scale). War Museum, 
Ottawa, Ontario.
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Figure 15: Honour (plaster figure, 1/2 scale). War 
Museum, Ottawa, Ontario.
 
Figure 16: Charity (plaster, 1/2 scale). War Museum, 
Ottawa, Ontario. 
Figure 17: Canadian National Vimy Memorial, front view. 
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Figure 18 (above): Breaking of the Sword (plaster, 1/2 
scale). War Museum, Ottawa, Ontario. 
 
Figure 19 (left): Break of the Sword (detail), Canadian 
National Vimy Memorial. 
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Figure 20: Sympathy of the Canadians for the Helpless, 
Canadian National Vimy Memorial. Note also the 
cannon, top left. 
Figure 21: Symbolic coffin with allegorical figures (Canada and 
pylon groupings), Canadian National Vimy Memorial. 
Figure 22: Closeup view of the figure of Canada, Canadian 
National Vimy Memorial. 
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Figure 22: Names of the missing carved on the side of the 
Canadian National Vimy Memorial. 
 
Figure 23: Gravestone of unknown soldier, Canadian Cemetery 
No. 2, Vimy. Note inscription „Known Unto God‟ at bottom of 
stone. 
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Figure 24: Site diagram of Canadian National Vimy Memorial, courtesy Commonwealth War Graves Commission. 
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below (figures 13 and 14). She is supported by Honour, holding yet another book, open to 
reveal blank pages (figure 15), and Charity, with a basket full of poppies (figure 16).26  
The visitor has to proceed along the upper rampart and down a flight of steps 
before being able to view the monument in its entirety, from the front (figure 17). From 
this vantage point, four more important elements come into view. From the upper rampart, 
the barrels of two cannons, draped in laurel garlands, point out towards the plain—and the 
viewer. The rear of these cannons is also visible from the upper rampart, but their place in 
the overall design of the monument is not clear until they are viewed from the front. Two 
large figure groups stand at either end of the base of the rampart. To the south is the 
Breaking of the Sword group (figure 18): two heroic male figures gaze off towards the 
centre point of the monument, while behind them, a smaller and less well-clothed man 
strains to bend a sword over a rock (figure 19). To the north is the Sympathy of Canadians 
for the Helpless (figure 20): one heroic male figure stands tall, gazing out over the plane, 
with a supporting arm around a smaller male figure, half kneeling, with gaze directed up, 
though not quite at the central figure; to the other side, a seated male holds a bowl over the 
head of a huddled, naked female figure. At the centre of the wall, underneath the gaze of 
the figure of Canada on the wall above, is a stone sarcophagus, symbolic of all the 
Canadians who died in the war (figure 21). 
 The pervasiveness of carved poppies around the site, as well as the centrality of the 
Torchbearer figure, call to mind the last stanza of John McCrae‘s poem, ‗In Flanders 
Fields‘. On the surface, Allward‘s design appears to support the inherent rightness of 
McCrae‘s argument, showing Peace triumphant, yet inescapably supported by both the 
scenes of sacrifice and mourning that adorn the base of the monument and by the other 
allegorical figures that adorn the pylons. One might also note that there is no allegorical 
figure of Mercy to be found anywhere on the monument. Jonathan F. Vance has presented 
an extremely convincing, historically contextualised reading of the Allward corpus as 
representative of the militant triumph of civilisation over the forces of barbarism, of 
pacifism as a privilege that could only be won at the point of a sword.27 However, the 
monument also undermines this allegorical argument. The carved vegetation—even the 
poppies—appears wilted. The books held by three of the figures hold out the promise of 
knowledge, or understanding, but what they offer is a blank page, or a permanently sealed 
                                                                                                                                               
26  The details of the figures at the top of the pylons are almost impossible to discern from the ground; even 
with the aid of binoculars or a telephoto lens, the angles of the monument mask most of the figures‘ 
upper bodies. In this regard, the plasters at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa are an invaluable aid. 
27  See Vance 27; 32-33. 
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binding.28 A certain weariness and strain seems to settle around the shoulders of even the 
most heroically posed figures. The figure of Canada mourning her dead seems startlingly 
old to be placed on a memorial to ‗the first appearance of [a] young nation in arms‘ (figure 
22).29  
The triumph here seems muted, the hope held out a distant one—as, indeed, Vance 
maintains Allward intended. Peace is not shown immediately triumphant, but rather 
supreme long after the memory of the current struggle has faded from view. But the belief 
in a war to end all wars is fainter, now, than it was in the 1920s and 1930s, when Allward 
created the monument; the signs of decay built into the design speak of abandonment, of 
precisely the broken faith that McCrae‘s poem warned of, rather than the eschatological 
lying of lions with lambs that a simpler reading of the monument would suggest. The hope 
expressed at the end of the First World War is tarnished by a contemporary viewer‘s 
awareness of the horrors of the Second World War, begun a scant three years after the 
monument‘s completion, and of all the other wars that have been fought since then, with 
no end any longer in sight. The monument is a memorial; it brings forth the idealism that 
characterised the discourse of the First World War out from the realm of history and into 
the visitor‘s own immediate, lived experience, but it does not do so without also bringing 
forth some of the cynicism and awareness of failure that the intervening decades have 
attached to those ideals. 
 The double-image produced by the memorial, of both high ideals and the failure of 
those ideals, is nowhere so haunting as when the viewer‘s gaze is directed at the 11,285 
names which adorn every vertical wall around the outside of the monument‘s base save for 
the very front (figure 22). These are the Canadian soldiers who went missing from the 
battlefields of France—whose bodies were either never found, or else found but never 
identified, but buried under headstones bearing the inscription ‗A Soldier of the Great War 
Known Unto God‘ (figure 23). The names were the last element of the monument to be 
decided upon, and much of the correspondence in the archive at Queen‘s involves a debate 
over how they ought to be incorporated into the overall design.30 Allward himself originally 
                                                                                                                                               
28  This could also be read as an invitation to the viewer to create their own text from the disparate elements 
of the memorial. 
29  CBMC 80-81. 
30  As noted above, the functions of the Vimy memorial evolved over time. Jacqueline Hucker has argued 
that the finished monument has three distinct functions: (1) marking the site of the battle of Vimy ridge, 
(2) to be ‗this country‘s principal monument in Europe honouring the valour of all Canadians who fought 
in the First World War‘, and (3) to ‗serve as testament to those Canadians who lost their lives in France 
and whose bodies were never identified‘. She notes that it was designed with function (2) in mind, its 
location was determined by function (1) (not until 1922, according to Brandon 9), and function (3) was 
decided upon only after the design and location were finalised. See Hucker, ‗―After the Agony in Stony 
Places‖: The Meaning and Significant of the Vimy Monument‘ in Hayes, Iarocci and Bechthold 284.  
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favoured carving them into the floorstones, after the fashion of gravestones in European 
cathedrals, although he was overruled by the rest of the committee. In the final design, the 
list of the missing begins on the southeast corner of the wall immediately behind the front 
rampart, and continues in horizontal lines, counterclockwise, around the outside of the 
base of the structure (see figure 24). The layout of the names is unusual; most local 
monuments, and the Menin Gate at Ypres, where the names of Canadian missing from 
Belgium are inscribed, list names in vertical columns. By carving names across, rather than 
down, each wall, Allward achieved a far more uniform, textural effect; the names bleed into 
and become part of the structure itself—just as the bodies of the missing soldiers became 
part of the landscape.31 
 It is easy to read these names as a reproach, rather than a roll of honour.32 It is 
difficult to find a comfortable balance between the collective identity represented by the 
monument and the individual identities represented by each name. It is at this point that a 
return to fiction once again becomes helpful—not, as was the case with Montgomery‘s 
work, for its historical value, but as a way of imaginatively reconstructing the balance 
between individual and collective, of grappling once again with the tension between civic 
and familial identity, body and name, that formed the subtext of Antigone. 
 
 
Jane Urquhart‘s novel, The Stone Carvers, is a family drama that begins in Shoneval, a 
fictional small town in southern Ontario (based loosely on the real town of Formosa), but 
reaches its climax at the site of the construction of the Vimy memorial.33 The book 
                                                                                                                                               
31  This way of laying out the names was inspired by the ‗Soldiers‘ Tower‘ built in the early 1920s at the 
University of Toronto; see letter from Colonel H. C. Osborne to Allward, 18 October 1926. The decision 
was, however, as much practical as it was aesthetic; carving the names horizontally permitted more names 
to fit into a space that was not originally designed to accommodate them, as attested by an undated letter 
from Allward to Osborne (to which the 18 October letter appears to be a reply).  
The bodies of missing soldiers did not fade into the landscape simply as a consequence of their lack 
of burial; the landscaping of the memorial park surrounding the Vimy monument continually suggests 
battered bodies in the negative space of the shell craters that have not been ploughed level as the rest of 
the surrounding countryside—and the land immediately surrounding the monument itself—has. The land 
is as wrinkled as a mountain range seen from the air, as puckered as the skin of a burn victim. The velvety 
texture of the grass and the sensuous play of light across the curves of the earth draw attention to the fact 
that this is the land after 90 years of wind and rain have had time to soften the edges of the craters; the 
connection to what the land must have looked like during the war, and what artillery that could do this to 
the landscape must have done to the bodies of the soldiers there, is immediate and visceral. 
32  This division over the meaning given to memories of the war is not unusual. For a discussion of this in 
relation to Jane Urquhart‘s The Stone Carvers, discussed below, see Anna Branach-Kallas, ‗Carving the 
Names of ―Not-Persons‖: Ex-centric Perspectives on Community In Jane Urquhart‘s The Stone Carvers‘, 
Central European Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d‟Études Canadiennes en Europe Centrale 3 (2003), 69. 
33  Jane Urquhart, interview by Linda Richards, January Magazine (June 2001);  
<http://januarymagazine.com/profiles/urquhart.html>, accessed 22 August 2009. 
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enforces, to some extent, popular myths of the war, such as the memory of an all-volunteer 
army. All three of the Canadian soldiers described in its pages enlisted well before the 
passing of the Military Service Act; Tilman Becker, one of the main characters, lost his leg 
at the battle of Vimy Ridge. However, the high ideals that are given such a prominent place 
in Allward‘s monument have little place in the novel‘s narrative. Eamon O‘Sullivan, the lost 
lover of Tilman‘s sister, Klara, enlists in spite of protestations from her and from his family 
(his Irish father threatens to disown him if he goes to fight for the English king) because he 
wants to learn how to fly an aeroplane.34 The stories of the other two—Tilman and his 
friend Giorgio—are far less concerned with reasons than they are with consequences, the 
toll that the decision to enlist has on the men and their families.35  
 However, Urquhart also subverts these myths. Nobody else in the village that 
Tilman, Klara, and Eamon come from served in the war; they all received agricultural 
exemptions.36 The novel implies that this may have as much to do with political 
ambivalence, or the desire to remain well outside of European conflicts, in a village settled 
by mostly German immigrants, as it does with the actual need for farm workers in the area, 
though this never moves beyond implication, as very few villagers from outside Klara and 
Tilman‘s family appear in the book. There is no honour or glory won on the battlefield, 
least of all at Vimy Ridge, where Tilman loses his leg and Eamon his life. The soldiers‘ 
sacrifices do not partake of Christ‘s resurrection or immortality; as the story opens, Klara‘s 
demands for a village war memorial are dismissed by her neighbours as the permissible 
eccentricity of an unhappy spinster.37 Later on, Tilman tells of his rather inglorious life as a 
disabled, unemployed veteran, carving prosthetic limbs for other disabled veterans until 
                                                                                                                                               
34  Urquhart 137-138. Eamon‘s desire for flight is an echo of that which guides Anne and Gilbert Blythe‘s 
youngest son, Shirley, to enlist near the end of the war in Rilla of Ingleside. However, Montgomery‘s 
character successfully navigates the many hurdles on the way to enlistment in the Flying Corps (for a 
discussion of which see Morton, Marching to Armageddon 30-31); Urquhart‘s, whether due to the difference 
in timing (Shirley enlists near the end of the war, Eamon at the beginning), socio-economic status (Shirley 
is the son of a country physician, and his family is well-to-do enough to afford live-in domestic help and 
send to every child so inclined to college; Eamon‘s parents are Irish immigrants, farmers, and markedly 
less well-off than their neighbours), or the historical situation and disposition of the author behind the 
character, dies having ‗never got anywhere near an aeroplane‘ (Urquhart 162). This is one of many 
instances in which Urquhart takes an aspect of the popular myth of the war and subtly undermines it. 
35  In fact, although the historical timeline is wrong, Urquhart writes as though the shadow of conscription 
does hang over Tilman and Giorgio; when war is declared, Giorgio‘s father, Nicolo, who speaks in 
negatives at times of great stress, saying the opposite of what he means, says ‗It‘s not war that has been 
declared in Europe [...] You will not have to go‘. However, the prophetic tension in this statement 
(Giorgio and Tillman do not have to go at that point; they choose to enlist before conscription would have 
forced them to) is undermined by the boys‘ reaction; they ‗jumped to their feet with excitement‘, 
following in the trope of war as a great adventure (Urquhart 218). 
For a lengthier discussion of Nicolo‘s speech disorder, see Branach-Kallas, ‗Carving the Names of 
―Not-Persons‖‗ 68. 
36  Urquhart 253. 
37  Urquhart 29. 
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even that work vanishes and he is forced to return to the childhood home he ran away 
from years before.38 
 In presenting stories that defy, in one way or another, the popular myth of the war, 
the novel helps to bridge the gap between the idealised image of the faceless, nameless 
citizen-soldiers of ‗In Flanders Fields‘ and the particular, embodied lives represented by the 
names on the Allward monument.39 The tension between the two is brought into sharp 
focus towards the end of the novel, as Klara, having disguised herself as a man in order to 
travel to France where both she and her brother obtained employment in Walter Allward‘s 
work crew, seeks to use the monument as a means of release from the grip Eamon‘s 
memory has held on her life: 
No matter how much it is cherished, an absent face that is a fixed point of 
reference becomes tyrannical, and tyranny eventually demands revolt, 
escape. Klara had fled from the memory of Eamon‘s face over and over, 
his bright eyes and perfect skin, now almost two decades younger and more 
perfect than her own. She had […] by a fierce act of will […] almost 
succeeded in turning him into a faceless ghost, until all that was left was the 
vaguely human, dark shape of his absence. […] 
 Now she would have to remember the bones under the skin, the 
scar on his left temple, the beautiful, full mouth, his upturned glance and 
radiant expression when searching the sky for a kite, an aeroplane. Each 
detail. […] He had been only a boy, the inquisitive child he had been had 
never left his face. He must hold the torch aloft, yes, but because this figure 
would become Eamon and would be looking up toward his beloved ether, 
his expression must be one of astonishment and joy at finding himself, at 
last, forever reaching toward the sky. […] She stood on the ladder, eyes 
squeezed shut, scraping these images from the deepest recesses of her 
memory as if using a sculpting tool on the inner curve of her skull. Then 
she began.40 
Klara‘s imposition of her personal memory onto the monument is disruptive to its function 
as a nationally unifying memorial; later on in this same scene, Urquhart‘s fictional rendition 
of Walter Allward enters, and, upon discovery of her carving, accuses her of vandalism.41 
The universal, Allward implies, cannot be reached through the particular. The memory of a 
single, specific face not only cannot encompass the memory of all lost faces, it actually 
                                                                                                                                               
38  Urquhart 231-235; Branach-Kallas, ‗Carving the Names of ―Not-Persons‖‗ 71. 
39  The Stone Carvers is by no means the only Canadian postwar novel to challenge the myth of the war, 
although its connection to the Vimy memorial renders it particularly interesting in the current context. 
For other Canadian novels with a similar approach—especially to the postwar years—see Joseph Boyden, 
Three Day Road (Penguin, 2005); Jack Hodgkins, Broken Ground (McClelland & Stewart, 1999). 
40  Urquhart 332-333. 
41  Urquhart 336. 
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works against the ability of any future mourner to project their own particular, absent face 
onto the monument.42  
  It can be argued, however, that an instance of particularity is necessary to offset the 
attempt at universal expression which, otherwise, becomes too distant, too impersonal; 
there must be room to remember the soldier as a brother, a son, a husband, rather than 
simply as a faceless servant of the Empire. Urquhart‘s fictional Allward comes to this 
realisation himself, at the conclusion of the scene:  
The face was becoming a portrait, he could see that, but beyond that the 
expression had about it the trustfulness of someone who did not know he 
would ever be missing, lost from the earth. This woman had brought a 
personal retrospection to his monument, and had by doing so allowed life 
to enter it.43  
While the introduction of the particular breathes life into Allward‘s monument, it is only 
the first step towards easing Klara‘s own grief. Interjecting her memory of Eamon‘s 
physical presence into the monument does not abrogate the actuality of his body‘s absence. 
It neither satisfies her yearning nor enables her to find release from the crippling burden of 
memory that she carries. It does, however, permit Klara to begin to distinguish her own 
physicality from Eamon‘s, and to experience her own bodily existence and her sexuality 
without his mediation. After Eamon‘s death, we are told, ‗[h]er body, once awakened, had 
gone back to sleep, folding in on itself, the skin recognizing only the change of external 
temperature, or the touch of cloth [...] Anything else she had simply willed away, refused to 
remember or even dream‘.44 The combined event of the carving and Klara‘s discovery free 
her mind from the tyranny of Eamon‘s remembered face and her body from the 
restrictions she has imposed on it, first in her life as a respectable spinster, and then in the 
masculine disguise she adopted to facilitate her journey to the monument. 
 There are problems with this reading, of course. Klara does not actually reclaim her 
gender identity willingly, but has it re-imposed on her by the men around her. It is not 
Klara‘s choice to abandon her disguise after Allward discovers both her carving and her 
gender. Klara resists the suggestion that her living quarters be moved out of the men‘s 
dormitory, wishing instead to remain with her brother. The worksite supervisor has to 
insist that she move into the office, ‗[n]ow that you‘re a woman‘.45 The gender confusion 
Klara undergoes in this passage is like that of a young girl, re-learning the boundaries 
                                                                                                                                               
42  It is interesting, perhaps, that Urquhart chose the figure with the least visible face of any on the 
monument onto which to project her own narrative. 
43  Urquhart 340. 
44  Urquhart 344. 
45  Urquhart 342. 
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between male and female, re-discovering the limitations her body places on her even as she 
is freed from the limitations her disguise has placed on her body. However, it is only the 
renewal of these boundaries that permits Klara to breach the divide between male and 
female again, by embarking upon another love affair. 
 It is noteworthy that two of the characters discussed in this section, Klara and 
Antigone, transgress (or are perceived as transgressing) gender boundaries in their pursuit 
of proper commemoration for their loved ones.46 In Klara‘s case, the transgression is both 
more overt—her appropriation of masculine dress and mannerisms—and more subtle—
her appropriation of Allward‘s creative prerogative. It is not just Klara‘s carving that blurs 
gender boundaries—although she acquired the skill as a side-effect of her grandfather‘s 
mostly frustrated attempts to teach Tillman, an early (and small) appropriation of what was 
meant to be her brother‘s birthright—but the success of her carving, her ability to transform 
the monument into something richer than Allward intended, which renders her threatening 
and thus necessitates her firm removal to a more securely female realm.47 Allward‘s 
reflection on Klara‘s carving emphasises her gender, as if to emphasize the contrast 
between her gender and her actions: ‗This woman had brought a personal retrospection to 
his monument, and had by doing so allowed life to enter it‘ (emphasis added). However, in 
the same sentence that contrasts femininity with creative achievement, Klara the childless 
spinster is endowed with the safely feminine characteristic of life-giving. 
 This is, however, an ironic statement; Klara‘s carving may have breathed life into 
Allward‘s monument, but it failed to breathe life into Eamon. Klara has the skill to create 
and alter many different bodies, from the Abbess she carves out of limewood under her 
grandfather‘s instruction, to her own gender transformations, but she cannot create the 
body she most desires. Upon first hearing of Eamon‘s death, Klara gropes for some 
physical artefact to serve as a substitute for his body. Her first, failed, attempt at a symbolic 
substitution to aid her mourning is the re-creation of the red waistcoat she made for him at 
the beginning of their courtship.48 We are told that ‗[s]he believed that once she began to 
                                                                                                                                               
46  Creon is quite concerned not only at Antigone‘s gender transgression, but at the degree to which her 
masculinity undermines his own: ‗Indeed, now I am no man, but she is a man, if she is to enjoy such 
power with impunity‘ (Sophocles 47; ln. 484-485); ‗But while I live a woman shall not rule!‘ (Sophocles 51; 
ln. 525); ‗If we must perish, it is better to do so by the hand of a man, and then we cannot be called 
inferior to women‘ (Sophocles 65; ln. 679-680). 
47  As if to underline the gender transgressions inherent in Klara‘s carving, Urquhart links Klara‘s first 
experience of carving with her grandfather‘s story of the Infant of Prague: ‗Klara was delighted by the 
idea of a boy doll, holy or otherwise, wearing dresses, and she set to work immediately carving the body 
from an abandoned porch pillar [...]‘ (Urquhart 96-7).  
The gender play around the act of carving in The Stone Carvers both relies upon and undermines the 
gendered idea of creative genius put forth in the Anne of Green Gables series. 
48  Urquhart 161, 163. 
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pull the scarlet thread through the wool, once she was involved in the act of 
reconstruction, some of her anguish would abate‘.49 She sews the waistcoat as she might 
have sewn Eamon‘s pall, and in so doing calls up an echo of the prediction Eamon himself 
made about the use to which the original waistcoat would be put.50 Unlike a pall, however, 
the recreated waistcoat has no ritual purpose; it is not laid in the ground with Eamon‘s 
body (it cannot be), but remains in Klara‘s keeping. It does not, and cannot, grant Klara 
any release from her grief, its presence instead serving to reinforce the stark fact of 
Eamon‘s absence, its outline pointing to the shape of, but not giving form to, the body that 
fails to fill it. Klara carries that absence, the resultant anguish, and her exacting attempt to 
reproduce Eamon‘s physicality, across the ocean with her, just as insistently as she carries 
the recreated waistcoat.51 Her carving at the monument is, then, a second attempt at 
bringing to the absent body enough solidity that she can bury it, and fulfil the mourning 
ritual that the War interrupted.52 
 The failure of Klara‘s portrait carving to erase her grief is, in a larger sense, a failure 
of the pre-existing paradigm of loss and grief to accommodate the experiences of the 
wartime generation. Mourning rituals focused on the body and gravesite deepen, rather 
than mitigate, the sense of loss felt when the body and gravesite are inaccessible or non-
existent, just as the second waistcoat Klara sews heightens, rather than diminishes, her 
awareness of Eamon‘s absence—not simply his absence from her present life, which she 
has lived with for several years, but also, and perhaps even more, his absence from her 
future life: the elimination of any possibility of his return or of a reconciliation between 
them. The emotional void of this double absence is too great to be contained by and 
disposed of through physical representation. However detailed and memory-laden such 
representation may be—the waistcoat recalling the awkward hesitancy of early courtship, 
                                                                                                                                               
49  Urquhart 164. 
50  Urquhart 80-81. 
51  Urquhart 258-259. 
52  The obvious question here is why Klara‘s grief is continually seeking a better substitute for Eamon, where 
Rilla is capable of fulfilling her mourning with little more than a letter and a commemorative plaque on 
the family pew. It is not a simple difference of religion—while Rilla is Presbyterian and Klara Catholic, 
both are quite devout and should be equally capable of being comforted by the promise of eternal life 
(though it may be a difference in religion on the part of the authors, Urquhart‘s reticence in regards to her 
own religious belief prevents this from being anything other than speculation); it may be a difference in 
the circumstances surrounding Walter‘s and Eamon‘s deaths, as Klara‘s quarrel with Eamon remains 
unresolved, and she has no final letter by which to be comforted. However, especially in light of the 
gender transgressions discussed above, I would suggest that another answer to this question is simply that 
Rilla represents the paradigmatic ‗good woman‘, who never strays from her prescribed role, where Klara, 
like Antigone, represents the ‗bad woman‘, incapable of being satisfied by the limited role and rituals she 
is socially permitted. See Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, ‗Assumptions and the Creation of Meaning: 
Reading Sophocles‘ Antigone‘ The Journal of Hellenic Studies 109 (1989) 140. 
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the upturned face of the Torchbearer recalling the reasons behind their quarrel and 
parting—it cannot contain the full depth and breadth of the absent loved one‘s being.  
  Representation is necessarily finite. It is a collapsing, a flattening, of the real into 
the symbolic—this is one of the reasons frequently cited for the prohibition against images 
in Judaism (and Islam).53 Some forms of representation do this more than others. Klara‘s 
carving, for example, is a highly detailed physical representation; it may even be an exact 
reproduction of her memory of Eamon‘s face. But a representation of a memory of the real 
thing is not the thing itself, and much less so the person; it is at least one flattening too 
many. Klara‘s attempts at mourning through representation are ineffective because 
representation itself is fundamentally ineffective for this purpose. What Klara (and, I would 
argue, the rest of her generation) requires is, instead, abstraction. A carving of Eamon‘s 
face quickly becomes simply a carving of a face, a single representative of the collective 
generation of doomed youth in whose honour the carving was created, because Eamon‘s 
essence is no longer corporeal. Rather, the corporeality of his essence has been 
transfigured, and is no longer borne by flesh, or capable of being represented by stone, but 
can most effectively be contained and approached as word. Eamon‘s own face may be lost 
forever, and a representation of that face may fade from particularity into anonymity, but 
Eamon O‘Sullivan remains Eamon O‘Sullivan. The uniqueness of his being is, finally, 
represented by his name, by a particular arrangement of a series of abstract symbols 
representing sounds (letters), rather than by a realistic representation of his physical, fleshly, 
characteristics. 
 Klara‘s refusal to speak his name, to give physical form, however ephemeral, to the 
idea represented by the symbols, attests to her instinctive appreciation of this fact. So long 
as Eamon remains unspoken, Klara remains the guardian not just of his memory but of his 
essence; her intimacy with him is thus considerably greater than it ever could be with 
Giorgio, and much more bound up in the structure of her own self-identity: ‗[s]he felt that 
to release the syllables [of his name] into the air all these years later would be a kind of 
amputation, a violent removal of a part of the self‘.54 The release of this bond, and the 
culmination of Klara‘s mourning, form the dual climax of the book.  
 After being revealed as a woman, Klara embarks on an affair with her brother‘s 
friend, Giorgio, who is employed at the monument primarily to carve the names of the 
missing onto its side. Her physical contact with another person enables her understanding 
of Eamon‘s death to move beyond the mostly physical level at which she had experienced 
                                                                                                                                               
53  For a more in-depth discussion, see Jacobs 10. 
54  Urquhart 360-361. 
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his absence for much of the book. The consummation of their relationship undermines 
Klara‘s previous understanding of the war and its costs. In the tunnel system that lies 
beneath the land on which the monument is being built, ‗like extended tangled roots 
reaching up to the monument above, feeding its construction by their very existence‘, she 
begins to learn to release her insistence on the absolute uniqueness of Eamon and his 
fate.55 Just as the intimacy she shares with Giorgio in these tunnels demonstrates that 
Eamon was not the only possible mediator for her sexuality, the carvings that she and 
Giorgio discover on the tunnel walls demonstrate to the reader that Eamon‘s fate, however 
tragic, was shared by many: ‗―I carved the letters of this boy‘s name yesterday,‖ [Giorgio] 
whispered, pointing to the second inscription. He shook his head. ―And the other... the 
other was found under the rocks when they cleared the entrance to Grange Tunnel. He was 
scratched from my list.‖‘56 
 The face of the torchbearer became a portrait; the portrait, in turn, fades and takes 
its place amongst the other allegorical figures that adorn the monument. A certain amount 
of distance has been imposed between the living and the memories of the dead. Klara, 
however, continues to cling to her position as the guardian of Eamon‘s particular memory, 
supported in this by the silence that she relied upon to insulate her since he went away to 
the war.57 Her insistence on maintaining this silence, even against Giorgio‘s direct 
questioning, shields her not only from the pain of fully acknowledging Eamon‘s loss, but 
also from the vulnerability of fully entering into a new relationship.58 She can admit Giorgio 
to the knowledge of her own body, but not to the knowledge of her past; she can display 
Eamon‘s face for all the world to see, but she cannot bring herself to speak his name in 
another person‘s hearing.  
  The first of the book‘s two climaxes comes when Klara does finally speak Eamon‘s 
name out loud, and this in itself occurs in two parts: first, her unwitnessed whisper into the 
dark and, eight pages later, the performance of the speech act in front of Giorgio. It is 
worthwhile to note that both of these utterances mark a break in the narrative, which picks 
up afterwards from a different point of view. It is also worthwhile to note that, while the 
first whisper is presented from Klara‘s viewpoint, the second vocalisation is seen through 
Giorgio‘s eyes; we readers are given only clues as to how and why Klara chooses to speak. 
The two speech acts are nearly identical: ‗―Eamon,‖ she [whispered/said]. ―Eamon 
                                                                                                                                               
55  Urquhart 356. 
56  Urquhart 356. 
57  Urquhart 160, 163. 
58  Urquhart 360. 
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O‘Sullivan.‖‗59 In the first instance, however, the narrative break occurs immediately after 
the utterance; in the second, Klara continues to speak: ‗―Poor boy [...] He was so young.‖ 
She paused. ―And so much time has passed.‖‗60  
 The causal link between the passage of time and Klara‘s ability to speak is implicit, 
but deceptive. While it is true that Eamon has been gone for many years, no more than a 
few weeks have passed since Klara and Giorgio quarrelled over her initial refusal release 
Eamon‘s name, and in so doing release her hold on his memory (and his memory‘s hold on 
her). What has changed is not time itself, but Klara‘s recognition of time. Her journey 
across the ocean, her carving of the portrait, her experiences with Giorgio, her encounter 
with the reality of other lives lost, all of these have worked to convince Klara of the 
distance between her self-identity and her role as the guardian of Eamon‘s memory-
identity, to make it possible for her to release the syllables of his name into the air, where 
she can not protect or control them, without committing a violent removal of a part of her 
self. The days or weeks (the exact amount of time that elapses is unclear) between the two 
speech acts can be read as the time it takes for Klara to recognise what has, in fact, already 
happened, and reconcile herself to this new kind of loss, which is also a gain.61/ 
 Klara‘s release is not yet complete, however: a second act of naming must occur, 
the final climax of the book. Nicola King has suggested that a final release occurs when a 
memory is transformed into text.62 This certainly appears to hold true in the case of Klara‘s 
second naming of (and second attempt to carve) Eamon. Where a representation of his 
physical characteristics proved unsatisfactory, the abstract shapes of letters are capable of 
bringing his essence into a form physical enough for Klara to relinquish her hold on his 
memory: 
Klara knew this would be the last time she touched Eamon, that when they 
finished carving his name all the confusion and regret of his absence would 
unravel, just as surely as if she had embraced him with forgiving arms.63 
In carving Eamon‘s name on the memorial, Klara not only brings him into 
sufficient solidity to effect a reconciliation with his memory, she also places him irrevocably 
in the care of the national collective, a sharp contrast to her earlier attempts to guard and 
maintain his identity as an individual, or a member of her family unit. To Antigone, the 
individual personality of a body faded in the face of its overwhelming symbolic 
                                                                                                                                               
59  Urquhart 362, 370. 
60  Urquhart 370. This last sentence is also an echo of an earlier statement by Tilman (Urquhart 366). 
61  A more detailed reading of Klara‘s inner transformation can be found in Branach-Kallas ‗Exploring the 
Dark Tunnels of Memory‘, especially pp 64-65. 
62  King 175. 
63  Urquhart 376. 
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significance. In the Vimy memorial, and other monuments to the First World War, the 
body itself fades from view, to be replaced by a name which both asserts and obscures 
individual identity; even in the Imperial War Graves cemeteries, where the normalcy of 
graves and bodies is preserved, the uniformity of the tombstones overrides the differences 
in their inscriptions. The carved names do not simply represent the missing; in their ability 
to contain the complexities and nuances of unique lives, they, at least functionally, have 
become the bodies of the missing. The arrangement of these names on the Vimy memorial 
achieves something similar to Klara‘s experiences in the tunnel, undermining any perceived 
uniqueness in the manner of each death, even as each carved name embodies the 
individuality of the life it represents. 
  
 
INTERLUDE:  
BLOTTING OUT AMALEK 
 
When the Second World War broke out in 1939, less than three years after 
he had returned to Canada, Allward reacted with panic and rage. He 
deluged the Department of National Defence with telegrams begging for 
reports and demanding that the memorial be sandbagged against aerial 
bombardment. As the weeks passed and he received no replies, he retreated 
into an inner landscape of great bleakness, pacing the house in the middle 
of the night, imagining the worst [...]  
With sharp coloured pencils he began a series of small, secretive drawings, 
each one more violent, more angry than the last. Tangled bodies littered 
torn landscapes, burning clots of brimstone rained down from a savage sky. 
And, in the background, tiny, almost insignificant in the drama, the 
wreckage of the monument [...] 
The drawings seemed to feed his belief in catastrophe, his certainty that 
there was absolutely nothing on earth not subject to vicious attack. In his 
imagination, and on the rice paper he used, the allegorical figures of his 
sculptures stepped away from their fixed positions to engage in appalling 
dramas. Always with the ruins of the memorial smoking in the distance, he 
drew embracing lovers impaled by a single sword, cairns composed of 
lifeless bodies, a naked man straddling the torn, prone torso of a woman 
from whose chest he had snatched her bleeding heart. Allward knew, even 
before he had completed this particular drawing, that it was his own heart 
the man held aloft, a trophy steaming in his desperate hands. 
He had spent fifteen years of his life obsessed by perfection and 
permanence [...] He had believed that he was making memory solid, 
indestructible, that its perfect stone would stand against the sky forever. 
With this certainty threatened, his world collapsed. 
Jane Urquhart, The Stone Carvers 380-381
  
 Figure 25: Tim Davies, European Drawings (2007). Used by permission of the artist. 
  
 
 
rquhart ends The Stone Carvers not with the completion of the Vimy 
memorial, but with images of its destruction. Working from sketches filed in 
the Allward Archive as ‗War Cartoons‘, she imagines how he became 
obsessed with the catastrophic scenarios that his own imagination spun out, making 
drawing after drawing of the monument reduced, or in the process of being reduced, to 
rubble. The fear of destruction that Urquhart attributes to Allward alone was, in actuality, 
echoed by the general Canadian public; both the Montreal Daily Star and the Toronto Globe 
and Mail published lurid, though ultimately erroneous, accounts of the memorial‘s 
destruction at the hands of German bombers.1 Both the British and Canadian military 
attempted to obtain intelligence regarding the memorial‘s condition throughout the 
German occupation of France, hoping to either boost morale with news of its continued 
endurance, or else derive propaganda value from its wreckage.2  
 ‗The calculated barbarism that has characterized post-1939 conflicts has made us 
loath to admit that there can be anything positive about war‘, writes Vance. 
Even Canada‘s social memory of the Second World War, as just a war as 
the modern world has seen, is dominated by overtones of negativity. 
Notions of individual heroism, self-sacrifice, and fighting in a good cause 
have been pushed to the background by a dominant memory that has come 
to emphasize mismanagement, injustice, failure, and cupidity.3 
In spite of this, the Second World War did not itself bring a great challenge to 
commemoration. In Canada and Great Britain, most localities that had constructed 
monuments to the First World War simply added another inscription to extend the 
monuments‘ reach over the Second, as well. The great upheaval of the Second World War 
was not entirely felt until the war‘s end, when details about activity within German-
occupied territories began to become fully and irrefutably known. The great challenge to 
the accepted order of the world brought by the years 1939-1945 was not the mass death of 
soldiers in war, but the mass death of civilians: the Holocaust. While death in the First 
World War could be folded into a religiously supported Just War narrative, death in the 
Holocaust defied—and continues to defy—attempts at theological response. 
 What the sketches Urquhart describes really depict is not the destruction of the 
memorial itself, nor of the monument-making culture which produced it, but of the 
dominance of that culture, of the high ideals—and idealism—that the memorial enshrines. 
                                                                                                                                               
1 Serge Durflinger, ‗Safeguarding Sanctity: Canada and the Vimy Memorial during the Second World War‘, 
in Hayes, Iarocci and Bechthold; see especially 293-298. 
2 Durflinger 296-7. 
3 Vance 10-11. 
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Although there is nothing to identify the figures in the war cartoons as the figures from the 
monument, the link Urquhart draws between the two, having Allward sketch ‗the 
allegorical figures of his sculptures stepped away from their fixed positions to engage in 
appalling dramas‘, accentuates the degree to which the Second World War undermined 
belief in the grand principles the figures represent. Urquhart‘s fictional Allward, in despair 
over the loss of those principles precipitated by the outbreak of another war, engages in an 
imaginative, visual deconstruction of his own monument, an attempt to blot out the 
memory he had so carefully constructed. 
 A similar attempt to blot out the memory of the past—not just the constructed 
monuments, but the ideas they represent—can be seen in the Welsh artist Tim Davies‘s 
recent series, European Drawings. The individual drawings in the series are presented without 
titles, but are displayed as a long row of identically mounted and framed images of 
presumably famous landmarks, united as much by their anonymity as by the uniformity of 
the graphite on their surface. As the viewer walks along the row, one or two familiar sites 
may come into view: here the London cenotaph, there a familiar face from along the 
Somme. But then the viewer moves on, the angle of the light shifts, and the surface 
becomes mirror-like, completely obscuring the image beneath it. 
 These are not drawings as one normally thinks of drawings. The pencil lines do not 
conspire to construct any sort of recognizable image. The most readily available visual 
point of reference is actually the paper beneath the drawn surface, a digital print which has 
then been furiously scratched out by thick, dark pencil lines. It is not unreasonable to say 
that the drawing, in fact, works against the image. But this is not an act of deconstruction; 
there is no attentive disassembling of component parts; the pencil lines betray no care for 
the way either the photograph or the monument which it depicts is composed. Instead, it 
reads as a deliberately failed attempt at obliteration—I say deliberately failed because the 
acts of selecting the photograph, of enlarging and printing it, of framing it and placing it on 
a gallery wall to be viewed, draw to the image the same attention that the graphite 
overdrawing seems meant to deflect or frustrate.  
 One wonders what exactly is being obliterated—the image itself, or the monument 
to which it refers. Or is the hand holding the pencil attempting to reach even further back, 
beyond the image, beyond the monument, to erase history itself? This last is impossible, 
and the mind behind the hand must surely know it to be so. However, it is precisely that 
reach for the impossible that Davies has portrayed. The drawings are a protest against the 
neatness and finality indicated by the memorial structures themselves. A press release from 
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the Collins Gallery, Glasgow (where I first saw these images) quotes Davies saying that he 
used the drawings as attempt ‗to get my head around the concept of loss and futility‘.4  
 The idea of futility is enforced by the second, smaller set of ‗drawings‘ in the series. 
Rather than building up a drawn surface in front of them, Davies has pierced the images 
from behind, with the pattern of pin-pricks focused most heavily around the figurative 
element of whichever monument is portrayed. The pin-pricks are like shrapnel wounds. 
Inside each one is a tiny drop of red, as though the image of the memorial has taken on, or 
been given, some of the characteristics of the wounded flesh to which it attests. The injury 
of the absent injured body is brought back into view, even while its absence is underscored 
by the substitution of an image of a memorial figure for a body, or even an image of a 
body. The second set of drawings enforces the futility of the exercise undertaken by the 
first: what has been done cannot be undone; history cannot be blotted out; some losses are, 
in the end, irretrievable.  
                                                                                                                                               
4 Collins Gallery, ‗Tim Davies: Cadet 31 March-5 May‘, press release (2006). 
  
 
  
n a quiet street of what was formerly East Berlin, not terribly far from 
Checkpoint Charlie, a crowd shuffles through the door of an old 
courthouse.1 A few at a time, they pass through a narrowly-guarded gate, 
down a steep and twisting flight of stairs (figure 26), into a sloping corridor with tiled 
floors, dully reflecting the glare of the institutional fluorescent lights overhead. The angles 
at which this corridor is cut across by two other, nearly identical, passageways are more 
reminiscent of a funhouse than a hospital (figure 27). These intersections seem to provide 
the visitors a multitude of potential destinations, though all are dead ends—even the 
recommended route up another long, steep flight of stairs is only the beginning of a long 
digressive path that will eventually deposit the visitor right back in the subterranean maze. 
The journey, in this case, is as important as the destination. Following the stairs up 
into the permanent exhibition space of the Daniel Libeskind-designed Jewish Museum 
Berlin propels visitors through a chronological recounting of the entire two thousand year 
history of German Jewry, from the earliest settlers, through the flourishing of Medieval 
Ashkenaz, to the Enlightenment and the Jewish Reform movement, the First World War, 
and beyond. This approach is a deliberate strategy on the part of the museum‘s curatorial 
team to present the German Jewish experience in terms that extend beyond ‗Auschwitz 
and guilt.‘2 The overarching meta-narrative of the historical presentation is one of 
‗continuous struggle‘; in this respect, the Holocaust is integrated into the narrative, rather 
than being figured as an interruption, or a terminus.3 The gallery presentation is complex 
and nuanced, drawing out individual narratives as counterpoints to the anti-Semitic 
stereotypes which characterise common historical images of the German Jew, emphasizing 
instead the close integration between Jewish and German cultural identities.4 
All of this combines to enhance the sense of loss felt by the visitor when they 
return to the underground corridors and choose between the remaining destinations—
three dead ends. They may walk up the sloping corridor to the outdoor Garden of Exile, 
with its dizzying, disorientingly tilted pillars, symbolically abandoning the rich cultural 
heritage they have only just learnt to appreciate. This is the path of escape; the other two 
options each lead to one of the ‗Voids‘ for which the building is famous, both of which 
house representations of the Holocaust.  
The first of these, the ‗Memory Void‘, houses a work by Menashe Kadishman, 
entitled ‗Fallen Leaves‘—a floor littered with thousands of pieces of iron, in various states 
                                                                                                                                               
1  Rolf Schneider, ‗The Jewish Museum Berlin‘, Die Neuen Architekutführer no. 2 (1999) 21. 
2  Museum director W. Michael Blumenthal, quoted in Kathrin Pieren, ‗―Being Jewish is more than the 
Holocaust experience‖: What visitors see at the Jewish Museum Berlin‘ Social History in Museums 29 (2004) 
79. 
3  Pieren 82. 
4  Pieren 81. 
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of rust, cut to resemble human faces; it resembles the infamous piles of shoes on display at 
Auschwitz (figure 28).5 A plaque near the entrance to the void invites visitors to walk 
across the floor, over the faces; few even attempt it, and most of those manage only one or 
two hesitant steps before retreating. This space feels like the climax of the entire journey: 
the wall of the tower is perforated by openings on all the building‘s other floors, and so the 
room has drifted in and out of visibility as visitors have made their way through the exhibit, 
with each subsequent encounter bringing the room closer, rendering its contents more 
visible. This room, however, is but the final preparation for the last void. Down a different 
corridor, an attendant waits to usher visitors through a heavy door into another concrete 
tower. Unlike the ‗Memory Void‘, this one is nearly windowless (indirect light leeches in 
from somewhere near the top of the room) and completely unadorned (figure 29). 
Libeskind has referred to this space as a ‗voided void‘; it is the ultimate blank wall on which 
to project memories of all the experiences that preceded it. The effectiveness of the space 
as a memorial specific to the Holocaust depends upon the presence of Kadishman‘s work 
in the Memory Void, and upon the visitor‘s encounter with it; without that final, visceral 
encounter with human figures piled up like detritus, the voided void would risk becoming 
an overly stylized image of loss, much like the Mémorial de la Déportation in Paris (figure 
30). In the latter, a visitor appreciates the symbolism of descent and entry into an enclosed 
space; here in Berlin, they experience the sense of hopelessness and captivity that the 
Parisian memorial alludes to. 
The integration of a museum component to memorial sites is a particular feature of 
Holocaust memorials. Auschwitz has been transformed into a museum, as has Dachau; 
even the most cursory internet search for ‗Holocaust Memorial Museum‘ reveals, in 
addition to Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, the Holocaust Memorial Centre in Montreal, and the 
United States Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C., countless similar sites scattered 
throughout North and South America, Europe, and Australia. Not two kilometres away 
from Libeskind‘s site stands The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, a field of 
concrete stellae designed by Peter Eisenman (remarkably similar to the pillars which sprout 
up from the Garden of Exile) which rises over a hidden, subterranean museum complex 
(figure  31).6 The heart of this museum is the Room of Names, a dark room, empty save 
for a few benches in the middle, upon the walls of which are projected, one at a time, the 
names of Holocaust victims, along with their dates of birth and death, if known (figure 32). 
                                                                                                                                               
5  Schneider 26. 
6  See Eisenman, ‗Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe‘, Materials on The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe, published by The Foundation for the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (Nicolai, 2005) 
10-13. 
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As each name is projected, a brief biography—sometimes little more than place of birth 
and date of deportation—is read in German and English. Just as Liebeskind‘s voided void 
depends upon the visitor carrying the experience of the museum into the space with them, 
the impact of the Room of Names depends not just on the preceding two rooms of the 
museum, but on the thousands of concrete stellae that the visitor had to walk through 
before descending into the museum at all.7 Sitting in the Room of Names for any length of 
time, or reading the family histories housed in the room that precedes it, impresses upon 
the visitor the absolute, terrifying unremarkability of the lives commended to communal 
memory: they are as indistinguishable as the concrete grid above.  
The prevalence of museum-memorials points to the crucial distinction between 
memorialisation of the First World War and of the Holocaust. The former arose in 
response to the disruption of communal mourning rituals caused by the absence of a body 
or gravesite; they support, through a series of substitutionary gestures, the continued 
expression of normalised narratives of loss and grief. The latter arises, profoundly, in the 
absence of not only body and gravesite, but in the absence of the normal community of 
mourners. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe documents entire families and 
villages wiped out; a sizeable portion of the individuals commemorated in the Room of 
Names had no surviving relatives. The memorial museums first create a sense of 
attachment to the dead as members of one‘s own community—whether that community is 
defined by shared religion, shared nationality, or shared humanity—in order to give the 
visitor a reason to mourn, only later providing space in which that mourning might occur. 
This is Jewish liturgical space, both in the sense of λειτουργία, the public duty owed by one 
segment of the Jewish community (the living) to another (the dead), and in the sense that 
these memorials fulfil the same function as do more recognisable, textual forms of Jewish 
liturgy, providing a space of encounter between present-day individuals and their collective 
past.8   
I began this study with an examination of collective memory transmitted in a 
liturgical context: the reading and interpretation of Parshat Zakhor in a synagogue on the 
Sabbath before Purim. I noted the multiple ways in which that memory has been used to 
shape Jewish understanding of the community and circumstances in which it has been 
                                                                                                                                               
7  For an account of the contents of each room in the museum, see Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten 
Juden Europas, ‗The Design Concept for the Information Centre‘ <http://www.denkmal-fuer-die-
ermordeten-juden-europas.org/en/thememorial/informationcentre/design> (Accessed 16 October 
2009).  
8  Of course, as Laura Levitt has pointed out, the Holocaust is the direct inheritance of only a relatively 
small number of European Jews; it has, however, grown in cultural significance, to become a defining 
historical event in Jewish collective identity. See Levitt, American Jewish Loss after the Holocaust (New York 
University Press, 2007). 
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recalled over the centuries—including as a legal justification for war. I then turned to an 
examination of the ways in which theology, expressed through a cultural medium, shaped 
the memorialisation of the First World War. In this, my concluding section, I will show 
that this shaping action works both ways, that historical memory has also had a profound 
impact upon theology in the 20th, and now the 21st, centuries. At the heart of this impact 
are questions of relationship between God and humanity, and questions about liturgical 
expressions of relationship.  
Figure 26: Jewish Museum Berlin. 
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Figure 27: Jewish Museum Berlin. 
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Figure 28: Menashe Kadishman, „Fallen Leaves‟, Jewish Museum Berlin. 
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Figure 29: 'Voided Void', Jewish Museum Berlin. 
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Figure 30: Mémorial de la Déportation, Paris. 
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Figure 31: Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin. 
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Figure 32: Room of Names, Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin. 
  
 
FRACTURED WORSHIP:  
CHRISTIAN AND JEWISH  
THEOLOGICAL RESPONSES  
TO THE HOLOCAUST
Figure 33: Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche, Berlin (night view). 
  
 
 
he first thing you see is blue. A surprisingly warm, inviting blue glow radiates 
from the centre of an otherwise dark square, beckoning you away from the 
shrill neon glare of the Kurfürstendamm and into its quiet embrace. 
Suspended between twin pools of blue there hovers, lit by yellow-tinted floodlights, a tall, 
crumbling stone structure, a rectangular base from which an octagonal tower protrudes, 
ornamented with the dark arches of empty windows, blind eyes peering back out into the 
darkness. A spire rises from the top of the tower, the sides sloping as if to converge at a 
point, but their journey is interrupted halfway; the roof terminates in a jagged edge.1 
 This is the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche, originally built in the last decade of 
the nineteenth century as a monument to Kaiser Wilhelm I by his grandson, Kaiser 
Wilhelm II.2 In its first incarnation, under the architectural direction of Franz Schechter, it 
‗took a neo-Romanesque style, rich in reference to Germanic medieval empires‘;  it served 
as ‗church, museum, and monument‘, richly decorated with lavish mosaic floors and 
ceilings depicting scenes from the Bible and from the life of Wilhelm I.3 These—the ones 
which remain—are largely reminiscent of the mosaics in Byzantine Imperial churches, such 
as those at San Vitale, in Ravenna, locating the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche firmly in 
a long tradition of imperial church architecture and decoration.4  
 After the end of the monarchy in 1918, the building's popularity declined, and it 
came to be viewed largely as ‗an obstruction to traffic‘, a lonely island in the midst of a 
busy theatre district, a discarded relic of the imperial past afloat on the sea of modernity.5 
However, the building survived the interwar years, and remained a landmark of note, as 
                                                                                                                                               
1 The three main buildings of the complex are, according to tourist guides, nicknamed ‗the powder box‘ 
(the main sanctuary), ‗the lipstick‘ (the campanile), and ‗the hollow tooth‘ (the ruined tower from the old 
church)—see, for example, Douglas Stallings et al., eds., Fodor‟s Eastern and Central Europe, 21st ed. 
(Fodor‘s, 2008) 351; see also Gerhard Kabierske, ‗(Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church) Berlin, 1956-63‘, in 
Egon Eiermann (1904-1970) Architect and Designer: The Continuity of Modernism, ed. Annemarie Jaeggi (Hatje 
Cantz Publishers, 2004) 172-177; 173. I hope I may be forgiven for eschewing the popular terminology, 
mainly on the grounds that I find it neither descriptively accurate nor aesthetically compelling. 
2  James N. Retallack, Imperial Germany 1871-1918 (Oxford University Press, 2008) 118. 
3  Retallack 118; see also Rudy Koshar, From monuments to traces: artifacts of German memory, 1870-1990 
(University of California Press, 2000) 112. 
4  For the relation between the design of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche (hereafter KWG) and 
Kaiser Wilhelm II‘s sense of the German Empire‘s place in history, see Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: 
The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, rev. ed. (Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000) 89. See also 
Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II: Emperor and Exile, 1900-1941 (University of North Carolina Press, 1996) 44; Arno 
J. Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (Croom Helm, 1981) 225. 
5 Much of the information on the site‘s history is taken from the rather thorough museum housed in the 
old church tower. See also Mary Fulbrook and Martin Swales, Representing the German Nation (Manchester 
University Press, 2000) 68-69; Henry Maximilian Pächter, Weimar études (Columbia University Press, 1982) 
95-96. Also see Sabine Hake, Topographies of class: modern architecture and mass society in Weimar Berlin 
(University of Michigan Press, 2008) 27, 137. Hake suggests the post-WWI distaste for the church was 
also linked to anti-imperial sentiment. 
T 
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well as a reasonably prestigious congregation. Dietrich Bonhoeffer preached several 
important sermons from the church in the early 1930s;6 later, the church's regular pastor, 
Gerhard Jacobi, became an influential figure in the Confessing Church's resistance against 
the Nazi regime.7 The church was not, however, an unambiguous symbol of resistance; it 
was also used as the centrepiece of a 1928 essay by Joseph Goebbels, who was later to 
become Hitler's propaganda minister, which decried the theatres and cabarets that had 
sprung up in the area around the church, contrasting sacred German history with the 
contemporary commercial corruption that he linked unambiguously to Jewish business 
interests.8   
 Even today, the church sits in the middle of a busy commercial centre; at night, the 
rotating Mercedes-Benz logo on top of the Europa-Center building is far more visible than 
the small gold cross on top of the campanile, and patrons spill out of nearby bars to 
congregate on the Breitscheidplatz around it. By day, a small collection of market stalls 
occupy the raised platform that separates the church complex from the rest of the plaza—a 
relatively recent attempt on the part of the congregation to cut down on vagrancy in the 
area and improve connections between the church and the local immigrant community.9 
The campanile, situated at the eastern side of the complex, houses a fairtrade shop at 
ground level; tourists crowd around that tower, the market, and into the bottom of the 
central tower, which now houses a small museum, illustrating the church's history. 
By day, it is apparent that this structure was not meant to be square, but is, in fact, a 
remnant of a much larger building, and what appeared to be windows at ground level are 
actually arches that lead from the central portion under the tower off into naves and 
transepts that no longer exist. The old church was destroyed in the Second World War, 
first by a series of air raids and then by street fighting; by the end of the war, the wrecked 
                                                                                                                                               
6 See Eberhard Bethge and Victoria Barnett, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography (Fortress Press, 2000) 236, 282; 
Geffrey B. Kelly and F. Burton Nelson, The Cost of Moral Leadership: The Spirituality of Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
(Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002) 35; Scott M. Langston, Exodus through the centuries (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2006) 247; F. Burton Nelson, ‗The Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer‘, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. John W. deGruchy (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 22-49, 32, 45. 
7 According to Victoria Barnett, the KWG was never officially a Confessing Church parish; rather, Jacobi 
carried on a Confessing Church ministry privately, while remaining officially affiliated to the ‗German 
Christian‘ movement, until 1939, when he succumbed to pressure to join the military. See Victoria 
Barnett, For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler (Oxford University Press, 1998) 168-9; 
Matthew D. Hockenos, A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past (Indiana University 
Press, 2004) 132. 
8 Koshar 112-113. See also Janet Ward, Weimar Surfaces: Urban Visual Culture in 1920s Germany (University of 
California Press, 2001) 181, 183 
9 I am greatly indebted to Gerrit Wegener, an architecture student, volunteer tourguide, and member of the 
KWG‘s congregation, for the information he provided on the current activity of the congregation in the 
course of a tour of the site on 5 August 2008. 
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central tower was all that remained standing.10 Its continued presence is an accident of 
history and of urban planning: although the parish passed a resolution to rebuild the 
church in 1947, no steps were taken towards the selection of an architect for the project 
until 1956.11 In the intervening years, much of the rubble that characterised Berlin at the 
end of the war had been cleared away, leaving the tower as a rare remnant of the wrecked 
cityscape, and one capable of attracting a certain degree of affection.12 Public pressure 
prevented the tower from being demolished completely, and it was instead incorporated 
into the complex of new buildings which were designed by Egon Eiermann and 
constructed entirely of glass, set in the modular cement latticing that is his signature 
material. 13 
 The church offices sit at the westernmost side of the complex, and small chapel is 
in the northeast corner; each of these buildings echoes the rectangular base of the central 
structure. In the centre, the sanctuary to the west and campanile to the east surround the 
ruined tower, imitating the octagonal shape of its upper extremities, clasping it from either 
side like a tension-set jewel. There is some indication that Eiermann was opposed to the 
ruin's continuing presence on the site, but the visual and symbolic tension achieved by the 
commingling of old and new imbues the church complex as it currently exists with a 
richness that would have been impossible to achieve by other means.14  
                                                                                                                                               
10 Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche, Memorial Hall, permanent exhibit (visited 5 August 2008). Hereafter 
referred to as KWG (MH).  
11 Kabierske 173. Much like Allward and the Vimy memorial, Eiermann submitted the winning design to a 
competition, and further adjustments were made later on; see Kabierske 173-174. 
12 Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape (University of Chicago 
Press, 1997) 176-177. See also Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, In the Wake of War: the Reconstruction of German Cities 
after World War II (Oxford University Press, 1993) 75; Thomas Sieverts, Cities Without Cities: Between Place 
and World, Space and Time, Town and Country, trans. Daniel de Lough (Routledge, 2003) 27. 
13 Eiermann also employed the concrete lattice structure in Matthäuskirche (Church of St. Matthew) in 
Pforzheim, a private residence in Baden-Baden, and the Chancery of the German Embassy in Washington 
D. C.; see Heidi Fischer, ‗Matthäuskirche (Church of St. Matthew), Pforzheim, 1951-53‘ in Jaeggi, Egon 
Eiermann, 156-159; Clemens Kieser, ‗Hardenberg Private Residence, Baden-Baden, 1958-60‘ in Jaeggi, 
Egon Eiermann, 178-181; Annemarie Jaeggi, ‗Chancery of the German Embassy, Washington, D. C., 1958-
64‘ in Jaeggi, Egon Eiermann, 186-7. 
14 Eiermann‘s dislike of the ruined tower has passed down anecdotally through the congregation of the 
KWG, and was related to me in rather forceful terms by Mr. Wegener; it is also alluded to in Kabierske 
173, Sieverts 27, and, more obliquely, in the multiple references to the public outcry that was necessary to 
keep the tower intact—see above, note 12. 
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 This is an odd place for a Jewish theologian to begin a reflection on the memory of 
the Holocaust. However, the contrast between this church and the open-air cathedral of 
Allward‘s Vimy memorial provides a useful bridge between theological reflection on the 
First World War and the Holocaust. The church, to the extent that it is presented as a 
memorial at all (and while it cannot avoid its landmark status, nor the steady stream of 
tourists that results, the majority of the informational materials at the site focus firmly on 
its role as a church with an active congregation), is a memorial to what Germans—and, in 
particular, members of the Confessing Church—endured during the Second World War; 
the little it has to say about the Holocaust focuses almost exclusively on baptised Jews who 
were members of the congregation.15 This is unsurprising when the church is considered 
within the larger context of Christian theological reactions to the Holocaust. 
                                                                                                                                               
15 In KWG (MH). 
Figure 34: Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche, Berlin. 
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It is difficult to argue that the years 1933-1945 (the total span of Nazi rule in Germany) 
have much to do with Christian theology, at least in the way that the shattered tower of the 
Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche would suggest. Looking from the outside of the 
tradition, it would appear that the events of the Holocaust, when they enter into the 
worldview of Christian theologians at all, have tended to be figured as confirmation of the 
Christian message of salvation. For example, there is Jürgen Moltmann‘s famous reading of 
Eli Wiesel, in The Crucified God.  Wiesel recounts an incident at Buna (one of Auschwitz‘s 
sub-camps) in which three men are hanged; two die quickly but one, a young boy, remains 
alive and struggling for some time.  
‗Where is God? Where is he?‘ someone asked behind me. As the youth still 
hung in torment in the noose after a long time, I heard the man call again, 
‗Where is God now?‘ And I heard a voice in myself answer: ‗Where is he? 
He is here. He is hanging there on the gallows.‘16 
To this, Moltmann adds the following commentary: 
Any other answer would be blasphemy. There cannot be any other 
Christian answer to the question of this torment. To speak here of a God 
who could not suffer would make God a demon. To speak here of an 
absolute God would make God an annihilating nothingness. To speak here 
of an indifferent God would condemn men to indifference.17 
Wiesel‘s work is complex; he declares his fury at God in one moment and prays to that 
same God for strength the next. Moltmann, however, is quick to turn Wiesel‘s struggle into 
a vehicle through which to proclaim the proper ‗Christian‘ response to suffering.18 Wiesel‘s 
image of the death of his faith (however ambivalent he may be about that death) becomes, 
for Moltmann, neither more nor less than a pure affirmation of what he terms the theologia 
crucis, in which God, through Christ, 
                                                                                                                                               
16 Elie Wiesel, Night, trans. Stella Rodway (Penguin, 1981) 77. 
17 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, 
trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993) 274. 
18 I say that Moltmann uses Wiesel as a vehicle for the Christian message because I assume, contrary to what 
the text itself seems to indicate, that Moltmann has not, in fact, forgotten that Wiesel himself is Jewish 
and presumably had no intention of articulating a Christian response of any kind. Wiesel does come to the 
image of God suffering alongside Israel—particularly in All Rivers Run to the Sea: Memoirs (Schocken 
Books, 1995); it is a concept with strong roots in the Rabbinic tradition. That Wiesel later adapted this 
vocabulary for his own in no way excuses Moltmann from his misreading of his much earlier work, Night, 
where the predominant attributes of God are absence, silence, and indifference. 
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humbles himself and takes upon himself the eternal death of the godless 
and godforsaken, so that all the godless and godforsaken can experience 
communion with him.19 
The death of Jews on the gallows at Auschwitz is, for Moltmann, merely an echo, or a 
subtype, of the death of a Jew on a cross at Calvary; the lesson of the latter applies to the 
former, as well.20 Moltmann‘s Jews function much like the soldiers of the First World War, 
pointing the way towards human participation in Christ‘s sacrifice, though without the 
theological danger that they might be mistaken for Christ himself.21 
Of the works that do attempt to address the Holocaust as though it makes a claim 
for the alteration of Christianity‘s religious imagination, many are cosmetic, not to mention 
circular, in nature, focused on the issue of Christian antisemitism as something which must 
be addressed because its consequences have proven to be undesirable, out of an impulse of 
charity towards other peoples, rather than because it is theologically flawed in its own 
right.22 Such critiques involve three distinctive themes, although any one work of ‗Christian 
response to the Holocaust‘ is likely to combine several of these. There is (1) a very simple 
critique of the language of Christian scripture and its use in preaching, in which Israel or 
                                                                                                                                               
19 Moltmann 276. Moltmann, like the Jewish theologian Melissa Raphael (whom I discuss later), points to 
the Shekinah as an instance of God‘s capacity to suffer alongside Israel. It should be noted now that I 
find Raphael‘s use of the Shekinah also uncomfortable and verging into problematic territory; however, 
her rendering, unlike Moltmann‘s, remains (mostly) grounded in the theology of image, and does not 
trespass into incarnation.  
20 Dorothee Soelle also reads the exact same passage from Wiesel, with similar results, although she goes on 
to note the potential danger of such an interpretation, to which Moltmann remains oblivious: 
To interpret this story within the framework of the Christian tradition, it is Christ who 
suffers and dies here. To be sure, one must ask the effect of such an interpretation, which 
connects Christ with those gassed in Auschwitz and those burned with napalm in 
Vietnam. Wherever one compares the incomparable—for instance, the Romans‘ judicial 
murder of a first-century religious leader and the fascist genocide in the twentieth 
century—there, in a sublime manner, the issue is robbed of clarity, indeed the modern 
horror is justified. 
 Dorothee Soelle, Suffering, trans. Everett Kalin (Fortress Press, 1975) 146. 
21 If I appear too hard on Moltmann, he finds a ready defender in Stephen R. Haynes, Prospects for Post-
Holocaust Theology (Scholars Press, 1991), esp. 114-122. Haynes wishes to give Moltmann credit for the 
depth of his engagement with Jewish sources—not just Wiesel, but also with elements of the rabbinic 
tradition—and search for a re-orientation of the relation between Judaism and Christianity, especially in 
light of the personal horror he experienced upon learning of the events of the Holocaust while interned as 
a German prisoner of war in Scotland. Haynes has persuaded me to acknowledge the probability of 
Moltmann‘s good intentions. However, this does not render what he has actually written in this passage 
any less problematic. See also A. Roy Echardt, ‗Jürgen Moltmann, the Jewish People, and the Holocaust‘, 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 44, no. 4 (1976). 
22 See, for example, Harry James Cargas, Shadows of Auschwitz: A Christian Response to the Holocaust (Crossroad 
Publishing Co., 1990); Alan T. Davies, Anti-Semitism and the Christian Mind: The Crisis of Conscience after 
Auschwitz (Herder and Herder, 1969); Darrell J. Fasching, Narrative Theology After Auschwitz: From Alienation 
to Ethics (Augsburg Fortress Press, 1992); Stephen R. Haynes, Reluctant Witness: Jews and the Christian 
Imagination (Westminster John Knox Press, 1995); Franklin Littell, The Crucifixion of the Jews: The Failure of 
Christians to Understand the Jewish Experience (Harper & Row, 1975); see also the essays collected in Darrell J. 
Fasching, ed., The Jewish People in Christian Preaching (Edwin Mellen Press, 1984); Carol Rittner and John K. 
Roth, eds., “Good News” After Auschwitz? Christian faith within a Post-Holocaust World (Mercer University 
Press, 2001). 
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‗the Jew‘ is figured as an agent of active opposition to the Christian message.23 This is often 
accompanied by (2) a broader critique of the doctrine of supersessionism, which 
transforms Judaism into an outmoded belief system and Jews into subjects for 
conversion.24 Finally, a number of writers engage in (3) an historical critique of 
Christianity's complicity in, or failure to protest against, the Holocaust.25 
I do not mean here to downplay the degree to which antisemitism has been 
entwined with Christianity for much of the latter's history, nor to suggest, contrary to my 
argument elsewhere, that what is said and done in liturgy is separable from doctrine, is 
vestigial to ‗real‘ theology. However, a critique of what German, or even European, 
churches did or failed to do in the 1930s and 1940s reveals flaws in those churches at that 
time; it does not necessarily undermine the Christian message as a whole.26 Moreover, a 
                                                                                                                                               
23 The work of  Davies, Haynes, and Fasching falls mainly into this and the following category, as does 
Gregory Baum‘s early work, The Jews and the Gospel: a re-examination of the New Testament (Bloomsbury, 
1961), as well as a number of official publications by church groups, such as Nostra Aetate, the Vatican II 
Declaration of the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions (1965), or the various statements collected in 
Allan Brockway et al., eds., The Theology of the Churches and the Jewish People: Statements by the World Council of 
Churches and Its Member Churches (WCC Publications, 1988). 
  Michael B. McGarry notes that, while Nostra Aetate ‗committed the Church to a posture of dialogue 
with no mention about missions to the Jews‘, in the other Vatican documents, ‗where reference is made to 
the Jewish people, Christ is presented as the fulfillment of Israel‘s hopes‘; in other words, the correction 
of what is presented in Nostra Aetate as a cosmetic flaw, a slight error of language, goes no further than 
that document itself—either the flaw is too slight to merit correction elsewhere (in which case why was 
Nostra Aetate necessary?), or else it is not really cosmetic at all, and changing the language of the other 
documents would have imperilled their message.  See Michael B. McGarry, ‗The Path to a Journey‘ in 
Faith Transformed: Christian Encounters with Jews and Judaism, eds. John C. Merkle and Walter J. Harrelson 
(Liturgical Press, 2003), 152. One might further note that the 2000 Declaration of the Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith, Dominus Iesus, while acknowledging the ongoing import of inter-religious 
dialogue proposed by Nostra Aetate, seeks to re-establish the supremacy of the revelation through Christ 
for all people, warning against pluralism and relativism within inter-religious dialogue—suggesting that the 
correction of language put forth in Nostra Aetate should be read as the barest cosmetic concession 
possible. For a brief gloss on the controversy surrounding Dominus Iesus, see the introduction to Rittner 
and Roth ix-x. 
24 See especially the discussion of Barth, Moltmann, and van Buren in Haynes, Prospects. 
25 The work of Cargas and the essays in Rittner and Roth are fairly representative of this position. See also 
Robert P. Ericksen and Susannah Heschel, eds., Betrayal: German Churches and the Holocaust (Fortress Press, 
1999), and especially the essay in that volume by Micha Brumlik, ‗Post-Holocaust Theology: German 
Theological Responses since 1945‘. There is also a large volume of work on the Catholic Church‘s, and 
particularly Pope Pius XII‘s, role in the Holocaust; this work in particular tends to be extremely 
contentious and ideologically driven, all too often providing a convenient platform for anti-Catholic 
rhetoric, and will not be reviewed here.  
26 This is not to dismiss the body of historical work that has revealed a global system of indifference which 
contributed to the severity of the Holocaust—for example, see Victoria Barnett, Bystanders: conscience and 
complicity during the Holocaust (Praeger, 1999); Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler‟s Willing Executioners: Ordinary 
Germans and the Holocaust (Vintage Books, 1997); Itamar Levin, His Majesty‟s Enemies: Great Britain‟s War 
Against Holocaust Victims and Survivors, trans. Natasha Dornberg and Judith Yalon-Fortus (Greenwood 
Press, 2001); Carol Ritter and John Roth‘s introduction to “Good News” After Auschwitz? Christian faith 
within a post-Holocaust World—however, that historical work seldom crosses over into theological critique 
except in the most roundabout fashion. The implication seems to be that Christianity now needs to atone 
for what Christians did then—and, insofar as atonement involves self-correction to ensure that such does 
not happen again, it is a noble impulse. However, one is also reminded of Hannah Arendt‘s critique of 
post-war German ‗guilt‘ in her essay ‗Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship‘:  
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critique of antisemitic language, regardless of the circumstances in which that language 
occurs, critiques the symptoms and ignores the underlying cause, the aspects of the belief 
system which requires such language to validate itself.27 This is the point made by 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, in her seminal 1974 work Faith and Fratricide: The Theological 
Roots of Anti-Semitism.28 
 
 
Ruether distinguishes between anti-Judaism, which she treats as a purely theological 
position, and anti-Semitism, which she treats as the (undesirable) social outgrowth of that 
theological position.29 She argues that anti-Judaism was a necessary position in 
Christianity's early self-definition, calling it ‗the left hand of Christology‘.30 It is this link 
between antisemitism and Christology, between an undesirable social outcome and a core 
theological principal, which distinguishes Ruether's work from the critiques I outlined 
above. Although Ruether's own critique is based in a critique of language, she 
acknowledges that language itself is only a symptom of a deeper issue in Christian theology, 
and that to eliminate antisemitism requires a re-thinking of the entire theological system, 
not simply a change in vocabulary: 
To reaffirm Jesus' hope in his name, then, is not to be able to claim that in 
Jesus this hope has already happened, albeit in invisible form. Nor does it 
mean that it is now only in his name that this hope can be proclaimed. It is 
simply to say that, for those who were caught up with him in that lively 
                                                                                                                                               
The result of this spontaneous admission of collective guilt was of course a very effective, though 
unintended, whitewashing of those who had done something: as we have already seen, where all are 
guilty, no one is [...] if young people in Germany, too young to have done anything at all, feel guilty, 
they are either wrong, confused, or they are playing intellectual games. There is no such thing as 
collective guilt or innocence; guilt and innocence make sense only if applied to individuals. 
(Arendt, ‗Personal Responsibility‘ 28-29.) 
27 My critique of this body of Christian post-Holocaust theology is similar to Judith Plaskow‘s critique of the 
male-dominated Jewish tradition in ‗God: Reimaging the Unimaginable‘, Standing Again at Sinai 121-69. 
28 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism (The Seabury Press, 
1974). The impact Ruether‘s work has had on later Biblical scholars is traced in George M. Smiga, Pain 
and Polemic: Anti-Judaism in the Gospels (Paulist Press, 1992). 
29 This is a common distinction to draw, between objecting to the Jewish faith as incapable of providing 
redemption, and objecting to Jews as people incapable of being redeemed; the former leads to the 
Inquisition, in which Jews are able to save their lives by conversion and assimilation, and the latter to 
Auschwitz, where Jews are permitted their Jewishness—and, indeed, many from assimilated families, 
whose parents or grandparents may have converted to Christianity, have it forced, or reinforced, upon 
them—but can do nothing to save their own bodies. What Ruether and others who make this distinction 
and treat anti-Judaism as the lesser of two evils (though still evil) fail to grasp is that both anti-Judaism 
and anti-Semitism attack Jews at the very core of their being, and aim to rob them of a vital component of 
selfhood. The distinction to be drawn, then, is not between what each does, that one is more damaging or 
less escapable than the other, but rather the way that each does it. 
30 This phrase is used by Gregory Baum in his introduction to the book; it is otherwise a frequently-bandied 
shorthand for Ruether‘s argument, although it does not, so far as my reading has uncovered, actually 
appear in Ruether‘s text itself. 
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expectation, it is now in his memory that they reaffirm his hope. They are 
sure that his death was not in vain. Ultimately, God will vindicate his hope, 
by revealing that victory over all the oppressive forces of evil for which he 
lived and died. It is now in his name that we (those who inherit the 
memories of this first community of Jesus' companions) reaffirm this hope, 
and it is in his name that this victory will be finally manifest for us [...] This 
is the theological content behind the proclamation of Jesus' resurrection 
[...] In this proleptic experiencing of the final future of mankind in advance, 
we reaffirm Jesus' hope in his name. He becomes the mediator of this hope 
to us and to our descendants. But this hope was not finally fulfilled either 
in his lifetime or in his death. The Resurrection reaffirms his hope, in the 
teeth of historical disappointment, that evil will be overcome and God's 
will be done on earth. The messianic meaning of Jesus' life, then, is 
paradigmatic and proleptic in nature, not final and fulfilled.31 
This is a rather radical position, and were I a Christian I suspect I would be deeply 
dissatisfied with Ruether's revised Christology.32 The transformation of Jesus from the son 
of God, the 'true God from true God' of the Nicene creed, who died to cleanse humanity 
from its oppression by the forces of evil, and into a man who died in the hope that God will 
someday cleanse humanity from its oppression by the forces of evil certainly makes him a 
far less ambivalent figure for Judaism (and for Jews) than he has been for the past two 
thousand years. In fact, it makes him almost indistinguishable from any other person who 
has ever died in the hope that God will someday cleanse humanity from its oppression by 
                                                                                                                                               
31 Ruether 149. 
32 Ruether‘s conclusions in Faith and Fratricide have certainly not gone uncriticised; for a summary of 
reactions to her work, see John G. Gager, The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes towards Judaism in Pagan and 
Christian Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 24-34; also Donald J. Dietrich, God and 
Humanity in Auschwitz: Christian-Jewish relations and sanctioned murder (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1995) 24-26; Thomas A. Idinopulos, Betrayal of spirit: Jew-hatred, the Holocaust, and Christianity 
(Aurora, CO: The Davies Group, 2007) 55-71; Miriam S. Taylor, Anti-Judaism and Early Christian Identity: A 
Critique of the Scholarly Consensus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994) 130-131. For a broader critique of Ruether (more 
focused on her feminist theology), see also Margaret Daphne Hampson, Theology and Feminism (Oxford 
and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990) 35, 158; Deborah F. Sawyer, ‗Gender‘ in The Blackwell Companion to 
the Bible and Culture, ed. John F. A. Sawyer (Maldon. MA, and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006) 464-479, 
472. Stephen Motyer, ‗Bridging the Gap: How Might the Fourth Gospel Help Us Cope with the Legacy 
of Christianity‘s Exclusive Claim over against Judaism?‘ in The Gospel of John and Christian Theology, ed. 
Richard Bauckham and Carl Mosser (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008) 143-
167, 148, is also highly relevant here, although his focus is not on Ruether but on Tina Pippin, who has 
drawn conclusions similar to Ruether‘s. 
  Discussion of Ruether‘s Christology typically focuses upon her innovations in feminist theology, 
which also centres on a Christological question, the now famous query ‗Can a male saviour save women?‘ 
See, for example, Kathryn Greene-McCreight, Feminist reconstructions of Christian doctrine: narrative analysis and 
appraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 78-80. For a connection between Ruether‘s work with 
Christian anti-Semitism and feminist Christology, see Lisa Isherwood, Introducing Feminist Christologies 
(London: Continuum, 2007) 33-37. 
  There are, however, a (relatively small) number of Christian theologians who have found Ruether‘s 
conclusions in Faith and Fratricide compelling—for example, Douglas John Hall, Professing the Faith: 
Christian Theology in a North American Context (Minneapolis; Fortress Press, 1993) 90. Wesley J. Wildman 
uses Ruether as an example of what he terms a ‗Modest Christology‘, a non-absolutist, non-universalising 
doctrine; in this, he sees similarities between her position and that of Ernst Troeltsch, James M. 
Gustafson, and Tom Driver. See Wildman, Fidelity with Plausibility: Modest Christologies in the Twentieth Century 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998) 270; see also Clark M. Williamson, A Guest in the House of Israel: post-
Holocaust church theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993) 167. 
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the forces of evil: a noble figure, but not quite worth founding a religion on. Ruether 
herself seems rather hard pressed to argue for faith in this drastically reduced Christ; she 
writes that his death and resurrection ‗is a paradigm for those for whom it has become a 
paradigm.‘33 While Ruether does begin from a charitable impulse, from the assumption that 
antisemitism has been shown to have undesirable results, and therefore doctrine which 
leads to antisemitism must be incorrect, the degree of the upheaval evident in her 
Christology is indicative of the depths to which she finds antisemitism entwined with the 
Christian tradition, contrary to the historically contextualized, Jewish Jesus that she reads 
between the lines of the gospels.  
 
 
The fracture in Ruether's Christology is deep, but she maintains an ultimately hopeful 
outlook. Jesus died in the hope of a final redemption; his memory conveys that hope to the 
community of believers who have allowed themselves to be caught up in his story. While it 
has not happened yet, God will heal the brokenness of the world. There is, however, 
another movement in Christian theology which sees in the Holocaust a proof against 
precisely this hope, undermining belief not in the divinity of Christ or the finality of the 
redemption offered by his sacrificial death, but in the ultimate goodness of God‘s own self. 
This strand of thought is typified by John Roth, who coined the term ‗Protest Theodicy‘ as 
the title of his essay in Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy.34 Roth argues that the event 
of the Holocaust necessitates a reconsideration of traditionally held assumptions about 
God's ability to ultimately redeem the world. Roth criticises God as ‗wasteful‘, and protests 
against attempts to justify this wastefulness as somehow necessary in the larger scheme of 
creation.35 In his view, to take seriously God's sovereignty and omnipotence leads 
necessarily to the conclusion that God has been, and continues to be, capable of 
preventing, and therefore responsible for, the enormous loss of human life that has 
characterised the past century of human history. In light of this, he ultimately concludes 
that while God may be good, God cannot reasonably be considered to be perfectly good.36 
As the critical responses to his essay indicate, this position is a sharp departure from the 
traditional Christian view. In fact, Roth, in his attempt to take seriously what he sees as the 
                                                                                                                                               
33 Ruether 250. 
34 Not to be confused with Protest Theology, coined by David Blumenthal, which will be discussed later on in 
this chapter. 
35 John K. Roth, ‗A Theodicy of Protest‘ in Stephen T. Davis, ed., Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, 
2nd ed. (Westminster John Knox, 2001) 1-20, 4. 
36 Roth 34. 
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radical evil manifest in the Holocaust, arrives at a theological position quite similar—and 
sympathetic—to the Jewish sources he draws upon. 
 The respondents to Roth‘s essay, a group of his colleagues from the Claremont 
Schools in California, represent ‗virtually all the available Christian options on the Theodicy 
problem‘ according to the book's editor, Stephen T. Davis. Thus, an examination of their 
critiques of Roth is helpful in illuminating exactly where Roth‘s theological response to the 
Holocaust stands vis à vis the Christian tradition. D. Z. Phillips, whose own contribution to 
the volume argues (in a vein similar to Roth's) that theodic language ought to be rejected, 
as it forces its proponents into untenable positions, makes the claim (correctly refuted by 
Roth as ‗weak‘—both in terms of the God it presents and the argumentative strength of 
the claim itself) that Roth fails to ‗consider the possibility that God's only sovereignty is the 
sovereignty of love.‘37 Phillips posits a divine withdrawal (a hypothesis that would be 
familiar to a Kabbalist, though neither he nor Roth makes this connection) to create space 
for humanity's freedom as the ultimate act of God's love—but in so doing fails to address 
the extent to which a truly sovereign God must still be held to account for the 
consequences of such a withdrawal.38  
John Hick, who later on characterises his own position as ‗An Irenaean Theodicy‘,39 
objects that 
If Roth were to give serious attention to the eschatological dimension of 
the religions, he would see options other than the unattractive idea of 
heavenly compensation for the ills of earth. The alternative is the ultimate 
fulfilment of human potential through a long and often painful process of 
moral and spiritual growth in a universe that is, in Bonhoeffer‘s phrase, ―etsi 
deus non daretur‖ (―as if there were no God‖).40 
Note that in critiquing Roth here, Hick also falls back on the hypothesis of a divine 
withdrawal. His larger point, however, consistent with his self-professed Irenaean position, 
is that the evils of this world are justified through the ‗moral and spiritual growth‘ that 
results from them (and that they are the result of), and that this justification can only be 
                                                                                                                                               
37 D. Z. Phillips, Critique of John K. Roth‘s ‗A Theodicy of Protest‘ in Davis, Encountering Evil, 23-25, 24. 
38 D. Z. Phillips, ‗Theism Without Theodicy‘, in Davis, Encountering Evil, 145-164. Roth‘s critique of Phillips 
charges that he ‗has not rejected theodicy but disguised it‘, noting that to define God—as Phillips does—
as simply excluding any negative capacity (‗divine withdrawal‘ is, according to Phillips, ‗an act of love‘) is 
‗to enforce silence that gives evil privileges it does not deserve.‘ See John Roth, ‗Critique‘ of D. Z. 
Phillips‘s ‗Theism without Theodicy‘ in Davis, Encountering Evil 170-174. 
39 John Hick, ‗An Irenaean Theodicy‘ in Davis, Encountering Evil 38-52. 
40 John Hick, ‗Critique‘ of John K. Roth‘s ‗A Theodicy of Protest‘ in Davis, Encountering Evil 30. I will 
quibble slightly with Hick‘s Latin, here; the more accurate translation would be ‗as if God were not a 
given‘, more commonly rendered as ‗even if there were not a God‘ (emphasis added), both of which are 
subtly different from ‗as if there were no God‘; the latter‘s weight falls on a presumption of atheism, 
where both of the former suggest a cautious, somewhat agnostic theism. 
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understood in eschatological terms. It is the issue of eschatology (or, rather, its absence) 
that Hicks finds most problematic about the position Roth expresses in his essay.41  
This objection is shared by Stephen T. Davis, who concludes that 
real solidarity with the victims and sufferers is telling them the truth. And 
the truth is that the Christian message of hope through the love of God as 
expressed pre-eminently in Christ is good news for all people, even those 
who suffered and died unjustly, maybe especially for them. Part of that truth 
is that ―the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with 
the glory about to be revealed to us‖ (Rom. 8:18).42  
Roth correctly characterises this notion as ‗obscene‘, stating that it ‗may get high marks as 
religious hyperbole, but it scarcely seems like solidarity with the victims.‘43 I myself am 
disinclined even to give it credit as religious hyperbole; it seems, instead, a complete—and 
completely irresponsible—retreat from the reality of suffering in this world. I find this 
assessment confirmed when the same unfortunate claim is repeated in Davis‘s own 
contribution to the volume, ‗Free Will and Evil‘, which otherwise embraces a roughly 
Augustinian position in order to place the fault of evil squarely on human shoulders (much 
in the way that Phillips does, though without the explicit assumption of a divine 
withdrawal).44 In his own essay, however, he uses as the example of suffering fading into 
insignificance not the Holocaust, but an episode from his own life when, in the ninth 
grade, he suffered severe embarrassment after his mother sent him to school wearing an 
unfashionable pair of trousers.45 ‗That episode‘, he writes, ‗is now more amusing than 
painful‘, and so, he suggests, will all earthly pain be, at the end of time, when ‗the vision of 
the face of God that we will then experience will make all previous suffering such that the 
pain will no longer matter.‘46 Such a blithely narcissistic equation of the suffering endured 
by the victims of the Holocaust with the embarrassment endured by a schoolboy wearing 
                                                                                                                                               
41 Roth contends in his rejoinder that his thought does include an eschatological dimension which (one 
presumes) was simply inadequately expressed in his original essay—though Roth insists that the essay 
addresses eschatological issues ‗by implication‘; he agrees with Hicks that an eschatological view is ‗crucial, 
because without it, history‘s slaughter-bench debris accumulates without redemption‘ (Roth, ‗Rejoinder‘ in 
Davis, Encountering Evil 30-37, 31). Roth, as I read him, admits the possibility of, and continues to hope 
for, an eschatological redemption; he simply discounts total certainty in such a redemption, or the 
expression thereof, as an ethically valid theological strategy at the present time. 
42 Stephen T. Davis, ‗Critique‘ of John K. Roth‘s ‗A Theodicy of Protest‘ in Davis, Encountering Evil 20-23, 
23. 
43 Roth, ‗Rejoinder‘, 33. 
44 Stephen T. Davis, ‗Free Will and Evil‘ in Davis, Encountering Evil 73-89, 85. 
45 Davis, ‗Free Will and Evil‘ 84-85. 
46 Davis, ‗Free Will and Evil‘ 85. A similar hypothesis is put forth by Miroslav Volf, in The End of Memory—
the major difference being that Volf, having personal experience of suffering beyond mere 
embarrassment, does not move so quickly to such an easy dismissal of pain. Rather, he acknowledges and 
wrestles with the difficulties posed to eschatological ‗forgetting‘ by issues such as the continuity of 
personal identity (recall my discussion of Locke from Chapter One). In the end, I do not find Volf 
convincing—though this is largely because I do not share his religious presuppositions. Neither, however, 
do I find him offensive (as I do Davis), nor easy to dismiss out of hand. 
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unfashionable trousers seriously undermines Davis‘s claim to take seriously, or to be taken 
seriously regarding the theological problems posed by evil and suffering. 
 The more reasonable objection to Roth‘s position posed by Davis is that the God 
Roth posits, lacking the characteristic of complete moral goodness, is not worthy of 
worship.47 This objection is also put forth by Hick (who writes that ‗if Roth really believes 
that the situation is as bad as he depicts it, then the God he still seems to believe in is the 
Devil!‘),48 and the final contributor to the volume, the process theologian David Ray 
Griffin. Griffin especially objects to Roth‘s assertion that ‗God must be a mixture of good 
and evil‘, stating that 
I see no basis for hope that a partly evil deity could be led to repent. The 
moral defect in God is presumably eternal, and many philosophers, from 
Aristotle to Hartshorne, have held that the eternal and the necessary are 
identical. In the first edition of this book, Roth replied to this point by 
saying: ―If God‘s power is bound only by his own unnecessitated will..., 
then God can change his ways.‖ However, the traditional doctrine that 
God‘s will is not necessitated by anything outside of God did not entail 
that God‘s basic character or will could change. [...] It seems a rather 
desperate hope that, assuming that God has had a mean streak for not only 
the past 15 billion years but from all eternity, our protests in the next 
century or so will bring about a change.49 
Griffin‘s own essay posits a relatively weak God, creating the universe from pre-existing 
chaos, and therefore never fully accountable for the result.50 Given the emphasis he places 
upon divine power as ‗shared power‘, on God‘s creation as always an act of compromise 
and co-creation, it is curious that he cannot imagine the possibility that God may choose to 
change, or that human protest may bring about such change.51 Indeed, Griffin‘s objection 
here seems less a general failure of imagination, and more a specific inability to reconcile 
the process deity that he envisions with the sovereign deity presumed by Roth. 
 The problem of worship brought up by Roth‘s critics presupposes that God is, by 
definition, that which must be worshipped—and, conversely, a being that they cannot 
bring themselves to worship cannot be God. By positing a God who lacks—or must be 
assumed to lack—the attribute of perfect goodness, Roth has departed from what his 
interlocutors recognise as theological speculation and into a position from which they find 
                                                                                                                                               
47 Davis, Critique of John K. Roth‘s ‗Theodicy of Protest‘ 22. 
48 Hicks, Critique of John K. Roth‘s ‗Theodicy of Protest‘ 29. 
49 David Ray Griffin, ‗Critique‘ of John K. Roth‘s ‗Theodicy of Protest‘ in Davis, Encountering Evil 25-28, 26. 
Griffin‘s assumption that the only point of protest against God is to ‗bring about a change‘ is problematic. 
As I shall argue later, there are other valid reasons for protest—not the least of which is to avoid 
complicity. It is this latter type of protest which I believe Roth intended. 
50 David Ray Griffin, ‗Creation out of Nothing, Creation out of Chaos, and the Problem of Evil‘ in Davis, 
Encountering Evil 108-125. 
51 Griffin, ‗Creation out of Nothing‘ 122. 
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his continued profession of faith barely tenable; he has, from their vantage point, ceased to 
believe in God.52 That Roth himself continues to find worship not only possible but 
necessary seems to fall outside the boundaries of what is possible within the Christian 
tradition; his theology has fractured past recognisability. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
52 Hick makes this criticism explicitly, though gently; the others hedge it off with protestations about their 
personal knowledge of Roth‘s character and religious commitment, leaving only implicit the suggestion 
that if they did not know him so well, their response to his stated position may not be so charitable. 
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Figure 35: Interior (New Sanctuary), Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche, Berlin. 
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Entering into the sanctuary of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche is like entering 
another world. Stepping from the sunny plaza through a pair of large, bronze doors, the 
visitor passes through a small, dark vestibule before emerging into a chamber of light. The 
noise of the streets outside vanishes completely. The blue glow that characterises the 
exterior of the building at night pales in comparison to the submarine hue that pulses from 
the tall interior walls. The space is dominated by blue—and by the large, gold, risen Christ 
suspended over the altar, designed by Karl Hemmeter, which ‗gives the church its optical 
focus and at the same time expresses who should be at the centre of every service.‘53 
 The visitor, too, is suspended, attention temporarily arrested upon entering the 
space; it takes a moment for the eyes to adjust to the new environment. It takes several 
moments of careful study to begin to discern the points of continuity between the interior 
and the exterior—the small, multicoloured ceramic floor tiles echoing the larger concrete 
circles of the plaza outside; and the joins in the stained glass echoing the cracks in the old 
tower.54 It takes much longer to notice, if one ever does, the space‘s optical illusions: the 
pattern of the interior glass does not match the exterior; the number of chambers in the 
concrete panels also differs between the outside and the inside—and the strength of the 
light emanating from the walls never varies, or betrays a hint of the weather outdoors. The 
sanctuary is actually constructed out of two sets of stained glass walls; the light pours 
through the glass from the space in between them (which also serves to dampen sound).55 
 The arrangement of furnishings within the church is absolutely typical of other 
Protestant churches in the area, with the altar and font at the front, directly across from the 
entrance, and rows of chairs facing all in the same direction.56 The strongest reminder of 
the church‘s history is a wall to the visitor‘s right as they enter the space, on which is 
displayed a bronze plaque with the inscription ‗Den Evangelischen Martyren Der Jare 
1933-1945‘ (‗The Protestant Martyrs of the years 1933-1945‘), alongside a crucifix and a 
quote from 1 John 5:4. A piece of paper clipped to the rail in front of the plaque explains 
to German-speaking visitors that the cross, from 13th century Spain, was a gift from Dr. 
Dibelius, the former Bishop of Berlin, on 20 July 1964—the 20th anniversary of the most 
                                                                                                                                               
53 KWG (MH). 
54 The stained glass was designed by Gabriel Loire. See Erwin Gerlach, Berlin: Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedachtnis-Kirche, 
trans. Katherine Vanovitch, Schnell Art Guide No. 2313, 5th ed. (Regensburg, Germany: Verlag Schnell & 
Steiner, 2007) 6. 
55 Gerlach 6. 
56 Mr. Wegener attested that, while the chairs are moveable, he cannot recall them having ever been shifted 
from the configuration in which they are set. Additionally, the font is, while not attached to the floor, so 
heavy as to render it practically immobile. 
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famous plot to assassinate Hitler. The paper further informs the visitor that this display is 
meant to echo similar ones at the KWG‘s Catholic sister-church, Maria Regina Martyrum, 
and at Plötzensee.57 Immediately to the right of the plaque is a charcoal drawing of a 
mother and child: the Madonna of Stalingrad, drawn by Lieutenant Kurt Reuber, a 
Protestant pastor and a physician in the German army, during the Battle of Stalingrad in 
1942, and presented to the KWG in 1983.58 Joseph Perry has noted that this image by itself 
carries strong resonances with the collective memory of the victimization of ordinary 
Germans—and especially German Christians—at the hands of the Nazi regime, and that 
its placement directly beside the ‗Martyr‘s Tablet‘ serves to reinforce these resonances.59  
Such resonances also carry over to the copy of the image on display in the 
Millennium Chapel at Coventry Cathedral, described in the Cathedral‘s online literature as 
‗a special place to pray for prisoners of conscience, those who have been imprisoned 
because of their faith or political views.‘60 This is not the only point of similarity between 
the two churches; Coventry Cathedral was also destroyed in a bombing raid during the 
Second World War, on the night of 14 November, 1940.61 When it was rebuilt, the ruins of 
the old cathedral also were incorporated into the site of the new construction, and the new 
construction at Coventry is also, in its own way, a showpiece of modernist architecture.62  
The ruins of Coventry Cathedral are still treated as active sacred space; scattered 
notices posted around the old sanctuary entreat visitors to respect it as a house of prayer. 
This is a sharp contrast to the KWG, the ruined tower of which has been converted into 
something akin to a museum—although the opening of the display asks visitors ‗to 
remember that the former vestibule of the old church is not a museum, but a place of 
remembrance, contemplation and exhortation‘ (emphasis added). It is difficult, however, to 
reconcile this request with the very museum-like display that clutters the place of 
contemplation—and a ‗place of remembrance, contemplation and exhortation‘ is still rather 
different from a place of worship. 
 In spite of the differences in the way each site is presented to the public, both 
spaces do still host liturgy—and, in fact, they host the same liturgy. Every Friday, at noon 
                                                                                                                                               
57 For a discussion of the Plötzensee memorial, see Koshar 183-7. 
58 See Joseph B. Perry, ‗The Madonna of Stalingrad: Mastering the (Christmas) Past and West German 
National Identity after World War II‘, Radical History Review 83 (2007). 
59 Perry 11. 
60 School Visits Team, Coventry Cathedral, ‗Coventry Cathedral Virtual Tour: Millennium Chapel‘,  
< http://coventrycathedraltour.org.uk/node.php?n=millennium_chapel#> (accessed 29 August 2009).  
61 James D. Herbert, ‗Bad Faith at Coventry: Spence‘s Cathedral and Britten‘s War Requiem‘, Critical Inquiry 
25, no. 3 (1999) 536. 
62 For details of the competition process leading to the design of the new Coventry Cathedral, and especially 
the impact of modernist architecture on such, see Louise Campbell, ‗Towards a New Cathedral: The 
Competition for Coventry Cathedral 1950-51‘, Architectural History 35 (1992). 
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(local time), a small crowd gathers to recite the Litany of the Cross of Nails. This practice 
originated at Coventry Cathedral, in the aftermath of the bombing. The Provost of the 
Cathedral had the words ‗Father Forgive‘ carved into the wall behind where the altar used 
to stand, and three of the nails that once held the beams of the collapsed roof were bound 
together to form a cross.63 These two motifs became the centrepieces of the Community of 
the Cross of Nails. After the war, the Cathedral sent crosses as gestures of reconciliation to 
churches at Kiel, Dresden, and Berlin (the last of which is still on display in the ruined 
tower of the KWG); since then, 156 Centres have been added to the community, each 
‗working for peace and reconciliation within their own communities and countries‘.64 Every 
Friday, at noon (local time), the Litany of Reconciliation is recited in the ruins65 of the 
KWG and of Coventry Cathedral:  
ALL HAVE SINNED AND FALLEN SHORT OF THE GLORY OF 
GOD 
The hatred which divides nation from nation, race from race, class from 
class 
FATHER FORGIVE 
The covetous desires of people and nations to possess what is not their 
own 
FATHER FORGIVE 
The greed which exploits the work of human hands and lays waste the 
earth 
FATHER FORGIVE 
Our envy of the welfare and happiness of others 
FATHER FORGIVE 
Our indifference to the plight of the imprisoned, the homeless, the refuge 
FATHER FORGIVE 
The lust which dishonours the bodies of men, women and children 
FATHER FORGIVE 
The pride that leads us to trust in ourselves and not in God 
FATHER FORGIVE 
BE KIND TO ONE ANOTHER, TENDERHEARTED, FORGIVING 
ONE ANOTHER, AS GOD IN CHRIST FORGAVE YOU.66 
This litany reflects the Community of the Cross of Nails‘s broad approach to 
reconciliation; while the impetus for the Community came from a very particular historical 
                                                                                                                                               
63 Community of the Cross of Nails, ‗An Overview‘, Coventry Cathedral, 
<http://www.crossofnails.org/about/> (accessed 31 August 2009). 
64 Community of the Cross of Nails, ‗Overview‘. Note that not all Cross of Nails Centres are churches; they 
may also be ‗reconciliation centres, prisons, NGOs, and schools‘. 
65 At Coventry Cathedral, the litany is recited at noon on every weekday, but Monday to Thursday it is in the 
new building. 
66  Community of the Cross of Nails, ‗Litany of Reconciliation‘, Coventry Cathedral, 
<http://www.crossofnails.org/litany/> (accessed 31 August 2009). I have preserved the capitalisation as 
published on the Cross of Nails website and in the orders of service distributed immediately prior to the 
litany; the lines in capital letters are typically recited by all present, while the others are read only by the 
presiding priest, minister, or layperson. 
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event, its focus is less on mending specific political rifts, and more on correcting systemic 
(or ‗original‘) sin—what Judaism refers to as tikkun olam, the mending of a fractured world. 
The combination of the litany and the surrounding ruins sends a powerful message: the 
world, like the worship space, is not yet whole.  
 But if this is the message of worship in the ruins, what is one to make of the spatial 
logic that, at both sites, compels the visitor to turn their back on the ruins in order to enter 
the space of everyday worship? The new sanctuaries at both Coventry and the KWG are 
constructed so that the old building is difficult (in the former case) or impossible (in the 
latter) to see from within the new, and during worship only the minister—and the large 
golden Christ that hangs in the KWG—looks towards it.67 Thus, during the most 
important moments of Christian liturgy, the only people who are fully present in the ruins, 
fully aware of the brokenness they signify, are those who stand outside the sanctuary. 
 
Figure 36: Coventry Cathedral. The ruins are to the right, the new sanctuary to the left. 
                                                                                                                                               
67  The cross at Coventry Cathedral does not incorporate any figurative element. 
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Figure 37: Ruined Sanctuary, Coventry Cathedral. 
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While it is true that, as the selections in the recent anthology of Jewish Holocaust 
Theology, Wrestling With God, make clear, the most Orthodox expressions of Jewish 
theology remained more or less unchanged and unchallenged by the events of the 
Holocaust, it is also true that these are the exception rather than the rule—especially in 
North America and Europe. Traditional doctrines which place the responsibility for 
suffering upon its victims (either as punishment for corporate sin—mi-penei hata‟einu—or as 
a test of faith, carrying Biblical resonances with the Book of Job, or the Akedah), or suggest 
that Jewish victimhood is cosmically necessary to correct the balance of the world (ideas of 
the scapegoat, or the ten righteous men) seem deeply unsatisfactory in light of the 
tremendous suffering visited largely upon observant, Orthodox, Eastern-European Jews.68 
Absent a convincing explanation for the events of the Holocaust, critical Jewish concepts 
such as chosenness and covenant became open to critique.  
One of the earliest and sharpest of such critiques came from Richard Rubenstein, 
in his 1966 book, After Auschwitz.69 Rubenstein, much like Roth (with whom he has 
collaborated on several volumes), is driven by his horror at the events of the Holocaust—
and the degree to which he perceives traditional Jewish theology to have contributed to 
those events—to formulate a theological position that is difficult to recognise as a 
normative expression of his religion.70 Rubenstein is often treated as the Jewish arm of the 
Christian ‗Death of God‘ theological movement and, while he has acknowledged the 
similarities between his own work and that movement, it is perhaps more accurate to 
characterise his central theological concern as the silence of God—or, even more accurately, 
the non-intervention of God into history.71 Rubenstein‘s theological project is predicated 
                                                                                                                                               
68 This is an extremely brief gloss of material that has been covered extensively elsewhere, especially in 
Steven T. Katz, Shlomo Biderman, and Gershon Greenberg, eds., Wrestling With God: Jewish Theological 
Responses during and after the Holocaust (Oxford University Press, 2007); Steven T. Katz, Post-Holocaust 
Dialogues: Critical Studies in Modern Jewish Thought (New York University Press, 1983); the essays collected in 
Steven T. Katz, ed., The Impact of the Holocaust on Jewish Theology (New York University Press, 2005); as well 
as the introductions to countless other books on ‗Post-Holocaust Theology‘. 
  The brevity with which I cover this material here is not meant as an indication of any lack of 
importance, but, rather, the amount of scholarship which already exists in this particular area. I have 
chosen to concentrate my own analysis on more recent Holocaust theologians, whose contributions have 
been less thoroughly digested. 
69 Richard Rubenstein, After Auschwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism (Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). 
70 Roth and Rubenstein have co-authored Approaches to Auschwitz: The Holocaust and its Legacy (Westminster 
John Knox, 2003), as well as The Politics of Latin American Liberation Theology: The Challenge to U.S. Public 
Policy (Washington Institute Press, 1988). For a summery of criticism levelled against Rubenstein‘s 
relationship to Judaism, see Zachary Braiterman, (God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust 
Jewish Thought (Princeton University Press, 1998) 87-9. 
71 Rubenstein employs the ‗Death of God‘ metaphor from the first chapter of After Auschwitz, in which he 
describes it as a goal ‗at the heart of the Nazi program‘ (Rubenstein 35). He discusses the connections 
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on a wholesale rejection of the idea of any ‗special status‘—a unique covenant with God—
being afforded to Jews; this stems largely from a conviction that the assumption of such a 
status led to, and helped to justify, the Holocaust.72 In place of the God of the covenant, 
doubly discredited through the complicity of the covenant in promoting persecution and 
through the failure of God to protect the Jewish people from that persecution, Rubenstein 
advocates a return to the After Auschwitz ‗God of Nature‘, a neo-paganism, although, as 
Zachary Braiterman has been at pains to point out, a neo-paganism tempered with a strong 
Jewish flavour, not least of which is its finding its centre in the modern-day land of Israel.73 
 Scandalous as Rubenstein‘s theology was, it is easy to read later Jewish Post-
Holocaust theologians as his respondents, attempting to rescue God and covenant from 
the void to which Rubenstein had consigned them, and surveys of post-Holocaust theology 
tend to support this approach, placing Rubenstein at the beginning and arranging others 
(always Emil Fackenheim, and some assortment of others including Eliezer Berkovits, 
Ignaz Maybaum, Irving Greenberg, and Arthur Cohen) afterwards.74 While this is generally 
correct, except for the case of Maybaum, whose book The Face of God after Auschwitz was 
published the year prior to Rubenstein‘s After Auschwitz, such a reading undermines the 
extent to which each thinker directly engages first and foremost with the Holocaust and 
Jewish tradition. Emil Fackenheim, for example, does cite Rubenstein in his 1970 work, 
God‟s Presence in History (and in a number of his later works), but only as a preliminary 
gesture towards what Fackenheim characterises as a spurious argument, before he arrives at 
the real business of God-wrestling which occupies him for the duration of that work.75 
 Fackenheim also offers a revision of the notion of covenant, through his famous 
proposal of the 614th commandment: 
                                                                                                                                               
between his work and the Christian movement in a later chapter in that same volume, ‗Death of God 
Theology and Judaism‘ (243-264). The major point of contrast, as Rubenstein himself points out, is that 
the Christian Death of God theologians take the metaphor as generally positive, while for Rubenstein it is 
a tragedy and a theological scandal.  
72 See especially ‗The Dean and the Chosen People‘ in Rubenstein, After Auschwitz 47-60. 
73 See especially ‗The Meaning of Torah in Contemporary Jewish Theology: An Existentialist Philosophy of 
Judaism‘ in Rubenstein, After Auschwitz 113-29; and Braiterman 94-100. 
74 See, again, Braiterman; Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues; Michael L. Morgan, Beyond Auschwitz: post-Holocaust 
Jewish thought in America (Oxford University Press 2001); Dan Cohn-Sherbok (ed.), Holocaust Theology: A 
Reader (University of Exeter Press, 2002). This arrangement is departed from in Katz, Biderman and 
Greenberg, which follows a strict chronological order, placing the more traditionally-minded Ignaz 
Maybaum‘s ‗suffering servant‘ theology prior to Rubenstein (along with contributions from Martin Buber, 
Abraham Joshua Heschel, Joseph Soloveitchik, and Zvi Koitz, all of whom are usually left out of post-
Holocaust surveys, although the first three of these are included in Braiterman‘s general discussion of 
modern Jewish theodicies). 
75 Emil Fackenheim, God‟s Presence in History: Jewish Affirmations and Philosophical Reflections (New York 
University Press, 1970) 30-31. Of course, Fackenheim‘s title itself constitutes an argument against 
Rubenstein‘s denial of God‘s presence in history, though there I am aware of no direct evidence that he 
intended it as such. 
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Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories. They are 
commanded to survive as Jews, lest the Jewish people perish. They are 
commanded to remember the victims of Auschwitz lest their memory 
perish. They are forbidden to despair of man [sic] and his world, and to 
escape into either cynicism or otherworldliness, lest they cooperate in 
delivering the world over to the forces of Auschwitz. Finally, they are 
forbidden to despair of the God of Israel, lest Judaism perish.76  
As Steven Katz has pointed out, the addition to the traditional 613 commandments 
contained in the revelation at Sinai constitutes a major upheaval of previous understandings 
of the covenant between God and Israel.77 The ‗614th commandment‘ was not spoken by 
God, was not transmitted in Torah, does not constitute revelation in the normative sense. 
Moreover, as Michael Wyschogrod has noted, that the source of this commandment is 
‗The Commanding Voice of Auschwitz‘ creates the problematic situation of divine 
commandment arising from and being transmitted through radical evil.78 To these critiques 
I would add a third, related point: the covenant at Sinai was a mutual covenant, which 
placed obligations on both Israel and God. It was also freely entered into by the Israelites 
who had travelled to that place willingly. Fackenheim‘s 614th commandment, by contrast, 
was given to a quite literally captive audience, unable to either accept or reject it (in the 
legalised language associated with sexual assault, 'incapable of consent'), and thus does not, 
cannot, have the same weight of obligation upon the people to whom it was given. It also 
neatly sidesteps any issue of God‘s responsibilities or obligations. 
Zachary Braiterman has argued that the ‗614th commandment‘ ‗was just a trope (in 
and of itself barely adequate) that stood for the far more critical motif of supernatural 
revelation‘; both Braiterman and Katz conclude that, contrary to Fackenheim‘s rhetoric, the 
‗Commanding Voice of Auschwitz‘ ‗does not constitute a divine imperative, but only a 
human response.‘79 However, even granting Braiterman‘s contention that the 614th 
commandment is a case of overblown rhetoric attached to Fackenheim‘s lifelong 
fascination with revelation, I still find Fackenheim‘s understanding of covenant and 
commandment problematic, insofar as that understanding (in general) may be reflected in 
what he has written about this particular case. Fackenheim does not dispense with the God 
of the covenant, with the God of history, but at moments he does risk transforming that 
God into precisely the sort of arbitrary tyrant that Rubenstein protested against. 
                                                                                                                                               
76 Emil L. Fackenheim, ‗These Twenty Years: A Reappraisal‘, Quest for Past and Future: Essays in Jewish Theology 
(Greenwood Press, 1968) 20; also quoted in God‟s Presence in History 84. Emil L. Fackenheim, To Mend the 
World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought, 2nd ed. (Indiana University Press, 1994) dates the original 
formulation of this commandment to 1967, with no reference made to Rubenstein at all (xix). 
77 Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues 218-219. 
78 Michael Wyschogrod, ‗Faith and the Holocaust‘, Judaism 20, no. 3 (1971); cited in Braiterman 135. 
79 Braiterman 135, 149; see also Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues 218. 
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This exceedingly brief overview of the earliest works of two of the earliest Jewish 
post-Holocaust theologians is meant to provide background and context to the discussion 
that follows, rather than as an exhaustive analysis of the full spectrum of Jewish responses 
to the Holocaust, or even of Rubenstein and Fackenheim. While both Rubenstein and 
Fackenheim have been quite influential, their contributions have been rather thoroughly 
assessed elsewhere, and recasting them under the terms of my current study is unlikely to 
produce any significant new insight.80 Instead, I turn to two more recent contributions to 
the field, by David Blumenthal and Melissa Raphael, which pick up on the themes and 
issues brought up by earlier work and attempt, each in their own way, to recast the 
narrative of the Holocaust in a manner that makes it possible to rescue Jewish faith from 
the challenges of history. 
 
 
Richard Rubenstein grounded After Auschwitz in psychoanalytic theory, using Freudian 
analysis to account for the depravities of the Nazi regime. David Blumenthal‘s work also 
borrows liberally from psychology, but rather than attempting to account for the 
Holocaust, his focus is on attempting to heal the trauma that it caused. Blumenthal is 
remarkably uninterested in defending God‘s actions, or lack thereof, but neither is he 
willing to abandon either God or the covenant.  Instead, he seeks to find some way to 
mend the relationship between God and Israel. To this end, he turns to testimony and 
strategies of child abuse survivors.81 In Blumenthal‘s theology, God is figured as a parent 
who has betrayed the fundamental trust of his children.82 The relationship of trust and 
dependence between parent and child intensifies the damage done by the betrayal. His 
conclusion is a synthesis between classical Jewish understanding of God‘s attributes and 
contemporary abuse counselling techniques:  
First, we must make it clear to ourselves […] that we have been the victims, 
victims of abuse […] that we are not guilty, that we will not accept the 
                                                                                                                                               
80 I direct the interested reader especially to Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues, and Braiterman, for further 
discussion of the work of the two earlier theologians. 
81 David R. Blumenthal, Facing the Abusing God: A Theology of Protest (Westminster John Knox, 1993) xvii. 
82 Blumenthal occasionally—especially when composing prayers—departs from gender-neutral language and 
employs the male pronoun out of considered and deliberate deference to his own male religious 
imagination (Blumenthal 284); contrary to my usual practice I maintain the gendering of Blumenthal‘s 
God—and, in the next section, the opposite gendering of Melissa Raphael‘s God—out of deference to 
the particularly human characteristics of that God. As shall be explained shortly, the theology of image—
the God/humanity mirroring relationship—is of fundamental importance to both of these theologies, and 
when it is God‘s attributes reflected in humanity which are being appealed to, a gendered imagination 
becomes not only reasonable (in a way that saddling the infinite with a finite characteristic usually is not) 
but very often necessary. 
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blame for what has happened […] it is the Perpetrator Who must answer, 
not we […] 
Second, in our hurt and in our good common sense, we will 
distance ourselves from the Perpetrator […] We will guard our distance—
theologically and spiritually, in worship and in study. 
Third, we will point the finger, we will identify the Abuser, we will 
tell this ugly truth. We will not keep silent, neither out of fear nor out of 
love […] We will cling tenaciously to our rage, and we will speak […] We 
will say, ―The fault is not ours. You are the Abuser. The fault was yours. 
You repent. You return to us.‖ 
Fourth, we will empower ourselves by acknowledging fully our 
survival, by building human relationships, by participating in worthy causes, 
and by working and accomplishing our daily and social tasks. 
Fifth, we will not deny our own spirituality […] we will affirm the 
reality of God‘s presence, God‘s power, and even God‘s love […] ours will 
be an acknowledgment of the Other Who is present to us in fear and in 
kinship, in terror and in presence.83 
Structurally, the centrepiece of this scheme is the insistence on speech: that is the bridge 
between maintaining an appropriately cautious distance and being able to affirm the 
positive attributes of God along with the negative ones. The first two steps in Blumenthal‘s 
spiritual self-help program are internal; the last three require engagement with the world, 
and that engagement begins with an act of speech, the vocalizing of the reality that is 
silently acknowledged in the first step.   
Blumenthal is unwilling to abandon God, so much so that his theology of protest 
becomes, at its heart, a mode of liturgical expression, a means by which to address God. 
Blumenthal is unwilling to abandon the covenant, so much so that his protests against 
God‘s abuse are grounded in the language of Jewish liturgy. The longest section of the 
book, ‗Text-ing‘, consists of four Psalms (128, 44, 109, and 27) laid out with commentary 
surrounding their verses, in the distinctive style of Jewish textual scholarship.84 The final 
thirty pages of the book contain psalms selected presumably for their thematic and 
emotional resonances, and retranslated to intensify those resonances—a protest hallel—
                                                                                                                                               
83 Blumenthal 266-267. 
84 Specifically, Blumenthal offers four streams of commentary: Words, Sparks, Affections, and Con-verses. 
Words ‗is a philological commentary intended to justify the translation‘; Sparks ‗contains brief comments 
on the psalms from the spiritual tradition of hasidism‘; Affections ‗is an attempt to point to and interpret 
the sustained emotional attitudes which the psalmist-tradition wishes us to cultivate‘; Con-verses brings 
the psalm into conversation with contemporary voices (Blumenthal 58-60). The practice of surrounding a 
core text with multiple commentaries seems to have its roots in the Talmud, but has evolved into a 
reasonably common method of textual interpretation—compare, for example, the series edited by 
Lawrence A. Hoffman, My People‟s Prayerbook: Traditional Prayers, Modern Commentaries, 10 vols. (Jewish 
Lights Publishing, 1997-2007). 
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and prayers from the traditional liturgy, slightly rewritten to call God to account for God‘s 
abuse, while at the same time acknowledging God‘s sovereignty.85  
Blumenthal‘s approach is sensitive and nuanced, but it is not beyond criticism. One 
reviewer has complained that his analogy between the Holocaust and child abuse is never 
fully unpacked, relying instead on a surface understanding of what abuse and recovery 
actually entails.86 A perusal of Blumenthal‘s bibliography reveals a far wider reading in the 
texts of the Jewish tradition than in psychology.87 Of the psychological sources he does 
utilize, he leans most heavily on the work of Alice Miller, the author of several popular 
books on child psychology, and Eliana Gil. Gil‘s book, Treatment of Adult Survivors of 
Childhood Abuse, is a fairly standard clinical manual, from which Blumenthal‘s five-step 
program appears to be derived.88 However, he engages with these sources primarily in 
‗Text-ing‘, placing their words alongside the Psalms under study; he does not appear to 
read them critically, nor does he explicitly carry forward insight from these readings into 
the next section, ‗Re-Sponse‘, which consists of dialogues with an adult survivor of child 
abuse (Diane) and a systematic theologian (Wendy), as well as an essay written by a rape 
survivor (Beth, one of Blumenthal‘s students).89 Indeed, he completely avoids responding 
to Diane‘s charge that he is ‗far too strongly influenced by Miller‘, who ‗does not 
understand the physically and sexually abused child who has grown to be an adult.‘90 His 
posture in this section is, instead, one of listening, letting the voices he invites into his 
world of dialogue speak for themselves.  
                                                                                                                                               
85 This is a useful descriptor, even though technically, the psalms do not actually constitute a Hallel in the 
liturgical sense—Hallel refers very specifically to Psalms 113-118, a sequence of six psalms of praise 
recited in succession, rather than the five psalms (38, 88, 94, 121, and 124) of confusion, unrelieved 
depression, righteous anger, comfort, and survival offered by Blumenthal. The very name ‗hallel‘ may be 
inappropriate, as it means ‗praise‘, and the emotional content of Blumenthal‘s psalms is far more complex 
than the unambiguous celebration that characterises the liturgical Hallel. However, insofar as ‗praise‘ can 
denote an act of worship and acknowledgement of God‘s sovereignty, this set of psalms still does 
constitute praise, however ambivalent that praise may be. As the psalms are presented with very little 
commentary (unlike the prayers, which contain detailed footnotes explaining when in the liturgy they are 
meant to occur, and what alterations have been made to them), it is unclear whether Blumenthal meant 
them to be recited individually or as a unit; however, there is a sensible progression from one to the other 
which would make such a recitation reasonable under certain circumstances. They reflect, in other words, 
the general spirit of the Hallel, even if they do not conform to the precise technical requirements. 
86 Jennifer L. Rike, Review of Facing the Abusing God: A Theology of Protest by David R. Blumenthal, Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion 65, no. 1 (1997) 206-209. 
87 ‗Translations‘, ‗Commentaries‘, and ‗Classic Jewish Texts‘ each are given their own bibliographic heading, 
while psychology texts are lumped together along with contemporary critical theory, student papers, 
Hebrew grammar, and a significant number of Blumenthal‘s own works under a catch-all heading labeled 
‗Studies‘. 
88 See Blumenthal 167-169, ‗Con-Verses‘. 
89 Blumenthal xx. 
90 Blumenthal 196. He similarly ignores another protest from Diane regarding his use of Gil; see Blumenthal 
207-209. 
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This listening stance is both difficult to argue against and, at the same time, deeply 
unsatisfactory. I take it to stem from Blumenthal‘s conviction that speech is central to both 
liturgy and to the healing process, and, therefore, from a desire to guard the sanctity and 
autonomy of each individual‘s act of self-narration. In this regard, Blumenthal‘s refusal to 
interject, to impose his own academic narrative on the personal testimonies he incorporates 
into his scheme is admirable. However, by incorporating the personal testimonies of others 
with minimal comment, Blumenthal enacts a more subtle appropriation, advancing his own 
argument via the experience of others, letting those other voices speak for him—and, in 
some cases, pre-empting the reader‘s own response. This is most deeply problematic with 
regard to the essay written by Beth, which is presented with only the barest of introduction. 
The dialogues with Diane and Wendy do include responses from Blumenthal himself—
though, as mentioned above, he avoids addressing specific criticisms, in favour of making 
more general statements about God and relationship.  
His conversation with Wendy involves a greater degree of academic rigour than the 
exchange with Diane, though again, Wendy does most of the talking.91 Her chapter ends 
with her delivering a critique similar to my own, that Blumenthal ‗just lay[s] [texts] side by 
side‘, that his ‗multivalency—perhaps esotericism—has become an excuse for not taking 
[his] work seriously.‘92 To this, Blumenthal responds that ‗[u]pon reflection, I do not think 
my taking this side-by-side position is lack of courage or intellect; I have proved myself in 
many situations in these matters.‘93 Exactly how, or in what situations, Blumenthal has 
                                                                                                                                               
91 This is not to say that the exchange with Diane lacked intellectual weight or interest, but Blumenthal 
seems more willing to engage and respond to the specific points Wendy raises. This contributes to a 
disturbing pattern of power and value hierarchies in this section. While both Diane and Wendy are known 
in their correspondence with Blumenthal only through their first names, and the introduction to ‗Re-
sponse‘ identifies them both as professors, the acknowledgements identify Wendy Farley by her full name, 
bringing her professional credentials into the world of the text; the presence of her book in the 
bibliography does just as much to assure the reader that she is being taken seriously by Blumenthal as a 
conversation partner as his own response to her critique does. Diane does not have a surname; this is an 
understandable method of protecting her privacy, but it also removes her academic credentials and 
credibility from view, and Blumenthal‘s failure to engage with or respond to her specific criticisms about 
his use of texts further diminishes those credentials, so that her identity is, in the end, reduced in 
complexity; she is simply a survivor of child abuse (and, one senses, her function is to speak on behalf of 
all survivors of child abuse, rather than as a full person in her own right). Finally, Beth, the rape survivor, 
is not named at all in the acknowledgements, nor does Blumenthal validate her voice through any sort of 
introduction or response; the only context the reader is given is that she is a student, that she was raped, 
and that she wrote about it. This follows the structure of the first part of the book, in which Blumenthal 
closed every chapter with a disruption, a counter-text; but it also opens some troubling questions about 
power dynamics. If Beth is one of Blumenthal‘s students, if this reflection was produced in the context of 
a class, what power dynamics were involved in obtaining her consent to publish it? Where is the line 
between making space for other voices to be heard and appropriating those voices—and is the position of 
that line altered when issues of authority are introduced? Would any of these issues provoke as much 
discomfort without the additional problem that it is a male author who uses women‘s voices in this way? 
Blumenthal does not even begin to ask these questions in the text itself. 
92 Blumenthal 224. 
93 Blumenthal 225. 
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proved himself is never elaborated upon; we are privy to Wendy‘s reflection on what 
Blumenthal has said, but must take Blumenthal‘s word for the existence of his own 
reflective process—we are only permitted to know the results of that reflection, not its 
content. Moreover, Wendy‘s voicing and Blumenthal‘s dismissal of this critique serves also 
to dismiss in advance any similar objections that might be raised by the reader. By 
incorporating criticism of his text into the text itself, Blumenthal insulates it from outside 
critique; in his attempt to maintain a position of openness to other voices, Blumenthal 
actually risks cutting off dialogue. 
While these difficulties ought not be overlooked, they negate neither the deep 
commitments with which Blumenthal writes, nor the contribution which Blumenthal 
makes to Jewish Post-Holocaust Theology. This contribution is twofold. First, he borrows 
from his Christian colleagues the concept of a systematic theology, which permits him to 
engage first with fundamental Jewish principles regarding the attributes of God.94 
Beginning from what my Protestant colleagues would characterise as the Doctrine of God, 
rather than from the reaction to historical events which served as the point of departure for 
previous post-Holocaust theologians, permits Blumenthal to place at the centre of his 
discourse the issue of relationship that has haunted the edges of much other work in this 
area. Discourse about God‘s presence in history is a thinly-masked discourse about the 
validity of the covenant between God and Israel: does history demonstrate that God has 
kept God‘s promises? The mutuality of the covenant, the fact that it makes demands on 
both Israel and God, points to the fact that what the covenant is actually doing is providing 
a formal structure for the dialogical relationship between God and Israel. Attempts to 
argue for the continued validity of the covenant, for the continued presence of God in 
history, over and against the apparent witness of the death camps, are attempts, however 
halting and abstract, to find some way to continue to remain in relationship with God.  
Second, Blumenthal realises that relationship cannot be worked out in the abstract, 
that ‗[t]heology is not real unless one can pray it.‘95 This is an extension of the therapeutic 
focus of Blumenthal‘s project, which places speech at the centre, but it is also, again, a 
direct statement of a notion that has haunted previous work. Roth‘s critics rejected his God 
as one they could not worship, rather than one in whom they could not believe; 
Blumenthal acknowledges the correctness of this position and, at the same time, recognises 
that one possible key to release theology (Jewish theology in particular, although I suspect 
this insight applies at least to Christianity as well) from the trap of the theodical dilemma is 
                                                                                                                                               
94 Blumenthal 5. 
95 Blumenthal 284. 
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to correct notions of what worship entails, rather than attempting to minimise the reality of 
suffering or God‘s apparent responsibility for it. 
 
 
Important as Blumenthal's insights are, he is by no means the last word in Jewish 
engagement with or response to the Holocaust. Melissa Raphael, writing some ten years 
later and with a vastly different set of methodological preoccupations, also has made a 
significant contribution to the pool of potential imaginative strategies from which Jewish 
theological memory can draw in its response to the Holocaust. In The Female Face of God in 
Auschwitz, Raphael begins from her commitment as a feminist to let the voices of women 
be heard at the centre of Jewish experience, rather than on its margins.96 In applying this 
commitment to the Holocaust, she not only improves historical scholarship and extends 
the reach of feminist Jewish scholarship, she also offers a unique understanding of the way 
that the relationship between God and Israel is worked out in history. 
 Raphael, like Blumenthal, places the theology of Image at the centre of her 
investigation. This is a distinctively Jewish doctrine, originating in the text of Parshat 
Beresheit: And God 
filled humankind with God‘s own Image; God created them male and female, filling both 
with the Image of God.‘97 The notion that humanity bears the Image of God means that 
                                                                                                                                               
96 Melissa Raphael, The Female Face of God in Auschwitz: A Jewish Feminist Theology of the Holocaust (Routledge, 
2003). 
97 Parsha Bereshit (Genesis 1:27). My translation here departs from the literal and grammatical Hebrew in 
favour of sensible and accurate expression in English, which does not have inbuilt grammatical gender as 
Hebrew does— in this passage is taken to refer to humanity, both male and female, rather than to 
specifically to ‗the man‘ (Rashi‘s rather fanciful explanation of this passage—seemingly derived from 
Plato‘s Symposium—aside); I avoid the use of gendered pronouns to refer to God. Avoiding pronouns 
necessitates some rearrangement in the order—most obviously, the second and third clauses are switched 
around, as the order they appear in Hebrew (‗filled with the image of God, male and female, God created 
them‘) may give the erroneous impression that God is filled with God‘s own image (thanks to Max 
Goldman for pointing this out). Finally, I have rendered the first two instances of the root (as it 
appears in the Hebrew) as ‗filled‘, which implies the Lurianic image of God‘s emanation flooding into the 
void at the moment of creation—an image which resonates with much of the current discussion, as 
Raphael‘s theology is also marked by Jewish mysticism (see, especially, Dan Cohn-Sherbok and Lavinia 
Cohn-Sherbok, Jewish and Christian Mysticism: An Introduction (Gracewing, 1995) 50-52). The third instance 
of the root is translated as the more standard ‗created‘; a more skilful translator would be able to carry 
the image of filling through the entire passage without causing confusion or disrupting the flow of the 
passage. 
   The word in this passage is also worth comment, especially as this is its first reappearance in this 
thesis after over one hundred pages of absence; here, it functions as a pair with , and so the sensible 
translation is ‗male‘,  but  its  placement  in  the  Hebrew  text  causes  it  to  do  double  duty; 
  could also translate (loosely) with the sense of an afterimage: ‗filled with the 
memory of God‘s image‘ (literally, ‗in the image of God filled memory‘—although this renders 
difficult to understand; it could, of course, be translated as orifice/opening/hole, to the effect that both 
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humanity becomes a source of theological understanding: the attributes of God are 
reflected in humanity; a statement that can be made about humanity also applies to God. 
Blumenthal began by dividing God‘s Image into the two essential attributes of ‗holiness‘ 
and ‗personality‘; while his study focuses more on the latter, and tends to reach for an 
understanding of God couched in human terms, it is quite significant that he also admits 
that holiness is part of the theology of Image—humans partake of, and are able to 
understand themselves through, Godliness.98 This move also has scriptural roots, of 
course—for example, the commandments in Leviticus that Israel is to be holy as God is 
holy.99 But the theology of Image in Blumenthal‘s (and Raphael‘s) formulation is not simply 
a Jewish gloss on Platonism; humanity is not a pale copy of God. Rather, ‗[h]umanity, in its 
individual and collective existence, is created in God‘s image and hence struggles, together 
with God, to live the depth of that image.‘100 The theology of Image reveals God and 
humanity locked in mutual regard, each learning how to be themselves through encounter 
with the other.101  
 For Raphael, the theology of Image is expressed most fully in the face to face 
encounter between human beings—particularly Jews, and more particularly Jewish 
women.102 The core of her study is a lengthy examination of the way that such face-to-face 
encounters functioned to conceal and reveal the presence of God in the concentration 
camps: the dehumanizing filth of the camps effecting hester panim, the hiding of God‘s face, 
and small acts of defiance—cleanliness, recognition of humanity—serving to reveal the 
face of God in the face of the camp inmates. In this way, Raphael not only suggests that 
God was present to victims of the Holocaust, she also suggests that God suffered with the 
victims, rather than being implicated as a cause of their suffering. 
 The problematic nature of Raphael‘s theology should, by this point, be clear: she 
neglects God‘s sovereignty in favour of God‘s immanence. Her abused, rather than 
abusing, God comes close to acting as an echo of Moltmann‘s theologia crucis, albeit recast in 
                                                                                                                                               
memory and opening (of vessels, possibly referring to the clay used for creation in Genesis 2) are filled 
with God‘s image, though that concept is exceedingly difficult to render in English). 
98 Blumenthal 6-8. 
99  E.g., Leviticus 19:2 and 11:44. 
100 Blumenthal 8. 
101 This reading of the Theology of Image owes a great deal to Jack Miles, God: A Biography (Vintage Books, 
1996). 
102 In her emphasis upon the face, Raphael is, of course, drawing on the thought of Martin Buber and 
Emanuel Levinas. She discusses these influences explicitly in pp. 100-106. 
  It should also be noted that Raphael differentiates between covenantal theology and theology of 
Image, arguing that ‗[c]ovenental relationship is [...] a witness to the theology of image that posits a 
relation of recursive presence between God and persons‘ (Raphael 88). One could, then, argue that 
Raphael‘s work, in focusing on theology of Image, does little to rescue the idea of covenant. However, in 
her later chapters especially, Raphael invokes the figure of the Shekhinah following Israel, in particular, 
into exile; the particular bond implied by this image is a form of covenantal theology. 
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a Jewish, feminist key.103 God is to be pitied, rather than brought to account; however great 
the sufferings of the human victims of the Holocaust, God‘s suffering must be infinitely 
greater, as God partook in the suffering of each victim. However, such a critique neglects 
the Kabbalistic roots of Raphael‘s thought, the acknowledgement of fracture at the heart of 
creation. The Shekhinah she posits is God in exile from God‘s own self; a fragmentary part 
of God, but not the entirety of Divine Being.104 Thus, Raphael‘s work is best read as a 
corrective to previous post-Holocaust theologies, all of which focus on the classically 
omnipotent God of the covenant, rather than the weakly immanent Shekhinah. What 
Raphael says of the latter does not necessarily invalidate what other theologians have said 
of the former. It is possible—and, perhaps, necessary—to both acknowledge God‘s 
suffering presence within the Holocaust and to seek redress from God for permitting the 
Holocaust to happen.  
 
  
Raphael‘s intervention into post-Holocaust theology is essential, but incomplete. She 
provides a much-needed framework for understanding God‘s action—or part of God‘s 
action—in the Holocaust (and, in theory, all other instances of radical suffering throughout 
history), and therefore a foundation upon which continued relationship between God and 
Israel may be built; she does not provide a terribly detailed vision of how that relationship 
ought to be enacted, liturgically. She does not immediately appear to answer Blumenthal‘s 
dictum that ‗[t]heology is not real unless one can pray it‘; moreover, she seems to break 
with the previous tradition of feminist Jewish theological intervention, which has tended to 
both begin from and end with practical concerns about the inclusion of women in Jewish 
life, Jewish law, and, especially, Jewish liturgy.105  
 However, a closer reading of Raphael's text reveals a strong suggestion of precisely 
such practical concerns, although their application to the present day is left as an exercise 
for the reader. The significance of Raphael‘s argument that, in Auschwitz, God was 
revealed in and through the face-to-face encounter between Jewish women, through the 
recognition and recovery of mutual humanity, extends far beyond Auschwitz. The process 
of tikkun, the reconciliation of ‗the exiled God to God‘, begun in the camps must, if it is to 
                                                                                                                                               
103  See above, note 20. 
104  See Raphael 133. 
105  Blumenthal 284. For examples of earlier works of Jewish Feminist Theology, see Rachel Adler, 
Engendering Judaism: An Inclusive Theology and Ethics (Beacon Press, 1998); Judith Plaskow, Standing Again at 
Sinai; see also the essays collected in Susannah Heschel, ed., On Being a Jewish Feminist, rev. ed. (Schocken 
Books, 1995). 
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be a meaningful reconciliation, continue into the present day.106 Raphael‘s enumeration of 
the acts which help to accomplish that reconciliation broadens and challenges existing 
concepts of liturgy: needlework, washing, touch, feeding, dressing, collecting, carrying; the 
bending of one body towards another.107 In saying that these acts did constitute tikkun, 
encounter, prayer, Raphael is also saying that they still do constitute such in the present, 
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future; the sacred and quotidian meet and 
merge, finding one another in the same sort of mutual regard that characterises the 
human/Divine relationship described by the theology of Image.  
This is still not a fully satisfactory response; a theology drawn from the 
particularities of predominantly Eastern European Orthodox women is not a universal cure 
for Holocaust-induced religious anxiety—there is no universal cure, and attempts to invent 
one risk falling into the same trap as First World War memorialisation, in which individual 
lives are collapsed together into the collective Glorious Dead.108 This collapsing is a 
diminishment of both humanity and God‘s Image in humanity. It is also inescapable; the 
enormity of loss in the Holocaust (or the First World War, or, for that matter, any other 
war, genocide, or natural disaster) is too great to approach in its entirety without losing 
sight of individual lives and experiences. Theology is conducted in the tense space in 
between individual and universal concerns, and thus is, at its best and most honest, always 
inadequate, never stable or complete.109 This is where an element of protest or reproach, 
such as Roth and Blumenthal endorse, becomes a necessary corrective—not as a 
repudiation of God, but as an acknowledgement of incompleteness, a refusal to subscribe 
to a tidy—and misleading—universal narrative.  
But just as Raphael‘s theology supplements and corrects, rather than substitutes for, 
the patriarchal tradition of Judaism, so do the liturgical acts she describes supplement, 
rather than supplant, the previous liturgical innovations carried out by other Jewish 
feminists. To point, as Raphael does, to the liturgical significance of the routines and rituals 
of  a Jewish home, traditionally the domain of women, is not to suggest that a Jewish 
                                                                                                                                               
106  Raphael 133. 
107  E.g., Raphael 154. 
108  Raphael notes this limitation in her study, but maintains that ‗[r]eligious feminists who wish to affirm 
female difference rather than eracing it in the name of equality with the male norm (the historic tendency 
of Reform Judaism) must take seriously the Orthodox contention that women have […] the priestly 
power to mediate the presence of God‘ (Raphael 77).  While Raphael is correct that such a contention, 
when it is taken seriously and not merely deployed in order to keep women in the kitchen and out of the 
synagogue, is an important step forward for Jewish feminism, it is at the same time deeply dependent on 
binary gender identification, leaving little room for intersex or transgendered spirituality to arise.  
109  This is well expressed in the opening meditation of Blumenthal‘s book, on the practice of theology, in 
which he declares: ‗To be a theologian is to be on the boundary‘,  mediating between tradition (and its 
necessary multivocity), God (and God‘s unknowability), and humanity (without appropriating the voice of 
the other) (Blumenthal 3-4). 
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woman‘s space of worship should be limited to the home—or, in fact, that a man is only 
capable of encountering God within the walls of a synagogue. God, with and through 
encounter with humanity, must be praised, reproached, and helped to mend; I suspect that 
we will learn that the spaces and languages which permit this are far more numerous than 
have yet been imagined.  
In my conclusion, I will return to Canadian literature as a source text for theological 
reflection, reading two very recent novels by Jewish authors, Anne Michaels and Edeet 
Ravel. These books bring issues of Holocaust memory and Canadian national identity into 
direct conversation with each other, and offer constructive interruptions into both 
discourses. Instead of the textbook Orthodox women that anchor Raphael‘s theology, 
Michaels and Ravel give us bad Jews: assimilated Jews, atheist Jews, intermarried Jews, 
unmarried Jews, gay Jews, Jews who don‘t know how to pray, Jews who know how to pray 
but don‘t, Jews who eat pepperoni pizza, Jews for whom Jewishness exists more as an 
interruption to their ability to be uncomplicatedly Canadian than as an identity in its own 
right. And instead of the entwinement of national and familial loyalties, bundled neatly 
together and always on a steady path towards ‗happily ever after‘ found in Anne Shirley, 
Rilla Blythe, or Klara Becker, Michaels and Ravel depict isolation, dysfunction, dislocation, 
children whose families are dead and familes whose children wish they were dead, 
characters who move through the world as confused about their point of origin as they are 
about their destination. It is these stories, and others like them, that best showcase the 
diversity, the complexity and the messiness of the world with which theology now 
contends.
  
 
  
 
 
Conclusion 
I watch Michaela bake a pie. She smiles and tells me that her mother used to roll 
the pastry this way. Unknowingly, her hands carry my memories. I remember my 
mother teaching Bella in the kitchen. Michaela says: ―My mother used to cut the 
dough this way, which she learned from her aunt, you know, the one who married 
the man who had a brother in New York...‖ On and on, casually, offhand, 
Michaela's mother's stories of relatives from the next town, from across the ocean, 
unroll like the crust. The bold dress cousin Pashka wore to her niece's wedding. 
The cousin who met and married a girl in America but she came from his own 
home town, can you believe it, he had to travel halfway around the world just to 
meet the neighbour's daughter... I remember my mother urging Bella not to reveal 
the secret ingredients of her honey cake—the envy of Mrs. Alperstein—not ever, 
except to her own daughter, God willing. A few tablespoons of porridge so it will 
be smooth and moist as cream, and honey from acacias so the cake will come out 
golden... 
-Anne Michaels, Fugitive Pieces (Bloomsbury, 1998) 192-193.
  
 
he great difficulty posed by Melissa Raphael‘s suggestion of quotidian 
liturgies as a way forward for post-Holocaust theology is the lack of a distinct 
set of texts from which to construct an argument. If anything can be liturgical, 
then the category loses its meaning.1 If all human actions (or, more properly, interactions) 
accomplished tikkun, then the world ought to have been mended long ago, and 
Blumenthal‘s demand for the inclusion of reproach in the range of potential modes of 
prayer would be unnecessary.  
Most studies of Jewish liturgy or religious ritual rely upon textual self-
identification—a text is liturgy if and because it is (or has been) labelled as such, or because 
it bears significant similarity to other texts which have been positively identified as liturgy.2 
Lawrence Hoffman has critiqued the tendency of liturgical studies to approach text and 
only text—to forget that liturgies exist in the context of specific, historically and socially 
situated communities, and are enacted, rather than simply read.3 However, even in his quest 
for a broader study of liturgy, Hoffman relies almost exclusively on textual evidence—and 
not merely textual evidence, but usually textual evidence with a publication history, 
omitting diaries, letters, and the like. Vanessa Ochs's recent work on newly emerging 
Jewish ritual practices has relied on a far broader assortment of texts—e-mails, postings to 
internet message boards, booklets distributed at religious services to help participants 
follow along, conversations, and personal experiences.4 However, even with the inclusion 
of the last two resources, Ochs still derives the vast majority of her information from text 
of one sort or another, and by the time the rituals she chronicles are transmitted to her 
readers, they have been transformed entirely into arrangements of words on a page. Liturgy 
may be, as Hoffman puts it, Beyond the Text, but it also is text. 
 I would suggest, however, that to think of liturgy as text is to mistake the evidence 
of a phenomenon for the phenomenon itself. Liturgy is not the text on the page so much 
as it is the actions described by the text; a text is categorised as liturgy because of the type 
of action it describes. Beginning from this understanding, it is possible to formulate a 
functional, descriptive definition of liturgy, which places the liturgical value on what an 
                                                                                                                                               
1  This is the same logic which Arendt applied to guilt in post-war Germany: ‗where all are guilty, none is.‘ 
Arendt, ‗Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship‘ 28. 
2  For example, Arthur Green, These are the Words: A Vocabulary of Jewish Spiritual Life (Jewish Lights 
Publishing, 1999) has only two entries in the index under ‗liturgy‘; one points to the entry on the Amidah 
(75-76), and the other on Tefillah (110-111); while the latter does argue for the importance of unscripted 
personal prayer in Judaism, it does so by way of appeal to scriptural authority (Moses and the Psalms), 
suggesting that personal prayer derives its validity from its resemblance to these textual antecedents.  
3 See Hoffman, Beyond the Text esp. 1-19. 
4 Vanessa L. Ochs, Inventing Jewish Ritual (Jewish Publication Society, 2007). 
T 
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action accomplishes, rather than on the textual heritage from which it draws. This is a 
move already implicitly made by Raphael, but it bears drawing out in greater detail. A close 
reading of the texts of Jewish liturgy reveals two dominant concerns: 5  
 1) The transmission of the collective memory of the community, and 
 2) The creation of a space of encounter with the divine. 
These concerns are interconnected; the Image of God is encountered within the 
community, and transmitted as part of the memory of the community. Certain liturgies 
very clearly consist of one more than the other—Passover, for example, tilts heavily in 
favour of communal memory, while the synagogue liturgies of the High Holy Days are 
primarily concerned with encounter—but both elements are present in each. What I 
characterise as ‗liturgical moments‘ are not textual replacements for formal liturgy, but, 
rather, moments and interactions in which the functional concerns of formal liturgy are 
attended to. 
Most of the quotidian routines which Raphael suggests might be transmuted into 
functionally liturgical moments exist as lived experience, rather than as text. Lived 
experience is difficult to translate into academic enquiry. Live-subject interviews are a 
viable method of uncovering the liturgical aspects of day-to-day routines—however, it is a 
cumbersome method, and the leap between the descriptions of quotidian liturgical 
experiences such a study would yield and the construction of a viable liturgical theology 
would open up the same ethical issues of appropriation that plagued Blumenthal's work, 
and which Raphael's use of memoirs sought to avoid.6 One might approach such moments 
as Raphael does, through journals, life-writing, and other forms of intimate documentary 
evidence. This approach has its merits, and may even be a bit seductive: it connects the 
                                                                                                                                               
5  This is a highly condensed gloss of an argument that could—and perhaps should—be drawn out into a 
book by itself. Aside from examinations of the liturgies themselves (a complete listing of which is 
available in my bibliography), it owes much to Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions (Oxford 
University Press, 1997), the earlier work of Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. J. 
W. Swain (New York: Free Press, 1965 [1915]), Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (Basic Books, 
1973), and Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Cornell University Press, 1969); 
Hammer, Entering the High Holy Days; Jonathan Sacks‘s essay, ‗Understanding Jewish Prayer‘ in The Koren 
Siddur: With introduction, translation, and commentary by Rabbi Sir Jonathan Sacks (Koren Publishers, 2009) xvii-
xlix; Anson Laytner, Arguing With God: A Jewish Tradition (Lanham, MI: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990); 
several of the essays in Louis Jacobs, Judaism and Theology: ‗Holy Places‘ (51-65), ‗The Jewish Tradition‘ 
(65-82), and ‗The Body in Jewish Worship: Three Rituals Examined‘ (83-101);  the essays collected in 
Michael A. Signer, ed., Memory and History in Christianity and Judaism (University of Notre Dame Press, 
2001); Paul F. Bradshaw and Lawrence A. Hoffman, eds., The Making of Jewish and Christian Worship 
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); Lawrence A. Hoffman, ‗The History, Structure, and Theology of 
Jewish Synagogue and Home Liturgy: An Overview‘ and ‗Liturgical Basis for Social Policy: A Jewish 
View‘ in Daniel F. Polish and Eugene J. Fisher, eds., Liturgical Foundations of Social Policy in the Catholic and 
Jewish Traditions (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); A. Z. Idelsohn, Jewish Liturgy and its Development, 
(Henry Holt and Company, 1932). 
6 This would be a very interesting comparative study nonetheless, conducted across different strands of 
Jewish observance, should funding and ethical approval become available. 
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scholar to the interior life of the author; it appears to have all the advantages of lived 
experience, and the stability of text. Moreover, publication places such text firmly in the 
public sphere, lessening concerns over appropriation of another's voice, and removing the 
ethical concerns connected to live subject interviews.7 However, the appearance of 
authority and stability belies the fact that most published life-writing is at the very least 
edited (whether by the author herself, or posthumously) and may, like L. M. Montgomery's 
journals, be every bit as much a literary production as an attempt at recording lived 
experience.8   
It is possible that some hints at quotidian liturgical routines might be uncovered in 
domestic manuals and cookbooks of ages past—the preparation of challah, for example, 
requires a bracha over the removal of a small piece of dough to be burnt, in 
commemoration of the dough that would have once been donated to the Temple to make 
up a loaf for the priests to eat. This bracha is written into several versions of the recipe 
currently in my possession; one presumes that to the person who originally copied down 
the recipe, the bracha was as necessary to the preparation of challah as the addition of yeast.9 
But the bracha for hafrashas challah, the division of the dough, is a specific birchah hamitzvah, a 
blessing recited to mark the fulfilment of a positive commandment; there are no similar 
brachot to accompany, for example, the face-to-face encounter that accompanies the 
handing over of challah from one person to another.10 While a study of material of this type 
would almost certainly yield interesting insights into domestic ritual and the liturgical life of 
women from the past, it is unlikely to reveal much about the interactions between human 
beings which are the basis of Raphael's expansion of the liturgical.  
                                                                                                                                               
7 Raphael mentioned these particular advantages at a session of the Religions, Holocaust and Genocide 
panel of the American Academy of Religion, 7 November 2009. 
8 Also especially relevant here is the case of The Diary of Anne Frank and its numerous posthumous 
revisions—for a recounting of the issues pertaining to The Diary as an historical document, see Max Page, 
‗The Life and Death of a Document: Lessons from the Strange Career of The Diary of Anne Frank‖, The 
Public Historian 21, no. 1 (1999).  
  This problem also extends to live subject interviews, of course; see, for example, Paul Chodoff, ‗The 
Holocaust and its Effects on Survivors: An Overview‘, Political Psychology 18, no. 1 (1997), in which the 
author claims that ‗In this account […] the reader will experience something of the physical and 
psychological stresses that confronted the inmate‘ (148; emphasis added). The suggestion that a reader 
could experience the physical stress of the camps simply by reading an oral history interview is at best 
trivializing the original experience—but it is also a rather naked revelation of the assumptions which I 
suspect underlie a great deal of work which relies upon text as a mediator of experience (including my 
own). Imaginative engagement in the world of a text is an experience, but one should remain mindful that 
it is an experience of imaginative engagement in the world of the text, not a direct experience of what the 
text describes. For a lengthy discussion of the interpretation of Holocaust memoir, diaries, testimony, and 
fiction, see Barbara Foley, ‗Fact, Fiction, Fascism: Testimony and Mimesis in Holocaust Narratives‘, 
Comparative Literature 34, no. 4 (1982). 
9 These recipes have come from various sources; most have been passed on to me by friends, and very few 
of them contain any attribution. 
10 The hamotzi, the bread blessing, is a bracha that accompanies the eating of bread, and can be recited in 
solitude just as readily as in company. 
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 A further potential source for a quotidian liturgical theology, the one which I 
believe to be most fruitful, is works of fiction: imaginative constructions of what might be. 
Fictive texts are stable points of reference, free from the ethical issues attached to 
appropriating another person‘s actual experience, but also less likely to be mistaken for a 
direct transmission of lived experience—that is to say, by the fact of their being fictive, 
such texts advertise the literary qualities which memoirs tend to obscure. In this 
conclusion, I will examine two such literary texts, Anne Michaels‘s Fugitive Pieces and Edeet 
Ravel‘s Your Sad Eyes and Unforgettable Mouth.  
 Both of these works focus, in whole (Ravel) or in part (Michaels) on the children of 
holocaust survivors, who ‗internalize the unresolved traumatic memories of their parents 
and thus suffer similar anxieties.‘11 Both texts, then, portray the Holocaust as already part 
of inherited collective memory, what Marianne Hirsch has termed ‗postmemory‘, rather 
than as an immediate experience (even the Holocaust survivor featured in the first part of 
Fugitive Pieces is a child escapee; later in life he seeks to partake of cultural memory as a way 
of sharing in the experience the rest of his family underwent).12 The Holocaust is a trace, 
haunting the edges of the narrators‘ lives, present in the lacunae that open up between them 
and their parents, their homes and other homes, their interior existence and the wider 
world. It is in these gaps that liturgical mending becomes possible. 
 Both of these works are complex literary constructions; Fugitive Pieces is less a novel 
than it is a very long prose poem, and Your Sad Eyes is dense with intertextual references—
for example, the protagonist, Maya, is a modern, Jewish, lesbian re-visioning of Anne of 
Green Gables, with an ‗overly long, freckled body‘, ‗Pre-Raphaelite red hair‘, and grey 
eyes.13 My reading here will be quite narrow, focusing exclusively on the instances in each 
book which reveal the potential for quotidian liturgical space, rather than attempting a 
                                                                                                                                               
11  Karein Goertz, ‗Transgenerational Representations of the Holocaust: From Memory to ―Post-Memory‖‘, 
World Literature Today 72, no. 1 (1998) 35. 
12  Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory (Harvard University Press, 1997) 22-
23; see also Hirsch, ‗The Generation of Postmemory‘, Poetics Today 29, no. 1 (2008) 103-128. 
13  Edeet Ravel, Your Sad Eyes and Unforgettable Mouth (Viking, 2008) 7, 84. Maya‘s romance with the Diana 
Barry-esque Rosie (‗Two black braids, large dark eyes, black eyebrows, heartbreaking mouth. Skin that 
glowed like the skin of red-cheeked children in coloured frontspiece illustrations‘; see Ravel 54) is more 
overtly sexual than Anne and Diana‘s, and after Rosie meets her ‗Fred Wright‘, a boy named Glenn, Maya 
does not enter into what Montgomery might have presented as an adult sexual relationship with a man, 
but becomes a fixed part of Montreal‘s lesbian bar scene—an option that was not available to Anne (or 
Montgomery)—see Ravel 2.  
 Less significant to the discussion at hand, Maya‘s constant but silent companion during her re-reading of 
her old journals is her dog, an aged St. Bernard named Sailor—which is also the name of the skeleton that 
is central to the plot of Michael Ondaatje‘s novel Anil‟s Ghost (which won both the Governor General‘s 
Award and the Giller Prize)—see Ravel 28; Ondaatje, Anil‟s Ghost (Picador, 2000) 64. I mention this to 
buttress my assertion that, in this novel, Ravel is deeply embedded in contemporary Canadian literary 
discourse, and it is not unreasonable to assume that she may have written her book with Michaels‘s award 
winning post-Holocaust novel also in mind—although there is less direct textual evidence of such a link. 
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complete unpacking of the books‘ literary significance, or the intertextual play between the 
two novels. Before that, however, a brief summary of the plot of each novel will smooth 
the way for the discussion to follow.14 
 
 
Fugitive Pieces is divided into two parts. The first takes the form of the memoirs of the 
fictional poet Jakob Beer, composed in the last months of his life, before he is struck by an 
automobile and killed at the age of sixty.15 It begins with an account of his escape from the 
site of his parents‘ murder, presumably at the hands of Nazi soldiers. Jakob‘s recounting of 
this trauma is fragmentary, and scattered throughout the narrative; it rises to the surface 
periodically and interrupts his adult existence. The events can be reconstructed something 
like this: his parents had sufficient advanced warning to send him to a hiding place inside 
one of the walls of their house, from where he could hear, but not see, their murder; he 
emerged and eventually made his way to the forest near Biskupin, an iron-age settlement, 
where he was found by Athos, a Greek geologist working with the excavation team.16 
Athos smuggled Jakob out of Poland and into Greece, where he remained in hiding at 
Athos‘s family home, on the island of Zakynthos, until the end of the war.  
After the war‘s end, Athos removed Jakob from the political instability of the 
Greek Civil War and moves them to Toronto, where Athos obtained a university post.17 
But Athos, in spite of his best efforts, could not protect Jakob from a confrontation with 
history. Although Jakob ‗tried to bury images, to cover them over with Greek and English 
words, with Athos‘s stories, with all the geologic eras‘, at night, his dead family ‗simply 
rose, shook the earth from their clothes, and waited.‘18 When Athos died, Jakob was left to 
re-assemble not only his own life, but Athos‘s final project, Bearing False Witness, a book on 
the SS-Ahnenerbe, the Nazi unit devoted to ancient history and archaeology. ‗The night I 
finished the work of my koumbaros,‘ Jakob says, ‗I wept with emptiness as I typed his 
dedication, for his colleagues at Biskupin: ―Murder steals from a man his future. It steals 
                                                                                                                                               
14  In the interest of clarity, as both novels feature memoirs, older documents re-read during the ‗present‘ of 
the novels themselves, I have departed from the customary use of the present tense when describing 
actions that form part of what the novel characterises as ‗past‘—Jakob‘s memoirs and Maya‘s journals. 
15  This information is conveyed in the frontspiece to the book. 
16  E.g., Michaels 6, 9, 148-149. 
17  Michaels 79 
18  Michaels 93. Full quote: ‗I tried to bury images, to cover them over with Greek and English words, with 
Athos‘s stories, with all the geologic eras. With the walks Athos and I took every Sunday into the ravines. 
Years later I would try a different avalanche of facts: train schedules, camp records, statistics, methods of 
execution. But at night, my mother, my father, Bella, Mones, simply rose, shook the earth from their 
clothes, and waited.‘ 
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from him his own death. But it must not steal from him his life.‖‘19 The theme of service 
rendered by the living to the dead runs throughout the book. 
 Jakob was haunted by the memory—or, more accurately, absence—of his sister, 
Bella. While he heard the murder of his parents and saw their bodies when he emerged 
from his hiding place in the wall, he did not realise until a considerable time after the event 
that his sister was entirely absent from the scene: ‗I couldn‘t remember hearing Bella at all. 
Filled with her silence, I had no choice but to imagine her face.‘20 Besides his book, Athos 
left behind another unfinished task. In a drawer that otherwise contained mementos of 
Athos‘s long-dead wife, Jakob found ‗a thick folder containing faint blue carbons and 
newspaper cuttings‘, evidence that Athos had, up until the end of his life, continued to 
search for Bella.21 Athos had begun this search almost immediately after the war, before he 
and Jakob left Greece for Canada. When Jakob first mentioned it, he presented it as a 
hopeless task: ‗We both understood that Athos must search so that I could give up. I found 
his faith unbearable.‘22 But from the time that Jakob and Athos moved to Toronto, Bella‘s 
silence became an increasingly central focus of Jakob‘s life. 
Jakob met and married Alex, the daughter of a British doctor whose slang-filled 
speech and leftist politics appear as much a rebellion against her upper-class background as 
Jakob‘s desire for her reads as an effort at escape from his own past.23 Throughout the 
marriage, however, Jakob continued to be haunted by the uncertainty of Bella‘s fate.24 He 
became increasingly obsessed with survivor testimonies and documentation relating to the 
death camps, and the strain of this obsession eventually caused his marriage to fail.25 Some 
years later, after Jakob became successful at transmuting his unresolved past into poetry, he 
met Michaela, a museum curator of mixed Russian and Spanish descent.26 In spite of a 
considerable age difference between the two (Michaela is twenty-five years younger), they 
were capable, in a way that Jakob and Alex were not, of sharing their past with one 
another.27 This mutual recognition led to a second marriage, and Jakob‘s memoirs end with 
a letter to the child that he hopes to conceive with Michaela: 
                                                                                                                                               
19  Michaels 120 
20  Michaels 10. 
21  Michaels 117. 
22  Michaels 59. 
23  See Michaels 127-136. 
24  Michaels 136-141. 
25  Jakob appears to suffer from some degree of survivor guilt; see Alfred Garwood, ‗The Holocaust and the 
Power of Powerlessness: Survivor Guilt in an Unhealed Wound‘, British Journal of Psychotherapy 13, no. 2 
(2007). 
26  Michaels 178-179. 
27  See especially Michaels 182, where Michaela weeps for Bella, and Jakob experiences ‗The joy of being 
recognized and the stabbing loss: recognized for the first time.‘ 
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Child I long for: if we conceive you, if you are born, if you reach the age I 
am now, sixty, I say this to you: Light the lamps but do not look for us [...] 
Light the lamp, cut a long wick. One day when you‘ve almost forgotten, I 
pray you‘ll let us return. That through an open window, even in the middle 
of a city, the sea air of our marriage will find you. I pray that one day in a 
room lit only by night snow, you will suddenly know how miraculous is 
your parents‘ love for each other. 
My son, my daughter: May you never be deaf to love. 
Bela, Bella: Once I was lost in a forest. I was so afraid. My blood 
pounded in my chest and I knew my heart‘s strength would soon be 
exhausted. I saved myself without thinking. I grasped the two syllables 
closest to me, and replaced my heartbeat with your name.28 
 This is not the end of the book, however. In the second part, the narrative is picked 
up by Ben, a student of the man who introduced Jakob and Michaela, and an admirer of 
Jakob‘s poetry. After Jakob‘s death, and in the wake of his own marital discord, Ben 
journeys to Idhra to recover Jakob‘s journals (that this recovery is successful is already 
attested to by the presence of Jakob‘s memoirs in the first part of the book). Ben is the 
child of Holocaust survivors, and his portion of the book is primarily devoted to the 
excavation of his own past, with his search for (and reflection upon) Jakob‘s journals 
lending structure to his reminiscences.29  
 Like Jakob, Ben is accompanied by family ghosts, by his memories of his dead 
parents and his estranged wife, Naomi; like Jakob, he is haunted by silence. But in Ben‘s 
narrative, the silence comes from the living, not the dead. He recalls the silence that 
pervaded his childhood home, the things that his parents would not speak of—or that his 
mother spoke only in a whisper, outside his father‘s hearing.30 He recalls the ‗generous‘ 
silences of Naomi, ‗who rarely clamps her jaw with frustration or anger (those usually come 
out in tears); her silence is usually wise.‘31 It is the combination of these two silences that 
caused the rupture in Ben‘s marriage to Naomi: Ben‘s mother confided to Naomi that she 
had had two children before Ben, before the war, a secret which Naomi unwittingly kept 
until after the deaths of Ben‘s parents, when Ben discovered a picture of the pre-war 
family.32 It was Naomi who explained to Ben that his parents ‗hoped that if they did not 
                                                                                                                                               
28  Michaels 194-195. 
29  My colleague, M. Godin, has argued in his own doctoral thesis that Ben attempts to use Jakob‘s life-
writing as an interpretative tool for his own life, deliberately re-casting events from his own experience as 
echoes of Jakob‘s narrative—but that, in so doing, Ben frequently misreads or misunderstands Jakob‘s 
lessons. See Mark Godin, Discerning the Body: A Sacramental Hermeneutic in Literature and Liturgy (University of 
Glasgow: unpublished PhD thesis, 2009) 203-208. 
30  Michaels 122-123. Ben is, in many ways, an archetypical representation of the Survivor‘s Child—see 
Adrienne Kertzer, ‗Fugitive Pieces: Listening as a Holocaust Survivor‘s Child‘, English Studies in Canada 26, 
no. 2 (2000). 
31  Michaels 208. 
32  Michaels 252-253. 
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name me, the angel of death might pass by. Ben, not from Benjamin, but merely ―ben‖—
the Hebrew word for son.‘33 
 Unable to forgive Naomi‘s complicity in the silences that damaged his childhood, 
Ben eagerly accepts her suggestion that he travel to Idhra, to retrieve Jakob‘s notebooks.34 
While there, he embarks upon an affair with a younger American woman named Petra, 
which terminates abruptly when he wakes up to discover her ransacking the house formerly 
occupied by Jakob and Michaela.35 While attempting to restore the house to order, Ben 
finally finds Jakob‘s journals.36 After reading them, he chooses to return home to Naomi—
although whether they reconcile as husband and wife is left an open question at the book‘s 
end.37 
 
 
Your Sad Eyes and Unforgettable Mouth is a frame story, which follows Maya Levitsky, who in 
2008 is an art historian at a Montréal CEGEP, as she re-reads (and re-writes) her 
adolescent journals, from the years 1968 to 1973.39  These journals record her coming-of-
age in the Montréal Jewish community, which at the time was home to the world‘s third 
largest population of Holocaust survivors.40 Most of the adults whom Maya encounters are 
survivors; most of her peers are, like herself, children of survivors.  
At the beginning of Maya‘s revisiting (and, possibly, although the text itself is 
unclear on this point, revisioning) of her past, in 1968, she was twelve years old and living 
                                                                                                                                               
33  Michaels 253 
34  Michaels 255. 
35  Michaels 281. 
36  Michaels 283-284. 
37  Michaels 284-294. 
38  Ravel 2. 
39  A CEGEP—Collège d‟enseignement général et professionnel—is an educational institution unique to Québec; it is 
a two- to three-year postsecondary program which is mandatory for students from Québec secondary 
schools (which end a year earlier than schools in the rest of Canada or the United States) who wish to 
enter university, and also provides vocational training for students who do not wish to continue on a 
university track. Teachers at CEGEP are required to have a Master‘s degree (in academic fields) or 
significant professional experience (in vocational fields). 
40  This is a frequently cited figure, even today—it is still, for example, featured prominently in the literature 
of The Montreal Holocaust Memorial Centre (<http://www.mhmc.ca/en>; accessed 25 November 
2009).  However, a wave of emigration following the 1981 referendum has depleted the overall Jewish 
population of Montréal, leaving Toronto as the home of the largest survivor population in Canada (see 
Jim L. Torczyner and Shary L. Brotman, ‗The Jews of Canada: A Profile from the Census‘, American 
Jewish Committee, 1995, pp. 228-229, 240 
      <http://www.bjpa.org/Publications/downloadPublication.cfm?PublicationID=3179>, accessed 25 
November 2009). For a general overview of Holocaust survivor populations in Canada, see Franklin 
Bialystok, Delayed Impact: the Holocaust and the Canadian Jewish Community (McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 
2000) 73-74. 
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in Côte des Neiges with her grandmother and mother: ‗Bubby Miriam, Fanya, Maya. Three 
mad women. Mad, mad, mad.‘41 She attended a state school run by the Protestant school 
board;42 she had no friends,  
Not real friends—not friends you met outside of school. Fanya would 
never let me visit just anyone; she‘d insist on coming with me, inspecting 
the premises, meeting the parents. And what would they make of her 
garbled snippets of horror-history, her prophetic alarms?43 
The distance that Fanya‘s post-traumatic speech patterns and protective parenting imposed 
between Maya and her classmates began to dissolve when she interrupted Maya‘s bath44 to 
display an advertisement for a summer camp, copied from the message board at the local 
market. Eager to participated in the subculture that the advertisement hinted at (and her 
mother failed to recognise), Maya agreed to spend the summer at camp.45 This was a 
portentous summer; it brought Maya her introduction to the community of Jewish youth in 
which she eventually made her home—and her first contact with Anthony, a charming 
(though slightly erratic) camp counsellor.46 The following summer, however, the camp 
closed. 
 Maya was nevertheless reunited with her friends from camp after she was 
introduced to Rosie Michaeli. In part because Rosie‘s own parents were Holocaust 
survivors, she accepted Maya‘s home life without the embarrassment or judgement that 
Maya feared from her classmates. In a scene reminiscent of the first meeting between Anne 
Shirley and Diana Barry in L. M. Montgomery‘s Anne of Green Gables, the two girls pledged 
firm friendship with one another. As a mark of her devotion to Rosie, Maya spent the rest 
of the summer learning Hebrew in order to pass the admission test for Eden, the Jewish 
school which Rosie and the rest of the children from Camp Bakunin attended. 
                                                                                                                                               
41  Ravel 9. 
42  One of the peculiarities of Montréal education is that there have been, since 1925, two school boards 
charged with operating state-run schools: the Catholic school board, which historically has operated 
primarily French-language schools, and the Protestant school board, which historically has operated 
primarily English-language schools. Since 1965, the ‗Protestant‘ school board has included members of 
the Jewish community, and been charged with supplying education to Jewish pupils (although privately 
run Hebrew schools continue to exist); the real distinction between the two school boards has more to do 
with the language of instruction which they oversee than with religious adherence. See Andrew Sancton, 
Governing the Island of Montreal: Language Differences and Metropolitan Politics (University of California Press, 
1985) 48-49. However, from Maya‘s general ignorance of Judaism prior to meeting Rosie—she does not, 
for example, understand what the word ‗kosher‘ means (see Ravel 36-37)—it seems reasonable to assume 
that Maya was one of only a few Jewish children at her school. 
43  Ravel 14-15. 
44  ‗The door to the bathroom was unlocked, in case my mother came home while I was still in the bath. 
Closed doors made her frantic‘ (Ravel 9). 
45  Ravel 20. 
46  Ravel 28. Maya‘s introduction to her own Jewishness is faintly reminiscent of a similar transition 
undergone by the protagonist of Chaim Potok‘s Davita‟s Harp (Ballantine Books, 1996). 
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 Through Rosie‘s father, who taught piano, the girls met Patrick, the spoiled, moody 
son of Vera Moore a child psychologist who once, briefly treated Maya.47 The following 
year (1971), Maya fell into a depression and could not be roused from her bed for quite 
some time. Her mother attempted to reach Dr. Moore, only to find that she was out of 
town; in her stead, Anthony appeared, because (as Maya deduced after the fact) he was 
Vera Moore‘s elder son, Patrick‘s older brother. This was confirmed by the contents of a 
letter that Anthony left on Maya‘s bureau after he departed—a letter written to Anthony by 
his father, Gerald, who had left the family to travel in the Far East on a ‗spiritual quest‘. 
The letter explains how Gerald and Vera met, just after the war, when Vera was passing 
through England on her way to Canada. With London still under reconstruction, housing 
was scarce, and Gerald offered Vera a place to stay; they embarked upon a brief affair, on 
the first night of which Vera told Gerald the story of her time in the camps. Gerald wrote 
that  
I think it was because she thought she would never see me again and she 
wanted to discard as many of her experiences as she could relate in a single 
night, record them in another brain, my brain, and then leave them behind 
forever, like an exorcism. That‘s what I think. There may have been other 
reasons... some sense of duty, some historic urge. Or a deeper need—who 
knows?48 
After Vera discovered that she was pregnant with Anthony, Gerald travelled to 
Canada and they married, but their life together was shadowed by her desire to forget what 
she had told him of her past, and his presence as a living reminder of it. Before Gerald left, 
the letter informed Anthony, he wrote down everything he remembered about Vera‘s story 
in a notebook and hid it so that their sons could read it and learn their mother‘s story, their 
family history.49 
 At this point, the workings of the story resolve into clarity: Maya, the narrator, is 
really a spectator, peering in from the outside on the Moore‘s family drama. This is 
confirmed in the novel‘s final pages, when Maya‘s narrative is replaced by several pages of 
free verse titled ‗Eikah‘ (‗Lamentations‘), which read as an excerpt from the story Vera told 
to Gerald on their first night together. This narrative‘s appearance at the end of the book 
has the character of the curtain being drawn aside at the end of a puppet-show, finally 
revealing what has been in the background all along, manipulating the action on stage. But 
this is not quite true: Heisenberg‘s uncertainty principle applies to narrative as well as to 
                                                                                                                                               
47  Vera, both in name and physical description, appears to be an echo of the self-sacrificing Leslie Moore 
from L. M. Montgomery‘s Anne‟s House of Dreams (see Ch. 5, n. 9) 
48  Ravel 162. 
49  Ravel 164. 
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particle physics, and so Maya observes, but also cannot avoid participating in, and therefore 
changing, Vera‘s story and the impact its echo has on her children.  
  All the divergent strands of narrative, the characters who drifted in and out of the 
story without apparent rhyme or reason, converge in the book‘s climax. After finishing 
their last exams at school, Maya and Rosie found themselves restless. They sought out 
Patrick, hoping that he would be bored enough to help them finance a road trip; Patrick 
offered his family‘s vacation home in the Laurentian Mountains, purchased as part of Vera 
and Gerald‘s effort to imitate a normal family life.50 Two days into this retreat, Anthony 
appeared at the door and announced his intentions of joining the trio because his wife had 
left him and he needed a break; at this point, Maya-in-2008 begins to address her narrative 
to Anthony directly.51 Anthony and Maya drifted back into the odd emotional intimacy they 
had shared since first meeting at Camp Bikunin, but when they retired to the same 
bedroom, Maya could not bring herself to tolerate Anthony‘s touch: 
I can‘t change the plot. I can‘t change that moment. The moment that 
could have saved you, saved everyone—maybe. When I felt your leg 
against mine, I moved away involuntarily and, covering my face, I began to 
cry.52 
The next day, the isolation of the cottage was shattered by the appearance of a 
group of young people from the nearest town, and their cousins from Toronto. Rosie fell 
instantly in love with one of the cousins, Glenn: 
I‘d seen her with boys hundreds of times, but not like this. Her body, its 
curve, the yielding trust. That‘s what was missing until now: the trust. Not 
just with the guys—also with me. She liked me, but I could see now that 
she held back. You may not know someone is holding back, Anthony, until 
you see them one day, catch them off-guard maybe, staring at a kite or a 
sculpture or witty graffiti under a bridge. And then you understand that you 
have nothing at all, that everything you thought was genuine and generous 
and loving was a holding back, and at that moment the real possibility 
emerges and it floors you.53 
Anthony probably did not need to be told about that moment, either in 2008 or in 1973, as 
he experienced it himself, at the exact same time. Maya‘s attention was so caught up with 
Rosie and Glenn, with the loss Glen represented to her own intimate life, that she barely 
noticed Anthony taking his leave of her, or Patrick running off into the woods to look for 
                                                                                                                                               
50  Ravel 188; 195-198. See especially p. 197: ‗Dr. Moore‘s cottage was a naked manifestation of her quest for 
family intimacy‘, and 198: ‗The word dad surprised me, and I wondered whether Patrick was being drawn 
against his will into the house‘s—or his own—shunned past.‘ 
51  Ravel 206. 
52  Ravel 226. 
53  Ravel 232-233. 
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him.54 She forgot to even wonder where they were until the guests had departed, and then 
she and Rosie went to the forest and found Patrick,  
sitting against a tree, blank and frozen. As frozen as a block of ice or a 
statue in a city square. But his eyes were red; he‘d been crying, and the tears 
had streaked his face. A weeping statue. 
Beside him we saw your feet and trousered legs. You‘d removed 
your shoes, for some reason. Maybe you thought someone would want 
them, or maybe you weren‘t thinking, and you did what people do when 
they get ready for bed. Black socks tenderly covered your feet, and the 
bottom cuffs of your suit fell gently on your ankles. The rest of you had 
vanished—where?55 
Maya, Rosie, and Patrick agreed to bury Anthony, to spare his mother the pain of 
knowing that he had shot himself. Instead, Patrick resolved to forge letters from his 
brother, perpetuating the illusion that he had travelled in his father‘s footsteps to pursue a 
monastic existence in India.56 The three vowed never to disclose the secret, and then went 
their separate ways—though the ‗cab money‘ Patrick left the girls was sufficient for Maya 
to move out of her mother‘s home and attend Cégep.57 She began ‗a new life‘, a life without 
Rosie, without ‗the appalling muddle that intimacy turned out to be.‘58 
 Maya‘s new life without intimacy is, in the end, as illusive as Ben‘s new life on 
Idhra; thirty-five years after Anthony‘s death, the end of her narrative finds her reflecting 
again on the event that prompted her trip into the past: dinner with Patrick after his 
mother‘s funeral. She sees that, over the years, his ‗self-protective irony had strayed into the 
arena of offhand nastiness. He had become cruel‘.59  There is no explicit parallel drawn 
between Patrick and Maya‘s attempts at self-isolation, but immediately after recounting 
Patrick‘s unfeeling behaviour towards his wife, Maya sets about re-establishing contact with 
Rosie, who is now married to Glenn and living in Boston, where he is a professor of 
mathematics at Harvard. The final scene in Maya‘s narrative is of her departing, at Glenn‘s 
request, to visit Rosie who has been suffering from severe depression:  
We think we aren‘t important; we tell ourselves that because we were 
helpless and ineffectual once, this is who we are, and our exits don‘t 
matter—no one will miss us. I told myself that Rosie had Glenn. My 
desertion was a way of mourning through imitation, a way we have of re-
enacting the worst traits of whoever it is we‘ve lost. For those tangled 
reasons, and others, I did to Rosie what Anthony did to me. 
                                                                                                                                               
54  Ravel 233-234. 
55  Ravel 235. 
56  Ravel 237. 
57  Ravel 243-244. 
58  Ravel 244, 245. 
59  Ravel 257. 
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Of course, I don‘t know why she‘s in trouble. I only know I haven‘t 
been there to help out. And I also know something else that doesn‘t occur 
to us when we‘re young, and when what we have in common with our 
fellow-travellers is being young, and it seems as if it‘s easy to find friends. It 
only dawns on us later, as people drift away, that friends are in fact hard to 
come by, hard to replace. 
I‘ve already bought my plane ticket and arranged for a dog sitter. I 
leave tomorrow morning. The past is irretrievable. I will never be in Eden 
again, trailing after Rosie, helping her gather up her books. I‘m waiting, as 
Anthony did not, to see what comes next.60 
 
 
Ben and Maya‘s stories have a similar trajectory. Both cut off with the narrator on their way 
to, but not yet arrived at, a reunion—but both intended reunions follow separations caused 
mainly by a failure to recognise the personhood of, and, therefore, the Image of God in, 
others. Both, in other words, have experienced the failure or absence of quotidian liturgical 
moments. These failures point both towards the continued fracture in the world and 
towards the possibility of mending, the existence of opportunities for healing encounters 
(even if those opportunities are mostly missed opportunities). Focusing on failure also 
leaves room to acknowledge the brokenness of the world, and a movement towards 
confronting and correcting it, rather than wallowing in illusions of perfection and happy 
endings. 
Both Ben and Maya‘s encounter with the world began with parents whose lives 
were marked by their experiences in the Holocaust, and both are, in turn, marked by their 
parents‘ experiences. As has already been mentioned, Maya‘s mother initially stood between 
Maya and any potential friendships she might have formed, though this was mitigated later 
on when Maya met other children of Holocaust survivors, who were able to understand 
and accept as normal the eccentricities of a parent who had spent time ‗there‘.62 Ben also 
‗learned not to bring school friends home‘, also found himself embarrassed to admit 
outside observers into his home life, but his understanding of his parents‘ pasts is more 
                                                                                                                                               
60  Ravel 260. 
61  Michaels 294. 
62  „There‘ is the oblique reference to the camps used by the characters in Your Sad Eyes; see, for example, 
Ravel 95, 121, 231. 
For both Maya and Ben, the Holocaust takes on a distance, a tinge of unreality, like a fairy tale; cf 
David Brauner ‗Breaking the Silences: Jewish-American Women Writing the Holocaust‘, The Yearbook of 
English Studies 31 (2001) 30. 
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painfully immediate than Maya‘s vague comprehension of what happened there.63  Maya‘s 
mother is a mostly comic character, who causes Maya embarrassment, but no real harm; 
Ben‘s recollection of his father, by contrast, interweaves scenes of them listening to 
classical music together, ‗[h]is absent fingers combing through my short hair‘, with a painful 
scene involving an apple:64 
My father found the apple in the garbage. It was rotten and I‘d thrown it 
out—I was eight or nine. He fished it from the bin, sought me in my room, 
grabbed me tight by the shoulder, and pushed the apple to my face. 
―What is this? What is it?‖ 
―An apple—‖65 
―Is an apple food?‖ 
―Yes.‖ 
―And you throw away food? You—my son—you throw away food?‖ 
―It‘s rotten—‖ 
―Eat it… Eat it!‖ 
―Pa, it‘s rotten—I won‘t—‖ 
He pushed it into my teeth until I opened my jaw. Struggling, sobbing, I 
ate. Its brown taste, oversweetness, tears.66 
Food is a thematic element in both books, which reveals a great deal about 
relationships between characters.67 Maya‘s mother obsessively monitored her daughter‘s 
food consumption, serving her elaborate meals while refusing any assistance in their 
preparation, and not partaking of them herself.68 Rosie‘s father ‗recoiled from money‘ and 
spent it ‗as quickly as possible‘ on, among other things, large restaurant dinners for his 
family, during which ‗he himself drank only coffee‘.69 Of all the adult survivors in Ravel‘s 
novel, Vera Moore is the only one who appears to take pleasure in food for its own sake, 
employing a personal chef.70 The final section of the book portrays her on the road to 
Prague, in the back of a truck driven by Russian soldiers, meditating on the pleasure of 
fresh eggs: 
eggs were part of my future 
if I found Katya I would eat two lightly salted poached eggs on buttered toast71 
                                                                                                                                               
63  Michaels 229. 
64  Michaels 217. 
65  Michaels 213-214. 
66  Michaels 218. 
67  This is consistent with research findings that show Holocaust survivors experience lasting psychological 
effects of food deprivation in the ghettos and camps. See Amy J. Sinder, Nancy S. Wellman, and Oren 
Baruch Stier, ‗Holocaust Survivors Report Long-Term Effects on Attitudes Towards Food‘, Journal of 
Nutrition Education and Behaviour 36.4 (2004). Ben‘s father‘s hoarding behaviour is far more in line with 
these findings than Maya‘s mother‘s compulsive feeding. 
68  Ravel 11. 
69  Ravel 110. 
70  Ravel 131, 174, 215-216.  
71  Ravel 263. 
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The precision with which Vera imagined her eggs—lightly salted, on buttered toast—is a 
sharp contrast to Ben‘s father eating ‗dutifully, methodically, tears streaming down his face, 
animal and spirit in such raw evidence, knowing he was degrading both‘.72 But Vera‘s eating 
was, like her other domestic behaviours, an attempt at substitution for, or mimicry of, a 
lifestyle predicated on familial relationships which she lacks. Where Maya and Rosie 
accepted the food that their parents pressed upon them out of affection for those parents, 
Patrick rejected what his mother offered for reasons that none of the characters even 
pretend have to do with the food itself, as evidenced by the dialogue following one such 
refusal: 
I don‘t think Rosie had ever witnessed anything quite like this, and she was 
on the verge of tears. I said, ―That was mean.‖ 
But now I‘d gone too far. Patrick‘s face darkened and he turned on 
me. ―You don‘t say,‖ he replied, straight out of the Ice Age, or maybe the 
Cold War. 
―Did something happen between you?‖ Rosie‘s voice had turned 
mournful. She could have been wandering through the stormy heath, she 
could have been asking, Is man no more than this? 
―How do you mean?‖ It was Rosie‘s turn to be shoved to the 
corner of the ring. 
She nodded sadly. Even she knew that at times there was nothing 
to be done.73 
Vera is an inversion of the other two parents in the book (and of Ben‘s father), who feed 
their children but are themselves incapable of enjoying food; she takes great pleasure in her 
food, but cannot share that pleasure with her children. In none of these cases, however, is 
the encounter between parent and child one of mutual recognition: the parents use their 
children in an attempt to restore what they themselves were deprived of (and are now 
incapable of possessing for themselves);74 the children accept or reject what is offered, 
either ignorant or resentful of the parental need which prompts the offering. The Image of 
God is visible in these scenes only as a trace, a fragment. 
 The apparent exception to this lack of mutuality is Ben‘s early relationship with his 
mother, who ‗was determined to impress upon me the absolute, inviolate necessity of 
pleasure‘, her ‗painful love for the world‘.75 Ben became, for a time, his mother‘s 
confidante, the vessel into which she poured the memories that his father could no longer 
                                                                                                                                               
72  Michaels 214. 
73  Ravel 134. 
74  This is made explicit in a conversation between Maya and Sheila, one of the Camp Bakunin girls, in which 
Sheila points out that Maya‘s mother ‗lost everything, she wants to make up for it by giving you 
everything‘, and Maya complains that ‗It just makes me feel guilty‘ (Ravel 151). 
75  Michaels 223. 
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bear to contemplate.76 But Ben was an imperfect vessel: he heard his mother‘s stories, but 
did not understand the grip they held on her life; he did not, perhaps could not, cling to the 
world with the same mix of fear and wonder as she did. Like Maya (and Patrick and 
Anthony), he grew ashamed and resentful of his parents, seeking to ‗free‘ himself from 
their constraints, realising only later that he ‗created a deeper harm. She was afraid. I 
believe that for moments my mother actually distrusted me […] This happened even more 
frequently once Naomi entered our lives‘.77 Whether Naomi‘s encounter with Ben‘s parents 
was more properly liturgical, a space of encounter in which the Image of God became 
clearly visible to all concerned, is unclear; the text is written from Ben‘s point of view.78 
What is quite clear is that the closeness between Naomi and Ben‘s mother led directly to 
the fracturing of Naomi and Ben‘s relationship, as discussed above. 
 What all these relationships have in common is a strange choreography of 
projection and attachment: one person reaches for the other in an attempt to hold them 
close and transform them into what that person most needs. Maya and Ben‘s mothers 
poured their loss into their children, seeking some sort of vicarious compensation. Rosie 
pours all of her energy into pleasing her parents, hoping to infuse her father with a will to 
live that he lacks for himself.79 Ben‘s father attempted to mould his son in his own image, 
and Ben in turn transfers his resentment from his dead father to the dead poet whose life 
he seeks to imitate, and from his dead mother to the wife whom he sees as the final living 
reminder of that mother‘s betrayal.80 Anthony desired not Maya as the reader knows her, 
but as the nickname/persona he gave her at camp, ‗Joan of Arc‘, able to see past his 
defensive pretence and straight into his soul;81 Maya desired Rosie, untroubled by the 
latter‘s casual liaisons with boys, spinning out elaborate fantasies in which Rosie featured as 
a passive object in need of rescue that only she could provide—and abandoned Rosie when 
                                                                                                                                               
76  Michaels 222-229. 
77  Michaels 231. 
78  The text certainly hints at a deeper relationship between Naomi and Ben‘s mother, and refers, as has 
previously been mentioned, to Naomi‘s innate generosity, hinting that the recognition aspect of a liturgical 
encounter would come more naturally to her than to Ben. However, Ben narrates though a haze of 
resentment over Naomi‘s usurpation of his place in the family, and may be overstating—or over-
imagining—the closeness of the relationship.  
79  Ravel 182.  
80  The hints that Ben views Jakob as a father substitute are subtle—Ben himself may not fully realise the 
parallels, but on the page after he breaks out of his reminiscence to berate the imaginary audience to 
whom his entire narrative is addressed, declaring that his mother was ‗a sensualist of proportions you, 
Jakob Beer, could never even estimate […] it was you who were embalmed!‘, he recalls visiting his parents 
to find his father ‗immobile, staring at a book in his room—another survivor account, another article with 
photographs‘ (Michaels 230-231); his father‘s habit of retreat, and his choice of reading material, are a 
close echo of Jakob‘s own retreat from his marriage with Alex—see Michaels 136-149. 
81  See, especially, Ravel 38: ‗Everything comes from inside you—you never do or think things just to make 
an impression, or so someone will think about you in a certain way. You‘re on a whole different plane, my 
love‘ and Ravel 221-225. 
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another rescuer appeared on the scene.82 And Vera, whose family life was troubled from its 
beginning by the past that she had meant to leave behind, insulated herself behind a thin 
veneer of domestic comfort; her children resented and eventually fled their roles in the 
family charade—Anthony went so far as to shoot himself. The memory of the Holocaust, 
both immediate and inherited/constructed, seeps from person to person, marring their 
connection with others. 
 The failure of the relationships that drive both novels is important, but it is not the 
whole story, or even the most important part of the story; God‘s seeming abandonment of 
covenant, and the Christian churches‘ seeming complicity in the mass death of the two 
World Wars is not the only lesson to be read from the constructed memory of the last 
century, or even the most important lesson. The important gesture in all of this is not the 
missed connection, but the stretching of one hand towards another; not the failure of 
relationship, but the attempt at any relationship at all. 
 
 
After Jakob Beer‘s obsession with the past drove away his first wife, he returned to Greece, 
to his guardian Athos‘s old family home on the island of Idhra. There, he found his prayer 
shawl, ‗a gift from Athos after the war, never worn, folded carefully and still stored in its 
cardboard box.‘83 He found a slim volume of Psalms that Athos once retrieved from a 
rubbish bin. Immersing himself in the book, he permitted himself be flooded by the voices 
of the past that, during his years in Canada, he had tried to keep at bay.84 In the dark night, 
with his never-worn prayer shawl and book of Psalms fished from the trash, Jakob 
imagined, in painful detail, what happened to his sister, Bella:  
We know they cried out. Each mouth, Bella‘s mouth, strained for its 
miracle. They were heard from the other side of the thick walls. It is 
impossible to imagine those sounds. 
At that moment of utmost degradation, in that twisted reef, is the 
most obscene testament of grace. For can anyone tell with absolute 
certainty the difference between the sounds of those who are in despair 
and the sounds of those who want desperately to believe? The moment 
                                                                                                                                               
82  Ravel 79. 
83  Michaels 156 
84  cf Michaels 139: ‗When we were married I hoped that if I let Alex in, if I let in a finger of light, it would 
flood the clearing. And at first, this is exactly what happened. But gradually, through no fault of Alex‘s, 
the finger of light poked down, cold as bone, illuminating nothing, not even the white point of contrast 
that burned away the ground it touched.‘ 
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when our faith in man is forced to change, anatomically—mercilessly—into 
faith.85  
At the end of this vigil, Jakob concluded that  
To remain with the dead is to abandon them. All the years I felt Bella entreating 
me, filled with her loneliness, I was mistaken. I have misunderstood her 
signals. Like other ghosts, she whispers; not for me to join her, but so that, 
when I‘m close enough, she can push me back into the world.86  
Prompted, in part, by obtaining tangible relics of his past, Jakob abandoned his 
futile quest for communion with ‗ghosts‘ and returned to Canada, where he met and 
married Michaela; they lived happily together until they were struck by a car, and died 
within two days of each other. This is not a happy ending, but it does have a sense of 
fulfilment which some critics have found problematic, on the grounds that it minimises the 
horrors of the Holocaust in favour of a narrative in which ‗love conquers all‘.87 This is 
doubly troubling, as Jakob‘s story becomes the lens through which we read Ben‘s; it is easy 
to assume that Ben‘s own departure from Idhra heralds a return to Naomi and happily-
ever-after, although the relics Ben carries are of Jakob‘s past, not his own, and his narrative 
ends still up in the air, both literally and figuratively: on a plane over the Atlantic, 
unresolved. And it is easy, too, to read Maya as an extension of Jakob and Ben, last seen on 
her way back to Rosie and the resumption of the eternal friendship pledged by Anne 
Shirley and Diana Barry. But these readings are mis-readings. Jakob is an inversion of Ben 
and Maya: he grapples with his own past, and makes a new life for himself; they grapple 
with the memories bequeathed to them by the previous generation, and attempt to 
reconstruct relationships that they had previously damaged and abandoned. 
Ben sits in the air and imagines his reunion with Naomi, interweaving it with 
memories of his parents, newly reconsidered in light of Jakob‘s journals:  
But now, from thousands of feet in the air, I see something else. My 
mother stands behind my father and his head leans against her. As he eats, 
she strokes his hair. Like a miraculous circuit, each draws strength from the 
other. 
 I see that I must give what I most need.88 
But the reunion exists only in Ben‘s imagination—and so, for all we know, does the 
memory. As far as Ben‘s resolve to give what he most needs, while it is a powerful closing 
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88  Michaels 294. 
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sentence, Ben has not proven adept at determining his needs at any other point in his 
narrative—why should we assume that he has suddenly grown wise (especially as he also 
imagines that he ‗will stop myself from confessing I was on Idhra with a woman‘—
presumably honesty is not something Ben feels that he has much need of).89 And Maya, in 
her rush to return to Rosie in her hour of need, never spares a thought for Tyen, the 
current (potential) lover who haunts the edges of her narrative in the present.90 None of 
these endings is perfect, complete, or even final. What resolution may be had from them 
exists only in the mind of the reader. We may guess, or imagine, but never know for sure 
whether Ben finds himself forgiven, whether Maya‘s presence proves as healing to Rosie as 
Glenn hopes. The only certainty we have is that both Ben and Maya have made the 
attempt: they stretch their hands out towards another, in the hope that this time there will 
be contact, encounter. They wait to see what comes next. 
 
 
 
This is not, by itself, redemption; at most, it is a gesture in that direction:  
halting, flawed, doomed (or so it seems) to failure.  
But it is the best we have. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
89  Michaels 294. 
90  See Ravel 40-43, 251. 
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This conclusion is not simple or satisfactory. It may seem to be barely a conclusion at all; 
this thesis, much like the two novels discussed in this chapter, may appear to terminate 
abruptly, en route to a destination but never actually arriving.  Unsatisfactory as it may be, 
however, I remain convinced that this suspension is the most appropriate response to the 
material addressed in this thesis.  
The preceding pages have explored a number of strategies for reconciling the 
promises of theology with the messy realities of history: the encounter between Israel and 
Amalek passed into scripture and became a model for subsequent conflicts; the 
commandment to remember has resonated through the centuries. But the forms of 
memorialisation that were adequate prior to 1914 were destabilised by the First World War; 
while theological narratives dominated by a sacrificial ethos still provided a framework for 
public memorialisation, social and liturgical commemorative practice had to shift slightly to 
accommodate the disruptions of the war. These slight adjustments, in turn, proved 
completely inadequate to the task of addressing the Holocaust. In total, the events of the 
20th century constitute a thorough assault on traditional forms of memorialisation, the end 
result of which is that no more simple adjustments to existing social or theological 
narratives are possible. Instead, the complex phenomenon of remembrance must be 
addressed by an equally complex and profound cultural, aesthetic, and theological shift.  
Early in my research, it became apparent that up through the First World War, 
memorials functioned as temporal boundary markers, attesting to the completion of a 
phase in history: there was a war, it ended, we built a statue to remind us what it was all 
about. This sense of finality is among the characteristics of memorials that have been 
unsettled by the Holocaust; simple statues are replaced by entire museums, and even these 
fail to convey a solid sense of ‗what it was all about‘. I have attempted, instead, a sort of 
theological realism: to honour the complexity of the material in the form of this thesis, as 
well as to resist the urge for a conclusion that is neat, simple, easily optimistic—and 
ultimately dishonest. 
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